The violent clash between Israel and Hamas during May 10-21, 2021 has brought back the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the forefront of complex issues afflicting West Asia. The Arab Spring and its aftermath had relegated the conflict to the bottom of regional problems.

The significance of the conflict had further diminished under the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency, with his administration focused on isolating Iran through the “maximum pressure” campaign. Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), imposed fresh sanctions and eliminated General Qassem Soleimani.

On the Israeli-Palestinian front, the Trump administration was seen as too partial to the Israeli side, especially in the context of the decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and shifting of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem. This led to his ‘Deal of the Century’ not receiving any attention from the Palestinians.

The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, in August 2020, did raise hopes for progress towards peace. The renewed escalation between Israel and Hamas, however, diminishes any hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the immediate future.

In the fighting, 248 Palestinians, including 66 children and 13 Israelis, including one Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier, three expatriates and two children, lost their lives. In addition, more than 1,900 Gaza residents and nearly 114 Israelis were injured. After mounting international pressure, the ceasefire agreement was announced on May 21, 2021. This was the fourth round of fighting between Israel and Hamas since 2008, and the worst since 2014.

The beginning of the escalation can be traced to the protests in mid-April by 13 Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah, a locality in East Jerusalem, facing eviction from their homes after losing a court battle against Jewish settlers. It provoked counter protests by extremist Jewish groups, sparking violence and rioting that soon spread to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area leading to clashes in the Al-Aqsa compound on May 7, the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan.

In trying to control the situation, the Israeli police and IDF personnel entered the compound - managed by the Waqf Council under Jordanian tutelage, leading to hundreds of Palestinians and scores of IDF personnel getting injured. Hamas saw this as an opportunity to reiterate its position as the leading Palestinian resistance movement and issued an ultimatum to Israel to withdraw its security personnel from Al-Aqsa by 6:30 pm on May 10, failing which it will take action.

As the deadline expired, Hamas launched a barrage of rockets indiscriminately targeting civilian establishments and residential buildings not only in southern Israel but also at targets in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The IDF retaliated by launching a full-fledged military campaign, codenamed Operation Guardian of the Wall, on May 11 pounding the network of tunnels, warehouses, munition factories.

By the time the ceasefire came into effect, Hamas and the other Palestinian militant group operating in the Gaza Strip, the Islamic Jihad, had reportedly launched nearly 4,350 rockets from Gaza, underlining their increased military capability. Some rockets were also fired from southern Lebanon towards norther Israel. The escalation was accompanied by protests and rioting in occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as in the mixed Arab-Jewish towns in Israel, highlighting the growing sympathy for Hamas among the wider Palestinian community.

Both sides, meanwhile, have claimed victory. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu while delivering a televised address, underlined the damage caused to Hamas by the IDF and affirmed that the “Hamas can’t hide anymore”. Netanyahu affirmed that a large part of the Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s command echelon was eliminated.

On the other hand, Hamas highlighted its narrative of mounting a successful resistance against a stronger military power, underscoring its undying spirit to fight for the Palestinian rights and against the Israeli occupation. Hamas chief, Ismail Haniyeh, affirmed that the group’s capabilities will be restored.

Notwithstanding the claims and counterclaims, there are six important lessons that the violence brings to the fore. Firstly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not dead. The multiplicity of conflicts, tensions and rivalries in the region since 2011 had relegated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the bottom of regional issues. This had many believing that the prolonged conflict is no longer a serious issue. Such assumptions have been proved wrong by the current spate of violence.

Secondly, the hopes for the revival of the peace process, that had been raised in the wake of the signing of the Abraham Accords, have diminished. Clearly, a peaceful resolution is not in sight and chances for the resumption of the peace process have ended for now.

Thirdly, the clashes have underlined the preeminence of Hamas as the Palestinian faction that can no longer be ignored by the international community, if they ever hope for the eventual resolution of the conflict and the realisation of the two-state solution.

Fourthly, the violence reemphasised the centrality of the city of Jerusalem. The city holds political and religious significance for both the parties; it is the third holiest site in Islam and the holiest in Judaism, housing the sanctum sanctorum of the Second Temple destroyed in 70 AD. Further, for Israel, the undivided Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel and for the Palestinians, East Jerusalem is capital of the future State of Palestine.

Fifthly, as far as the regional geopolitics is concerned, Iran has emerged as a major regional threat. Though Hamas and Islamic Jihad have developed serious military capacity and have been producing much of their arsenal and ammunition in the underground network they have built inside the Gaza Strip, Iran is the most important supporter of the militant Palestinian factions in the region. Hamas also receives support from Turkey and Qatar. Iran’s growing military arsenal, its quest for nuclear weapons and arming of militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, seen together with the military and financial support for Hamas, add to the angst of its regional rivals.

Finally, the latest round of Israel-Hamas confrontation has underlined that President Joe Biden, cannot afford to ignore the Middle East. Notably, it was the tough talk by the Biden administration that eventually led to Israel and Hamas agreeing for a ceasefire, underlining the preeminence of the US as the regional arbiter. This means that even if Biden does not want to get entangled in the complex regional conflicts, he will have to devote some time to manage the situation to avoid flare ups that can deviate the administration’s attention from priority issues.

The fighting between Israel and Hamas has come to an end for now, but as any serious observer of West Asian politics will underline, one can never be sure of what might happen next and for how long the ceasefire will hold. Unarguably, this will not be the last round of violence between Israel and Hamas. The international community cannot ignore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and there is a need to work towards reviving the peace process.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

The February 1 military coup in Myanmar is now over 100 days old but the countrywide civil disobedience movement against it has not dissipated. The military or the Tatmadaw declared a one-year state of Emergency, established a new State Administrative Council (SAC) and placed the National League for Democracy (NLD) leadership - including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and others, under detention.

The military staged the coup on the day a new Parliament was to meet, in the aftermath of the November 2020 elections. Daw Aung Suu Kyi’s NLD won 396 of the 476 (contested) parliamentary seats in those elections. The army’s party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), did poorly securing only 33 seats. The military refused to accept the results. Although a large number of ethnic minority voters were excluded, independent election observers found no evidence of systematic irregularities.

The February 2021 coup led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is the third in Myanmar’s history. The other two were in 1962 and in 1988 respectively. The military had also annulled parliamentary elections held in 1990 previously. It is pertinent to note that the military has a fair share of the levers of power. The 2008 Constitution secures a special place to the military, in that 25 per cent of the seats in parliament and local legislatures are reserved for them, as indeed key ministries like Home, Defence and Border Affairs. No amendments to the Constitution are possible without a 75 per cent majority.

The Constitution also disqualifies persons with foreign spouses from becoming president. This provision automatically excluded Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The political parties accepted the special place accorded to the military by the 2008 Constitution and the military allowed the “discipline-flourishing democracy”, with multi-party elections held in 2010, 2015 and November 2020.

Thus, the compromise that the NLD as a party made with the military came to a dead end, a decade after the junta formally exited. The quasi-democratic experiment has been aborted, fueled by multiple factors, including political ambitions of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. There were also fears on their part that after the resounding electoral victory, Aung San Suu Kyi could move to curb the military’s powers.

India’s Stakes

Developments in the geo-strategically important country impact India in myriad ways. Myanmar is the only ASEAN country with which India shares a land border, extending to 1643 kms, most of which is not fenced. Myanmar borders four North East Indian States - Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, and its help is critical to countering insurgency in India’s North East.

Peace in Chin and Rakhine states of Myanmar is essential for the completion of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway project. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway will provide connectivity from Moreh (Manipur) to Mae Sot (Tak province, Thailand) and the Kaladan project would link Mizoram to the Bay of Bengal. The political instability in the post-coup period is expected to divert the attention of the Myanmar Army from its periphery and its borders. Political instability and violence in Myanmar would also delay plans to further extend the trilateral highway to Vietnam.

The Arakan Army (AA) on the Myanmar side of the border continues to be a source of concern. It must be remembered that it was the Myanmar army that was assisting the Indian Army in dealing with the Arakan Army and the National-Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN (IM) in the period before the coup.

Second, the refugee influx from Myanmar to Manipur and Mizoram (due to common ethnic links and family ties) is a matter of concern for New Delhi. On March 18, the Chief Minister of Mizoram, Zoramthanga, had written to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking asylum and relief on humanitarian grounds for the Myanmar nationals belonging to the Chin community.1 Some of them were offered refuge by the local NGOs. The Mizoram CM’s request closely followed a directive from New Delhi on March 10, to the four North East states bordering Myanmar, to prevent illegal immigration and ensure expeditious deportation.

The position taken by Mizoram on the refugees and the insurgent issue respectively could be viewed as a challenge or an opportunity. Mizoram does not favour sending the refugees back to Myanmar.2 By the early 1990s (when the military junta still held sway), India had realised that if it wanted to succeed in its counter-insurgency effort on the Indo-Myanmar border, it could not do so without the support of the regime at the helm in Myanmar.

Does that lesson still hold for the current situation in Myanmar? Ought the central government heed the loud voice of a small state? Can it ignore the voices on the periphery? In sum, closer coordination between the central government and states (especially those on the borders) is essential for the successful attainment of critical national objectives.

Critics maintain that these voices are important because they are rooted to the ground and because they have the ability to negotiate with insurgents or constitute part of the ceasefire monitoring groups.3 But could they perhaps be a liability if the regime in power across the border tags such an interaction as an unfriendly act?4

Third, the growing international isolation of Myanmar government led by the Army could once again push the country into dependence on China. When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in January 2020, 33 important agreements were signed, including the Kyaukphyuyu Special Economic Zone and Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.

Earlier in 2018, Myanmar and China had signed an MoU to establish the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The 1,700km corridor is meant to connect Kunming to Myanmar’s economic hubs, first to Mandalay and then east to Yangon and west to Kyaukphyu. A framework agreement on Kyaukphyu was also signed in November 2018. Another agreement when Xi visited Myanmar in 2018 related to the New Yangon City project.

New Delhi’s Position

Developments in Myanmar pose a serious policy challenge to India. Myanmar is an important element for the success of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’, and ‘Indo-Pacific’ policies. It was from Naypyitaw that Prime Minister Modi launched India’s Act East policy in 2014. India’s initial response to the February 1 coup expressing “deep concern” was moderate. India, however, upped the ante as death toll kept on rising.

India still retains the credibility of most stakeholders in Myanmar and could help in the country’s transition to democracy. India has in the past been the first responder in times of natural calamities like cyclones or earthquakes. India does not support sanctions against Myanmar. Sanctions have not worked in the past and are not likely to work now.

New Delhi supports ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus formula, announced at the Jakarta Summit on April 24, 2021 – attended by Senior General Hlaing, must be allowed a chance to succeed.5

India and Myanmar have enjoyed cordial relations at the highest diplomatic, political and military levels in recent times. An outstanding example of this understanding was the joint visit of the Foreign Secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla and the Army Chief, General Manoj Mukund Naravane on October 4-5, 2020 to Myanmar. During the visit, the two sides agreed to strengthen partnership in connectivity projects, reviewed progress of Rakhine State Development Programme and accorded Myanmar priority for vaccine and other aid.

Foreign Secretary Shringla while addressing the Ananta Aspen Centre on March 15 pointed out that India was concerned that the democratic gains made by Myanmar over the previous decades should not be undermined. He reiterated India’s “support to the process of democratic transition” and assured that India’s developmental and humanitarian efforts in Myanmar aimed at the socio-economic development of the country will continue, as would its constructive role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC).6

Earlier, India’s envoy to the UN in Geneva, Indra Mani Pandey told the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on February 12, 2021, that the rule of law and democratic processes in Myanmar must be upheld and the detained political leaders released.7 India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti, also spoke on similar lines when he stated that “India has been consistently encouraging stakeholders to find practical and pragmatic solutions.”8

Conclusion

New Delhi’s policy options in Myanmar would depend on the evolving situation on the ground. It remains to be seen if the military can continue in power, in the face of the civil disobedience movement. The nature of the relationship between the Tatmadaw and China will be crucial. If it leads to greater dependence of the military regime on Beijing, it will impact India’s security negatively. India on its part must continue to engage with the Tatmadaw.

Apart from the civil-military conflict in Myanmar, the country is a hotbed of ethnic conflict. Minority ethnic groups are engaged in a civil war with the majority Bamar community. If the country slips into an extended civil war, then India will have to be prepared to deal with the ensuing implications for its Northeastern states.

The implications on national security and in countering insurgency will have to be kept in mind, while addressing the concerns of bordering states. At the same time, greater policy coordination between the central government and the border states can help avoid possible alienation of the local communities.

As a non-permanent member of the UNSC during 2021-2022, India can play an important role with other partners like Vietnam in building international opinion, given that Vietnam is also a UNSC non-permanent member this year. If a supportive international environment is built up through the UN and ASEAN, the military in Myanmar could be encouraged to return to the democratic road map.

As Myanmar and the region copes with the Covid-19 pandemic, it would be only appropriate that neighbouring countries, including India, prevent the country from not only failing but enable it to emerge as a successful ASEAN Member State.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Ethnic linkages are critical in Myanmar’s power play. It may be recalled that there were two Vice Presidents in Aung San Suu Kyi’s government which was overthrown on February 1. The First Vice President, Myint Swe, has taken over as Acting President since February 1. The Second Vice President, who was in power from 2016 onwards, was Henry Van Thio— an ethnic Chin (and as such a kinsman of the Mizoram CM of Mizoram) and a fellow Christian. Before he joined politics, he had served as a Major in the Myanmar Army.  He was placed under house arrest after the Feb 1 coup.
• 2. The Chin National Army (CNA), the armed wing of the Chin National Front (CNF), a Myanmar based militant group has sought asylum for their families in Mizoram.
• 3. The AA was said to be behind the 2019 kidnapping of five Indian and five Myanmar nationals engaged in the project. Apparently, their release was secured with the intervention of the Mizoram CM Zoramthanga.
• 4. The Mizoram CM, Zoramthanga, for instance, held a virtual meeting with the Myanmar Foreign Minister (in exile) Zin Mar Aung and some US-based Mizo leaders on March 21, 2021 to express solidarity with the Zo ethnic people of Myanmar. See ‘Mizoram CM Zoramthanga holds meeting with Myanmar’s foreign minister over situation amid coup’, PTI, March 21, 2021.
• 5. The five points of the consensus were cessation of violence; constructive dialogue among all parties concerned; Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to mediate with the help of the ASEAN Secretary General; ASEAN to provide humanitarian assistance; and Special Envoy and delegation to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. See ‘ASEAN leaders agree 5-point plan for Myanmar’, Bangkok Post, April 25, 2021.
• 6. ‘Foreign Secretary’s address at Ananta Aspen Centre on “What Next for Neighbourhood First”’, Ministry of External Affairs, March 15, 2021.
• 7. Sidhant Sibal, ‘At UNHRC, India calls for release of political detainees in Myanmar’, February 13, 2021.
• 8. Yoshita Singh, ‘India monitoring developments in Myanmar, urges leadership to resolve differences: Amb Tirumurti’, February  26, 2021.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra is, perhaps, the quintessential treatise on ancient Indian statecraft. Its policy prescriptions are universal and by virtue of their generality, it is averred that “they could have been arrived at by others elsewhere and in different times.”1 This suggests, almost reassuringly, that there is a broad convergence on the range of issues discussed and options explored in the practice of statecraft across geographies. While this is true at one level, it, however, underappreciates the distinctiveness that cultural and geographical contexts lend to the vocabularies of power, kingship and morality. The Arthashastra stands out in both its universality (in terms of the range of questions and answers) and particularity (of its embeddedness in Indian philosophical thought). This article concerns the latter, and in so doing, seeks to assert the unique character of the text which innately intertwines precepts of philosophy with principles of statecraft.

The Arthashastra is broadly divided into three parts: political theory, problems of administration, and interstate relations, in that order. It is the discussion in the first part that establishes the theoretical underpinning of the text and alludes to its coupling with Indian philosophical tradition through the incorporation of ‘Anvikshiki’ (science of inquiry). The core branches of knowledge in the Arthashastra are Anvikshiki (Philosophy), Trayi or the Vedas, Varta (Economics) and Dandaniti (Political Science). While critical inquiry/philosophy (the Anvikshiki) is stated as an autonomous discipline, it is seen as the lamp for all branches of knowledge, means in all activities, and support for all duties and obligations:

Pradeepah sarvavidyaanaamupayah sarvakarmanaam | Aashrayah sarvadharmaanaam shashwadaanvikshakee mataa || [KA, I, 3, 12]2

Herein lies the genus of all ideas of Kautilyan statecraft and has a strong bearing on the text’s methodology too. But how does philosophy shape the realist tenets of statecraft? It flows directly from the understanding of the term ‘Anvikshiki’.

‘Anvikshiki’

Simply put, the term connotes critical/scientific inquiry, reasoned investigation, or logical argument. A combination of words ‘anu’ and ‘iksh’, ‘anvikshiki’ literally means to think/consider/reflect after; reconsideration. It is also seen as ‘Nyaya’, an orthodox school of Indian philosophy concerned with logic and epistemology. According to the commentator of Nyaya Sutra, Vatsyayana:

Nyaya is the examination of things with the help of evidence (pramana). An argument based on observation and received belief is called an anvikṣa or reconsideration, and the discipline known as anvıkṣiki or nyaya is that which pertains to such arguments.3

Kautilya also handpicks a set of three schools of Indian philosophy as the philosophical substructure of Anvikshiki. These are Sankhya, Yoga (Vaisheshika) and Lokayata, the first two are orthodox schools and the last heterodox. Each of these schools through their principal tenets lends a distinct character to the functioning and objectives of ancient Indian statecraft.

‘Anvikshiki’: Lamp of All Sciences

The very first verse of the Arthashastra talks about it being a compendium of all previous Arthashastras, written with the objective of acquisition and maintenance of the earth. ‘Artha’, which is defined as the land (earth) inhabited by human beings, is seen as the wellspring of all economic activities and the science that deals with the protection of that land is the Arthashastra. The purpose of the scripture (to achieve wealth that has not been achieved and to maintain wealth that has been achieved), therefore, is aligned with the objective of knowledge which is essential in order to secure the desired objective (artha).

Anvikshiki, according to Kautilya, is the illuminator of other branches of knowledge – Vedas, Economics and Political Science, because it investigates by means of reasoning what is spiritual good and evil in the Vedas, material gain and loss in economics, good policy and bad policy in the science of politics and the relative strength and weakness of these. Anvikshiki here is seen as an analytical tool to verify the utility of the recommendations of the established branches of knowledge in light of objective reality. Kautilya states that in a matter of dispute which has four feet – law (based on truth), transaction (based on witness), customs (commonly held view of men) and royal edict (command of the king), the royal edict based on Anvikshiki (rationalising tool) was supreme. The ruler who promulgated the edicts needed to be suitably trained to acquire a scientific temper based on retention through understanding, and rejection of false views and intentness on truth.

‘Anvikshiki’: Means of All Activities

Anvikshiki or reasoned inquiry concerns itself with the acquisition of knowledge which is the prerequisite for a spectrum of activities, from mundane goals to elimination of suffering. The Arthashastra, in this regard, exemplifies a focused and purposeful use of reason. The three philosophical substructures (Sankhya, Yoga and Lokayata) provide a holistic approach to knowledge gathering combining empirical and inferential logic. Sankhya, based on systematic enumeration and rational examination relies on three means of knowledge (pramana) – pratyaksha (self-perception), anumana (inference) and shabda (verbal testimony); Yoga (Vaisheshika) believes in atomistic pluralism and analysis through breaking down and synthesis, and holds perception and inference as valid means; and Lokayata emphasises empiricism and considers perception as the only source of knowledge.

But why is valid means of knowing an important aspect of statecraft? Perhaps, the importance of the acquisition of knowledge represented through the schools of Indian philosophy provides the theoretical underpinning for Arthashastra’s robust intelligence culture.

The king with the eyes of intelligence and political science can overcome rival kings even if they possess greater economic and military resources.[KA, IX, 1, 15]4

>Additionally, an accurate assessment of one’s comprehensive national power (through robust means of knowing) reveals a state’s relative strength which drives foreign policy making. Decision making in the Arthashastra relies on sound and corroborative knowledge. The ruler arrives at a policy choice through an analysis of information that he directly perceives, indirectly through communication by others, and through inference (forming an idea of what has not been done from what is done).

‘Anvikshiki’: Support for All Duties

Each of the philosophical substructures that contribute to the text’s scientific/rational dimension, also lend it an ethical perspective, coalescing the rational and prudent with the ethical and abstract. Sankhya through its recognition of contrasting principles–purusha (observing mind) and prakriti (nature), alludes to both the cosmological and material, an uncompromising dualism perhaps typified by the importance of artha and dharma in the text.

Kanad, the founder of Vaisheshika Darshan, had a lot in common with Kautilya. One, that dharma was defined as ‘material progress and spiritual fulfillment’ – a theme completely in tune with the goals of artha and dharma in the Arthashastra. Also, this darshan divides reality into six fundamental categories (padarthas) – dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action), samanya (generality), vishesha (particularity) and samavaya (inherence). The last one lays special emphasis on how wholes (avayavin) relate to their parts (avyava), which is reminiscent of the Saptanga theory5 of Kautilyan statecraft. Vaisheshika believes in the ‘whole’ inhering in its ‘parts’, similar to the Kautilyan ‘body politic’ inhering in its seven constituent organs (prakritis).

The Lokayata (literally one which is popular) is the harbinger of materialist ideas and was distinct from the other two orthodox schools in disputing the truth of Vedic ritualism. Attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain was its supreme ethic. Clearly alluding to the materialist basis of Kautilyan statecraft, it justifies the inclusion of prajaranjan (literally to please the subjects) as the ruler’s rajadharma (the dharma of the king).

From the spiritualism of Sankhya to the materialism of Lokayat, philosophy in Kautilya’s Arthashastra taught the ruler to not only think rationally but also act rationally. The four branches of knowledge corresponded to the goals of trivarga (artha, dharma and kama) in the text. The interweaving of philosophy with statecraft lends Kautilya’s Arthashastra a unique comprehensive approach that is not limited to good economics and politics alone but extends to a reasoned, righteous approach to life in general. So, even if some of its tenets are resoundingly commonsensical, the lamp of philosophy credibly illuminates its Indianness.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Krzysztof Iwanek, “India Does Not Follow ‘Arthashastra’ in Its Foreign Policy”, The Diplomat, November 03, 2020. Also, a number of scholarly expositions on Kautilya’s Arthashastra exhibit an essentialist interpretation of the text in political realist/realpolitik terms, substantially limiting its intellectual worth to a non-Western variant of classical realism and neorealism, glossing over its unique philosophical underpinning.
• 2. R.P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 2014, p. 7.
• 3. Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri, Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, Vol. 5, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, p. 169.
• 4. R.P. Kangle, n. 2, p. 407.
• 5. Saptanga literally means seven parts/organs. The seven constituent elements of the Kautilyan state are Swami (ruler), Amatya (ministers), Janapada (territory and population), Durga (fort), Kosha (treasury), Danda (armed might) and Mitra (ally).

India’s defence exports during 2015-20 grew at a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 35 per cent — from around Rs 2,000 crore to Rs 9,000 crore. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has set an ambitious defence exports target of Rs 35,000 crore by 2025. The country’s defence exports push is part of its effort to become part of the global defence value chain and one of the leading countries in the defence sector. India was ranked at the 23rd position as a global arms exporter by SIPRI in 2020.  

The MoD has undertaken key institutional changes in recent years to facilitate exports. The creation of the Export Promotion Cell (EPC) in the Department of Defence Production (DDP) is one significant institutional step. Measures like the 2019 Defence Attache’s (DAs) scheme is another, as part of which financial support to undertaking outreach activities and market studies are provided to DAs. The DA scheme, in its initial avatar, divided 85 countries into three categories — A (23), B (17), and C (45), with the Category A countries being seen as having the highest potential for exports.

Private Indian firms can also make use of certificates issued by government testing and quality control agencies, as part of the 2018 Scheme for Promotion of Defence Exports, to improve the marketability of their products overseas. In 2019-20, ten such certificates, certifying that their products were ‘Fit for Indian Military use’, were awarded to four private firms (Bharat Forge; JCB; L&T Defence, Tata Motors).

The private sector has come to occupy an important role in India’s defence exports saga. In 2019-20, over 85 per cent of export authorisations were to private sector companies, valued at over Rs 8,000 crore. As of 2020, nearly 500 industrial licenses (ILs) have been issued to about 300 private sector companies. These licenses are valid to 15 years, and can be further extended for a period of three years.

Some of the significant export items by the defence public sector units (DPSU’s) include the export of an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) to Mauritius in 2014 by the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE Ltd). This was the first export of a ship by an Indian shipyard. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has exported helicopters to Nepal, Afghanistan, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, Ecuador and Suriname, apart from structural work packages and avionics to major foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in Europe and the US.

The ordnance factories have supplied ammunition to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) while major exports by the Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) have included Coastal Surveillance System for Maldives and Seychelles as well as Weapon Locating Radar for Armenia. BEL has also opened up marketing offices overseas, in six countries, and has proposed strategic alliances with global players like the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), for joint marketing of niche BEL products.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-developed products like the Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) are expected to achieve export success, with the government in December 2020 authorising the sale of such sophisticated systems. The government also created a special committee, comprised of the Raksha Mantri, the External Affairs Minister (EAM) and the National Security Advisor (NSA), to fast track approvals for such systems, going forward.      

The need to leverage credit financing suitably to enhance defence exports is recognised by the government. As of December 2020, $930.48 million out of $4.3 billion of EXIM Bank Pipeline LoCs relate to procurement by other countries of indigenous defence equipment. These include landing ship tanks and training ships by Nigeria, interceptor boats by Comoros, and defence projects by Vietnam amounting to nearly $500 million, among others. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Suriname have also used LoCs to source domestically manufactured defence equipment in the recent past.

The Challenges

In February 2015, in response to a question, the Minister of State (MoS) in the MoD told the Lok Sabha that there were no fixed targets for export of military stores to other countries. The export target of Rs 35,000 crore highlighted subsequently in MoD documents like the Draft Defence Production Policy, 2018 and the Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy, 2020, is indeed noteworthy. However, during 2020-25, exports need to grow at a CAGR of over 40 per cent to reach Rs 35,000 cr. While the target for 2020-21 was Rs 15,000 crore, till Dec 2020, India’s defence exports stood at around Rs 5,700 crore.

The Draft DPP 2018 and Draft DPEPP 2020 had, inter alia, flagged the need for enhancing the export focus of DPSUs and the ordnance factories, the importance of marketing and outreach activities, robustness of quality assurance infrastructure, among other suggestions. The DPSUs and ordnance factories are challenged to achieve export targets equivalent to 25 per cent of their sales, by 2025. In 2019-20, exports by the DPSUs and the ordnance factories were less than 2 per cent of their revenues.

The economic challenges due to the Covid pandemic faced by potential customers of Indian defence equipment are also expected to pose a challenge. The Philippines, for instance, in November 2020, cited issues with funding to conclude a deal for Brahmos. In March 2021, however, in a significant development, both countries signed an Implementing Agreement, paving the way for the procurement of defence equipment from India. This does indicate that the Southeast Asian country’s challenging security environment has trumped economic considerations in dictating its defence choices.

More than Rs 120,000 crore of DRDO technology-based systems have been inducted in to the Indian armed forces in the last few years and over 400 Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) agreements have been concluded with the Indian defence industry. Still, more than 140 DRDO technologies are available for licensing by the Indian defence industry, across niche areas like mini-unmanned ground vehicles, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear suits, among others. It is up to the increasingly robust Indian defence industry to take advantages of such readily available technologies.

Conclusion 

The MoD has established a robust relationship with industry associations to conduct numerous seminars and webinars to explore opportunities for the export of defence equipment. In the past year, it is noteworthy that such webinars have been held with more than 20 countries. Trade shows, like Defexpo 2020 and Aero India 2021 have gained in international prominence. Aero India 2021 was aptly titled, ‘The Runway to a Billion Opportunities’. More than 500 exhibitors participated in the trade show, despite limitations imposed by the pandemic, and the show witnessed over 200 MoUs and product launches.

India’s defence indigenisation push is expected to add value to the domestic defence industry, and help boost their exports profile. Not just incremental but significant changes in institutional structures and policy framework have been initiated to facilitate defence exports, signifying an unmistakable intent and resolve on the part of the government. The defence eco-system, made up of DPSUs, ordnance factories, private industry, DRDO, Start-Ups, and the academia, is indeed becoming more dynamic as it strives to achieve the tough defence exports targets.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.