The recent coup in Sudan may have several ramifications for the country as well as for the stability in the region as it connects North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. It may intensify the territorial disputes and escalate tensions between Sudan and its neighbouring countries and could also affect its trade ties with countries like India.
On 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, dissolved the transitional government, declared a state of emergency and imprisoned the civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. This coup has led to widespread protests in the country and condemnation across the world. The African Union (AU) has suspended Sudan; the United Nations (UN), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Arab League have condemned the coup and called for the return of the civilian rule. Sudan’s neighbours—Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia—have called for restraint in the country. There are fears that the political crisis may lead to worsening situation internally and in the region
In April 2019, Sudan’s transitional authorities came to power after country-wide protests brought an end to then President Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. Since then, Sudan has been run by an administration of military generals and civilians from the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). In recent months, splits have deepened within the FFC and support for the transitional government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has waned to some extent due to economic reforms. Pro-military faction had been carrying out protests demanding the government’s removal. Port Sudan, the country’s largest port, on the Red Sea, has been blocked by a tribal group.
Whether the economic reforms implemented by the transitional government are the main factor behind the coup is a pertinent question to ponder upon. The timing of the coup is also worth mentioning here. According to the 2019 power sharing agreement, General Burhan was due to step down and hand over the leadership to civilians in November 2021. A BBC report suggests that the desire to protect military’s commercial interests may have led to the coup.1 Prime Minister Hamdok had critiqued military’s involvement in the economy in the past. This would expose the tentacles of the commercial empires owned by military, senior generals in particular. Prime Minister Hamdok had become increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the military entanglement in the economy. Placing the army under proper civilian control was also a priority for the next stage of the transitional period.2
Impact of the Coup
The coup in Sudan may have several ramifications. First, the Sudanese economy is in a bad shape. The secession of South Sudan in 2011, was a big economic shock, as the country lost its oil wealth which accounted for 50 per cent of the government revenue and 95 per cent of its exports. The internal conflict within South Sudan added to the misery, as the country was deprived of the revenue earned through the transit of oil through pipelines that remained in the country. Hence the transitional government had inherited a shattered economy. Over the last few years, the economic situation has not changed much with inflation at 400 per cent.3 The COVID-19 compounded the economic problems faced by the country, though Prime Minister Hamdok’s government was putting in efforts to improve the country’s economic situation.4 It was a result of these efforts that Sudan was removed from the United States’ State Sponsors of Terrorism list, thereby paving the way to access to assistance from international financial institutions.5 The economic reforms initiated by the Hamdok government helped Sudan secure billions of dollars in debt relief from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6 But the coup has reversed the progress and will certainly weaken the economy further. The US and the World Bank have paused their economic assistance to the country after the coup, and EU is likely to follow suit.
The coup also threatens the country’s fragile peace. In October 2020, the transitional government had signed the Juba Agreement for Peace with some armed rebels.7 However this agreement excluded two powerful armed groups from Central Darfur and the Two Areas. These groups are wary of the Sudanese army and interested in talking only with the civilian government. The coup has weakened the chances of these groups joining the government anytime in future. Rather there are fears that tensions may flare up in these regions.
The military coup may have an impact on the region, including inflaming existing disputes among Sudan's neighbours, for instance, it could escalate tensions between Sudan and its eastern neighbour Ethiopia. The two countries have been embroiled in a territorial dispute regarding 100 square miles of farmland in the border region of Al-Fashaga.8 This age-old dispute has existed since the colonial times, and the ambiguity regarding demarcation of border has left the issue unresolved. It is feared that the coup may also delay the resolution of the dispute related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia considers that the construction of GERD is essential for the economic progress of the country and for providing hydroelectricity to the entire region. On the other hand, Egypt and Sudan are opposed to its development as this dam would reduce Nile water flow to their countries. The Egypt government is considered to be close to the military in Sudan and may gain an edge in the running dispute thereby enhancing the chances of a deadlock.9 The coup may also push the military in Sudan to provide more support to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the ongoing internal conflict in Ethiopia precipitating a regional conflagration.10
Implications for India
The visit of Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, V. Muraleedharan, to Sudan on 18–19 October 2021, less than a week before the coup, underlines close relations between the two countries. During the visit, he had discussions with General Burhan and Prime Minister Hamdok on bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest.
India is a key development partner, with New Delhi extending Lines of Credit over US$ 631 million to the country.11 It is also noteworthy that a large number of Sudanese students study in India. During the last one year, India continued to support Sudan as it faced multiple challenges, such as an armed conflict, COVID-19 outbreak and massive floods. It was reported that the torrential floods had affected hundreds of thousands of people in the country. India supplied 10 MT of life-saving drugs essential for treating COVID-19 and also delivered 100 MT of food aid to Sudan.12
Sudan’s importance for India stems from the fact that the country has been a gateway for India’s investments in the energy sector in the African continent. India’s total investment in unified Sudan’s petroleum sector was about US$ 2.3 billion.13 In July 2011, after the succession, South Sudan took control of around 75 per cent of united Sudan’s oil production. Over the years, conflict in South Sudan and disputes between the two countries over transit and transportation of fuel have taken the shine off this investment. At present, India’s investments in South Sudan’s energy sector remain, however it does not have any stake in Sudan’s energy sector. In 2020, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) exited from Sudan after the country refused to pay for the oil it had lifted from the oil fields.14
Nevertheless, coup in Sudan may have an adverse impact on India’s trade ties with the country. In 2018, the value of bilateral trade was estimated to be around US$ 1.5 billion and total Indian investment around US$ 450 million.15 This is mainly in steel, packaging, beverage, food and pharmaceutical sector. Major Indian pharma and automobile brands have a presence in the country. Security of the Indian community in Sudan is another concern. In the past, India has evacuated Indian nationals and workers stuck in the country during turmoil.
In conclusion, it can be said that Sudan, which connects North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Sahel, is key to stability in the region, and any instability and chaos in Sudan may intensify the territorial disputes in the region. The coup may also have an impact on India’s trade ties with the country. Regional organisations, such as IGAD, AU and Sudan’s external partners including India, should put pressure on the military regime in Sudan to an early restoration of the civilian transitional government in the country.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces through Indigenisation
Richa Tokas
November 05, 2021
In the current geopolitical situation, India needs to increase the indigenous defence production and build a strong military force armed with technologically advanced defence equipment to create a robust security framework that meets the requisites of modern warfare.
A strong and well-equipped military provides a country the immunity to resist attack and thwart unprovoked aggression from external sources and deal with any kind of internal disturbance. It works as a defence mechanism and reflects the country’s military capability and capacity to defend itself against the hostile countries. Equipping the military with the latest technology and modernising the existing inventory of weapons and surveillance systems is therefore crucial for any country. India too needs to build a strong military force armed with all types of technologically advanced defence equipment to strengthen its security and intelligence and to secure its territorial integrity.1
All over the world, the countries which are embroiled in any kind of internal security issues or have border disputes with hostile neighbours or face any kind of terror threat or countries which face any war-like situation are spending more and more on strengthening their defence portfolio. The countries feel that only a strong defence and security framework can overcome any kind of threat to their autonomy or sovereignty. The technological advancement has led to development of very sophisticated weapons and many countries are now in possession of such weapons. These include ballistic missile systems, nuclear powered submarines, stealth fighter airplanes, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, etc. For tackling any kind of untoward happening, any country requires a robust and a modernised defence and security framework. Therefore, along with procuring new defence products, emphasis should be laid on doing it in such a manner that the weapons system does not become obsolete in a few years. Further, such products should be capable of being upgraded without much hassle. Any country cannot sideline the modernisation aspect as it holds the key to managing any form of unexpected aggression: internal or external.
In the current geopolitical situation, it has become vital for India to maintain its regional autonomy. India needs to assert its presence and sovereignty over the border regions and for that, it needs to have modernised defence products and strategic autonomy over such defence products. This strategic autonomy can be achieved by having a self-reliant defence industry which would ultimately strengthen the Indian economy as well. It is the need of the hour to increase the indigenous defence production to meet the requirements of the armed forces along with putting lesser burden on the exchequer. India requires an overhaul of its defence products to meet the current requisites of modern warfare. To create a robust security framework India needs to strengthen its surveillance system which requires inducting of modernised radars and drones so that suspicious activities and trespassing at the border areas could be detected at the earliest. India also needs to understand that it cannot always depend on the emergency purchases of defence equipment during the times of crises, which has been seen during the recent border clashes with Chinese troops and the rising tension along the northern borders. This has forced accelerated domestic and foreign purchase of weapons,2 however relying on the imports for emergency purchases leads to excessive spending.
Aiming to make India a manufacturing hub is a step taken in the right direction under the ambit of ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’. Promoting investments in research and development and production in the defence sector will prove to be significant in enhancing the manufacturing of defence products and in creating employment opportunities. Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector will reduce dependency on imports which will lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange expenditure and enhance the level of operational preparedness considerably. Domestic manufacturing will promote the growth of many ancillary industries within the country and at the same time, it will generate a lot of revenue by exporting defence products to other countries. Restructuring of approximately 200-year-old Ordnance Factory Board into seven State-owned corporate entities in line with the vision of Aatmanirbhar Bharat would not only increase competitiveness, but will also improve quality, cost-efficiency while ensuring self-reliance in the defence sector.3 This will help in reducing the trade deficit as well. Defence Acquisition Procedure, DAP-2020 has aimed to bring into line and support the Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan by focusing on self-reliance by boosting domestic manufacturing and encouraging private sector involvement.4
After the clarion call of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for ‘Aatmanirbharta’ and indigenisation of products in all spheres, specific efforts have been made to indigenise the Indian defence industry, and to reduce the huge import bill of the defence products. The induction of Light Combat Aircraft Tejas is a huge accomplishment in this regard, and another order for 83 Tejas fighter jets will certainly help in strengthening the Indian Air Force as well as boosting the morale of the Indian defence industry.5 Further, the embargo upon the import of 209 defence equipment means that they would be indigenously developed in India.6 A separate fund has been earmarked for supporting the start-ups (iDEX) and MSMEs for the development of design and new technology in the defence and aerospace sector.7 The government has permitted Foreign Direct Investment of up to 74 per cent in defence production through the Automatic Route to encourage domestic manufacturing and use of innovative technology in defence products, keeping into consideration the active participation of private sector. Through Automatic Route any foreign investor or Indian company can directly invest into the defence sector without any prior approval of RBI or Government of India. This would encourage ease of doing business and encourage investments in the Indian defence industry. Moreover, states are showing interest in establishing and developing defence industries in their region, for instance, Karnataka has requested the Government of India to set up a Defence Technology Hub as it already has various Defence Public Sector Undertakings like HAL, BEL and laboratories of DRDO.8 If the Indian Government keeps up with this pace of modernising Indian Armed Forces through ‘Indigenisation’, it will certainly bring a big boost to the Indian economy. Consistent efforts of the stakeholders involved in policymaking and effective implementation of the self-indigenisation campaign will be crucial for realising this dream. With the right kind of support and assistance from the Government of India, the local industries will be able to fulfil the domestic demands of the Indian armed forces and strengthen them to confront the adversaries effectively. The Indian armed forces need to be battle-ready even on short notice, especially in view of the changing nature of the threat within military domains.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Bangladesh Violence: Minorities and Anti-Liberation Forces
Anand Kumar
November 02, 2021
Sheikh Hasina and her India-friendly policies are not liked by her domestic and international opponents. The Awami League government should remain vigilant to the designs of forces inimical to it, and not let them undo the progress in India–Bangladesh relations.
The recent violence against the minorities in Bangladesh has taken a large number of people by surprise. It is not that violence against the minorities is unknown in Bangladesh, however, it was certainly put in check after Sheikh Hasina came to power. The violence against the Hindu minorities flared up once again in Cumilla this year during the Hindu festival Durga Puja when a miscreant perhaps on instigation of some extremists put the Holy Book Quran in a Puja Pandal.1 Subsequently, violence also spread to other areas due to rumour-mongering on social media.
In the last decade or so, Bangladesh has managed to prioritise economic progress over religious extremism engulfing a number of other Muslim majority countries. The country grew at a decent pace2 even when the whole world was grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic. The growing prosperity of Bangladesh is seen as a major reason behind the strong support of Bangladeshi people enjoyed by Sheikh Hasina. However, the recent violence against the minorities can prove to be detrimental if due measures are not taken by the Awami League government.
After the breakout of the violence, the government placed eight units of Border Guard Bangladesh in various parts of the Chattogram district to maintain law and order. State Minister for Religious Affairs Md Faridul Haque Khan warned people not to take law into their own hands. He stated that the local administration will investigate what really happened in Cumilla. A week later, the Bangladesh police managed to arrest Iqbal Hossain, identified as the key suspect in instigating the Cumilla violence from Cox's Bazar. The civil society in Bangladesh also protested violence against the minorities. They have demanded that Bangladesh government should enact a new law to ensure religious freedom for everyone. However, the situation still remains tense in the country.
After coming to power in 2009, the Sheikh Hasina government took strong measures against the anti-liberation forces, in a large measure represented by Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh. The other extremist groups present in Bangladesh were an outgrowth of Jamaat, as they thought that Jamaat was not being radical enough. The Awami League government carried out war crime trials of the prominent Jamaat leaders. A number of them were hanged for the crimes committed during the liberation war. When the war crime tribunal in Bangladesh gave only life sentence to the Jamaat leader Abdul Quader Molla, a large number of people in Bangladesh were incensed, and it led to the Shahbag movement in 2013, during which the pro-liberation forces demanded hanging of Abdul Quader Molla for his crimes during the liberation war.3
Unfortunately, along with the Shahbag movement, Bangladesh also saw the rise of Hefazat-e-Islam, another radical Islamist movement in the year 2013.4 Hefazat-e-Islam ransacked Dhaka when it launched its protest against the organisers of the Shahbag movement. It considered them atheists.5 Ironically, subsequently Awami League tied up with Hefazat-e-Islam perhaps to gain electoral mileage.6 It has not been easy for any government in a Muslim majority country to follow secular policies. This dilemma was also seen in the policies of Awami League. It acted against the Jamaatis but could not change the status of Islam as the religion of state.
Hasina has also acted against radical and terrorist organisations. Once in power, she declared a policy of zero tolerance against terrorism. This kind of policy was only expected from her as she was nearly killed in a terrorist attack in Dhaka in 2004 when she was addressing a rally. In this attack, 24 Awami League workers, including one of her close associates, were killed.7
Hasina took action against Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), a group which was active in Bangladesh but was also carrying out terror strikes within India. She also took action against other Bangladeshi groups like Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Pakistan-based Islamist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed were using Bangladesh as a transit route. Hasina’s tough measures stopped their use of Bangladesh as a springboard for terror activities against India.
India was pleasantly surprised when Hasina took action against the Indian insurgent groups active in North East India. These groups were using Bangladesh as a base for their terror activities in North East India. Previous political and military regimes in Bangladesh had consciously allowed these insurgent groups to operate from Bangladesh. In fact when Sheikh Hasina took action against them and handed over most of their top leaders to India, these forces criticised Hasina for losing an important pressure point against India.8 Sheikh Hasina’s cooperation with India on counter-terrorism has dramatically improved India–Bangladesh relations and has taken it to a different level altogether.
However, return of Sheikh Hasina to power and her India-friendly policies have not been liked by her domestic and international opponents. Domestically she has faced strong resistance from the main opposition party the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami. Though Jamaat has been deregistered by the Election Commission of Bangladesh for not recognising the legislative power of Bangladesh parliament, it still has significant influence in the country. Jamaat as part of ruling coalition of the BNP-led government controlled two important ministries. During this period it tried to Islamise Bangladeshi society. The influence of Jamaat also increased in army, bureaucracy and police forces of Bangladesh.
Pakistan is one of the important international players which is hostile to the Sheikh Hasina government. When Sheikh Hasina declared her intention to try war criminals, it was not liked by Pakistan. Pakistan had sent Zia Ispahni as its special envoy to dissuade Sheikh Hasina from carrying out the trials. However, since she remained adamant on war crime trials, it is widely suspected that ISI instigated a rebellion in the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), then border guarding force of Bangladesh.9 This rebellion nearly upturned the political regime of Sheikh Hasina., but she managed to save the situation though with great difficulty.
Sheikh Hasina’s actions against Jamaat and prosecution of the BNP leader Khaleda Zia over the corruption charges have managed to weaken the opposition, but they are still a force to reckon with. The opposition has been out of power for the last three terms, and in order to make a comeback, they would like to create a situation of political crisis in Bangladesh so that either army is provoked to take control of power or to create a caretaker government. The army in Bangladesh has undergone significant changes as now most of the Pakistan-era officers have retired but it still remains an important factor in the polity of Bangladesh. The easiest way for opposition in Bangladesh is to create a political crisis in Bangladesh by inciting communal strife.10 Perhaps the forces inimical to Sheikh Hasina government are trying to do just that. The Awami League government should remain vigilant to the designs of forces inimical to it and not let them undo the works done by it in the last one decade or so.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Implications of the Enhancement of Area of Jurisdiction of the BSF
Pushpita Das
November 01, 2021
The notification regarding modification of area of jurisdiction of the BSF focuses on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. It is important that the BSF trains its personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC and work towards better coordination with the other agencies.
On 11 October 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) through a Gazette Notification, modified the areas of jurisdiction for the Border Security Force (BSF) to exercise its powers in the states bordering Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. According to the new Notification, the BSF’s jurisdiction now comprises “the whole of the area in the States of Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya and Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) and Ladakh and so much of the area within a belt of fifty kilometers in the States of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal and Assam, running along the borders of India”.1 This Notification, in effect, amends the 3 July 2014 Notification by increasing the area of jurisdiction of the BSF in Punjab, West Bengal and Assam to 50 km from existing 15 km, while reducing the area in Gujarat to 50 km from existing 80 km. There is no change in the area of jurisdiction of the BSF in the north-eastern states and the union territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.
Reasons for Jurisdictional Changes
This decision of the MHA is apparently triggered by national security concerns following the recent developments in Afghanistan.2 Apprehensions are raised that the taking over of Afghanistan by the Taliban has emboldened anti-India elements in the Af-Pak region, and, as a result India might witness heightened incidents of cross-border terrorism in future. This concern is reinforced by the concomitant rise in terrorist attacks in J & K as well as an increase in the incidents of arms being dropped by Pakistani drones in Punjab. At the same time, concerns regarding illegal migration, cattle smuggling, trafficking in person and narcotics as well as smuggling in fake Indian currency notes (FICN) along the Bangladesh border continue to persist.
BSF’s Response
The BSF has welcomed the decision of the MHA. In its official statement released to the press, the organisation said, “The amendment will aid the border guarding force in effectively curbing trans-border crimes and the new amendment brings in ‘uniformity’ for its operations in the border states of Punjab, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Assam where it can now operate within a 50 kms area from the border”.3 For instance, in Punjab, where the drones from Pakistan intrude far deeper than 15 km to drop the weapons, the increased jurisdictional limit will enable the BSF to track and destroy them effectively. Similarly, in West Bengal and Assam, the cattle smugglers and criminals operate from the hinterland, and despite credible evidence/intelligence, the BSF is unable to nab them. Now, with the increase in their operational limits, the force will be able to conduct raids and make arrests deep inside the state.
Changes Made in the BSF’s Power
It is important to note that the new Notification empowers the BSF to search, seize and arrest only in respect to the Passport Act of 1967, the Passport (Entry into India) Act of 1920, and specified sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) in the extended area of its jurisdiction. The BSF’s powers and duties regarding other central acts such as the Customs Act, the Central Excise and Salt Act, the Narcotics and Psychotropic (NDPS) Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, etc., do not apply to the extended area of jurisdiction and remain same as earlier, that is, 15 km for Punjab, West Bengal and Assam and 80 km for Gujarat.4 In other words, the emphasis is laid on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. Further, the Notification does not provide the BSF the power to investigate and prosecute, which implies that the BSF still has to hand the arrested person and the seized consignments over to the State Police within 24 hours after minimal questioning.
Reaction to the Changes
Predictably, the Notification has attracted a wide spectrum of reactions from political parties as well as security analysts and academics depending upon their political leanings. While the BJP-ruled Assam government has welcomed the decision and expressed confidence that in coordination with the state police, the amendment will help defeat cross-border smuggling and illegal migration, the Congress-ruled Punjab and the Trinamool Congress-ruled West Bengal governments have termed it “a direct attack on federalism” and “an infringement on the rights of the state”.5
Significant here is to mention that, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2011, had attempted to extend the jurisdictional limits of the BSF to the entire country. For this purpose, the Border Security Force (Amendment) Bill in Rajya Sabha was introduced in the Rajya Sabha wherein it was proposed to amend the BSF Act by deleting the words “adjoining the borders of India” and, inserting the words “or in any part of the territory thereof” after the words “borders of India”.6 This amendment was considered necessary given the expansion of the role of the BSF as the force was deployed in various states for counter-insurgency and anti-Naxal operations, internal security duties as well as for assistance during natural calamities.7 While arguing for the amendment, the then Home Minister, P. Chidambaram had said that such enabling provisions already existed in the Acts governing CRPF, ITBP and SSB.8
As regards the new notification, the MHA had notified that the amendment has come into force on 11 October 2021. However, the BSF Act under Section 139 (3) requires the government to lay the notification before each house of the Parliament within 30 days for the members to raise a motion for discussion, modification or annulment of the notification. Unless the amendment is approved by the Parliament, the notification cannot come into force. Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, acquiescing to the demands of the TMC members, has agreed to discuss this notification and added it to the list of agenda.9
Voices of Concern from Within BSF
As far as the BSF is concerned, the decision has generated mixed reaction. While it has welcomed the extension of their jurisdiction in the three states, sections within have pointed out to the practical difficulties in their functioning. To begin with, the BSF officers10 revealed that the BSF personnel on the ground do not effectively utilise the powers vested upon them even within the existing 15 km belt because they are not conversant either with the Acts or the various sections of the CrPC, which empower them in their area of jurisdiction. That is why more often than not, they had to depend on the local Police while conducting search and seize operations or arrest suspected criminals, especially in populated areas.
They further stated that the BSF shares an excellent working relationship with the state police. In fact, most of the raids and arrests that are conducted are in close coordination and cooperation with the local police. Even in states where vested political interests malign the BSF and instruct their police not to cooperate with the force,11 the Police do act against any smuggler or criminal if the BSF provides irrefutable evidence. They, however, feel that the new notification could potentially generate bad blood between the BSF and the state police because the police might perceive the enhanced jurisdiction as an infringement on their powers. In fact, a few police officers have expressed concerns that the BSF might conduct arbitrary raids and arrests on behest of the Union government.12 Besides the State Police, the BSF officers argue that the people in the border areas, in general, resent their presence. Some of the officers even accept that they have not been successful in garnering the support of the people in border areas. They lament that the notification will further aggravate the situation as the people in the hinterland will now also raise their voice against the force. Consequently, the BSF will have to grapple with the resentment of both the police as well as the people of these states.
A few BSF officers also expressed their dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Police and the Customs department towards crime. They argue that when an illegal infiltrator or a smuggler is handed over to the local Police, they either set him/her free under political pressure or because of financial incentives, which negates the hard work put in by the BSF. Furthermore, in case of cattle smuggling, after the BSF hands over the cattle to the Customs officials, they auction the cattle. However, since the Customs officials are not careful in screening the customers, these cattle are bought back by the smugglers who then smuggle the consignment to Bangladesh.
Given these constraints, some of the officers argue that the BSF should be given additional power of investigation and prosecution so that trans-border crime can be curbed effectively. This view is not shared by others who argue that investigation and prosecution will require additional manpower and resources and detract the BSF from their original mandate of acting as the first line of defence against external threats. They instead propose that the BSF officers should be given the authority to hand over such cases which they consider to be extremely sensitive to central agencies such as National Investigation Agency (NIA), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Customs, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), etc., instead of the local police. They also demand that the BSF should be given the power to monitor the telephonic conversation of the criminals who are active in the border-belt areas.13 It is moot whether these demands of the BSF officers are feasible.
Conclusion
In sum, the notification appears to be a welcome decision. However, for it to be effective the BSF has to concentrate on training their personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC. At the same time, emphasis must be laid on the sensitising the personnel on the local customs, traditions and languages so that the BSF can initiate a dialogue with the border inhabitants and encourage them to support the efforts of the force in making the border areas secure and peaceful. The union government, on its part, should formulate guidelines for the operationalisation of the notification in order to mitigate any confusion that may arise. It should also establish structures such as district and state coordination committees and appoint nodal officers to achieve better synergy among all the agencies concerned.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Author’s telephonic interview with senior BSF officials at New Delhi and other states. Also see Prakash Singh, “Let Border Security Force Do Its Job”, The Indian Express, 17 October 2021.
Strategic Significance of Admiral Michael Gilday’s Visit to India
R. Vignesh
October 28, 2021
The recent visit of the Chief of US Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday to India is not only significant to the national security narrative of India and the US but it is also bound to have a profound impact on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
Military Diplomacy has always been an important element of a bilateral relationship that signifies mutual trust, political alignment and strategic assurances between two nations. In this light, the visit of the Chief of US Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday to India in October 2021 is quite significant to the national security narrative of India and the US. At the same time, this visit signifies greater enactment of American strategy for the Indo-Pacific and is also bound to have a profound impact on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
India as a Cornerstone in the US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific
Successive American governments over the last decade have identified India as a crucial link in their Indo-Pacific rebalancing efforts. This was first reflected in their “National Security Strategy” document released in December 2017, which describes the Indo-Pacific region as a geopolitical arena where competition between free and repressive perspectives of global order is taking place.1 Here India’s rise as a leading global power and a strategic contender to China in the Indo-Pacific has been acknowledged. Also, the Quad has been described as a platform for bolstering strategic cooperation with India, Japan and Australia to safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.
The critical role of India in the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific was again reiterated in the document titled “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing Shared Vision” released by the US Department of State on 4 November 2019. This document indirectly describes China as an authoritarian revisionist power that seeks to pursue its interests at the expense of others in the Indo-Pacific. 2 Hence, the India–US strategic relations are emerging as a crucial component of America’s strategy to counter China’s aggressive expansionism in the region.
Strategic Significance of Admiral Gilday’s Visit
The announcement of AUKUS, the unprecedented escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait and the continued impasse between India and China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are the contributing factors to the tensions in the region. The visit coming in the midst of these developments does signify a greater degree of America’s concerns about China’s actions in the region. The timing and the agenda of Admiral Gilday’s visit do reflect some of the tenets articulated in the “2019 Shared Vision”for promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Among these tenets, the strengthening of India–US naval cooperation is seen as a critical element for securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. Describing India as the “closest strategic partner”, Admiral Gilday stressed on achieving high-end interoperability between both the navies across all aspects of naval warfare.3 Aboard the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the Bay of Bengal, Admiral Gilday affirmed the Indo-US naval cooperation being a crucial component within the Quad navies. He described the Malabar exercise as an excellent platform for overseeing the first-hand integration of the Indian and U.S navies.4
The other aspect that the “2019 Shared Vision” laid emphasis on is the strengthening of interoperability among the Quad navies being essential for joint operations in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. The document identifies the Malabar naval exercises as an important platform to develop and demonstrate growing interoperability between the Quad navies.5 Admiral Gilday’s visit coinciding with the second phase of the 25th Malabar exercise illustrates America’s focus towards enhancing the synergy between Quad navies. The Chief of the US Navy being personally present in the first joint exercise encompassing the Quad navies after their respective leaders met in Washington on 24 September 2021 is being considered strategically significant.
Expanding existing avenues for military and political cooperation to include more like-minded nations to secure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is something that has been expressed in both “2019 Shared Vision” and “2017 National Security Strategy”. This aspect resonated with Admiral Gilday’s remarks to the press at the outset of the 2021 Malabar Exercise where he brought forth the view of expanding the annual quadrilateral naval exercise to include more like-minded nations.6 Although he did acknowledge that the decision to expand the Malabar Exercise rests with the political leadership of Quad.
Among the most important aspects of Admiral Gilday’s visit was the signalling of the completion of American rebalancing efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2016 the US Navy announced that it aims to deploy 60 per cent of its surface ships in the Indo-Pacific Region by 2019.7 Maintaining a sustained naval presence in the Indo-Pacific has been described as instrumental in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific in the“2019 Shared Vision”. In his very first interaction with the press, Admiral Gilday conveyed that the US Navy has completed its rebalancing with 60 per cent of its forces operating in the region.8
Significance to India’s Maritime Security
Although Admiral Gilday’s visit primarily centred on consolidating American interests in the Indo-Pacific, it does have enormous significance for India’s maritime security. In 2015 the Indian Navy published its maritime security document titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”. This document advocates the enhancement of naval cooperation and interoperability with friendly nations as a key determinant for shaping a favourable maritime security environment for India.9 The detailed scrutiny of both “2019 Shared Vision” and “2015 Ensuring Secure Seas” reveals that there is a considerable overlap with both nations emphasising on a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Enhancing naval cooperation with US Navy enables the Indian Navy to efficiently extend the operational reach across the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy Ships can avail replenishment from US naval facilities across the Indo-Pacific through the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that was signed in 2016. This is in addition to bilateral logistics support agreements that have been signed by India with several friendly nations over the past couple of years. These agreements enable the Indian Navy to use naval facilities stretched across the Indo-Pacific for replenishment. Some of these important logistics support agreements are as follows:
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) with Australia on 4 June 2020.
Logistics Support Agreement with Japan on 10 September 2020.
Military Logistics Agreement with South Korea on 6 September 2019.
Agreement for Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support for Naval Ships with Singapore on 1 June 2018.
Agreement of Reciprocal Logistics Support with France on 10 March 2018.
The sharing of information between the armed forces of India and the US is facilitated by the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed on 6 September 2018. On the other hand, sharing of geo-spatial information between India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the US’ National Geospatial Agency (NGA) is enabled through Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA) signed on 27 October 2020. The MoD describes this set of agreements as the blueprint for collaboration between the two nations that are instrumental for achieving a “Free, Open and inclusive Indo-Pacific”. 10 Hence, the strategic weight that Admiral Gilday’s visit to India carries can be regarded as a step forward in achieving greater operational capability for the Indian Navy through enhancing cooperation with the US.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific.
Over the years, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has expanded its agenda to adapt itself to face the gen-next threats in the Indo-Pacific, most notably the emerging technology. The Quad was created as an ad hoc group to help the Indo-Pacific littoral states in the aftermath of the Tsunami in 2004. Although the first iteration of the Quad in 2007 was short-lived, the latest iteration promises that Quad is here to stay for decades to come. This inference can be reached based on the expansive agenda that the Quad has drawn for itself, which looks beyond narrow security calculations in the region. The first in-person summit of the Quad leaders delved upon not only the security situation in the Indo-Pacific but also multiple areas, including the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, climate crisis, terrorism and emerging technology. By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quad has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is pertinent to look at the evolution of the second iteration of the Quad and how the minilateral is seamlessly synergising technology with its original agenda of security.
Evolution of the Quad
Amid the belligerent behaviour of China in the maritime continuum of the Indo-Pacific and growing trust and comfort between the four democracies1, the Quad re-emerged on the sidelines of the 31st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, 2017. Four working-level meetings—November 2017, June 2018, November 2018 and May 2019—involving officials from the foreign ministries of Delhi, Washington, Tokyo and Canberra focused on “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” benefitting all in the region and the world at large.2 They also touched upon connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cyber security and ASEAN centrality.3 The separate statements from the four capitals also mentioned about the respect for sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all nations in a transparent, economically viable and financially responsible manner.4
In September 2019, the working-level meeting of the Quad was elevated to the ministerial-level meeting when the United States (US) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosted his counterparts from India, Japan and Australia in New York. Although the leaders did not issue a joint statement post meeting, the issues raised were similar to those raised during the working-level meetings.5 The first ministerial meeting saw a limited expansion of the agenda as the Quad countries “conducted a tabletop counter-terrorism exercise in November 2019 and convened a meeting of cyber experts the following month”.6 As COVID-19 gripped the world in early 2020, the senior officials’ consultation of the four countries “underscored the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains” and added pandemic and best practices to deal with the same in the agenda of the meeting.7 The second ministerial meeting of the Quad in Tokyo, held in October 2020, discussed “post COVID-19 international order” and issues related to “the resilience of supply chains” in addition to the maritime security issues of the Indo-Pacific.
Emergence of Technology as a Cornerstone
COVID-19 and the subsequent behaviour of China raised many questions regarding China’s commitment to rise as a responsible international player. China’s tendency to weaponise trade and technology became obvious. China punished Australia in the domain of trade as the latter demanded a fair enquiry into the origin of COVID-19. Moreover, reports emerged about the Chinese quest to snoop the foreign governments by using 5G mobile network technology8 and meddle in the country’s internal affairs9. Earlier, in 2017, China enacted the National Intelligence Law that made it mandatory for the Chinese firms to cooperate with its intelligence agencies by giving free access to their data within and without China.10 Thus, the law violated the digital sovereignty of the nations where Chinese firms had market access in accordance with the international law. In view of the Chinese threat in the realm of emerging technologies, the Quad proved deft enough to adapt to the new reality.
The joint statement following the Quad leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021 mentioned “critical technologies” three times. The leaders resolved that the Quad “will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific”.11 The minilateral group also launched “a critical- and emerging-technology working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative technologies of the future”.12 Building on the spirit of technological cooperation, the Quad took a holistic view of the emerging technologies and associated issues. In the realm of 5G mobile networks, the Quad, during the first-ever in-person summit in September 2021, decided to deploy “secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond-5G networks” from trustworthy vendors. The statement exuded confidence about coming up with the “open, standards-based 5G technology”. Individually, the Quad countries devised formal and informal policies to deny entry to untrustworthy telecom vendors.13 The leaders also announced sector-specific contact groups to develop technical standards for emerging technologies. They launched the Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use with the purpose of “guiding not only the region but the world towards responsible, open, high-standards innovation”.14
Sensing the vulnerabilities in the supply chains, the Quad leaders decided “to map the supply chain of the critical technologies and materials”15 and diversify the same. Further, India, Japan and Australia launched Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to counter Chinese dominance of the supply chains in the region.16 The need to diversify the supply chains away from China was felt intensely in the light of deteriorating relations between China and members of Quad. As Amitendu Palit has argued, the repositioning of strategic supply chains, especially in the field of semiconductors and telecommunications, was part of a broader strategy to decouple from China and “to develop a coalition of like-minded countries for taking on an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific”.17 In the realm of Artificial Intelligence, the Quad countries are working with other like-minded countries for an initiative titled “Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence”18 under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that promotes inclusive and responsible use of Artificial Intelligence.
Domestically, India is taking baby steps to shape the rules and norms vis-à-vis emerging technologies such as 5G and Artificial Intelligence on international platforms. The country is debating the issues related to data sovereignty vigorously. It has also come up with an Approach Document on Artificial Intelligence.19 Bilaterally, India is collaborating with like-minded countries in the field of emerging technologies. India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2021, to enhance cooperation in Information and Communications Technologies, covering 5G technologies, telecom security, submarine optical fibre cable system to islands of India, and spectrum management, among others.20 Similarly, India and Australia have set up the India–Australia Joint Working Group on Cyber Security Cooperation.21 The two countries have also signed the Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals.22 India is also cooperating with ASEAN for capacity building and knowledge sharing in the areas of Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G, among others, to achieve the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM2025).23 Separately, India and the US have resolved to “revive the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in early 2022, to accelerate high technology commerce in key areas”.24 In October 2020, India joined Japan and Five Eyes Alliance countries to demand access to end-to-end encrypted communication from big tech companies.25
Thus, in addition to its existing agenda of securing free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad is fast embracing the emerging technology as a critical area to build upon. By spindling around the emerging technologies, the Quad is successfully expanding horizontally. Similarly, with the initiatives such as the Quad plus—which included the foreign secretary-level meeting of New Zealand, Vietnam, South Korea and the foreign ministers-level meeting of Brazil, South Korea, Israel to discuss COVID-19—the Quad is stretching laterally. As authoritarian societies are better equipped to extract data from their citizens than free societies26, the Quad is trying to offer an alternative model different from the coercive vision of the authoritarian states in the Indo-Pacific. With the emerging technology intruding into our daily lives and changing how nations create power and wield it against one another27, the Quad is proving to be a prudent minilateral to cope with the technological churn in the Indo-Pacific.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Mali: Growing Trend of Violence Against UN Peacekeepers
Sindhu Dinesh
October 25, 2021
The growing trend of attacks on international entities besides the government units and civilians in Mali is an issue of serious concern. The complex security situation in Mali and high fatalities of peacekeepers has led to MINUSMA being perceived as the most dangerous UN Peacekeeping mission.
On 2 October 2021, a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeeper died and four others were seriously injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Tessalit, Kidal region. Strongly condemning the incident, Mr El-Ghassim Wane, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MINUSMA, remarked that, “this incident is a sad reminder of the permanent danger that hangs over our peacekeepers and of the sacrifices made for peace in Mali.”1 The worsening security situation in Mali is fuelled by political instability and economic crisis. As per UN official statistics, 255 peacekeepers have lost their lives in Mali as part of MINUSMA, as on 31 August 2021.2 The growing trend of attacks on international entities besides the government units and civilians in Mali is an issue of serious concern. Against this backdrop, this commentary provides an insight into the security situation in Mali and attempts to explore the questions—What do the terrorists and insurgent groups in Mali seek? Why has the violence increased? Why have peacekeepers been targeted frequently?
Security Situation in Mali
Over the last few decades, Mali has been troubled by issues like ineffective governance, poor economic conditions, human rights violations and feeling of marginalisation among communities in the northern region. In recent years, these challenges have been exacerbated by the increase of insurgency and jihadist elements, absence of political will to protect civilians, issues of corruption and internal strife among different sections in the society.
The security crisis in Mali began with the armed rebellion in 2012 by ethnic Tuaregs of the separatist organisation Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) which seeks to establish a separate Tuareg state called Azawad in northern Mali.3 The MNLA was aided by external Islamist militant groups like the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine.4 The crisis was aggravated by the military coup in 2012. Owing to the subsequent political instability and violent conflict, northern Mali became a breeding ground for various insurgent, violent extremist and terrorist outfits. While local insurgent movements like the Tuareg rebels have turned into organised terrorist outfits through linkages with fighters from AQIM; external terrorist groups like the AQIM Sahel Branch laid inroads into the region in 2017 by merging with local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting Islam and Muslims (also known as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin [JNIM]) further worsening the crisis.5 Frequent attacks on civilians by armed extremist groups like JNIM, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and others have led to the displacement of over 3,70,000 people.6 It is of grave concern that besides consolidating their control over the northern and central areas of Mali, these groups have begun to expand into the southern regions.7
The weakening of the State institutions by frequent coups, three in less than a decade, has further deteriorated the security situation.8 The most recent coup in May 2021 was led by Col Assimi Goïta, the interim vice-president of the transitional government, who seized power from the transitional President Bah Ndaw and the Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. He announced that he felt obligated to arrest the members of the transitional government in order to preserve the “transitional charter and defend the republic” as they had failed to consult him on the reshuffle of the Cabinet which removed two influential military-appointed Cabinet Ministers.9 The resulting political instability has inadvertently strengthened the terrorist elements who take advantage of the lack in checks and balances. These groups seek to gain territory in order to carry out their operations. The involvement of several external actors like the French troops, MINUSMA, G5 Sahel Force and others to aid the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) has yielded limited success. The JNIM and another AQIM offshoot associated with the Islamic State have claimed several attacks against UN personnel and state targets in Mali and Burkina Faso.10 The security crisis is amplified by the growth of organised crime networks involved in human trafficking and drug smuggling in the region suspected to be the source of funding for the terrorist groups. It has been reported that the continued strengthening of the militant groups in Sahel region based out of northern Mali could allow the Islamic State and Al Qaeda to establish a safe haven and engage in intensified militancy.
The MINUSMA
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was instituted in 2013 by the UNSC Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to perform security-related tasks and support political processes in Mali.11 Through the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2164, its functions were expanded to include protection of civilians, support reconciliation efforts and national political dialogues amongst others.12 As of March 2021, MINUSMA includes 13,289 military personnel, 1,920 police personnel and 1,619 civilians contributed by over 60 countries.13 Owing to the security conditions, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has continually extended the mandate of MINUSMA each time by a year. It was extended up to 30 June 2022 by passing of the UNSC Resolution 2584 on 29 June 2021.14 These resolutions also include dimensions like ensuring political transition; renewal of asset freeze and travel bans on persons obstructing the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; and extending the mandate of a 15-member Expert Panel to aid in monitoring the situation and facilitate political dialogue.
Attacks on MINUSMA Peacekeepers and Its Implications
The attacks on UN Peacekeepers has increased over the last few months. In April 2021, four peacekeepers were killed and 19 were seriously injured in an attack on their camp in Aguelhok, Kidal.15 Furthermore, in January 2021, four peacekeepers lost their lives and seven were seriously injured by IED attacks.16The complexity of the security situation in Mali and high fatalities of peacekeepers has led to MINUSMA being perceived as the most dangerous UN Peacekeeping mission. In an official statement referring to the 2 October 2021 incident, the UN Secretary General called on the Malian government to immediately identify the perpetrators to ensure swift justice, reiterating that attack on peacekeepers amounts to “war crimes” under the international law.17
Numerous resolutions too have been passed by UNSC on the situation in Mali such as 2584 in June and 2590 in August this year, amongst others.18 However, the continued incidents of violence raise concerns about the utility of issuing statements alone. There is an urgent need to proactively implement them and ensure accountability on actions. Owing to the security crisis, MINUSMA has been aided by ad hoc missions like the G5 Sahel Joint Force. However, these multiple missions need to be closely coordinated to complement one another rather than causing unnecessary overlap in their activities.19
The primary reason underlying the violence against the peacekeepers is the indigenous resentment against the presence of foreign military troops on Mali soil.20 The militant outfits dub the peacekeepers as “Crusader Occupation forces” and specifically target them.21 Insurgent elements of the Tuareg groups perceive the foreign presence as a weakness of the state authority and interference in the internal affairs of Mali. The slow progress on implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, is an added dimension. The peace deal also known as “Algiers Accord” was mediated by Algeria and signed between the Government of Mali and two northern armed coalitions assuring disarmament, addressing northern political grievances, promoting development and re-establishment of state authority in the north.22 The implementation of the agreement has been stalled due to delayed response from the government, the emergence of new armed factions since 2015 as well as armed struggle between the northern factions due to competing objectives which has complicated the security scenario.23
It could also perhaps be that attacking peacekeepers, which is covered by the international media, gives negative limelight to the violent factions and reinforces a sense of relevance. This is incited by poor progress or non-implementation of strict measures against the perpetrators by Malian authorities. Since the government is itself dependent on the foreign troops to prevent acts of terrorism, it is not equipped to militarily react to attacks on the foreign actors like the UN Peacekeepers, effectively.24 Other reasons for the lack of strict measures is the malfunctioning of judicial system, corruption, lack of training and constraints in resources.25 Mali ranks 19th in the Fragile States Index 2021 implying that the state presently lacks the ability and infrastructure to enforce accountability for attacks against peacekeepers.26
Yet another facet to the issue is the framework and functioning of UN peacekeeping operations. UN Peacekeepers are equipped to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups but not to engage in counter-terrorism activities.27 Although MINUSMA is the only peacekeeping operation authorised to counter asymmetric threats, it does not have the tools to deal with organised armed terrorists making them easy targets.28
Any form of attack on the blue helmets is unacceptable and the UN must take efficacious measures of accountability. India pioneered this effort by organising an open level debate titled “Protecting the Protectors” during its UNSC Presidency in August 2021 chaired by External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar. The resolution must gain traction by being proactively implemented at the earliest so as to avoid further incidents of violence and loss of faith on humanitarian aid by countries. The security crisis in Mali has spilled over to the region and the increased violence against peacekeepers needs to be given due attention by the international community before the crisis escalates out of control.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
US has undertaken a number of initiatives on cybersecurity, specifically ransomware, one of them being the Counter-Ransomware Initiative Meeting held in October 2021. Whether this attempt by the US to mobilise a larger group of countries to discuss ransomware will lead to real outcomes, or is just meant to endorse its actions, remains to be seen.
Even as the pandemic was wreaking havoc worldwide through the course of the past year, the ransomware gang REvil was doing the same in cyberspace, locking up computers of multiple companies and government organisations, mainly US-based, till they coughed up a ransom, to be paid through cryptocurrency.1 REvil operations ceased briefly after their websites and infrastructure were disabled by the US government agencies in July 2021, but reappeared soon afterwards. According to the news reports, they have again been taken down through US-led operations with multiple countries.2
Since assuming office, the Biden Administration has undertaken a number of domestic and international initiatives on cybersecurity, and specifically ransomware, from bringing it on the agenda in the NATO and G-7 summits held in June 2021, discussing the issue with President Putin at the Geneva summit in the same month, to taking action, such as the one detailed above, against ransomware actors and cryptocurrency exchanges through its domestic law enforcement and judicial agencies. This also follows on the large number of ransomware attacks the US has faced in recent years—an estimate by the Treasury Department found that at least $ 400 million had been collected by way of ransomware by actors mainly based in Russia.3
In a precursor of sorts to the latest action, the US National Security Council held a virtual Counter-Ransomware Initiative Meeting at the White House on 13th and 14th of October 2021. Thirty-two countries were invited to the meeting with the notable exception of Russia. Nonetheless, the United States maintained that this meeting was not targeted against any one country and that they in fact had an existing arrangement with Russia to discuss these issues.4 The goal of this particular meeting was to get international partners together to give an outline of US’ ransomware efforts and to work together to eradicate this scourge.
US’ efforts have centred around four pillars, the first being to disrupt the ransomware infrastructure and actors. Unilateral actions taken in this regard have included sanctioning cryptocurrency exchanges. The second strategy has been to identify the vulnerabilities which enable ransomware actors to take control of computers, especially those controlling critical information infrastructure and other critical networks. The third strategy has been to intensify efforts to trace ransomware payments, and the fourth, using diplomatic means to address the issue. To highlight that this was not a unilateral effort, four countries led discussions on these issues, these being India for national resilience, Australia for disruption, the UK for countering illicit finance through virtual currency, and Germany for diplomacy. At a background briefing, a senior administration official took pains to emphasise that there was no favouritism or other consideration on the basis of which these countries had been selected and that it was mainly the outcome of many factors including availability and logistics. This was only the first of a series of such meetings planned.5
As far as the outcome of the meeting is concerned, the Joint Statement released on 14 October 2021 noted that the participating countries had taken note of the “need for urgent action, common priorities, and complementary efforts to reduce the risk of ransomware”.6 Such efforts would include “improving network resilience to prevent incidents when possible and respond effectively when incidents do occur; addressing the abuse of financial mechanisms to launder ransom payments or conduct other activities that make ransomware profitable; and disrupting the ransomware ecosystem via law enforcement collaboration to investigate and prosecute ransomware actors, addressing safe havens for ransomware criminals, and continued diplomatic engagement.”7
On resilience, the emphasis was on information sharing and best practices. On illicit financing, much of the recommendations centred around using the existing mechanisms for anti-money laundering effectively to combat the use of virtual currencies for ransomware. Recognising that ransomware emanated from identifiable countries, the statement called for taking appropriate steps to counter cybercriminal activity by impressing on countries not to allow the use of their territories for criminal activities and eliminating safe havens for those conducting such disruptive and destabilising operations. As a variation of “all means necessary”, the statement noted that countries could use “all national tools available in taking action against those responsible for ransomware operations threatening critical infrastructure and public safety”.8
The diplomatic tools outlined were a mix of coercive and cooperative diplomacy. States were to be “encouraged” to take “reasonable steps to address ransomware operations emanating from within their territory”. Coordinated sanctions or “naming and shaming” actions of the type that have already been taken by the US and its allies seem implicit in the commitment to “leverage diplomacy through coordination of action in response to states whenever they do not address the activities of cybercriminals”.9 On the whole, this was an effort to endorse US’ approach towards combating ransomware.
The Counter-Ransomware Summit has been an attempt to move out of its comfort zone of close allies and mobilise a larger group of countries to discuss ransomware. Despite being the world’s foremost cyberpower, the US has been a laggard when it comes to cooperation in cyberspace, and has preferred sticking to its long-established positions in fora like the UN, and steering behind the scenes in fora such as the ASEAN. As the well-known author and analyst John Arquilla wrote recently, right at the dawn of the cyber age, when Russia was interested in establishing rules of the road for cyberspace, the US demurred from doing so because it did not see it in its interest to be constrained by rules.10
Whilst this is a good initiative, it remains to be seen whether this is any different from existing efforts or will lead to real outcomes. Actions such as the one against REvil can only be taken by countries with the heft and capabilities of the US and is not a long-term solution to cyber-criminal activities, state-backed or otherwise. It is also at cross-purposes with principles such as sovereignty and jurisdiction which the US has sworn to uphold as the lynchpin of the current world order. Initiatives such as this might work better if all major cyberpowers are brought on board, and more concrete proposals put on the table. Other fora like the BRICS, for instance, have gone beyond summitry to holding workshops on cybersecurity issues, for instance, India hosted a BRICS seminar on “Misuse of Internet for Terrorist Purposes and Role of Digital Forensics in Terrorist Investigations” in April and a workshop on Digital Forensic Analysis in September this year. Ironically enough, even though the actions against REvil were undertaken by Cyber Command only after a determination by the US Justice Department that ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure should be treated as a national security issue akin to terrorism, there was no discussion on terror groups’ use of ransomware and cryptocurrency during the meet.11
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
What Beijing’s Growing Polar Silk Road Means to India?
Mayuri Banerjee
October 21, 2021
Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power is quite evident in its initiatives like the Polar Silk Road. In light of growing global ambition and resource needs, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition.
In its 14th Five Year Plan released in March this year, China has pledged to build a Polar Silk Road (PSR) over the period 2021–2025.1 Following this declaration, just a few months later in September, the Chinese ice-breaker Xuelong2 returned to the Shanghai port from a 79 days’ expedition after successfully completing China’s 12th Arctic scientific expedition.2 Although the Chinese state media reported it as a purely scientific exercise focused on understanding the effects of climate change on the Arctic ecology, however, considering China’s latest pronouncements in the 14th Five Year Plan and its previous statements on the importance of Arctic region in China’s national security, it remains to be stated that these expeditions are meant for more than scientific knowledge.3 Beijing’s growing foreign policy interests in the Arctic have raised eyebrows amongst the Euro-Asian community, including India which is aiming to make its presence counted in the Arctic region. New Delhi has exhibited significant interest in the Arctic affairs. In 2013, New Delhi acquired the observer status in the Arctic Council and in January 2021, it proposed India’s Draft Arctic Policy elaborating its stand on the Arctic.4 What China’s growing inroads into the Arctic and its ambition to execute a Polar Silk Road means to India?
China’s Interests and Strategies in the Arctic
China’s interests in the Arctic are threefold—execute strategic ambition, enhance economic supremacy, and acquire polar great power status. Such interests are well-orchestrated and aimed to steadily build Beijing’s Polar Silk Road that would correspond with its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In many ways, the speech delivered by President Xi Jinping in 2014 in Australia arrived as a prelude, clearly articulating Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power.5 As an exercise in this direction, four years later, Beijing published a white paper to forcefully project itself as a significant stakeholder in the region and propound its focus areas in the Arctic. In a bid to validate China’s claims on 001Arctic resources, the document termed China as a “near Arctic state” and insisted on “respect” and recognition of China’s rights and freedom in the region. Highlighting China’s commercial interests in Arctic shipping routes, resource exploration and tourism, the document explicitly outlined the core areas Beijing intends to venture into in the coming years.6
China’s strategic interest in the Arctic is related primarily to its maritime aspirations. Since Beijing is striving to build a blue water navy which will be capable of operating globally, the polar regions are seen as crucial elements to realise such a capability. Upholding this vision, President Xi Jinping in 2014 declared the process of becoming a polar great power as an important component in China’s becoming a maritime great power. Consequently, the Arctic and the Antarctic were formally integrated into maritime affairs to amplify these regions’ centrality within the overall maritime strategy.7 Moreover, Beijing expects that PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) presence in inter-continental transit corridors of North Sea Route and Transpolar Sea Route will not only help to challenge perceived US dominance in the Pacific but will also maintain China’s strategic ability to counter if and when Washington increases pressure in the South China Sea.8 As a precursor to China’s future actions, the PLAN recently deployed four ships to the Alaska’s Aleutian Islands conveying to the US, Beijing’s determination to protect its maritime interests in the Arctic and elsewhere.9
From an economic perspective, China sees the Arctic as a major source of energy security and thus has a keen interest in exploiting its natural resources like polar minerals, oil, natural gas and fish stock along with utilising it for trade, transportation and tourism. In this regard, the White Paper overtly exhibited Beijing’s interest by asserting China’s freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables, pipelines and resource exploration.10 Further, to expedite China’s future exploratory activities, the Chinese government even prepared and published Arctic resource maps displaying its natural gas and oil basins. It is noteworthy that these maps are available only in Chinese-language internet, thus demonstrating China’s reluctance to give away its intentions to the international community.11
Lastly, in China’s view, control of one of the “Global Commons” and its resources is important to augment China’s international status. The presence of the US and Russia in the Arctic Council makes it all the more imperative for China to enter the ranks of the powers that manage Arctic affairs. Although the word “status” is rarely used in the public domain, Chinese scholars and experts routinely talk about “China’s right to speak” for cultivating China’s identity as an Arctic state and its intent to “protect” and “govern” the Arctic.12 The vertical maps published by China are noteworthy in this regard. The maps depict the Arctic as the central ocean and place China at the center of the world order, visually dominating the Asia-Pacific, sidelining the US and dwarfing Europe.13
China perceives the Arctic as the new frontier of great power competition and is anxious about losing out in that competition. Its internal discourse on the Arctic, describe the region as an ungoverned space and point towards the military and economic endeavours undertaken by the major powers like the US, Russia and Canada to assert control. Therefore, Chinese strategists and experts argue that in order to secure unfettered strategic and economic access to the Arctic, China should move rapidly.14
As part of its Arctic strategy, China has invested heavily in its Arctic diplomacy that aims to enhance China’s economic opportunities and its legitimacy as a stakeholder in the region. Therefore, Beijing has adopted a multifaceted approach that includes developing scientific and economic partnerships with the Nordic countries, collaborating on institution-building and engaging in Track-II level dialogues to shape perception of the Nordic states and dispel fears about Chinese intentions.15 Through financial contribution to Arctic Council’s projects and sharing of information and scientific expertise, Beijing has made itself quite active within the council.16 It has also strived to increase its visibility in regional affairs through its participation in regional debates, scientific and academic representation in Arctic Circle and Arctic frontier conferences. Further, China is trying to develop dialogue forums from its own end to showcase its scientific and business expertise in the region.17
Beyond these endeavours, Beijing has also engaged in capacity-building in the Arctic and accumulation of knowledge about the region to strengthen its strategic claims vis-à-vis the US and Russia. The existing literature on China’s Arctic activities list several initiatives that are underway, like construction of nuclear-fuelled ice-breakers, scientific expeditions by the PLA to study sea-ice changes, launching of imaging satellites for observation and monitoring Arctic shipping routes, establishment of unmanned ice station in the Arctic and scientific facilities in Nordic states.18 These initiatives are primarily aimed at building China’s military capability in the Arctic region. Particularly interesting is China’s research on Arctic acoustics to understand sound propagation under Arctic waters. According to Chinese scientists, knowledge about Arctic acoustics is an important military capability to ensure future submarine patrols for nuclear deterrence and navigational safety of Chinese warships in the Arctic.19
Implications for India
India’s Arctic links go back to 1920 when British India signed the Svalbard Treaty.20 However, post-independence, India focused primarily on conducting research activities in the Antarctic, beginning its scientific expedition in 1981. The worrisome impact of Arctic warming on Indian monsoons shifted New Delhi’s attention to the Arctic. India undertook its first scientific expedition to the Arctic in 2007.21 Thereafter, it has been involved in mainly scientific research and technical collaboration with Arctic countries. In 2008, New Delhi inaugurated its Arctic research station “Himadri” in Norwegian Arctic, Svalbard to study life-forms in Arctic and impact of climate change on the Arctic ecology.22 Following this feat, within six years India in collaboration with Norway deployed an underwater moored observatory named IndARC to collect real-time data on Arctic.23 India’s endeavours achieved a major milestone when in 2013 it gained the observer status in the Arctic Council.24 Since then, India has pursued a steady Arctic engagement with an eye to promote bilateral and multilateral convergence on climate change, strategic and economic issues. India’s activities have ranged from participating in India–Nordic Summit in 201825 to jointly organising virtual bilateral summits with countries like Finland, Sweden and Denmark in 2020 to discuss issues of trade, investment and climate change. On the other hand, India’s NITI Aayog also signed a MoU with Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic in 2019 to deepen India–Russia trade and economic cooperation in the Arctic region26, followed by New Delhi signing MoUs with Norway, Sweden, Canada and Finland on various issues like biodiversity conservation, education and polar research.27 Affirming India’s commitment towards the region, the former Minister of Earth Sciences, Dr Harsh Vardhan declared during the 3rd Arctic Science Ministerial in 2021 that India will continue to play a positive role in the Arctic through observation, research, capacity-building and international cooperation.28
Nonetheless compared to China’s efforts in the Arctic, India’s endeavours are still at a nascent stage. Meanwhile, China’s rapid rise in the Arctic raises a number of questions regarding India’s geo-political and economic security. For instance, in what ways China’s rise in the Arctic will increase geo-political pressure on India? Should there emerge a China–Russia–US nexus in the future on the Arctic, how will that impact India’s geo-political standing? If the proposed PSR trade route becomes popular, will that adversely affect India’s trade through the International North South Trade Corridor? Also, if China entrenches itself as a polar power, will China exercise access denial strategies against India during political or military tensions? These questions might be easier to answer as the situation progresses in the Arctic. However, in light of growing global ambition and resource needs on both the sides, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition. There is also a fundamental difference in the approaches of the two countries—China seeks a hegemonic position in the Arctic, both militarily and in terms of its governance, while India is more inclined towards scientific collaboration, research and joint natural resource exploration with Arctic countries. This is likely to engender conflict of interest and widen the scope of disagreement between the two countries regarding its governance and utilisation of resources.
Therefore, besides accelerating its engagement with the Arctic states, India should also look into opportunities of deepening its participation in governance, institution building, infrastructure development and resource exploration. This in turn will help India strengthen its voice within the Council and resist China’s hegemonic policy moves in the future. Simultaneously, to counter China’s soft power manoeuvres in the Arctic, India should also invest in image building amongst the Arctic states. For instance, to highlight India’s polar identity, the notion of the Himalayas being the Third Pole29 should be promoted more actively within the Nordic states through informational programmes. Correspondingly, the planned joint projects on scientific and technical knowledge sharing in the Arctic should be fast-tracked to demonstrate India’s involvement and interest in collaboration. Building partnerships with non-Arctic states like Singapore, Japan and South Korea will also be beneficial to India in the long-run for adding to its weight within the Arctic Council decision-making. Furthermore, India can also seek to strengthen its Arctic linkages on the basis of shared political values like democracy, respect for human rights and promotion of inclusive international order and women empowerment. To that end, acknowledgment of these values as basis of India–Nordic cooperation in the 2018 India–Nordic Joint Press Statement was a positive outcome.30 More cultural and civilian exchanges and dialogue forums between the concerned stakeholders would help in further strengthening India–Nordic partnership.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
A conglomerate of elite jihadists called Malhama Tactical, a commercial enterprise driven by a for-profit agenda and not constrained by a specific ideology and defined enemies, has emerged as a serious threat as it can potentially connect and facilitate terrorist organisations worldwide.
A conglomerate of elite jihadists, referred to as Malhama Tactical, has emerged as a serious threat. It was formed by an Uzbek militant, Sukhrob Baltabaev or Abu Rofiq, in 2016,1 and is believed to be the first for-hire terrorist group, which has trained Islamist militants, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement fighters, and those who participated as mercenaries in the Syrian war.
It has therefore gained notoriety as the “Blackwater of Jihad”.2 Blackwater (renamed Academi) is an American private military company whose contractors have infamously participated in conflict-ridden states like Iraq, as part of American security operations. Jeremy Scahill, an investigative journalist, has attributed Blackwater’s catapulting rise to American demobilisation in the post-Cold war era.3
Unlike the conventional terrorist groups, Malhama Tactical is a commercial enterprise driven by a for-profit agenda and is not constrained by a specific ideology and defined enemies. Today, the market for private contractors is flourishing with a vast supply of cash and weaponry and earnings far better than that of ordinary soldiers.4 These factors have given Malhama Tactical much leeway in carrying out its objectives, and associating with a broad spectrum of radical and violent groups including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ajnad al-Kavkaz. Although the organisation reportedly has a Sunni pan-Islamic leaning, it remains ideologically opposed to groups like Islamic State.
It is also considered exclusive due to the military expertise and guerilla warfare tactics passed on by the trainers (battle-hardened and former Chechen militants) and Abu Rofiq, who was a member of the Russian Airborne Troops, an elite group within the armed forces.5 The training modules also incorporate lessons from the strategic tactics of foreign armies.6 Its trainers and recruits have easy access to a wide array of extravagant arms and ammunition, such as the Rocket Propelled Grenades, that amount to no less than $800 per round.7 Its recruitment process is selective where trusted associates provide a reference for the incoming training recruits.
The militants have derived the word Malhama from Hadith literature prophesizing end-time events. They consider Al-Malhama Al-Kubra to be the fiercest apocalyptic war, even though descriptions of the event are highly abstruse and have been subject to varied interpretations.8 Although mainstream Islamic theorists have advised against taking Malhama myths literally, jihadists use the term as part of their propaganda campaigns. Combined with the word “tactical”, the attempt to invent a catchy brand that becomes popular among impressionable radical youth is obvious, even though the name in and of itself makes little sense.
Its emergence and increasing numerical strength could be attributed to the collapse of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result of this development, extremist jihadists could seek an alliance with terrorist groups like Malhama Tactical. Making extensive use of forums like Telegram, the organisation advertises its propaganda videos and training programmes, and has even conducted Q&A sessions about the type of weapons preferred in armed conflicts.9
Notably, Malhama Tactical has paid its core members and purchased arms and necessities using bitcoin and other forms of cryptocurrency, which are non-conventional tactics of finance terrorism for carrying out its objectives.
Equally significant is the concept of Nizam La Tanzim, from which this group could be deriving its strategies and gaining mounting prominence. Tracing its origin to Abu Musab al-Suri (affiliated with Osama bin Laden and a prominent Syrian jihadist), this call refers to a global jihad being fought by a loosely connected network of fighters instead of a centralised organisation.10 It encompasses four crucial features, such as spontaneity, autonomy, decentralisation and situationist outlook.
Malhama Tactical has posed multiple challenges for global security. Hostile states can now rely on plausible deniability while conducting asymmetrical war against actors perceived as oppressors, infidels or contenders for dominance.
Secondly, it has resulted in an additional problem for states that cannot associate Malhama Tactical with a specific terrorist group and, consequently, an ideological underpinning, the base of operations, leadership and recruitment methods. Such factors have long allowed them to formulate broadly coherent counter-terrorism initiatives by tracing past and current activities.
Furthermore, it could foment the growth of similar extremist organisations worldwide, potentially taking advantage of the security vacuum in the territories experiencing turmoil.
Although it primarily came to the fore to oust President Bashar al-Assad, it has also set its sights on expanding its influence across Central Asia.11 Violent extremism has remained a potent threat across the region since the dissolution of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Significantly, most of the fighters hail from the former Soviet Republics or Russia’s Muslim majority areas like Chechnya.12
Evolving Trends and Enemies
Malhama Tactical has indirectly targetted countries such as Russia by providing training in combat to violent extremists who are fighting against it on the Syrian battlefield. It has previously experienced waves of Islamic militancy led by Chechen terrorists. They believe that the efforts of the Syrian resistance forces are part of a much broader and intensive war against the Russian state with which they had engaged in bloody battles.13 Violent separatists in Chechnya had engaged in two armed conflicts against the Russian state between 1994–1996 and 1999–2009. Additionally, Russian soldiers have also come under direct attacks while supporting President al-Assad’s counter-terrorism operations.
In the recent past, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, has underscored the security dilemma his country faces should this event come to pass—“There must be at least 5,000-6,000 Russian-speaking militants (fighting in the Syrian war). Their wives and children have started returning to Russia and other CIS countries. The chances are that once the militant groups are defeated, the terrorists and members of these jihadist private military companies, set up with the assistance of Russia’s enemies, will follow the women and children.”14
His fears are not unfounded. Ali al-Shishani, the current leader of Malhama Tactical, has called for a “new page” to be opened in the Chechen war while mentioning the group’s links with the Chechen mujahedeen fighters in Russia that have persevered over the years.15
The Potential Implications
The privatisation of jihad has underscored a pertinent dilemma. As extremist Islamist groups are becoming more territorial, their reach has also become narrower. However, Malhama Tactical with a more global outlook could potentially connect and facilitate terrorist organisations worldwide.
The situation has become considerably more challenging with the formation of the Taliban-led government in Kabul. The turn of events could embolden violent jihadist groups like Malhama Tactical to follow suit—particularly in West Asia (primary base of operations) and Central Asia (where the core fighters and trainers trace their origin to). These regions could experience further instability and violence, more so in Russia.
Additionally, jihadist groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda have diminished in strength or fraught with in-fighting and organisational issues. Yet, Malhama Tactical’s loosely organised structure and absence of similar complexities have become a fertile ground for defecting terrorists to join its ranks. They would bring resources, expertise and connections to collectively engage in global jihad and boost its numerical strength. This has resulted in a quagmire for counter-terrorism agencies who would find it difficult to dismantle the overall organisational structure and leadership through the arrests of a significant leader, which is the case with conventional terrorist groups.
According to notable strategists like Sean McFate, the activities of this organisation have revolutionised war, and it will continue to pose a grave threat in the foreseeable future.16 The appeal of global jihad and the military and technological advancements have enabled swift implementation of radical ideas promulgated by Malhama Tactical, which could possibly bolster its consolidation as the predominant jihadist for-hire group and widen its reach.
Furthermore, given the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, it has become imperative for India to overhaul its security and intelligence frameworks in the event of potential spillover of Malhama Tactical. Understandably, countries like Pakistan or their proxy groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed could independently use Malhama fighters to undermine Indian national interests using plausible deniability. The victory of the Taliban has rejuvenated the jihadist ambitions, including in Kashmir, where the Indian state has frequently engaged in counter-terrorism operations.
The website of Malhama Tactical is easily accessible for those seeking information about this organisation or to directly get in touch with its members.17 This degree of accessibility makes the emergence of radicalised and violent individuals a greater threat than before.
Furthermore, this organisation could result in an upsurge of lone-wolf terrorist attacks across India. The jihadists who do not want to affiliate themselves with a specific terrorist organisation could become radicalised by the propaganda disseminated by Malhama Tactical. Much of its activities, including instructional videos, appear to be directed towards individual extremists and not cohesive organisations. Therefore, violent and radical youth could potentially look towards this terrorist group as an outlet to realise their objectives. The adherence to Abu Musab al-Suri’s call, facilitated by internet connectivity and social media access, could create havoc, forcing societies towards civil wars. India could face terrorist threats on multiple fronts. For now, the due diligence of the counter-terrorism agencies has curtailed the dramatic upsurge of such attacks and broadly eliminated potential threats. Counter-terrorism agencies can closely monitor and seize the bitcoin transfers via channels like Telegram to counter finance terrorism.18 The states could also reverse engineer the social media-based technology used by Malhama Tactical to neutralise its fighters and trainers.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent coup in Sudan may have several ramifications for the country as well as for the stability in the region as it connects North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. It may intensify the territorial disputes and escalate tensions between Sudan and its neighbouring countries and could also affect its trade ties with countries like India.
On 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, dissolved the transitional government, declared a state of emergency and imprisoned the civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. This coup has led to widespread protests in the country and condemnation across the world. The African Union (AU) has suspended Sudan; the United Nations (UN), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Arab League have condemned the coup and called for the return of the civilian rule. Sudan’s neighbours—Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia—have called for restraint in the country. There are fears that the political crisis may lead to worsening situation internally and in the region
In April 2019, Sudan’s transitional authorities came to power after country-wide protests brought an end to then President Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. Since then, Sudan has been run by an administration of military generals and civilians from the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). In recent months, splits have deepened within the FFC and support for the transitional government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has waned to some extent due to economic reforms. Pro-military faction had been carrying out protests demanding the government’s removal. Port Sudan, the country’s largest port, on the Red Sea, has been blocked by a tribal group.
Whether the economic reforms implemented by the transitional government are the main factor behind the coup is a pertinent question to ponder upon. The timing of the coup is also worth mentioning here. According to the 2019 power sharing agreement, General Burhan was due to step down and hand over the leadership to civilians in November 2021. A BBC report suggests that the desire to protect military’s commercial interests may have led to the coup.1 Prime Minister Hamdok had critiqued military’s involvement in the economy in the past. This would expose the tentacles of the commercial empires owned by military, senior generals in particular. Prime Minister Hamdok had become increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the military entanglement in the economy. Placing the army under proper civilian control was also a priority for the next stage of the transitional period.2
Impact of the Coup
The coup in Sudan may have several ramifications. First, the Sudanese economy is in a bad shape. The secession of South Sudan in 2011, was a big economic shock, as the country lost its oil wealth which accounted for 50 per cent of the government revenue and 95 per cent of its exports. The internal conflict within South Sudan added to the misery, as the country was deprived of the revenue earned through the transit of oil through pipelines that remained in the country. Hence the transitional government had inherited a shattered economy. Over the last few years, the economic situation has not changed much with inflation at 400 per cent.3 The COVID-19 compounded the economic problems faced by the country, though Prime Minister Hamdok’s government was putting in efforts to improve the country’s economic situation.4 It was a result of these efforts that Sudan was removed from the United States’ State Sponsors of Terrorism list, thereby paving the way to access to assistance from international financial institutions.5 The economic reforms initiated by the Hamdok government helped Sudan secure billions of dollars in debt relief from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6 But the coup has reversed the progress and will certainly weaken the economy further. The US and the World Bank have paused their economic assistance to the country after the coup, and EU is likely to follow suit.
The coup also threatens the country’s fragile peace. In October 2020, the transitional government had signed the Juba Agreement for Peace with some armed rebels.7 However this agreement excluded two powerful armed groups from Central Darfur and the Two Areas. These groups are wary of the Sudanese army and interested in talking only with the civilian government. The coup has weakened the chances of these groups joining the government anytime in future. Rather there are fears that tensions may flare up in these regions.
The military coup may have an impact on the region, including inflaming existing disputes among Sudan's neighbours, for instance, it could escalate tensions between Sudan and its eastern neighbour Ethiopia. The two countries have been embroiled in a territorial dispute regarding 100 square miles of farmland in the border region of Al-Fashaga.8 This age-old dispute has existed since the colonial times, and the ambiguity regarding demarcation of border has left the issue unresolved. It is feared that the coup may also delay the resolution of the dispute related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia considers that the construction of GERD is essential for the economic progress of the country and for providing hydroelectricity to the entire region. On the other hand, Egypt and Sudan are opposed to its development as this dam would reduce Nile water flow to their countries. The Egypt government is considered to be close to the military in Sudan and may gain an edge in the running dispute thereby enhancing the chances of a deadlock.9 The coup may also push the military in Sudan to provide more support to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the ongoing internal conflict in Ethiopia precipitating a regional conflagration.10
Implications for India
The visit of Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, V. Muraleedharan, to Sudan on 18–19 October 2021, less than a week before the coup, underlines close relations between the two countries. During the visit, he had discussions with General Burhan and Prime Minister Hamdok on bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest.
India is a key development partner, with New Delhi extending Lines of Credit over US$ 631 million to the country.11 It is also noteworthy that a large number of Sudanese students study in India. During the last one year, India continued to support Sudan as it faced multiple challenges, such as an armed conflict, COVID-19 outbreak and massive floods. It was reported that the torrential floods had affected hundreds of thousands of people in the country. India supplied 10 MT of life-saving drugs essential for treating COVID-19 and also delivered 100 MT of food aid to Sudan.12
Sudan’s importance for India stems from the fact that the country has been a gateway for India’s investments in the energy sector in the African continent. India’s total investment in unified Sudan’s petroleum sector was about US$ 2.3 billion.13 In July 2011, after the succession, South Sudan took control of around 75 per cent of united Sudan’s oil production. Over the years, conflict in South Sudan and disputes between the two countries over transit and transportation of fuel have taken the shine off this investment. At present, India’s investments in South Sudan’s energy sector remain, however it does not have any stake in Sudan’s energy sector. In 2020, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) exited from Sudan after the country refused to pay for the oil it had lifted from the oil fields.14
Nevertheless, coup in Sudan may have an adverse impact on India’s trade ties with the country. In 2018, the value of bilateral trade was estimated to be around US$ 1.5 billion and total Indian investment around US$ 450 million.15 This is mainly in steel, packaging, beverage, food and pharmaceutical sector. Major Indian pharma and automobile brands have a presence in the country. Security of the Indian community in Sudan is another concern. In the past, India has evacuated Indian nationals and workers stuck in the country during turmoil.
In conclusion, it can be said that Sudan, which connects North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Sahel, is key to stability in the region, and any instability and chaos in Sudan may intensify the territorial disputes in the region. The coup may also have an impact on India’s trade ties with the country. Regional organisations, such as IGAD, AU and Sudan’s external partners including India, should put pressure on the military regime in Sudan to an early restoration of the civilian transitional government in the country.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
In the current geopolitical situation, India needs to increase the indigenous defence production and build a strong military force armed with technologically advanced defence equipment to create a robust security framework that meets the requisites of modern warfare.
A strong and well-equipped military provides a country the immunity to resist attack and thwart unprovoked aggression from external sources and deal with any kind of internal disturbance. It works as a defence mechanism and reflects the country’s military capability and capacity to defend itself against the hostile countries. Equipping the military with the latest technology and modernising the existing inventory of weapons and surveillance systems is therefore crucial for any country. India too needs to build a strong military force armed with all types of technologically advanced defence equipment to strengthen its security and intelligence and to secure its territorial integrity.1
All over the world, the countries which are embroiled in any kind of internal security issues or have border disputes with hostile neighbours or face any kind of terror threat or countries which face any war-like situation are spending more and more on strengthening their defence portfolio. The countries feel that only a strong defence and security framework can overcome any kind of threat to their autonomy or sovereignty. The technological advancement has led to development of very sophisticated weapons and many countries are now in possession of such weapons. These include ballistic missile systems, nuclear powered submarines, stealth fighter airplanes, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, etc. For tackling any kind of untoward happening, any country requires a robust and a modernised defence and security framework. Therefore, along with procuring new defence products, emphasis should be laid on doing it in such a manner that the weapons system does not become obsolete in a few years. Further, such products should be capable of being upgraded without much hassle. Any country cannot sideline the modernisation aspect as it holds the key to managing any form of unexpected aggression: internal or external.
In the current geopolitical situation, it has become vital for India to maintain its regional autonomy. India needs to assert its presence and sovereignty over the border regions and for that, it needs to have modernised defence products and strategic autonomy over such defence products. This strategic autonomy can be achieved by having a self-reliant defence industry which would ultimately strengthen the Indian economy as well. It is the need of the hour to increase the indigenous defence production to meet the requirements of the armed forces along with putting lesser burden on the exchequer. India requires an overhaul of its defence products to meet the current requisites of modern warfare. To create a robust security framework India needs to strengthen its surveillance system which requires inducting of modernised radars and drones so that suspicious activities and trespassing at the border areas could be detected at the earliest. India also needs to understand that it cannot always depend on the emergency purchases of defence equipment during the times of crises, which has been seen during the recent border clashes with Chinese troops and the rising tension along the northern borders. This has forced accelerated domestic and foreign purchase of weapons,2 however relying on the imports for emergency purchases leads to excessive spending.
Aiming to make India a manufacturing hub is a step taken in the right direction under the ambit of ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’. Promoting investments in research and development and production in the defence sector will prove to be significant in enhancing the manufacturing of defence products and in creating employment opportunities. Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector will reduce dependency on imports which will lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange expenditure and enhance the level of operational preparedness considerably. Domestic manufacturing will promote the growth of many ancillary industries within the country and at the same time, it will generate a lot of revenue by exporting defence products to other countries. Restructuring of approximately 200-year-old Ordnance Factory Board into seven State-owned corporate entities in line with the vision of Aatmanirbhar Bharat would not only increase competitiveness, but will also improve quality, cost-efficiency while ensuring self-reliance in the defence sector.3 This will help in reducing the trade deficit as well. Defence Acquisition Procedure, DAP-2020 has aimed to bring into line and support the Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan by focusing on self-reliance by boosting domestic manufacturing and encouraging private sector involvement.4
After the clarion call of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for ‘Aatmanirbharta’ and indigenisation of products in all spheres, specific efforts have been made to indigenise the Indian defence industry, and to reduce the huge import bill of the defence products. The induction of Light Combat Aircraft Tejas is a huge accomplishment in this regard, and another order for 83 Tejas fighter jets will certainly help in strengthening the Indian Air Force as well as boosting the morale of the Indian defence industry.5 Further, the embargo upon the import of 209 defence equipment means that they would be indigenously developed in India.6 A separate fund has been earmarked for supporting the start-ups (iDEX) and MSMEs for the development of design and new technology in the defence and aerospace sector.7 The government has permitted Foreign Direct Investment of up to 74 per cent in defence production through the Automatic Route to encourage domestic manufacturing and use of innovative technology in defence products, keeping into consideration the active participation of private sector. Through Automatic Route any foreign investor or Indian company can directly invest into the defence sector without any prior approval of RBI or Government of India. This would encourage ease of doing business and encourage investments in the Indian defence industry. Moreover, states are showing interest in establishing and developing defence industries in their region, for instance, Karnataka has requested the Government of India to set up a Defence Technology Hub as it already has various Defence Public Sector Undertakings like HAL, BEL and laboratories of DRDO.8 If the Indian Government keeps up with this pace of modernising Indian Armed Forces through ‘Indigenisation’, it will certainly bring a big boost to the Indian economy. Consistent efforts of the stakeholders involved in policymaking and effective implementation of the self-indigenisation campaign will be crucial for realising this dream. With the right kind of support and assistance from the Government of India, the local industries will be able to fulfil the domestic demands of the Indian armed forces and strengthen them to confront the adversaries effectively. The Indian armed forces need to be battle-ready even on short notice, especially in view of the changing nature of the threat within military domains.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sheikh Hasina and her India-friendly policies are not liked by her domestic and international opponents. The Awami League government should remain vigilant to the designs of forces inimical to it, and not let them undo the progress in India–Bangladesh relations.
The recent violence against the minorities in Bangladesh has taken a large number of people by surprise. It is not that violence against the minorities is unknown in Bangladesh, however, it was certainly put in check after Sheikh Hasina came to power. The violence against the Hindu minorities flared up once again in Cumilla this year during the Hindu festival Durga Puja when a miscreant perhaps on instigation of some extremists put the Holy Book Quran in a Puja Pandal.1 Subsequently, violence also spread to other areas due to rumour-mongering on social media.
In the last decade or so, Bangladesh has managed to prioritise economic progress over religious extremism engulfing a number of other Muslim majority countries. The country grew at a decent pace2 even when the whole world was grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic. The growing prosperity of Bangladesh is seen as a major reason behind the strong support of Bangladeshi people enjoyed by Sheikh Hasina. However, the recent violence against the minorities can prove to be detrimental if due measures are not taken by the Awami League government.
After the breakout of the violence, the government placed eight units of Border Guard Bangladesh in various parts of the Chattogram district to maintain law and order. State Minister for Religious Affairs Md Faridul Haque Khan warned people not to take law into their own hands. He stated that the local administration will investigate what really happened in Cumilla. A week later, the Bangladesh police managed to arrest Iqbal Hossain, identified as the key suspect in instigating the Cumilla violence from Cox's Bazar. The civil society in Bangladesh also protested violence against the minorities. They have demanded that Bangladesh government should enact a new law to ensure religious freedom for everyone. However, the situation still remains tense in the country.
After coming to power in 2009, the Sheikh Hasina government took strong measures against the anti-liberation forces, in a large measure represented by Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh. The other extremist groups present in Bangladesh were an outgrowth of Jamaat, as they thought that Jamaat was not being radical enough. The Awami League government carried out war crime trials of the prominent Jamaat leaders. A number of them were hanged for the crimes committed during the liberation war. When the war crime tribunal in Bangladesh gave only life sentence to the Jamaat leader Abdul Quader Molla, a large number of people in Bangladesh were incensed, and it led to the Shahbag movement in 2013, during which the pro-liberation forces demanded hanging of Abdul Quader Molla for his crimes during the liberation war.3
Unfortunately, along with the Shahbag movement, Bangladesh also saw the rise of Hefazat-e-Islam, another radical Islamist movement in the year 2013.4 Hefazat-e-Islam ransacked Dhaka when it launched its protest against the organisers of the Shahbag movement. It considered them atheists.5 Ironically, subsequently Awami League tied up with Hefazat-e-Islam perhaps to gain electoral mileage.6 It has not been easy for any government in a Muslim majority country to follow secular policies. This dilemma was also seen in the policies of Awami League. It acted against the Jamaatis but could not change the status of Islam as the religion of state.
Hasina has also acted against radical and terrorist organisations. Once in power, she declared a policy of zero tolerance against terrorism. This kind of policy was only expected from her as she was nearly killed in a terrorist attack in Dhaka in 2004 when she was addressing a rally. In this attack, 24 Awami League workers, including one of her close associates, were killed.7
Hasina took action against Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), a group which was active in Bangladesh but was also carrying out terror strikes within India. She also took action against other Bangladeshi groups like Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Pakistan-based Islamist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed were using Bangladesh as a transit route. Hasina’s tough measures stopped their use of Bangladesh as a springboard for terror activities against India.
India was pleasantly surprised when Hasina took action against the Indian insurgent groups active in North East India. These groups were using Bangladesh as a base for their terror activities in North East India. Previous political and military regimes in Bangladesh had consciously allowed these insurgent groups to operate from Bangladesh. In fact when Sheikh Hasina took action against them and handed over most of their top leaders to India, these forces criticised Hasina for losing an important pressure point against India.8 Sheikh Hasina’s cooperation with India on counter-terrorism has dramatically improved India–Bangladesh relations and has taken it to a different level altogether.
However, return of Sheikh Hasina to power and her India-friendly policies have not been liked by her domestic and international opponents. Domestically she has faced strong resistance from the main opposition party the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami. Though Jamaat has been deregistered by the Election Commission of Bangladesh for not recognising the legislative power of Bangladesh parliament, it still has significant influence in the country. Jamaat as part of ruling coalition of the BNP-led government controlled two important ministries. During this period it tried to Islamise Bangladeshi society. The influence of Jamaat also increased in army, bureaucracy and police forces of Bangladesh.
Pakistan is one of the important international players which is hostile to the Sheikh Hasina government. When Sheikh Hasina declared her intention to try war criminals, it was not liked by Pakistan. Pakistan had sent Zia Ispahni as its special envoy to dissuade Sheikh Hasina from carrying out the trials. However, since she remained adamant on war crime trials, it is widely suspected that ISI instigated a rebellion in the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), then border guarding force of Bangladesh.9 This rebellion nearly upturned the political regime of Sheikh Hasina., but she managed to save the situation though with great difficulty.
Sheikh Hasina’s actions against Jamaat and prosecution of the BNP leader Khaleda Zia over the corruption charges have managed to weaken the opposition, but they are still a force to reckon with. The opposition has been out of power for the last three terms, and in order to make a comeback, they would like to create a situation of political crisis in Bangladesh so that either army is provoked to take control of power or to create a caretaker government. The army in Bangladesh has undergone significant changes as now most of the Pakistan-era officers have retired but it still remains an important factor in the polity of Bangladesh. The easiest way for opposition in Bangladesh is to create a political crisis in Bangladesh by inciting communal strife.10 Perhaps the forces inimical to Sheikh Hasina government are trying to do just that. The Awami League government should remain vigilant to the designs of forces inimical to it and not let them undo the works done by it in the last one decade or so.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The notification regarding modification of area of jurisdiction of the BSF focuses on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. It is important that the BSF trains its personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC and work towards better coordination with the other agencies.
On 11 October 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) through a Gazette Notification, modified the areas of jurisdiction for the Border Security Force (BSF) to exercise its powers in the states bordering Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. According to the new Notification, the BSF’s jurisdiction now comprises “the whole of the area in the States of Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya and Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) and Ladakh and so much of the area within a belt of fifty kilometers in the States of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal and Assam, running along the borders of India”.1 This Notification, in effect, amends the 3 July 2014 Notification by increasing the area of jurisdiction of the BSF in Punjab, West Bengal and Assam to 50 km from existing 15 km, while reducing the area in Gujarat to 50 km from existing 80 km. There is no change in the area of jurisdiction of the BSF in the north-eastern states and the union territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.
Reasons for Jurisdictional Changes
This decision of the MHA is apparently triggered by national security concerns following the recent developments in Afghanistan.2 Apprehensions are raised that the taking over of Afghanistan by the Taliban has emboldened anti-India elements in the Af-Pak region, and, as a result India might witness heightened incidents of cross-border terrorism in future. This concern is reinforced by the concomitant rise in terrorist attacks in J & K as well as an increase in the incidents of arms being dropped by Pakistani drones in Punjab. At the same time, concerns regarding illegal migration, cattle smuggling, trafficking in person and narcotics as well as smuggling in fake Indian currency notes (FICN) along the Bangladesh border continue to persist.
BSF’s Response
The BSF has welcomed the decision of the MHA. In its official statement released to the press, the organisation said, “The amendment will aid the border guarding force in effectively curbing trans-border crimes and the new amendment brings in ‘uniformity’ for its operations in the border states of Punjab, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Assam where it can now operate within a 50 kms area from the border”.3 For instance, in Punjab, where the drones from Pakistan intrude far deeper than 15 km to drop the weapons, the increased jurisdictional limit will enable the BSF to track and destroy them effectively. Similarly, in West Bengal and Assam, the cattle smugglers and criminals operate from the hinterland, and despite credible evidence/intelligence, the BSF is unable to nab them. Now, with the increase in their operational limits, the force will be able to conduct raids and make arrests deep inside the state.
Changes Made in the BSF’s Power
It is important to note that the new Notification empowers the BSF to search, seize and arrest only in respect to the Passport Act of 1967, the Passport (Entry into India) Act of 1920, and specified sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) in the extended area of its jurisdiction. The BSF’s powers and duties regarding other central acts such as the Customs Act, the Central Excise and Salt Act, the Narcotics and Psychotropic (NDPS) Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, etc., do not apply to the extended area of jurisdiction and remain same as earlier, that is, 15 km for Punjab, West Bengal and Assam and 80 km for Gujarat.4 In other words, the emphasis is laid on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. Further, the Notification does not provide the BSF the power to investigate and prosecute, which implies that the BSF still has to hand the arrested person and the seized consignments over to the State Police within 24 hours after minimal questioning.
Reaction to the Changes
Predictably, the Notification has attracted a wide spectrum of reactions from political parties as well as security analysts and academics depending upon their political leanings. While the BJP-ruled Assam government has welcomed the decision and expressed confidence that in coordination with the state police, the amendment will help defeat cross-border smuggling and illegal migration, the Congress-ruled Punjab and the Trinamool Congress-ruled West Bengal governments have termed it “a direct attack on federalism” and “an infringement on the rights of the state”.5
Significant here is to mention that, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2011, had attempted to extend the jurisdictional limits of the BSF to the entire country. For this purpose, the Border Security Force (Amendment) Bill in Rajya Sabha was introduced in the Rajya Sabha wherein it was proposed to amend the BSF Act by deleting the words “adjoining the borders of India” and, inserting the words “or in any part of the territory thereof” after the words “borders of India”.6 This amendment was considered necessary given the expansion of the role of the BSF as the force was deployed in various states for counter-insurgency and anti-Naxal operations, internal security duties as well as for assistance during natural calamities.7 While arguing for the amendment, the then Home Minister, P. Chidambaram had said that such enabling provisions already existed in the Acts governing CRPF, ITBP and SSB.8
As regards the new notification, the MHA had notified that the amendment has come into force on 11 October 2021. However, the BSF Act under Section 139 (3) requires the government to lay the notification before each house of the Parliament within 30 days for the members to raise a motion for discussion, modification or annulment of the notification. Unless the amendment is approved by the Parliament, the notification cannot come into force. Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, acquiescing to the demands of the TMC members, has agreed to discuss this notification and added it to the list of agenda.9
Voices of Concern from Within BSF
As far as the BSF is concerned, the decision has generated mixed reaction. While it has welcomed the extension of their jurisdiction in the three states, sections within have pointed out to the practical difficulties in their functioning. To begin with, the BSF officers10 revealed that the BSF personnel on the ground do not effectively utilise the powers vested upon them even within the existing 15 km belt because they are not conversant either with the Acts or the various sections of the CrPC, which empower them in their area of jurisdiction. That is why more often than not, they had to depend on the local Police while conducting search and seize operations or arrest suspected criminals, especially in populated areas.
They further stated that the BSF shares an excellent working relationship with the state police. In fact, most of the raids and arrests that are conducted are in close coordination and cooperation with the local police. Even in states where vested political interests malign the BSF and instruct their police not to cooperate with the force,11 the Police do act against any smuggler or criminal if the BSF provides irrefutable evidence. They, however, feel that the new notification could potentially generate bad blood between the BSF and the state police because the police might perceive the enhanced jurisdiction as an infringement on their powers. In fact, a few police officers have expressed concerns that the BSF might conduct arbitrary raids and arrests on behest of the Union government.12 Besides the State Police, the BSF officers argue that the people in the border areas, in general, resent their presence. Some of the officers even accept that they have not been successful in garnering the support of the people in border areas. They lament that the notification will further aggravate the situation as the people in the hinterland will now also raise their voice against the force. Consequently, the BSF will have to grapple with the resentment of both the police as well as the people of these states.
A few BSF officers also expressed their dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Police and the Customs department towards crime. They argue that when an illegal infiltrator or a smuggler is handed over to the local Police, they either set him/her free under political pressure or because of financial incentives, which negates the hard work put in by the BSF. Furthermore, in case of cattle smuggling, after the BSF hands over the cattle to the Customs officials, they auction the cattle. However, since the Customs officials are not careful in screening the customers, these cattle are bought back by the smugglers who then smuggle the consignment to Bangladesh.
Given these constraints, some of the officers argue that the BSF should be given additional power of investigation and prosecution so that trans-border crime can be curbed effectively. This view is not shared by others who argue that investigation and prosecution will require additional manpower and resources and detract the BSF from their original mandate of acting as the first line of defence against external threats. They instead propose that the BSF officers should be given the authority to hand over such cases which they consider to be extremely sensitive to central agencies such as National Investigation Agency (NIA), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Customs, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), etc., instead of the local police. They also demand that the BSF should be given the power to monitor the telephonic conversation of the criminals who are active in the border-belt areas.13 It is moot whether these demands of the BSF officers are feasible.
Conclusion
In sum, the notification appears to be a welcome decision. However, for it to be effective the BSF has to concentrate on training their personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC. At the same time, emphasis must be laid on the sensitising the personnel on the local customs, traditions and languages so that the BSF can initiate a dialogue with the border inhabitants and encourage them to support the efforts of the force in making the border areas secure and peaceful. The union government, on its part, should formulate guidelines for the operationalisation of the notification in order to mitigate any confusion that may arise. It should also establish structures such as district and state coordination committees and appoint nodal officers to achieve better synergy among all the agencies concerned.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent visit of the Chief of US Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday to India is not only significant to the national security narrative of India and the US but it is also bound to have a profound impact on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
Military Diplomacy has always been an important element of a bilateral relationship that signifies mutual trust, political alignment and strategic assurances between two nations. In this light, the visit of the Chief of US Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday to India in October 2021 is quite significant to the national security narrative of India and the US. At the same time, this visit signifies greater enactment of American strategy for the Indo-Pacific and is also bound to have a profound impact on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.
India as a Cornerstone in the US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific
Successive American governments over the last decade have identified India as a crucial link in their Indo-Pacific rebalancing efforts. This was first reflected in their “National Security Strategy” document released in December 2017, which describes the Indo-Pacific region as a geopolitical arena where competition between free and repressive perspectives of global order is taking place.1 Here India’s rise as a leading global power and a strategic contender to China in the Indo-Pacific has been acknowledged. Also, the Quad has been described as a platform for bolstering strategic cooperation with India, Japan and Australia to safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.
The critical role of India in the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific was again reiterated in the document titled “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing Shared Vision” released by the US Department of State on 4 November 2019. This document indirectly describes China as an authoritarian revisionist power that seeks to pursue its interests at the expense of others in the Indo-Pacific. 2 Hence, the India–US strategic relations are emerging as a crucial component of America’s strategy to counter China’s aggressive expansionism in the region.
Strategic Significance of Admiral Gilday’s Visit
The announcement of AUKUS, the unprecedented escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait and the continued impasse between India and China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are the contributing factors to the tensions in the region. The visit coming in the midst of these developments does signify a greater degree of America’s concerns about China’s actions in the region. The timing and the agenda of Admiral Gilday’s visit do reflect some of the tenets articulated in the “2019 Shared Vision”for promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Among these tenets, the strengthening of India–US naval cooperation is seen as a critical element for securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. Describing India as the “closest strategic partner”, Admiral Gilday stressed on achieving high-end interoperability between both the navies across all aspects of naval warfare.3 Aboard the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the Bay of Bengal, Admiral Gilday affirmed the Indo-US naval cooperation being a crucial component within the Quad navies. He described the Malabar exercise as an excellent platform for overseeing the first-hand integration of the Indian and U.S navies.4
The other aspect that the “2019 Shared Vision” laid emphasis on is the strengthening of interoperability among the Quad navies being essential for joint operations in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. The document identifies the Malabar naval exercises as an important platform to develop and demonstrate growing interoperability between the Quad navies.5 Admiral Gilday’s visit coinciding with the second phase of the 25th Malabar exercise illustrates America’s focus towards enhancing the synergy between Quad navies. The Chief of the US Navy being personally present in the first joint exercise encompassing the Quad navies after their respective leaders met in Washington on 24 September 2021 is being considered strategically significant.
Expanding existing avenues for military and political cooperation to include more like-minded nations to secure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is something that has been expressed in both “2019 Shared Vision” and “2017 National Security Strategy”. This aspect resonated with Admiral Gilday’s remarks to the press at the outset of the 2021 Malabar Exercise where he brought forth the view of expanding the annual quadrilateral naval exercise to include more like-minded nations.6 Although he did acknowledge that the decision to expand the Malabar Exercise rests with the political leadership of Quad.
Among the most important aspects of Admiral Gilday’s visit was the signalling of the completion of American rebalancing efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2016 the US Navy announced that it aims to deploy 60 per cent of its surface ships in the Indo-Pacific Region by 2019.7 Maintaining a sustained naval presence in the Indo-Pacific has been described as instrumental in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific in the“2019 Shared Vision”. In his very first interaction with the press, Admiral Gilday conveyed that the US Navy has completed its rebalancing with 60 per cent of its forces operating in the region.8
Significance to India’s Maritime Security
Although Admiral Gilday’s visit primarily centred on consolidating American interests in the Indo-Pacific, it does have enormous significance for India’s maritime security. In 2015 the Indian Navy published its maritime security document titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”. This document advocates the enhancement of naval cooperation and interoperability with friendly nations as a key determinant for shaping a favourable maritime security environment for India.9 The detailed scrutiny of both “2019 Shared Vision” and “2015 Ensuring Secure Seas” reveals that there is a considerable overlap with both nations emphasising on a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Enhancing naval cooperation with US Navy enables the Indian Navy to efficiently extend the operational reach across the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy Ships can avail replenishment from US naval facilities across the Indo-Pacific through the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that was signed in 2016. This is in addition to bilateral logistics support agreements that have been signed by India with several friendly nations over the past couple of years. These agreements enable the Indian Navy to use naval facilities stretched across the Indo-Pacific for replenishment. Some of these important logistics support agreements are as follows:
The sharing of information between the armed forces of India and the US is facilitated by the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed on 6 September 2018. On the other hand, sharing of geo-spatial information between India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the US’ National Geospatial Agency (NGA) is enabled through Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA) signed on 27 October 2020. The MoD describes this set of agreements as the blueprint for collaboration between the two nations that are instrumental for achieving a “Free, Open and inclusive Indo-Pacific”. 10 Hence, the strategic weight that Admiral Gilday’s visit to India carries can be regarded as a step forward in achieving greater operational capability for the Indian Navy through enhancing cooperation with the US.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific.
Over the years, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has expanded its agenda to adapt itself to face the gen-next threats in the Indo-Pacific, most notably the emerging technology. The Quad was created as an ad hoc group to help the Indo-Pacific littoral states in the aftermath of the Tsunami in 2004. Although the first iteration of the Quad in 2007 was short-lived, the latest iteration promises that Quad is here to stay for decades to come. This inference can be reached based on the expansive agenda that the Quad has drawn for itself, which looks beyond narrow security calculations in the region. The first in-person summit of the Quad leaders delved upon not only the security situation in the Indo-Pacific but also multiple areas, including the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, climate crisis, terrorism and emerging technology. By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quad has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is pertinent to look at the evolution of the second iteration of the Quad and how the minilateral is seamlessly synergising technology with its original agenda of security.
Evolution of the Quad
Amid the belligerent behaviour of China in the maritime continuum of the Indo-Pacific and growing trust and comfort between the four democracies1 , the Quad re-emerged on the sidelines of the 31st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, 2017. Four working-level meetings—November 2017, June 2018, November 2018 and May 2019—involving officials from the foreign ministries of Delhi, Washington, Tokyo and Canberra focused on “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” benefitting all in the region and the world at large.2 They also touched upon connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cyber security and ASEAN centrality.3 The separate statements from the four capitals also mentioned about the respect for sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all nations in a transparent, economically viable and financially responsible manner.4
In September 2019, the working-level meeting of the Quad was elevated to the ministerial-level meeting when the United States (US) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosted his counterparts from India, Japan and Australia in New York. Although the leaders did not issue a joint statement post meeting, the issues raised were similar to those raised during the working-level meetings.5 The first ministerial meeting saw a limited expansion of the agenda as the Quad countries “conducted a tabletop counter-terrorism exercise in November 2019 and convened a meeting of cyber experts the following month”.6 As COVID-19 gripped the world in early 2020, the senior officials’ consultation of the four countries “underscored the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains” and added pandemic and best practices to deal with the same in the agenda of the meeting.7 The second ministerial meeting of the Quad in Tokyo, held in October 2020, discussed “post COVID-19 international order” and issues related to “the resilience of supply chains” in addition to the maritime security issues of the Indo-Pacific.
Emergence of Technology as a Cornerstone
COVID-19 and the subsequent behaviour of China raised many questions regarding China’s commitment to rise as a responsible international player. China’s tendency to weaponise trade and technology became obvious. China punished Australia in the domain of trade as the latter demanded a fair enquiry into the origin of COVID-19. Moreover, reports emerged about the Chinese quest to snoop the foreign governments by using 5G mobile network technology8 and meddle in the country’s internal affairs9 . Earlier, in 2017, China enacted the National Intelligence Law that made it mandatory for the Chinese firms to cooperate with its intelligence agencies by giving free access to their data within and without China.10 Thus, the law violated the digital sovereignty of the nations where Chinese firms had market access in accordance with the international law. In view of the Chinese threat in the realm of emerging technologies, the Quad proved deft enough to adapt to the new reality.
The joint statement following the Quad leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021 mentioned “critical technologies” three times. The leaders resolved that the Quad “will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific”.11 The minilateral group also launched “a critical- and emerging-technology working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative technologies of the future”.12 Building on the spirit of technological cooperation, the Quad took a holistic view of the emerging technologies and associated issues. In the realm of 5G mobile networks, the Quad, during the first-ever in-person summit in September 2021, decided to deploy “secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond-5G networks” from trustworthy vendors. The statement exuded confidence about coming up with the “open, standards-based 5G technology”. Individually, the Quad countries devised formal and informal policies to deny entry to untrustworthy telecom vendors.13 The leaders also announced sector-specific contact groups to develop technical standards for emerging technologies. They launched the Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use with the purpose of “guiding not only the region but the world towards responsible, open, high-standards innovation”.14
Sensing the vulnerabilities in the supply chains, the Quad leaders decided “to map the supply chain of the critical technologies and materials”15 and diversify the same. Further, India, Japan and Australia launched Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to counter Chinese dominance of the supply chains in the region.16 The need to diversify the supply chains away from China was felt intensely in the light of deteriorating relations between China and members of Quad. As Amitendu Palit has argued, the repositioning of strategic supply chains, especially in the field of semiconductors and telecommunications, was part of a broader strategy to decouple from China and “to develop a coalition of like-minded countries for taking on an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific”.17 In the realm of Artificial Intelligence, the Quad countries are working with other like-minded countries for an initiative titled “Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence”18 under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that promotes inclusive and responsible use of Artificial Intelligence.
Domestically, India is taking baby steps to shape the rules and norms vis-à-vis emerging technologies such as 5G and Artificial Intelligence on international platforms. The country is debating the issues related to data sovereignty vigorously. It has also come up with an Approach Document on Artificial Intelligence.19 Bilaterally, India is collaborating with like-minded countries in the field of emerging technologies. India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2021, to enhance cooperation in Information and Communications Technologies, covering 5G technologies, telecom security, submarine optical fibre cable system to islands of India, and spectrum management, among others.20 Similarly, India and Australia have set up the India–Australia Joint Working Group on Cyber Security Cooperation.21 The two countries have also signed the Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals.22 India is also cooperating with ASEAN for capacity building and knowledge sharing in the areas of Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G, among others, to achieve the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM2025).23 Separately, India and the US have resolved to “revive the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in early 2022, to accelerate high technology commerce in key areas”.24 In October 2020, India joined Japan and Five Eyes Alliance countries to demand access to end-to-end encrypted communication from big tech companies.25
Thus, in addition to its existing agenda of securing free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad is fast embracing the emerging technology as a critical area to build upon. By spindling around the emerging technologies, the Quad is successfully expanding horizontally. Similarly, with the initiatives such as the Quad plus—which included the foreign secretary-level meeting of New Zealand, Vietnam, South Korea and the foreign ministers-level meeting of Brazil, South Korea, Israel to discuss COVID-19—the Quad is stretching laterally. As authoritarian societies are better equipped to extract data from their citizens than free societies26 , the Quad is trying to offer an alternative model different from the coercive vision of the authoritarian states in the Indo-Pacific. With the emerging technology intruding into our daily lives and changing how nations create power and wield it against one another27 , the Quad is proving to be a prudent minilateral to cope with the technological churn in the Indo-Pacific.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The growing trend of attacks on international entities besides the government units and civilians in Mali is an issue of serious concern. The complex security situation in Mali and high fatalities of peacekeepers has led to MINUSMA being perceived as the most dangerous UN Peacekeeping mission.
On 2 October 2021, a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeeper died and four others were seriously injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Tessalit, Kidal region. Strongly condemning the incident, Mr El-Ghassim Wane, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MINUSMA, remarked that, “this incident is a sad reminder of the permanent danger that hangs over our peacekeepers and of the sacrifices made for peace in Mali.”1 The worsening security situation in Mali is fuelled by political instability and economic crisis. As per UN official statistics, 255 peacekeepers have lost their lives in Mali as part of MINUSMA, as on 31 August 2021.2 The growing trend of attacks on international entities besides the government units and civilians in Mali is an issue of serious concern. Against this backdrop, this commentary provides an insight into the security situation in Mali and attempts to explore the questions—What do the terrorists and insurgent groups in Mali seek? Why has the violence increased? Why have peacekeepers been targeted frequently?
Security Situation in Mali
Over the last few decades, Mali has been troubled by issues like ineffective governance, poor economic conditions, human rights violations and feeling of marginalisation among communities in the northern region. In recent years, these challenges have been exacerbated by the increase of insurgency and jihadist elements, absence of political will to protect civilians, issues of corruption and internal strife among different sections in the society.
The security crisis in Mali began with the armed rebellion in 2012 by ethnic Tuaregs of the separatist organisation Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) which seeks to establish a separate Tuareg state called Azawad in northern Mali.3 The MNLA was aided by external Islamist militant groups like the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine.4 The crisis was aggravated by the military coup in 2012. Owing to the subsequent political instability and violent conflict, northern Mali became a breeding ground for various insurgent, violent extremist and terrorist outfits. While local insurgent movements like the Tuareg rebels have turned into organised terrorist outfits through linkages with fighters from AQIM; external terrorist groups like the AQIM Sahel Branch laid inroads into the region in 2017 by merging with local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting Islam and Muslims (also known as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin [JNIM]) further worsening the crisis.5 Frequent attacks on civilians by armed extremist groups like JNIM, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and others have led to the displacement of over 3,70,000 people.6 It is of grave concern that besides consolidating their control over the northern and central areas of Mali, these groups have begun to expand into the southern regions.7
The weakening of the State institutions by frequent coups, three in less than a decade, has further deteriorated the security situation.8 The most recent coup in May 2021 was led by Col Assimi Goïta, the interim vice-president of the transitional government, who seized power from the transitional President Bah Ndaw and the Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. He announced that he felt obligated to arrest the members of the transitional government in order to preserve the “transitional charter and defend the republic” as they had failed to consult him on the reshuffle of the Cabinet which removed two influential military-appointed Cabinet Ministers.9 The resulting political instability has inadvertently strengthened the terrorist elements who take advantage of the lack in checks and balances. These groups seek to gain territory in order to carry out their operations. The involvement of several external actors like the French troops, MINUSMA, G5 Sahel Force and others to aid the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) has yielded limited success. The JNIM and another AQIM offshoot associated with the Islamic State have claimed several attacks against UN personnel and state targets in Mali and Burkina Faso.10 The security crisis is amplified by the growth of organised crime networks involved in human trafficking and drug smuggling in the region suspected to be the source of funding for the terrorist groups. It has been reported that the continued strengthening of the militant groups in Sahel region based out of northern Mali could allow the Islamic State and Al Qaeda to establish a safe haven and engage in intensified militancy.
The MINUSMA
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was instituted in 2013 by the UNSC Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to perform security-related tasks and support political processes in Mali.11 Through the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2164, its functions were expanded to include protection of civilians, support reconciliation efforts and national political dialogues amongst others.12 As of March 2021, MINUSMA includes 13,289 military personnel, 1,920 police personnel and 1,619 civilians contributed by over 60 countries.13 Owing to the security conditions, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has continually extended the mandate of MINUSMA each time by a year. It was extended up to 30 June 2022 by passing of the UNSC Resolution 2584 on 29 June 2021.14 These resolutions also include dimensions like ensuring political transition; renewal of asset freeze and travel bans on persons obstructing the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; and extending the mandate of a 15-member Expert Panel to aid in monitoring the situation and facilitate political dialogue.
Attacks on MINUSMA Peacekeepers and Its Implications
The attacks on UN Peacekeepers has increased over the last few months. In April 2021, four peacekeepers were killed and 19 were seriously injured in an attack on their camp in Aguelhok, Kidal.15 Furthermore, in January 2021, four peacekeepers lost their lives and seven were seriously injured by IED attacks.16The complexity of the security situation in Mali and high fatalities of peacekeepers has led to MINUSMA being perceived as the most dangerous UN Peacekeeping mission. In an official statement referring to the 2 October 2021 incident, the UN Secretary General called on the Malian government to immediately identify the perpetrators to ensure swift justice, reiterating that attack on peacekeepers amounts to “war crimes” under the international law.17
Numerous resolutions too have been passed by UNSC on the situation in Mali such as 2584 in June and 2590 in August this year, amongst others.18 However, the continued incidents of violence raise concerns about the utility of issuing statements alone. There is an urgent need to proactively implement them and ensure accountability on actions. Owing to the security crisis, MINUSMA has been aided by ad hoc missions like the G5 Sahel Joint Force. However, these multiple missions need to be closely coordinated to complement one another rather than causing unnecessary overlap in their activities.19
The primary reason underlying the violence against the peacekeepers is the indigenous resentment against the presence of foreign military troops on Mali soil.20 The militant outfits dub the peacekeepers as “Crusader Occupation forces” and specifically target them.21 Insurgent elements of the Tuareg groups perceive the foreign presence as a weakness of the state authority and interference in the internal affairs of Mali. The slow progress on implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, is an added dimension. The peace deal also known as “Algiers Accord” was mediated by Algeria and signed between the Government of Mali and two northern armed coalitions assuring disarmament, addressing northern political grievances, promoting development and re-establishment of state authority in the north.22 The implementation of the agreement has been stalled due to delayed response from the government, the emergence of new armed factions since 2015 as well as armed struggle between the northern factions due to competing objectives which has complicated the security scenario.23
It could also perhaps be that attacking peacekeepers, which is covered by the international media, gives negative limelight to the violent factions and reinforces a sense of relevance. This is incited by poor progress or non-implementation of strict measures against the perpetrators by Malian authorities. Since the government is itself dependent on the foreign troops to prevent acts of terrorism, it is not equipped to militarily react to attacks on the foreign actors like the UN Peacekeepers, effectively.24 Other reasons for the lack of strict measures is the malfunctioning of judicial system, corruption, lack of training and constraints in resources.25 Mali ranks 19th in the Fragile States Index 2021 implying that the state presently lacks the ability and infrastructure to enforce accountability for attacks against peacekeepers.26
Yet another facet to the issue is the framework and functioning of UN peacekeeping operations. UN Peacekeepers are equipped to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups but not to engage in counter-terrorism activities.27 Although MINUSMA is the only peacekeeping operation authorised to counter asymmetric threats, it does not have the tools to deal with organised armed terrorists making them easy targets.28
Any form of attack on the blue helmets is unacceptable and the UN must take efficacious measures of accountability. India pioneered this effort by organising an open level debate titled “Protecting the Protectors” during its UNSC Presidency in August 2021 chaired by External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar. The resolution must gain traction by being proactively implemented at the earliest so as to avoid further incidents of violence and loss of faith on humanitarian aid by countries. The security crisis in Mali has spilled over to the region and the increased violence against peacekeepers needs to be given due attention by the international community before the crisis escalates out of control.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
US has undertaken a number of initiatives on cybersecurity, specifically ransomware, one of them being the Counter-Ransomware Initiative Meeting held in October 2021. Whether this attempt by the US to mobilise a larger group of countries to discuss ransomware will lead to real outcomes, or is just meant to endorse its actions, remains to be seen.
Even as the pandemic was wreaking havoc worldwide through the course of the past year, the ransomware gang REvil was doing the same in cyberspace, locking up computers of multiple companies and government organisations, mainly US-based, till they coughed up a ransom, to be paid through cryptocurrency.1 REvil operations ceased briefly after their websites and infrastructure were disabled by the US government agencies in July 2021, but reappeared soon afterwards. According to the news reports, they have again been taken down through US-led operations with multiple countries.2
Since assuming office, the Biden Administration has undertaken a number of domestic and international initiatives on cybersecurity, and specifically ransomware, from bringing it on the agenda in the NATO and G-7 summits held in June 2021, discussing the issue with President Putin at the Geneva summit in the same month, to taking action, such as the one detailed above, against ransomware actors and cryptocurrency exchanges through its domestic law enforcement and judicial agencies. This also follows on the large number of ransomware attacks the US has faced in recent years—an estimate by the Treasury Department found that at least $ 400 million had been collected by way of ransomware by actors mainly based in Russia.3
In a precursor of sorts to the latest action, the US National Security Council held a virtual Counter-Ransomware Initiative Meeting at the White House on 13th and 14th of October 2021. Thirty-two countries were invited to the meeting with the notable exception of Russia. Nonetheless, the United States maintained that this meeting was not targeted against any one country and that they in fact had an existing arrangement with Russia to discuss these issues.4 The goal of this particular meeting was to get international partners together to give an outline of US’ ransomware efforts and to work together to eradicate this scourge.
US’ efforts have centred around four pillars, the first being to disrupt the ransomware infrastructure and actors. Unilateral actions taken in this regard have included sanctioning cryptocurrency exchanges. The second strategy has been to identify the vulnerabilities which enable ransomware actors to take control of computers, especially those controlling critical information infrastructure and other critical networks. The third strategy has been to intensify efforts to trace ransomware payments, and the fourth, using diplomatic means to address the issue. To highlight that this was not a unilateral effort, four countries led discussions on these issues, these being India for national resilience, Australia for disruption, the UK for countering illicit finance through virtual currency, and Germany for diplomacy. At a background briefing, a senior administration official took pains to emphasise that there was no favouritism or other consideration on the basis of which these countries had been selected and that it was mainly the outcome of many factors including availability and logistics. This was only the first of a series of such meetings planned.5
As far as the outcome of the meeting is concerned, the Joint Statement released on 14 October 2021 noted that the participating countries had taken note of the “need for urgent action, common priorities, and complementary efforts to reduce the risk of ransomware”.6 Such efforts would include “improving network resilience to prevent incidents when possible and respond effectively when incidents do occur; addressing the abuse of financial mechanisms to launder ransom payments or conduct other activities that make ransomware profitable; and disrupting the ransomware ecosystem via law enforcement collaboration to investigate and prosecute ransomware actors, addressing safe havens for ransomware criminals, and continued diplomatic engagement.”7
On resilience, the emphasis was on information sharing and best practices. On illicit financing, much of the recommendations centred around using the existing mechanisms for anti-money laundering effectively to combat the use of virtual currencies for ransomware. Recognising that ransomware emanated from identifiable countries, the statement called for taking appropriate steps to counter cybercriminal activity by impressing on countries not to allow the use of their territories for criminal activities and eliminating safe havens for those conducting such disruptive and destabilising operations. As a variation of “all means necessary”, the statement noted that countries could use “all national tools available in taking action against those responsible for ransomware operations threatening critical infrastructure and public safety”.8
The diplomatic tools outlined were a mix of coercive and cooperative diplomacy. States were to be “encouraged” to take “reasonable steps to address ransomware operations emanating from within their territory”. Coordinated sanctions or “naming and shaming” actions of the type that have already been taken by the US and its allies seem implicit in the commitment to “leverage diplomacy through coordination of action in response to states whenever they do not address the activities of cybercriminals”.9 On the whole, this was an effort to endorse US’ approach towards combating ransomware.
The Counter-Ransomware Summit has been an attempt to move out of its comfort zone of close allies and mobilise a larger group of countries to discuss ransomware. Despite being the world’s foremost cyberpower, the US has been a laggard when it comes to cooperation in cyberspace, and has preferred sticking to its long-established positions in fora like the UN, and steering behind the scenes in fora such as the ASEAN. As the well-known author and analyst John Arquilla wrote recently, right at the dawn of the cyber age, when Russia was interested in establishing rules of the road for cyberspace, the US demurred from doing so because it did not see it in its interest to be constrained by rules.10
Whilst this is a good initiative, it remains to be seen whether this is any different from existing efforts or will lead to real outcomes. Actions such as the one against REvil can only be taken by countries with the heft and capabilities of the US and is not a long-term solution to cyber-criminal activities, state-backed or otherwise. It is also at cross-purposes with principles such as sovereignty and jurisdiction which the US has sworn to uphold as the lynchpin of the current world order. Initiatives such as this might work better if all major cyberpowers are brought on board, and more concrete proposals put on the table. Other fora like the BRICS, for instance, have gone beyond summitry to holding workshops on cybersecurity issues, for instance, India hosted a BRICS seminar on “Misuse of Internet for Terrorist Purposes and Role of Digital Forensics in Terrorist Investigations” in April and a workshop on Digital Forensic Analysis in September this year. Ironically enough, even though the actions against REvil were undertaken by Cyber Command only after a determination by the US Justice Department that ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure should be treated as a national security issue akin to terrorism, there was no discussion on terror groups’ use of ransomware and cryptocurrency during the meet.11
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power is quite evident in its initiatives like the Polar Silk Road. In light of growing global ambition and resource needs, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition.
In its 14th Five Year Plan released in March this year, China has pledged to build a Polar Silk Road (PSR) over the period 2021–2025.1 Following this declaration, just a few months later in September, the Chinese ice-breaker Xuelong 2 returned to the Shanghai port from a 79 days’ expedition after successfully completing China’s 12th Arctic scientific expedition.2 Although the Chinese state media reported it as a purely scientific exercise focused on understanding the effects of climate change on the Arctic ecology, however, considering China’s latest pronouncements in the 14th Five Year Plan and its previous statements on the importance of Arctic region in China’s national security, it remains to be stated that these expeditions are meant for more than scientific knowledge.3 Beijing’s growing foreign policy interests in the Arctic have raised eyebrows amongst the Euro-Asian community, including India which is aiming to make its presence counted in the Arctic region. New Delhi has exhibited significant interest in the Arctic affairs. In 2013, New Delhi acquired the observer status in the Arctic Council and in January 2021, it proposed India’s Draft Arctic Policy elaborating its stand on the Arctic.4 What China’s growing inroads into the Arctic and its ambition to execute a Polar Silk Road means to India?
China’s Interests and Strategies in the Arctic
China’s interests in the Arctic are threefold—execute strategic ambition, enhance economic supremacy, and acquire polar great power status. Such interests are well-orchestrated and aimed to steadily build Beijing’s Polar Silk Road that would correspond with its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In many ways, the speech delivered by President Xi Jinping in 2014 in Australia arrived as a prelude, clearly articulating Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power.5 As an exercise in this direction, four years later, Beijing published a white paper to forcefully project itself as a significant stakeholder in the region and propound its focus areas in the Arctic. In a bid to validate China’s claims on 001Arctic resources, the document termed China as a “near Arctic state” and insisted on “respect” and recognition of China’s rights and freedom in the region. Highlighting China’s commercial interests in Arctic shipping routes, resource exploration and tourism, the document explicitly outlined the core areas Beijing intends to venture into in the coming years.6
China’s strategic interest in the Arctic is related primarily to its maritime aspirations. Since Beijing is striving to build a blue water navy which will be capable of operating globally, the polar regions are seen as crucial elements to realise such a capability. Upholding this vision, President Xi Jinping in 2014 declared the process of becoming a polar great power as an important component in China’s becoming a maritime great power. Consequently, the Arctic and the Antarctic were formally integrated into maritime affairs to amplify these regions’ centrality within the overall maritime strategy.7 Moreover, Beijing expects that PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) presence in inter-continental transit corridors of North Sea Route and Transpolar Sea Route will not only help to challenge perceived US dominance in the Pacific but will also maintain China’s strategic ability to counter if and when Washington increases pressure in the South China Sea.8 As a precursor to China’s future actions, the PLAN recently deployed four ships to the Alaska’s Aleutian Islands conveying to the US, Beijing’s determination to protect its maritime interests in the Arctic and elsewhere.9
From an economic perspective, China sees the Arctic as a major source of energy security and thus has a keen interest in exploiting its natural resources like polar minerals, oil, natural gas and fish stock along with utilising it for trade, transportation and tourism. In this regard, the White Paper overtly exhibited Beijing’s interest by asserting China’s freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables, pipelines and resource exploration.10 Further, to expedite China’s future exploratory activities, the Chinese government even prepared and published Arctic resource maps displaying its natural gas and oil basins. It is noteworthy that these maps are available only in Chinese-language internet, thus demonstrating China’s reluctance to give away its intentions to the international community.11
Lastly, in China’s view, control of one of the “Global Commons” and its resources is important to augment China’s international status. The presence of the US and Russia in the Arctic Council makes it all the more imperative for China to enter the ranks of the powers that manage Arctic affairs. Although the word “status” is rarely used in the public domain, Chinese scholars and experts routinely talk about “China’s right to speak” for cultivating China’s identity as an Arctic state and its intent to “protect” and “govern” the Arctic.12 The vertical maps published by China are noteworthy in this regard. The maps depict the Arctic as the central ocean and place China at the center of the world order, visually dominating the Asia-Pacific, sidelining the US and dwarfing Europe.13
China perceives the Arctic as the new frontier of great power competition and is anxious about losing out in that competition. Its internal discourse on the Arctic, describe the region as an ungoverned space and point towards the military and economic endeavours undertaken by the major powers like the US, Russia and Canada to assert control. Therefore, Chinese strategists and experts argue that in order to secure unfettered strategic and economic access to the Arctic, China should move rapidly.14
As part of its Arctic strategy, China has invested heavily in its Arctic diplomacy that aims to enhance China’s economic opportunities and its legitimacy as a stakeholder in the region. Therefore, Beijing has adopted a multifaceted approach that includes developing scientific and economic partnerships with the Nordic countries, collaborating on institution-building and engaging in Track-II level dialogues to shape perception of the Nordic states and dispel fears about Chinese intentions.15 Through financial contribution to Arctic Council’s projects and sharing of information and scientific expertise, Beijing has made itself quite active within the council.16 It has also strived to increase its visibility in regional affairs through its participation in regional debates, scientific and academic representation in Arctic Circle and Arctic frontier conferences. Further, China is trying to develop dialogue forums from its own end to showcase its scientific and business expertise in the region.17
Beyond these endeavours, Beijing has also engaged in capacity-building in the Arctic and accumulation of knowledge about the region to strengthen its strategic claims vis-à-vis the US and Russia. The existing literature on China’s Arctic activities list several initiatives that are underway, like construction of nuclear-fuelled ice-breakers, scientific expeditions by the PLA to study sea-ice changes, launching of imaging satellites for observation and monitoring Arctic shipping routes, establishment of unmanned ice station in the Arctic and scientific facilities in Nordic states.18 These initiatives are primarily aimed at building China’s military capability in the Arctic region. Particularly interesting is China’s research on Arctic acoustics to understand sound propagation under Arctic waters. According to Chinese scientists, knowledge about Arctic acoustics is an important military capability to ensure future submarine patrols for nuclear deterrence and navigational safety of Chinese warships in the Arctic.19
Implications for India
India’s Arctic links go back to 1920 when British India signed the Svalbard Treaty.20 However, post-independence, India focused primarily on conducting research activities in the Antarctic, beginning its scientific expedition in 1981. The worrisome impact of Arctic warming on Indian monsoons shifted New Delhi’s attention to the Arctic. India undertook its first scientific expedition to the Arctic in 2007.21 Thereafter, it has been involved in mainly scientific research and technical collaboration with Arctic countries. In 2008, New Delhi inaugurated its Arctic research station “Himadri” in Norwegian Arctic, Svalbard to study life-forms in Arctic and impact of climate change on the Arctic ecology.22 Following this feat, within six years India in collaboration with Norway deployed an underwater moored observatory named IndARC to collect real-time data on Arctic.23 India’s endeavours achieved a major milestone when in 2013 it gained the observer status in the Arctic Council.24 Since then, India has pursued a steady Arctic engagement with an eye to promote bilateral and multilateral convergence on climate change, strategic and economic issues. India’s activities have ranged from participating in India–Nordic Summit in 201825 to jointly organising virtual bilateral summits with countries like Finland, Sweden and Denmark in 2020 to discuss issues of trade, investment and climate change. On the other hand, India’s NITI Aayog also signed a MoU with Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic in 2019 to deepen India–Russia trade and economic cooperation in the Arctic region26, followed by New Delhi signing MoUs with Norway, Sweden, Canada and Finland on various issues like biodiversity conservation, education and polar research.27 Affirming India’s commitment towards the region, the former Minister of Earth Sciences, Dr Harsh Vardhan declared during the 3rd Arctic Science Ministerial in 2021 that India will continue to play a positive role in the Arctic through observation, research, capacity-building and international cooperation.28
Nonetheless compared to China’s efforts in the Arctic, India’s endeavours are still at a nascent stage. Meanwhile, China’s rapid rise in the Arctic raises a number of questions regarding India’s geo-political and economic security. For instance, in what ways China’s rise in the Arctic will increase geo-political pressure on India? Should there emerge a China–Russia–US nexus in the future on the Arctic, how will that impact India’s geo-political standing? If the proposed PSR trade route becomes popular, will that adversely affect India’s trade through the International North South Trade Corridor? Also, if China entrenches itself as a polar power, will China exercise access denial strategies against India during political or military tensions? These questions might be easier to answer as the situation progresses in the Arctic. However, in light of growing global ambition and resource needs on both the sides, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition. There is also a fundamental difference in the approaches of the two countries—China seeks a hegemonic position in the Arctic, both militarily and in terms of its governance, while India is more inclined towards scientific collaboration, research and joint natural resource exploration with Arctic countries. This is likely to engender conflict of interest and widen the scope of disagreement between the two countries regarding its governance and utilisation of resources.
Therefore, besides accelerating its engagement with the Arctic states, India should also look into opportunities of deepening its participation in governance, institution building, infrastructure development and resource exploration. This in turn will help India strengthen its voice within the Council and resist China’s hegemonic policy moves in the future. Simultaneously, to counter China’s soft power manoeuvres in the Arctic, India should also invest in image building amongst the Arctic states. For instance, to highlight India’s polar identity, the notion of the Himalayas being the Third Pole29 should be promoted more actively within the Nordic states through informational programmes. Correspondingly, the planned joint projects on scientific and technical knowledge sharing in the Arctic should be fast-tracked to demonstrate India’s involvement and interest in collaboration. Building partnerships with non-Arctic states like Singapore, Japan and South Korea will also be beneficial to India in the long-run for adding to its weight within the Arctic Council decision-making. Furthermore, India can also seek to strengthen its Arctic linkages on the basis of shared political values like democracy, respect for human rights and promotion of inclusive international order and women empowerment. To that end, acknowledgment of these values as basis of India–Nordic cooperation in the 2018 India–Nordic Joint Press Statement was a positive outcome.30 More cultural and civilian exchanges and dialogue forums between the concerned stakeholders would help in further strengthening India–Nordic partnership.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
A conglomerate of elite jihadists called Malhama Tactical, a commercial enterprise driven by a for-profit agenda and not constrained by a specific ideology and defined enemies, has emerged as a serious threat as it can potentially connect and facilitate terrorist organisations worldwide.
A conglomerate of elite jihadists, referred to as Malhama Tactical, has emerged as a serious threat. It was formed by an Uzbek militant, Sukhrob Baltabaev or Abu Rofiq, in 2016,1 and is believed to be the first for-hire terrorist group, which has trained Islamist militants, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement fighters, and those who participated as mercenaries in the Syrian war.
It has therefore gained notoriety as the “Blackwater of Jihad”.2 Blackwater (renamed Academi) is an American private military company whose contractors have infamously participated in conflict-ridden states like Iraq, as part of American security operations. Jeremy Scahill, an investigative journalist, has attributed Blackwater’s catapulting rise to American demobilisation in the post-Cold war era.3
Unlike the conventional terrorist groups, Malhama Tactical is a commercial enterprise driven by a for-profit agenda and is not constrained by a specific ideology and defined enemies. Today, the market for private contractors is flourishing with a vast supply of cash and weaponry and earnings far better than that of ordinary soldiers.4 These factors have given Malhama Tactical much leeway in carrying out its objectives, and associating with a broad spectrum of radical and violent groups including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ajnad al-Kavkaz. Although the organisation reportedly has a Sunni pan-Islamic leaning, it remains ideologically opposed to groups like Islamic State.
It is also considered exclusive due to the military expertise and guerilla warfare tactics passed on by the trainers (battle-hardened and former Chechen militants) and Abu Rofiq, who was a member of the Russian Airborne Troops, an elite group within the armed forces.5 The training modules also incorporate lessons from the strategic tactics of foreign armies.6 Its trainers and recruits have easy access to a wide array of extravagant arms and ammunition, such as the Rocket Propelled Grenades, that amount to no less than $800 per round.7 Its recruitment process is selective where trusted associates provide a reference for the incoming training recruits.
The militants have derived the word Malhama from Hadith literature prophesizing end-time events. They consider Al-Malhama Al-Kubra to be the fiercest apocalyptic war, even though descriptions of the event are highly abstruse and have been subject to varied interpretations.8 Although mainstream Islamic theorists have advised against taking Malhama myths literally, jihadists use the term as part of their propaganda campaigns. Combined with the word “tactical”, the attempt to invent a catchy brand that becomes popular among impressionable radical youth is obvious, even though the name in and of itself makes little sense.
Its emergence and increasing numerical strength could be attributed to the collapse of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result of this development, extremist jihadists could seek an alliance with terrorist groups like Malhama Tactical. Making extensive use of forums like Telegram, the organisation advertises its propaganda videos and training programmes, and has even conducted Q&A sessions about the type of weapons preferred in armed conflicts.9
Notably, Malhama Tactical has paid its core members and purchased arms and necessities using bitcoin and other forms of cryptocurrency, which are non-conventional tactics of finance terrorism for carrying out its objectives.
Equally significant is the concept of Nizam La Tanzim, from which this group could be deriving its strategies and gaining mounting prominence. Tracing its origin to Abu Musab al-Suri (affiliated with Osama bin Laden and a prominent Syrian jihadist), this call refers to a global jihad being fought by a loosely connected network of fighters instead of a centralised organisation.10 It encompasses four crucial features, such as spontaneity, autonomy, decentralisation and situationist outlook.
Malhama Tactical has posed multiple challenges for global security. Hostile states can now rely on plausible deniability while conducting asymmetrical war against actors perceived as oppressors, infidels or contenders for dominance.
Secondly, it has resulted in an additional problem for states that cannot associate Malhama Tactical with a specific terrorist group and, consequently, an ideological underpinning, the base of operations, leadership and recruitment methods. Such factors have long allowed them to formulate broadly coherent counter-terrorism initiatives by tracing past and current activities.
Furthermore, it could foment the growth of similar extremist organisations worldwide, potentially taking advantage of the security vacuum in the territories experiencing turmoil.
Although it primarily came to the fore to oust President Bashar al-Assad, it has also set its sights on expanding its influence across Central Asia.11 Violent extremism has remained a potent threat across the region since the dissolution of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Significantly, most of the fighters hail from the former Soviet Republics or Russia’s Muslim majority areas like Chechnya.12
Evolving Trends and Enemies
Malhama Tactical has indirectly targetted countries such as Russia by providing training in combat to violent extremists who are fighting against it on the Syrian battlefield. It has previously experienced waves of Islamic militancy led by Chechen terrorists. They believe that the efforts of the Syrian resistance forces are part of a much broader and intensive war against the Russian state with which they had engaged in bloody battles.13 Violent separatists in Chechnya had engaged in two armed conflicts against the Russian state between 1994–1996 and 1999–2009. Additionally, Russian soldiers have also come under direct attacks while supporting President al-Assad’s counter-terrorism operations.
In the recent past, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, has underscored the security dilemma his country faces should this event come to pass—“There must be at least 5,000-6,000 Russian-speaking militants (fighting in the Syrian war). Their wives and children have started returning to Russia and other CIS countries. The chances are that once the militant groups are defeated, the terrorists and members of these jihadist private military companies, set up with the assistance of Russia’s enemies, will follow the women and children.”14
His fears are not unfounded. Ali al-Shishani, the current leader of Malhama Tactical, has called for a “new page” to be opened in the Chechen war while mentioning the group’s links with the Chechen mujahedeen fighters in Russia that have persevered over the years.15
The Potential Implications
The privatisation of jihad has underscored a pertinent dilemma. As extremist Islamist groups are becoming more territorial, their reach has also become narrower. However, Malhama Tactical with a more global outlook could potentially connect and facilitate terrorist organisations worldwide.
The situation has become considerably more challenging with the formation of the Taliban-led government in Kabul. The turn of events could embolden violent jihadist groups like Malhama Tactical to follow suit—particularly in West Asia (primary base of operations) and Central Asia (where the core fighters and trainers trace their origin to). These regions could experience further instability and violence, more so in Russia.
Additionally, jihadist groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda have diminished in strength or fraught with in-fighting and organisational issues. Yet, Malhama Tactical’s loosely organised structure and absence of similar complexities have become a fertile ground for defecting terrorists to join its ranks. They would bring resources, expertise and connections to collectively engage in global jihad and boost its numerical strength. This has resulted in a quagmire for counter-terrorism agencies who would find it difficult to dismantle the overall organisational structure and leadership through the arrests of a significant leader, which is the case with conventional terrorist groups.
According to notable strategists like Sean McFate, the activities of this organisation have revolutionised war, and it will continue to pose a grave threat in the foreseeable future.16 The appeal of global jihad and the military and technological advancements have enabled swift implementation of radical ideas promulgated by Malhama Tactical, which could possibly bolster its consolidation as the predominant jihadist for-hire group and widen its reach.
Furthermore, given the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, it has become imperative for India to overhaul its security and intelligence frameworks in the event of potential spillover of Malhama Tactical. Understandably, countries like Pakistan or their proxy groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed could independently use Malhama fighters to undermine Indian national interests using plausible deniability. The victory of the Taliban has rejuvenated the jihadist ambitions, including in Kashmir, where the Indian state has frequently engaged in counter-terrorism operations.
The website of Malhama Tactical is easily accessible for those seeking information about this organisation or to directly get in touch with its members.17 This degree of accessibility makes the emergence of radicalised and violent individuals a greater threat than before.
Furthermore, this organisation could result in an upsurge of lone-wolf terrorist attacks across India. The jihadists who do not want to affiliate themselves with a specific terrorist organisation could become radicalised by the propaganda disseminated by Malhama Tactical. Much of its activities, including instructional videos, appear to be directed towards individual extremists and not cohesive organisations. Therefore, violent and radical youth could potentially look towards this terrorist group as an outlet to realise their objectives. The adherence to Abu Musab al-Suri’s call, facilitated by internet connectivity and social media access, could create havoc, forcing societies towards civil wars. India could face terrorist threats on multiple fronts. For now, the due diligence of the counter-terrorism agencies has curtailed the dramatic upsurge of such attacks and broadly eliminated potential threats. Counter-terrorism agencies can closely monitor and seize the bitcoin transfers via channels like Telegram to counter finance terrorism.18 The states could also reverse engineer the social media-based technology used by Malhama Tactical to neutralise its fighters and trainers.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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