With India’s current semiconductor demand of $40 billion expected to rise to $100 billion by 2025, the time is indeed right to begin production of semiconductors within the country.
The current brouhaha over semiconductors is reminiscent of the Y2K bug at the turn of the century, when there was a fear that the bug would affect software and bring computer systems to a crashing halt. This time around, the sudden and unexpected shortage of semiconductors that make up the core of most electronic items threatens to give a massive shock to the global economy as virtually everything from cars to toys to military drones has a chip inside it. Unlike the Y2K bug, it is not merely a technical issue but has acquired overtones and ramifications far beyond that.
From the geo-political perspective, it has become a part of the technological tussle between the United States and China; whilst the microchip was invented in the US in the 1950s, with Europe and the US manufacturers providing much of the world’s supply, by the 1990s, manufacturing shifted to Asia, driven by reduced cost of production and government incentives.
Thus, though US headquartered companies still have a 44 per cent market share in sales currently, only 11 per cent of chips are manufactured in the US, with the bulk of the manufacturing happening in South Korea (28 per cent), Taiwan (22 per cent), Japan (16 per cent), and China (12 per cent). Europe’s share is a measly 3 percent. Much of the production is gobbled up by Asian companies such as Samsung (8.1 per cent), Huawei (4.1 per cent), Lenovo (4.1 per cent), and Xiaomi (2 per cent), even though Apple by itself consumes as much as 12 per cent.
Huawei saw a 23 per cent drop in purchase share in 2020 following the imposition of restrictions by the US government on its purchase of semi-conductors from its main supplier, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). These sanctions could be applied since much of the technology used in the manufacture of semiconductors is American. The US also placed Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), China’s biggest semiconductor producer, on the entity list in September 2020, preventing it from accessing US software and chip making hardware, citing possible end-use by the Chinese military.
Even before the blow-up in US-China relations, the Chinese government has been ramping up its efforts to increase chip production within the country, under the Make-in-China 202 initiative. While huge amounts of money have been invested in the endeavour, the Chinese companies have been hamstrung by the lack of technical know-how. Chinese manufacturing is at least two generations behind the latest chips available today.
For other countries that have tried to fashion a path to semiconductor independence, it is both technical knowhow as well as financial constraints that have so far presented insurmountable obstacles. The average semiconductor production unit requires an investment of at least $10-12 billion and a long gestation period. Coupled with rapidly changing technology and requirements of the client companies, a factory or foundry set up to produce a certain kind of chip could very well find its product is not in demand after coming on-stream or face price pressures from competitors. This has led to a situation where there are only a handful of suppliers in a $500 billion industry.
The geo-political tussle over micro-chips has been further exacerbated by the sudden shortage of semiconductors, which is partially an outcome of the tussle and partially of the pandemic. Huawei began to stock up on chips anticipating the US sanctions at the same time that many other purchasers cancelled orders on the back of reduced demand for their products. Semi-conductor foundries, in turn, reduced production and diverted their sales to sectors where demand increased, like laptops, webcams and gaming systems.
The shortage is leading to huge losses for companies across sectors, but the most affected has been the car industry. Semiconductors control critical areas of the vehicle like air-conditioning, airbags, driver information, audio/video entertainment, sensors, transmission and gear, navigation and collision detection systems.
The Biden administration has gone all out in its efforts to both restrain China from accessing technology as well as in bringing the US back as a leading manufacturer of semiconductors. The president has initiated a review of the semi-conductor supply chain and urged Congress to provide $37 billion of funding to spur semiconductor manufacturing in the US. In January, the CHIPS for America Act was introduced in the US Congress providing investment incentives and tax credits to manufacturers.
Though India consumes as much as 5 per cent of the global production of semiconductors, it produces only a miniscule amount, mainly in the in-house foundries of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). However, as much as 45 per cent of the research and design of semiconductors is carried out in India, by a talent pool of over 20,000 engineers. Many start-ups are also engaged in various aspects of the semiconductor ecosystem, such as testing and developing niche solutions.
The government, recognising the strategic value of semi-conductors, has made efforts over the years to have fabrication units (fabs) established in India, but those efforts have floundered because of the high levels of investment needed, the low levels of financial support from the government, coupled with very stringent conditions laid down in the proposal documents.
There have also been divided voices on whether setting up a fab would be a viable proposition. In an article in 2015, Vinod Dham, the father of the Pentium chip, posed the question, “Does India really need a $5 billion semiconductor unit?”1 He gave a qualified response, noting that China had been unsuccessful in its endeavour despite spending billions, as well as the fact that Moore’s law dictated that the technology required to produce semiconductors changed every few years, thus making the technology obsolete by the time the factories came up.2 He instead suggested that global majors like Samsung be encouraged to set up factories in India.
The government seems to be following this playbook by inviting expressions of interest (EoI) towards the end of 20203, and actively following up with manufacturers like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, VIA Technologies Inc., United Microelectronics Corporation, Intel, Micron Technology, Inc., NXP Semiconductors, and Texas Instruments, Fuji Electric Co. Panasonic, and Infineon.
As Dham himself noted recently, the context of 2021 is very different from that of 2015. Electronic manufacturing has begun in a big way, on the back of the Production Linked Incentives (PLI) Scheme, techno-nationalism is on the rise — which makes it imperative for India to establish supply of strategically important products such as semiconductors, and the imminent end of Moore’s law, has provided greater impetus to the current endeavour.4
That said, it is still not an easy road given the complicated ecosystem of semi-conductors, with its myriad types, the many different parts of the process — ranging from design to production to testing, and the infrastructure required — from dust-free environments to the availability of water. In 2013, the government had got to the stage where approval was granted to two consortiums led by Jaypee and HSMC to set up fabs with an investment of Rs 63,000 crores but financial closure could not be achieved despite the government offering a 40 per cent subsidy.
With the current semiconductor demand of $40 billion expected to rise to $100 billion by 2025 for just the electronics industry, the time is indeed right to begin production of semiconductors within the country. Though the EoI covers all the bases from setting up facilities in India to acquiring assets outside India, additional alternatives should include expanding the scope of the existing government-owned production facilities in ISRO/DRDO.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Moore’s Law, named after Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel who first postulated it, states that technology developments enable the number of transistors on a microchip to double every two years. That law has now hit a physical roadblock since chips have maxed out at 50 billion transistors.
The Storming of Capitol Hill: Implications for US Polity
Savini Mehta
March 25, 2021
The January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol by White Supremacists and members of far-right militias brought to stark attention the political divisiveness in the United States.
The January 6, 2021 attack on the US Capitol, the seat of the country’s legislature, by an angry mob that sought to disrupt the confirmation process of Joseph Biden’s election as US President, resulted in the death of five people, while over a hundred were injured. The looting and the vandalism by hundreds of armed rioters, inflamed by the calls of the incumbent president, Donald Trump, to “save America”, following Biden’s victory in the 2020 US presidential elections, lasted for several hours.1 Biden won 306 Electoral College votes, as against Trump’s 232 and was able to swing key states such as Georgia in his favour, which historically supported Republican candidates.
The assault sparked widespread condemnation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Christopher Wray, declared that the riot was an incident of domestic terrorism.2 Republican lawmakers, such as Rep. Mo Brooks of Alabama and Rep. Paul Gosar of Arizona, among others, charged that members of Antifa, a Left-wing political movement, came disguised as pro-Trump supporters and committed the assault, despite the lack of any evidence supporting such claims.3
Reports instead flagged White Supremacists, some of whom were already on the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database, as having participated in the attack.4 The FBI has since charged over 300 persons, including members of militias such as the far-right ‘Oath Keepers’ and the neo-fascist ‘Proud Boys’.5
Domestic political violence in the US
The US has had a long history with domestic terrorism. The 1970’s witnessed an incendiary wave of Left-wing extremism. The Vietnam War, racial tensions and the growing fervour of anti-establishment sentiments, particularly amongst the college-aged youth, contributed to the emergence of such an ideology.6 Even groups such as the ‘Weather Underground Organization’ (WUO) that violently railed against war policies, racial inequality and corporate practices, or fringe outfits such as the ‘Symbionese Liberation Army’ (SLA), a revolutionary anarchist group, attempted to rouse the general public to their cause.7
Another phenomenon of public violence fairly unique to the US is mass shootings and gun violence. Although most perpetrators are not driven by purely political factors to commit such acts of violence, incidents such as the 2016 Orlando shooting, stand out. Nearly 50 people were killed by an American gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS.8
The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, perpetrated primarily by Timothy McVeigh, killed 168 people and injured nearly 700. This was the highest number of casualties in US history as a result of a domestic terrorist act. McVeigh was an extremist radicalised due to White supremacist and anti-government views.9 He was especially upset at the 1993 FBI raid on the Branch Davidian complex in Waco, Texas, which housed members of a cult. McVeigh was hanged in June 2001.
The September 11, 2001 attacks, the most devastating terrorist attacks on American soil, resulted in a more active US counter-terrorism engagement overseas, including regime change efforts in places like Iraq, at enormous cost to US lives and exchequer. Domestically, after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created and stringent legislations like the Patriot Act, were enacted.
Far-right movements have been fairly ubiquitous within the fabric of the American polity, with groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, representing a particular tradition of extremism rooted within the notion of White supremacy. The 1980’s saw a startling rise in far-right support and mobilisation — perhaps due to the traction populist rhetoric on issues like elitism and free trade gained, distinct from the historical brutalities associated with far-right ideologies like Nazism and Fascism, a trend that further escalated in the 21st Century.10
Far-right extremism coupled with White supremacist ideology has since formed a fairly volatile concoction. The 2017 Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally organised by Neo-Nazi and self-proclaimed ‘alt-right’ leader, Richard Spencer, was attended by hundreds of members of far-right militant organisations.11
The rally sparked counter-protests and incidents related to it claimed the lives of three and injuries to over 30 people. Critics charged that Spencer’s views on White superiority and extremism were not condemned strongly by Trump, given the fact that he declared those participating in the rally, as well as those publicly opposing it, as “fine people”.12
Going forward
Despite the stark political polarisation, the successful transfer of power from Trump to Biden does indicate the strength of the US political system and processes. The Biden administration, meanwhile, is exploring the possibility of enacting a domestic terrorism law.13
Although the Capitol Hill attack was termed as an act of ‘domestic terrorism’ by heads of law enforcement agencies like the FBI, perpetrators are not being prosecuted on domestic terrorism charges as existing US laws do not have such enabling provisions.14
Furthermore, despite a general consensus on the fact that there is a necessity to focus inward rather than solely externally when it comes to counter-terrorism, there are still contentions regarding the nature, purpose and implications of a domestic terrorism law.
The debate relates to whether there exists a need for a new legislation or whether there is simply a problem with enforcing existing legislations that already contain provisions against terror financing, enhanced surveillance and other domestic security measures, including border security, among others. Possible conflicts with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly and the Second Amendment’s assurance that any citizen may bear arms, is also being debated.15
The US, it seems, still has an arduous path to traverse in order to deal more effectively with issues such as White supremacy and domestic terrorism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India-Pakistan LoC Ceasefire Decision: A Thaw in Sight?
Zainab Akhter
March 12, 2021
Even as the India-Pakistan ceasefire decision on the LoC is in effect, India has affirmed that there would not be any let-up in its counter-terrorism efforts.
The decision by India and Pakistan to ‘cease firing along the Line of Control (LoC) and all other sectors’, with effect from the midnight of February 25, 2021, is being seen as an important thaw in the bilateral relationship that was at an all-time low.1 The decision came about after talks between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO’s) of both countries. This joint statement is the first such understanding between India and Pakistan in nearly two decades, after the 2003 ceasefire agreement.
In 2019, during the Indian general elections, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan Niazi had famously said that there was a “better chance of peace talks with India” if Prime Minister Narendra Modi was voted back to power.2 PM Modi had earlier made a surprise stop over at Lahore in 2015 to attend the wedding of the grand-daughter of the then Prime Minister and PML-N Chief, Nawaz Sharif.3
While these were two bright spots, 2016 witnessed a downward spiral in bilateral relations with terror strikes at Pathankot and Uri, followed by a surgical strike by India in September 2016. The February 2019 Pulwama attack worsened the relations further. India retaliated by launching aerial attacks on campsites in Balakot on February 24.
The conflict escalated further in 2019 with the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A on August 5, 2019 and re-organisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Political, commercial, cultural and sporting ties were snapped and cross LoC movements were completely stopped. The High Commissioners from both countries were re-called. Imran Khan had asserted that until Article 370 was restored to its original form, there was no chance of any political dialogue with the Indian government.
Pakistan upped the ante across the LoC and ceasefire violations escalated manifold. Reports noted that the number of violations in September 2019 was nearly three times that in the previous years for the same month.4 In 2020, the number of ceasefire violations along the LoC were over 5,000, with 46 fatalities. This was the highest number of ceasefire violations since 2003.5
The Imran Khan government also invested its energy and time in highlighting alleged Indian atrocities in Kashmir at national and international forums. Khan even demanded a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers to discuss Kashmir, which was not supported by Saudi Arabia.6 The Pakistan government moreover submitted anti-India dossiers at the UN.
However, from the start of 2021, Pakistan has exhibited signs of being open to measures to reduce tensions. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa, at the passing-out ceremony of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) cadets on February 2, stated that it was “time to extend the hand of peace in all directions”.7 He added that India and Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue in a dignified manner.
Pakistan also accepted the invitation by India to attend the Health Secretary-level South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) virtual meeting-cum-workshop on February 18, 2021 to discuss the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. This virtual meeting was addressed by PM Modi.
At the virtual conference of SAARC Heads of State held earlier on March 15, 2020, PM Modi had proposed a regional Coronavirus Emergency Fund to mitigate the risks associated with the pandemic in the South Asian region, with India pledging an initial contribution of US$10 million.8 At that time, the proposal received extensive support from the SAARC members, except Pakistan.
Meanwhile, India also allowed the use of its air space to Imran Khan’s aircraft on his February 2021 trip to Sri Lanka. During this trip, Khan stated that the Kashmir dispute can only be resolved through dialogue.9 The Chief of Army Staff Gen. M.M. Naravane, a day before the ceasefire agreement, while addressing a webinar, was cited as stating that “unsettled borders and violence on the borders help no one” and that continued engagement with Pakistan could result in an understanding on the border.
Even as the ceasefire agreement has been welcomed by analysts, there was speculation that an exchange of views between National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and Special Assistant to the Pakistan PM, Moeed Yusuf had played a part in the development. Yusuf, in a series of tweets on February 25, rejected this claim and stated that the decision came about only as a result of the talks between the two DGMOs. Earlier in October 2020, Yusuf had stated that India had expressed an interest in dialogue.10 This was denied by the Ministry of External Affairs.11
The ceasefire decision marks the softening of stances on both sides, which has renewed hopes of a new beginning. There are talks of the revival of the SAARC Summit meeting, cancelled in 2016 when it was supposed to take place in Islamabad. Speculations are rife that PM Modi will participate in it as and when Pakistan hosts the summit. There is a hope that as a follow-up to the DGMO’s hotline talk, the High Commissioners will be reinstated on both sides, which may open up possibilities of a restart of trade and travel.
While there are optimists on both sides, many in Pakistan are questioning the Khan government’s decision to agree to the ceasefire. Imran Khan himself has placed the onus on India to keep the LoC peaceful. Some analysts argue whether it is wise on the part of the government and the army to talk peace with India, without resolution of the Kashmir issue. There are those who insist that India agreed to the ceasefire keeping its own self-interest in mind, and was a tactic to possibly avoid a two-front war.12
Be that as it may, with the ceasefire in effect, it will certainly help India and Pakistan diffuse tensions along the LoC. India on it part has affirmed that there would not be any let-up in its counter-terrorism efforts. It is time perhaps to take additional, incremental steps, towards peace and reconciliation. These could include re-starting cross-LoC trade and connectivity, which could create the right environment for fruitful dialogue to resolve outstanding issues between the two South Asian neighbours.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative will help African countries in the fight against the COVID pandemic and foster stronger ties based on the principle of South-South cooperation.
The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak has left a mark on countries across the world. Africa is no different with the virus impacting countries across the region. African countries launched a robust response to deal with the pandemic. As a result, Africa has fared significantly better than other parts of the world, a year after the outbreak.1
India shares a close partnership with African countries. In recent years, India has visibly enhanced the level of political and economic engagement with the region. Amidst the current pandemic, India has continued its diplomatic engagement with the region. The Vaccine Maitri (Friendship) initiative, launched by the Indian government, provides fresh opportunity for furthering cooperation with Africa, particularly in the health sector, which has been a crucial part of India’s partnership with Africa.
India-Africa Health Cooperation
The India-Africa development cooperation in health sector has gained greater salience in view of the several global and regional health policy instruments. Prominent amongst them are the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want’, launched by the African Union.2 These instruments call for ensuring healthy lives and promoting wellbeing for all. India’s national health policy also echoes these goals.
Over the years, India, well known as the pharmacy of the world, has provided low cost, generic drugs to several African countries to combat HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other infectious diseases. The Indian firm Cipla, has supplied anti-retroviral medicines for HIV/AIDS treatment to African countries at a minimal cost. Its Dollar-a-Day treatment programme has helped several African countries. Similarly, pharmaceutical firm Ranbaxy Laboratories has been very active in Africa for decades.3
Another important initiative, the Pan-African e-Network, first launched in 2009 and relaunched as the eVidya Bharti e Arogya Bharti (eVBAB) project in 2019, has connected hospitals in 54 African countries with medical practitioners in India to provide consultations and comprehensive tele-medicine training opportunities for African doctors, nurses and paramedics.
Covid-19 Pandemic
Africa has around 3.9 million confirmed COVID 19 cases, as of March 11, 2021.4 Maximum cases have been reported in South Africa (1.5 million) followed by Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria and Kenya. From the outset, India maintained contact with countries in the region, and exchanged information on the management of the pandemic.5
With a population of around 1.3 billion, India is facing a major battle of its own fighting COVID-19. However, the country has demonstrated capacity to support its partner countries. Since the coronavirus pandemic began, India has been at the forefront of supplying medicines and generic drugs to others.
India supplied hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol tablets, test kits, and other medical equipment for about 90 countries, including 25 from Africa.6 India has also helped with capacity building by offering health care training for COVID-19 management and protocols to several countries in Africa through the e-ITEC courses.
India’s defence forces have played a key role in implementing the country’s health cooperation initiatives with the African continent. Under Mission Sagar initiative, the Indian Naval Ship, INS Kesari, supplied COVID-related relief to Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar and the Comoros. Similarly under Mission ‘Sagar-II’, Indian Naval Ship, Airavat, sailed to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea with medicines and material to support their fight against natural calamities and COVID-19 pandemic.7
Such missions are aligned with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of SAGAR — Security and Growth for All in the Region. They highlight the importance accorded by India to relations with its maritime neighbours, including those in Africa. These early responses during the pandemic have been buttressed by the Indian drive to share the Made-in-India vaccines across the world.
Vaccine Maitri Initiative
The inequity in the access and distribution of the Covid vaccine has left the African countries and India equally aghast. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has warned that vaccine nationalism “could undermine decades of progress in human development, while investing in vaccination for all would benefit international trade in the near future”.8 President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa has also drawn attention to the problem of vaccine hoarding by developed countries.9
India has constantly raised its voice against vaccine nationalism and has supported initiatives calling for international cooperation to ensure global access to the vaccine.10 At a time, when rich and powerful countries are resorting to vaccine nationalism, India launched the Vaccine Maitri initiative. This initiative marks the supply of Made-in-India COVID vaccine for free or at a marginal cost to countries around the world. The leading Made-in-India vaccines are Covaxin, manufactured by Bharat Biotech and the Oxford-AstraZeneca Covishield, produced by the Serum Institute of India.
The Vaccine Maitri Initiative has been launched in line with India’s philosophy of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (the world is one family), as flagged by Prime Minister Modi during the Vaccine Summit in June 2020.11 As the largest vaccine producing country in the world, India has gifted millions of doses of the COVID vaccine to countries across the world, including in Africa.
Seychelles was the first African country to receive the Indian made vaccines. During the handing over ceremony, Sylvestre Radegonde, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tourism of Seychelles, noted that this “gesture cements the ties of solidarity, friendship and cooperation which exists between our two countries.”12
Similar sentiments were echoed by other African countries that received the vaccines, including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
As India rolls out its pandemic diplomacy with African countries, an important challenge is from criminal networks that may either hijack the consignments or supply fake vaccines. South African police recently busted a fake Covid-19 vaccine distribution network.13 Three Chinese nationals were arrested in this incident. In past, China has been involved in supplying fake medicines under the Made-in-India tag to African countries.14
In recent years, China’s footprint has also been rising in the African continent. This is visible in the increase in bilateral trade along with investments in large infrastructure projects in several African countries. During the pandemic, China has pledged to supply Sinopharm vaccines to around 20 African countries.
India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative will no doubt help African countries in the fight against the pandemic and foster stronger ties based on the principle of South-South cooperation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. As of March 11, 2021, the African continent as a whole has 3.99 million confirmed cases, compared to over 29.8 million in the United States, 11.28 million in India and 11.2 in Brazil. See BBC, “Coronavirus in Africa tracker” March 11, 2021. See Also, “COVID 19 Coronavirus Pandemic,” March 11, 2021.
Greater attention needs to be focused on effectively countering threats of radicalisation affecting India from Southeast Asia.
The incidence of jihadist radicalisation in India, across all its states, remains remarkably low when compared to West Asia, Africa and even Europe. Of the 177 ISIS sympathisers arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) since 2014, Tamil Nadu, at 34, accounted for the largest number of those arrested, as of February 2020. 26 ISIS sympathisers were arrested from Maharashtra, 25 from Uttar Pradesh, 19 from Kerala, 17 from Telangana and 11 from Jammu and Kashmir.1
Tamil Nadu accounting for the high number of arrests may be the result of a specific campaign launched by the NIA in Coimbatore in 2019, wherein seven operatives were arrested for propagating ISIS ideology on social media with the intention of carrying out attacks both in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.2 Nevertheless, the NIA arrests have certainly highlighted pockets of growing jihadist radicalisation in Tamil Nadu.
Historical Context
The state witnessed sporadic incidents of violent extremism in the past, when groups like Al Umma carried out the infamous Coimbatore blasts in February 1998. The blasts were in response to communal riots in the city, the previous year. A total of 58 people were killed and over 200 injured in 12 bomb attacks in 11 places.
The blasts were a criminal conspiracy to target L.K. Advani, leader of the BJP who escaped unhurt during an election rally. S.A. Basha, the founder of Al Ummah, was among the more than 180 arrested and convicted by the courts. An accused, N.P. Noohu, evaded arrest for 20 years but was eventually arrested in Kerala in 2018.3
The early and late 2000s did not witness major extremist activities. However, with the advent of ISIS in India, there were instances of youth getting radicalised locally and through social media. In 2014, Tamil Nadu police arrested two persons in Ramnathapuram district for printing and selling ISIS T-shirts. Later, a photo on twitter was widely circulated showing 26 youths clad in black T-shirts with ISIS emblem posing in front of a mosque.4
In April 2015, Subahani Haja Moideen, a native of Tirunelveli district, went to Iraq to join ISIS. After undergoing religious and arms training, he was deployed with an ISIS military formation, Umar Ibnu Khatab Khatiba, headed by French national Abu Suleiman, who was later killed. Haja Moideen returned to India in September 2015 and attempted to procure explosive chemicals from Sivakasi, with the sole intention to carry out terrorist attacks in India.5 After his arrest in October 2016, he was found guilty by the NIA Special court and sentenced to life imprisonment.
According to the Intelligence Bureau (IB) dossier, the Al-Umma outfit, which subsequently changed its name to The Base Movement, carried out several blasts in Mallapuram court premises in Kerala and outside the BJP's office in Malleshwaram in Bengaluru in 2016.6 Affiliated to Al Qaeda, this outfit also sent out threatening letters to the judiciary, prisons and senior government officials.
Diaspora Concerns
Tamil Nadu borders Kerala and Karnataka, states with large migrant populations exposed to radicalism in West Asia. A large Tamil diaspora reside in Southeast Asia as well. Radical Salafi jihadist groups are active in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia (particularly the restive Aceh province), southern Philippines, and Malaysia.
Tamilians constitute a sizeable section of the local populations in some of these countries. These people still have active links with the place of their origin. It is reported that there are almost 19 lakh Tamils in Malaysia, about 500,000 in Singapore and 75,000 in Indonesia.
This population is susceptible to the propaganda of various Islamist groups in the region, some of whom are affiliates of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, such as Jemaah Al-Islamiyah and Lashkar Jundullah (Indonesia), Abu Sayyaf group (Southern Philippines), and Kumpulan Mujahidin (Malaysia).
Analysts flag instances of Tamilians getting radicalised in South East Asian countries.7 In 2014, a Singaporean Tamil, Haja Fakrudden, travelled to Syria and joined ISIS. Another Singaporean, Gul Mohammed Mariakar, was deported to India for distributing jihadi literature and radicalising Usmal Ali, who joined ISIS in Syria. The ISIS’ media wing, Al Isabah, had in the past also released speeches of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in the Tamil language.8
The Tamil-Muslim mistrust in Sri Lanka has spilled over into Tamil Nadu. About 72,000 Muslims from Sri Lanka’s Northern Province were forcibly expelled by the LTTE in October 1990.9 This is suspected to have created a sense of resentment among some sections of Tamil Nadu’s Muslims.10
The Saudi–funded Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ) came into the limelight during investigations into the 2019 Easter bombings in Sri Lanka.11 The main group behind the Easter bombings was the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ), termed an ‘ideological offspring’ of TNTJ, by analysts.12
Conclusion
The focus of study for jihadist indoctrination and violence by Indian security experts has largely been confined to the Af-Pak front or limited to the country’s western coastal states. Equal attention needs to be given to countering threats of radicalisation affecting India from Southeast Asia as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and America enjoy amity in their bilateral relationship, but both share adversarial relations with China. What has cemented their global strategic partnership is the threat that both countries perceive from China. This pattern appears set to continue into the medium term.
When the China-India-United States triangle began to form in the early years of this century, it most closely resembled a ménage á trois. All three dyads in the triangle – India-China, India-US and China-US – were characterised by equally amicable relationships. Each country had an overall positive and cooperative policy towards the other two. India’s relationship with China recovered from the stumble caused by India highlighting China as the principal reason for the 1998 nuclear tests. The two countries built on the understanding reached in the 1990s on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border. In 2005, they agreed to a set of political parameters for settling the boundary dispute. Bilateral trade began to zoom. And India and China began to coordinate positions in trilateral and multilateral groupings such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Russia-India-China (RIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), World Trade Organization (WTO), climate change negotiations, etc.
India-US relations also traced a similar trajectory after the 1998 nuclear tests, which the United States perceived as a huge setback to its non-proliferation policy objectives. Dense economic linkages especially in the information technology sector were accompanied by a spurt in the growth and influence of the Indian diaspora in the United States. Further, the combination of the challenge of international terrorism and the imperative of shaping the evolving international order in which Asia appeared set to emerge as the centre stage led India and America to conclude the nuclear deal and the defence cooperation framework in 2005.
At the same time, China-US relations also began to recover from controversies such as the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and the EP-3 incident of 2001 involving a collision between US and Chinese military aircraft near Hainan. America persisted with its bet on deepening China’s integration into the international system by welcoming China into the WTO. By 2005, China was proclaiming its peaceful rise to great power status, and America was gently urging China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
The year 2005 was thus a geopolitical sweet spot for all three dyads in the triangle. They appeared to be in an amicable and stable ménage á trois. Things unravelled thereafter between both China and India and China and the United States, whereas the India-US relationship has witnessed steady progress. Two factors are responsible for this change in the pattern of the triangular dynamic. The first is the alteration in the underlying balance of power between China and India and China and the United States, caused by China’s meteoric rise as the world’s factory and the new fount of investment, America’s decline in both economic and political spheres signified by the Great Recession and the domestic and global disruption caused by the Trump presidency, and India’s inability to sustain high growth rates. The second, inter-linked, factor is the strategic rivalry that underlies China’s relationship with both India and the United States.
The India-China boundary dispute has persisted since China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950. Negotiations both before and after the 1962 War have failed to yield a mutually acceptable solution. China, according to one expert, has come to the conclusion that the Line of Actual Control and eventually the border has to be consolidated on the ground. As a result, the last few years have witnessed repeated standoffs between the two militaries along the disputed border areas. The latest such standoff, which actually led to the loss of life for the first time since 1975, began in April 2020 when China attempted to impose a territorial fait accompli on India. While disengagement began a few days ago, the series of standoffs since 2013 portends further eruptions. Second, India and China conflict also extends to their respective status. India aspires for multipolarity not just in the international system but also in Asia where it does not want to play second fiddle to China. China, however, appears committed to denying peer status to India. It continues to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and remains non-committal on India’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. A third source of conflict revolves around access to key geographical regions. China is acutely concerned about its Malacca Dilemma – that its commerce through the Indian Ocean might be throttled at this choke point. By virtue of the geostrategic location of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India is in a commanding position to monitor the approaches to the Malacca Straits. For its part, India is concerned about China’s penetration of both the Himalayan security perimeter through close ties to Nepal and of the maritime security perimeter by gaining a lease over Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Indian concerns also extend to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses the territory of Kashmir under Pakistan’s occupation, thus undermining Indian sovereignty, deepening China’s stakes on the Kashmir issue, and enhancing Chinese support for Pakistan.
In the case of China and the United States, the two countries have entered what Professor Graham Allison calls the Thucydides Trap between a reigning hegemon and a rising challenger. America is keen on retaining its 75-year long primacy in East Asia, which is manifested in treaty commitments and military forces stationed in, deployed to, and rotated through the region. China has, however, articulated the importance of establishing a new type of great power relations with America, which entails US abandonment of treaty commitments to East Asian allies and withdrawal of military forces stationed or deployed in the region. In addition, the China-US conflict extends to political ideology. America remains committed to a world composed of democratic states, which, it believes, would usher in the so-called Kantian peace. Democracy is, however, anathema to the Chinese Communist Party, which is determined to maintain its monopoly over power in domestic politics and can therefore be logically expected to support and advocate non-democratic forms of government around the world.
In contrast to the return of rivalry in the relationships between China and India and China and the United States, the India-US relationship has broadened and deepened into a comprehensive global strategic partnership. This, despite the history of estrangement between these two democracies throughout the second half of the 20th century. Although India and America regularly found themselves on opposite sides of key issues, none of these actually involved a conflict over issues such as territory, status, sphere of influence, and ideology that actually contribute to the growth of strategic rivalry. In addition, what has cemented the partnership is the threat to their vital national interests that both India and the United States perceive from China.
As a result, the triangular dynamic among China, India and the United States has come to resemble a stable marriage – another ideal type identified by Professor Lowell Dittmer 40 years ago. India and America enjoy amity in their bilateral relationship, but both share adversarial relations with China. This pattern appears set to continue into the medium term. India is stepping up defence preparedness and contemplating force restructuring to become better prepared and capable against China in the wake of the now unwinding military crisis. The Biden administration has categorised China as America’s “most serious competitor” and expressed its determination to “confront China’s economic abuses” and “counter its aggressive, coercive action”. And India and the United States have resolved to closely cooperate in support of freedom of navigation, territory integrity, and a robust security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
Select References
Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis”, World Politics, 33 (4), July 1981, pp. 485-515.
Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007.
WhatsApp’s updated terms of service and privacy policy raise important questions on data privacy and data security.
WhatsApp updated its terms of service and privacy policy in January 2021 and asked its users to compulsorily comply with it if they wished to continue using the app.1 The updated terms would enable the app to collect the metadata of users such as mobile phone number, phone model, call logs, approximate location, duration of interactions, etc. and share it with business accounts and WhatsApp’s parent company, Facebook.
WhatsApp has stated in its updated policy that if users choose to click on ads while using Facebook or Instagram, it may be used to provide personalised ads in the future based on user metadata.2 WhatsApp will be needing the consent of users in Europe for Facebook to even access their metadata like phone numbers or call logs.
The users may also choose to not give their consent and still continue using WhatsApp. For users in the rest of the world, as of now, the date to accept the policy changes in order to continue using the app has been extended till May 15, 2021, from the earlier deadline of February 8, 2021.
WhatsApp’s move has raised important questions on data privacy, data security and most importantly, the freedom of choice of individuals. This is especially so since the option to opt out of the policy changes was not provided. The changes also appeared discriminatory in nature since they applied only to users outside Europe and the United Kingdom — jurisdictions where there are strict data protection laws.3
With a user base of more than 340 million, WhatsApp is one of the most popular messaging apps in India, accounting for the largest number of subscribers, followed by Brazil and the US.4 There was a backlash among users soon after the alert of the updated policy. A large number of users shifted to rival messaging apps like Telegram and Signal.5
The massive influx of new users to Signal led to the disruption of its services on January 15, 2021.6 Telegram became the most downloaded non-gaming app worldwide for January 2021, with 24 percent of total downloads from India, according to the latest data provided by analytics firm, Sensor Tower.7
Responding to the negative backlash, WhatsApp clarified via its own status updates that nothing had changed with respect to personal messaging, given that all personal conversations were protected with end-to-end encryption and no contacts and location updates were shared with Facebook, except for some business accounts.
The Issue of Data Privacy
WhatsApp’s new policy changes have led to growing concerns about the manner in which business data will be treated and how it will affect the privacy of the customers.8 For instance, many companies use this platform to deliver lab reports, air tickets, and other confidential information to customers.
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), has termed the policy changes as unfair and unacceptable in their current form, and has sought clarifications from WhatsApp regarding its information privacy.9 The differential treatment to the citizens of the country, as opposed to European citizens, was highlighted as a matter of concern.10
The Delhi High Court, hearing a petition challenging the apps’ new privacy policy on grounds that it violated the right to privacy guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, stated that WhatsApp is a private app and downloading the app itself was not mandatory for citizens.11 It also highlighted the fact that not just WhatsApp but many other apps have similar terms and conditions.
It is pertinent to note that in February 2021, the government imposed a ban on nearly 60 apps, including TikTok, under section 69A of the Information Technology Act.12 Concerns regarding data collection, data security and user privacy — precisely the reasons regarding which MeitY has now sought clarifications from WhatsApp, were responsible for that ban.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgement by a nine judge bench in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India case in 2017, had held that data privacy is under the ambit of Right to Privacy, protected as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner of the case, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.), had submitted that making Aadhar mandatory and linking it to the grant of state benefits was violative of the right to privacy of individuals.13 The Court in this judgment also overruled the previous judgments in the Kharak Singh vs State of UP (1962) and M.P Sharma vs Satish Chandra (1954) cases, in which it had held that Right to Privacy was not a Fundamental Right.
Data protection and privacy currently is regulated under the provisions of the Information Technology Act 2000. Article 21 of the Constitution has also evolved over a period of time to include the right to privacy as an essential component of the Right to Life. In the absence of a specific legislation on data privacy, however, the Union Government in July 2017, after the judgement by the Supreme Court in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy case, formed the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee to deliberate on a data protection framework for the country. The Committee submitted its report in July 2018.
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019, which was tabled in the Lok Sabha in 2019, is currently under consideration by a parliamentary committee. As and when it is passed, it would be India’s first legislation on protection of personal data based on the recommendations of the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee. The committee recommended privacy by design on part of data processors and individual consent as essential frameworks to govern data sharing. It also called for the Right to be forgotten — the ability of individuals to limit, delink, and delete personal data on the internet.14 A specific regulatory mechanism of this kind is the need of the hour since private tech giants play a very significant role when it comes to managing and handling personal data.
The Way Forward
Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Facebook are among the ten top-most valuable companies in the world and they all belong to the data sector. These tech-giants own a substantial amount of Big Data, the high volume of information generated by users using their services. Technological advances have enabled these companies to collect, store and process such data. Their ability to do so, however, should not infringe upon basic human rights. Providing safeguards to personal data using the highest-possible privacy settings by default, asking for consent and granting the right to revoke the consent anytime, are important standards in this regard. As India constantly strives to ensure the safety and sovereignty of the cyberspace and of personal data, the direction which the WhatsApp saga will take will be keenly watched.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sadyr Japarov was sworn in as the President of the Kyrgyz Republic on January 28, 2021, after months of political upheaval.
Within a span of four months, the Kyrgyz Republic has witnessed power shifts, provisionally and definitively, among three presidents and five prime ministers. Most recently, Sadyr Japarov was sworn in as president on January 28, 2021, after winning the presidential elections held on January 10. Ulukbek Maripov, a former Chairman of the Accounts Chamber, was sworn in as the Prime Minister on February 3.
The January 10 presidential elections were the critical consequence of months of political upheaval that followed the contentious October 4, 2020 parliamentary elections. The opposition alleged widespread irregularities in the elections to the 120-member unicameral parliament (Jogorku Kenesh, or the Supreme Council). The parties aligned with the government of then President-elect, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, had emerged victorious in those elections.
The opposition incited protests, stormed government buildings, and demanded the conduct of new elections as well as the release of politicians controversially put in prison. A former elected member of the Supreme Council – Sadyr Japarov, serving an 11-year sentence for being involved in the kidnapping of a local official in 2013 during anti-corruption protests at the Kumtor gold mine – was among those freed from prison by his supporters.
Subsequently, the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda annulled the results of the parliamentary elections, and Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov resigned on October 6, 2020. The very next day, Japarov was nominated as the interim prime minister by feuding opposition groups. A state of emergency was declared by President Jeenbekov, first on October 9 and then on October 12, of which only the latter got endorsed by the Parliament on October 13.
When Jeenbekov resigned on October 15, Japarov was declared as the acting President, after the Speaker of Parliament, Kanat Isayev, declined to hold the office. Japarov, therefore, went from being a parliamentarian to prisoner to assuming the roles of acting Prime Minister and acting President, within a short period of time.1
The interim government decided to postpone parliamentary elections, earlier scheduled to be held in December 2020, till June 2021 and to instead hold early presidential elections in January 2021, along with a referendum on whether the country should have a presidential form of government.2 Japarov stepped down from his posts in November 2020 to become eligible to run for the office of President, since the Kyrgyz constitution bars interim leaders from contesting in elections.
The January 2021 elections saw seventeen claimants to power. Kyrgyz voters, of which just under forty per cent turned out, voted in favour of Japarov, while in the referendum, the majority voted for a return to a presidential form of government.3 In the Kyrgyz Republic, tenures of political leaders have been intricately linked with referendums for constitutional change. The January 2021 referendum vote for a presidential system is being viewed as having a better chance of ensuring accountability.4
Analysts note that the strong ‘anti-elite’ and ‘anti-establishment’ feelings in the electorate helped Japarov in securing victory in the elections.5 He was viewed as a nationalist, receiving the popular sympathies for being allegedly wronged by the establishment. Japarov also promised a strong government sans corruption.6
Regional reactions
Kyrgyzstan is viewed as Russia’s traditional sphere of influence and China’s strategic backyard. Both Russia and China have been monitoring the period of political turmoil with cautious non-intervention. Japarov reiterated his country’s strategic alliance with Russia and assured the continued status of Russian as the country’s official language.7 President Vladimir Putin, in his greetings to Japarov, pledged to cooperate to develop bilateral relations for mutual benefit.8
Kyrgyz-Russian relations, though, are not without challenges. Over half-a-million Kyrgyz workers in Russia face a host of issues, including charges of discrimination, in addition to the precariousness imposed on them by the COVID-19 crisis.9 Japarov, at multiple instances, has promised to create economic opportunities domestically for migrant workers.
However, no concrete policies have been put forth. The economy has also been ravaged by the pandemic and systemic corruption. GDP growth forecast for 2021 has been reduced from 4.5 per cent to 4 per cent.10 Kyrgyzstan scored 31 out of 100 in the Corruption Perceptions Index, lower than the 36 out of 100 average regional score of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.11
As for Kyrgyz-China relations, Japarov has difficult choices to make. In the violent uprisings that followed the October 2020 events, given long-standing apprehensions against the foreign-funded mining industry, Chinese-run mines were among the facilities occupied by protesters. A Chinese-owned oil refinery in Kara Balta, country’s largest, was threatened.
Beijing conveyed its concerns about the safety of its interests and enterprises in Kyrgyzstan, in meetings that the Chinese Ambassador had with the Kyrgyz Foreign Minister on October 16. The Kyrgyz Ambassador to China was also summoned by the Chinese Foreign Security Commissioner on October 19.12
Nearly 40 per cent of the country’s external debt, at $1.8 billion, is owed to China.13 While previous governments have secured temporary deferments, Japarov has also considered voluntary financial contributions from citizens to make the repayments.14 The auctioning of government assets is also part of the menu of choices. Developing the Jetim-Too iron ore deposit to pay off Chinese debt has also been deliberated upon.15
Conclusion
Analysts note that a failure on the part of Japarov to deliver on his campaign promises concerning the economy could lead to inevitable discontentment. A draft constitution, endorsed by Japarov in November-December 2020, seeks to undo the 2010 Constitutional referendum, and introduce a new consultative council, People’s Kurultai. This proposal, on which a referendum will be held later in the year, has drawn widespread criticism from the opposition, legal experts, journalists, and human rights activists. Political-economic compulsions created by external actors, in addition to the intensifying economic expectations, could lead to another political crisis. While popular support for Japarov could perhaps help tide over minor non-accomplishments, failure to deliver on the plethora of promises on ensuring economic prosperity could make his position untenable as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India, Russia and the Indo-Pacific: A Search for Congruence
Rajorshi Roy
February 03, 2021
India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific not only accommodates Russia’s clamour for ASEAN centrality but also complements its Greater Eurasia construct.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent uncharacteristic statement of “India being an object of the Western countries persistent, aggressive and devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies”1 has reignited the debate on India and Russia’s increasingly divergent outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Lavrov at the 2020 Raisinia Dialogue had expressed confidence of India “being smart enough to understand” the Western “trap” of the Indo-Pacific and “not get into it”.2
The tone, tenor and timing of Lavrov’s December 2020 statement insinuates Russia’s apprehensions of a fundamental shift in India’s foreign policy playbook which traditionally has placed a premium on strategic autonomy, with Russia as one of its key pillars.
These developments have the potential to cast a shadow on India-Russia bilateral ties. The pertinent question is whether New Delhi and Moscow can find common ground in the evolving geo-strategic construct.
Asia-Pacific vs Indo-Pacific
India and Russia’s divergent outlooks appear to stem from the latter’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific construct in favour of Asia-Pacific. This is predicated on Kremlin’s assertion that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a US-led initiative designed to contain China and Russia.3
Russia has viewed attempts to formulate a new rules-based Indo-Pacific order as a Western strategy to override international law, thereby circumventing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where Russia holds veto power.
Russia’s Indo-Pacific opposition is also based on its perception that it undermines the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality, an organisation with which Russia has intensified its engagement.4 Russia also holds that the construct is limited in its geographical scope as it excludes Africa and the Persian Gulf, regions where Russia has increased its strategic footprints in recent times.5 Seeing no tangible gains from this redefined construct, Russia continues to emphasise on the Asia-Pacific.
However, when viewed critically, Asia-Pacific remains limited in its scope and geographical reach. It does not reflect the shift in the centres of growth and influence from the Asia-Pacific to regions beyond East and South-East Asia encompassing South Asia and Africa.
Notably, Asia-Pacific excludes India, a nation of 1.3 billion with a $3 trillion economy and a sprawling coastline that includes the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which straddle the Malacca Straits. This makes India a key stakeholder in the maritime commons of not only the Indian Ocean but also the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, it is questionable whether the Indo-Pacific really is an American construct. Christened by an Indian scholar and structured by Japan’s former-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Indo-Pacific and its adoption by several stakeholders who appear to maintain an independent foreign policy, is a reflection of its inclusive character and wide acceptance. This includes the ASEAN states, earlier seen as the fulcrum of Asia-Pacific.6
There also does not appear to be any appetite among these stakeholders to view the construct through the American lens of Great Power rivalry and contestation. This is unsurprising given their economic interdependence with China. A strategy of containment and confrontation with China appears passé. The recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, whose signatories include China, ASEAN countries and two QUAD members (Australia and Japan), reflects the same.
The overriding consensus among the Indo-Pacific stakeholders appears to be the joint construction of a stable and inclusive security architecture that promotes peace and harmony. This reflects the new economic and security realities which are anchored in the recognition of the Indian and Pacific Oceans being interconnected and interdependent, particularly given the indivisible nature of security.
Therefore, developmental partnerships that eschew unilateralism and coercive behaviour would be in the shared interests of the majority. A corollary of this would be the shared concerns of its stakeholders about China’s peaceful rise. Pertinently, this is a concern that is prevalent even among Russian experts.7
The Indo-Pacific stakeholders’ strategy appears predicated on putting diplomatic pressure on Beijing to strengthen the foundations of peaceful co-existence. The strategy, however, may not necessarily be China specific. Moreover, majority of stakeholders view expansion of the Indo-Pacific’s frontiers to the east-coast of Africa and ASEAN centrality as intrinsic to the construct.
In relation to the QUAD, Russia maintains that it is a military alliance designed to contain China and Russia. An alternative view to this would be that the QUAD is a plurilateral dialogue mechanism designed to complement the Indo-Pacific in building synergies in infrastructure, capacity building, connectivity and tackling non-traditional security threats. Perhaps, the QUAD Plus collaborative framework may help in overcoming its image of offering exclusionary membership.
In these circumstances, opting to remain outside the Indo-Pacific tent is likely to prevent Russia from participating in these nascent attempts to create a stable regional security architecture.
Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Opportunity for Russia?
Even as it rejects the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s growing stakes in the region tell a different tale. This is reflected in its new partnerships with ASEAN, SAARC, African and Gulf countries, anchored in its weapons and natural resources diplomacy. The jurisdiction of its Pacific Fleet extends from Vladivostok right up to the Persian Gulf, effectively highlighting Russia practising an Indo-Pacific strategy.
This nascent network of new relationships could help fulfil Russia’s long-cherished dream of gaining access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, Russian maritime expeditions made frequent port calls in the region in the 19th century, marked by a full time consulate at Batavia, the capital of Dutch East Indies Company.8
Russia’s vocal opposition of Indo-Pacific appears tactically linked to its necessity of an entente with China. With Beijing’s support being critical to overcome Western pressure on its policies, the Kremlin as quid pro quo appears to increasingly back China in its core areas of strategic concern by doing the diplomatic heavy-lifting.
However, its advocacy seems to be tempered with a selective approach. For instance, instead of supporting Beijing on the issue of the South China Sea, Russia has called for preventing the dispute’s internationalisation.9 Similarly, Russia has qualitatively stepped up its engagement with the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam — countries who have long-running territorial feuds and sovereignty claims with China.
Therefore, Russia appears to be performing the deft balancing act of not upsetting the Chinese applecart while continuing to pull at certain apples sensitive to China, creating a strategic space for manoeuvre.
The Indo-Pacific, on the other hand, can likely be one of Russia’s tools to stay relevant on the global stage. Today, an increasingly bipolar US-China global narrative runs the risk of leaving Russia in its trail, given Moscow’s relative decline. This necessitates Russia adopting independent positions in one of the world’s most dynamic regions to project the image of a pole in global affairs.
Being China’s junior partner undermines Kremlin’s great power ambitions. Russia, therefore, likely stands to gain from the multipolarity and multilateralism that the Indo-Pacific seeks to promote. A strategic repositioning could not only help Russia overcome Western attempts to isolate it but also broaden the horizons of its pivot to Asia beyond China.
It, therefore, makes strategic sense to explore congruence with the nuanced Indo-Pacific vision of non-American stakeholders, including the QUAD members. Notably, Russia appears to enjoy stable relations with all the key stakeholders, with the exception of the US.
However, this is likely predicated on Russia’s willingness to reimagine a new geo-strategic maritime role for itself. Russia’s unique geographical position of straddling the Heartland and Rimland at a time when the Indo-Pacific’s emphasis has been on visualising the continental and maritime areas of the two oceans as a seamless strategic space does seem to provide it the necessary tools. Russia remains as much an Asian power as it is a European one with 2/3rds of its territory and 15 per cent of its population based in Asia.
At a time when Russia is recalibrating its identity from a European to a Eurasian one, its Greater Eurasia construct, envisioned as a harmonious strategic space from Lisbon to Jakarta, seems to aptly complement the Indo-Pacific.10 Interestingly, the core content of the Greater Eurasia construct appears similar to Indo-Pacific, with its emphasis on being open and inclusive, stress on dialogue and building developmental partnerships and connectivity, respecting international law, and eschewing confrontation.
With the Russian Far East being the connecting tissue between Greater Eurasia and Indo-Pacific, Russia could tap into the expertise and resources of Indo-Pacific countries beyond China, so as to develop its Far East. This region remains one of Russia’s least developed regions. Similarly, exploring congruence in building of new regional supply chains in Indo-Pacific could help Russia overcome its Achilles heel – its weak global economic competitiveness.
Exploring an India-Russia Congruence
A framework of India-Russia strategic cooperation in this space already exists, as outlined by Prime Minister Modi in the seminal ‘Act Far East’ policy launched in Vladivostok in 2019.11 This was seen as the lynchpin of harmonising the two countries strategic outlook. However, Lavrov’s recent outburst, seen largely through the prism of tensions in Russia-West ties, seems to suggest a continuing gap between the Indian and Russian viewpoints.
Inevitably, the push and pull of Russia-US confrontation has complicated India’s foreign policy options. Similar to Russia’s strategic necessity of an entente with China, a closer partnership with the US appears to be in India’s interests.
However, it is likely that India will continue its independent course of action anchored in multi-alignment. Russia remains India’s traditional partner and a pillar of India’s strategic autonomy. The challenge will likely be to convince Russia of India’s long-term independent Indo-Pacific vision.
It is, therefore, essential to continue to strive for congruence. What can possibly bridge the gap are both nations’ similar but as yet parallel visions of a stable security architecture and shared concerns over hegemonism.
India’s vision of Indo-Pacific appears to not only accommodate Russia’s clamour for ASEAN centrality and inclusion of East Africa but also complement the Greater Eurasia construct.
A Russia-India-Japan trilateral could be a new vector, given the fact that India and Japan’s Indo-Pacific visions seem to be the closest to Russia’s strategic comfort. This trilateral holds potential with Japan seeking a new modus vivendi with Russia. This was reflected in ex-Prime Minister Abe’s speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in 2019, an event where Indian and Japanese premiers were the guests of honour.
As India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar had stated in 2019, “Russia is a Pacific Power which has Indian Ocean interests” while “India is an Indian Ocean power with very strong and growing Pacific interest”.12
The litmus test of this traditional partnership will be to harmonise each other’s viewpoints, to the extent possible, and ride out the storm. Perhaps, a logistics sharing pact, long in the offing, could provide the much needed momentum.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
11. “Translation of Prime Minister's Speech in Plenary Session of 5th Eastern Economic Forum (September 05, 2019)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, September 5, 2019. PM Modi highlighted the importance of Vladivostok being a confluence of Eurasia and the Pacific, thereby presenting opportunities for the Arctic and the Northern Sea routes. He referred to the region being the take-off point of India’s Act Far East policy which would add a new dimension to bilateral economic diplomacy. He emphasised on the robust India-Russia partnership providing a strong foundation of a rules-based order, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and abstaining from interfering in the internal affairs of a country.
The rapidity and selflessness with which India rolled out millions of doses of vaccines as aid despite the massive requirements of its own vaccination drive, is being particularly appreciated by world leaders and observers.
Speaking at the first UN General Assembly Session he attended in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India’s foreign policy is governed by its age-old maxim of ‘’Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’’ (The World is One Family).
As soon as the coronavirus hit the world, India emphasised the imperative of collaboration to overcome the inimical health and economic impact of the virus. It was with this objective that the Indian government organised a virtual meeting of SAARC leaders on March 15, 2020. A SAARC Fund to combat the disease was established, with India contributing an amount of $10 million.
In the initial months of the pandemic, India, by virtue of the fact that it is the ‘pharmacy of the world’, ramped up production of essential medicines like hydroxychloroquine, paracetamol etc. as well as Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) kits, ventilators and masks. It should be noted that at the start of the pandemic, India’s production capacity to manufacture such equipment was negligible. However, India was very quickly able to significantly augment its production competence to not only meet its own domestic requirements but also emerge as a significant exporter of these items.
The United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) failed miserably to provide leadership in dealing with this crisis. The UN Security Council (UNSC) could not meet in March 2020 because China was chairing the body and did not want questions to be raised on its actions of deception and hypocrisy, after the virus first erupted in Wuhan and spread around the world. Even when the UNSC met to discuss the issue in April 2020, it could not agree on any concrete course of action because of deep divisions amongst the members.
Speaking on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the UN in September 2020, PM Modi pointed out that the world body faced a ‘crisis of confidence’ as it operated on outdated structures. On the same occasion, Modi affirmed that India’s vaccine production capacity will be used to help humanity in fighting the virus.
Roll Out of ‘’Vaccine Maitri’’ (Vaccine Friendship)
India produces 60 per cent of all vaccines manufactured in the world. The head of the WHO recently complained that the developed countries monopolised the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines for their own populations and were not making them available to developing countries.
In accordance with the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy enunciated by Modi at the beginning of his first term in 2014, Bhutan and Maldives became the first two countries to receive 150,000 and 100,000 vaccines respectively, on January 20, 2021. Bangladesh and Nepal received two million and one million doses on January 21. Myanmar received 1.5 million doses, Seychelles 50,000 doses, and Mauritius 100,000 doses on January 22.
The two million doses gifted by India to Bangladesh were the single largest consignment of vaccines provided by India to any country thus far, prompting the Bangladesh Health minister to comment that India had stood by his country during the Liberation War of 1971 as well as during the pandemic. Bangladesh was supposed to get 110,000 doses of free vaccines from the Chinese firm Sinovac Biotech, but its reluctance to contribute towards the development cost of the vaccine, led to a deadlock.
India’s vaccine assistance reached Nepal within a week of a request made by Nepalese Foreign Minister during his visit to New Delhi on January 15, 2021. India’s gesture to Nepal came at a time when its ties have been strained by a territorial dispute as well as concerns over China’s expanding political and economic influence in the Himalayan nation. China, which had promised Nepal help to deal with the pandemic, is yet to receive Nepali clearance for its Sinopharm shots.
It is pertinent to flag that there is huge demand for vaccines in some of the above mentioned countries who are desperate to revive their tourism-dependent economies. This has provided an important opportunity for the Indian government to expand and strengthen its outreach.
All the above vaccine supplies by India were made on a gratis basis. Several of these countries are among the reportedly 90 countries including South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UAE and a host of others that have signed commercial agreements with Indian manufacturers, supplies pursuant to which will be made in the coming days.
Regulatory approvals by Afghanistan are awaited to effect supplies to it. Shipment of 500,000 doses to Sri Lanka was effected on January 27, 2021. India has also conducted training programmes for its neighbours to help them in the vaccination drive.
Apart from countries in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, Brazil and Morocco, close strategic partners, also got 2 million doses each on January 22. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro thanked PM Modi for sending the vaccine supplies and equated the gesture with that of Lord Hanuman bringing the holy 'Sanjeevani'. PM Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominican Republic called for assistance from India ‘with great humility and respect … to make our population safe’.
The US State Department, the WHO, Bill Gates and several others have spoken warmly and appreciatively of the selfless manner in which India is helping several developing countries with the vaccines.
India’s ‘Vaccine Maitri’ Mission appears to have taken China by surprise and put it on the back foot. Global Times, the mouth piece of the Chinese Communist Party, has started spreading lies and making disparaging remarks about the safety, efficacy and capacity of India to produce vaccines in adequate numbers. This is even as countries like Cambodia, Nepal and Bangladesh have refused to take China’s vaccines because of quality concerns or terms of supply.
China’s ‘iron friend’ Pakistan, meanwhile, has been informed that it could send its aircraft to Beijing to airlift 500,000 doses of the vaccine. This is in stark contrast to the dispatch effected by India to Nepal and Bangladesh in Air India special flights. Brazil which had also imported Chinese vaccines, is wary of using them because it finds that their efficacy is just around 50 per cent, which is much lower than all other vaccines in use in the world.
Conclusion
What has been particularly appreciated by observers is the rapidity and selflessness with which India rolled out millions of doses as aid despite the massive requirements of its own vaccination drive. While the world is witnessing the aggressive and threatening demeanor of China, the humane and caring attitude of India, in stark contrast, is evident. In the rapidly evolving global geo-political landscape, the healing and supportive actions by India through supply of Covishield and Covaxin vaccines will have a huge impact in promoting peace, security, cooperation and prosperity in the region and the world. India’s ‘Vaccine Maitri’ initiative has further strengthened its image as the first responder in emergency situations. This is all the more commendable when there are only five countries in the world who have thus far been able to successfully manufacture Covid-19 vaccines.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
With India’s current semiconductor demand of $40 billion expected to rise to $100 billion by 2025, the time is indeed right to begin production of semiconductors within the country.
The current brouhaha over semiconductors is reminiscent of the Y2K bug at the turn of the century, when there was a fear that the bug would affect software and bring computer systems to a crashing halt. This time around, the sudden and unexpected shortage of semiconductors that make up the core of most electronic items threatens to give a massive shock to the global economy as virtually everything from cars to toys to military drones has a chip inside it. Unlike the Y2K bug, it is not merely a technical issue but has acquired overtones and ramifications far beyond that.
From the geo-political perspective, it has become a part of the technological tussle between the United States and China; whilst the microchip was invented in the US in the 1950s, with Europe and the US manufacturers providing much of the world’s supply, by the 1990s, manufacturing shifted to Asia, driven by reduced cost of production and government incentives.
Thus, though US headquartered companies still have a 44 per cent market share in sales currently, only 11 per cent of chips are manufactured in the US, with the bulk of the manufacturing happening in South Korea (28 per cent), Taiwan (22 per cent), Japan (16 per cent), and China (12 per cent). Europe’s share is a measly 3 percent. Much of the production is gobbled up by Asian companies such as Samsung (8.1 per cent), Huawei (4.1 per cent), Lenovo (4.1 per cent), and Xiaomi (2 per cent), even though Apple by itself consumes as much as 12 per cent.
Huawei saw a 23 per cent drop in purchase share in 2020 following the imposition of restrictions by the US government on its purchase of semi-conductors from its main supplier, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). These sanctions could be applied since much of the technology used in the manufacture of semiconductors is American. The US also placed Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), China’s biggest semiconductor producer, on the entity list in September 2020, preventing it from accessing US software and chip making hardware, citing possible end-use by the Chinese military.
Even before the blow-up in US-China relations, the Chinese government has been ramping up its efforts to increase chip production within the country, under the Make-in-China 202 initiative. While huge amounts of money have been invested in the endeavour, the Chinese companies have been hamstrung by the lack of technical know-how. Chinese manufacturing is at least two generations behind the latest chips available today.
For other countries that have tried to fashion a path to semiconductor independence, it is both technical knowhow as well as financial constraints that have so far presented insurmountable obstacles. The average semiconductor production unit requires an investment of at least $10-12 billion and a long gestation period. Coupled with rapidly changing technology and requirements of the client companies, a factory or foundry set up to produce a certain kind of chip could very well find its product is not in demand after coming on-stream or face price pressures from competitors. This has led to a situation where there are only a handful of suppliers in a $500 billion industry.
The geo-political tussle over micro-chips has been further exacerbated by the sudden shortage of semiconductors, which is partially an outcome of the tussle and partially of the pandemic. Huawei began to stock up on chips anticipating the US sanctions at the same time that many other purchasers cancelled orders on the back of reduced demand for their products. Semi-conductor foundries, in turn, reduced production and diverted their sales to sectors where demand increased, like laptops, webcams and gaming systems.
The shortage is leading to huge losses for companies across sectors, but the most affected has been the car industry. Semiconductors control critical areas of the vehicle like air-conditioning, airbags, driver information, audio/video entertainment, sensors, transmission and gear, navigation and collision detection systems.
The Biden administration has gone all out in its efforts to both restrain China from accessing technology as well as in bringing the US back as a leading manufacturer of semiconductors. The president has initiated a review of the semi-conductor supply chain and urged Congress to provide $37 billion of funding to spur semiconductor manufacturing in the US. In January, the CHIPS for America Act was introduced in the US Congress providing investment incentives and tax credits to manufacturers.
Though India consumes as much as 5 per cent of the global production of semiconductors, it produces only a miniscule amount, mainly in the in-house foundries of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). However, as much as 45 per cent of the research and design of semiconductors is carried out in India, by a talent pool of over 20,000 engineers. Many start-ups are also engaged in various aspects of the semiconductor ecosystem, such as testing and developing niche solutions.
The government, recognising the strategic value of semi-conductors, has made efforts over the years to have fabrication units (fabs) established in India, but those efforts have floundered because of the high levels of investment needed, the low levels of financial support from the government, coupled with very stringent conditions laid down in the proposal documents.
There have also been divided voices on whether setting up a fab would be a viable proposition. In an article in 2015, Vinod Dham, the father of the Pentium chip, posed the question, “Does India really need a $5 billion semiconductor unit?”1 He gave a qualified response, noting that China had been unsuccessful in its endeavour despite spending billions, as well as the fact that Moore’s law dictated that the technology required to produce semiconductors changed every few years, thus making the technology obsolete by the time the factories came up.2 He instead suggested that global majors like Samsung be encouraged to set up factories in India.
The government seems to be following this playbook by inviting expressions of interest (EoI) towards the end of 20203, and actively following up with manufacturers like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, VIA Technologies Inc., United Microelectronics Corporation, Intel, Micron Technology, Inc., NXP Semiconductors, and Texas Instruments, Fuji Electric Co. Panasonic, and Infineon.
As Dham himself noted recently, the context of 2021 is very different from that of 2015. Electronic manufacturing has begun in a big way, on the back of the Production Linked Incentives (PLI) Scheme, techno-nationalism is on the rise — which makes it imperative for India to establish supply of strategically important products such as semiconductors, and the imminent end of Moore’s law, has provided greater impetus to the current endeavour.4
That said, it is still not an easy road given the complicated ecosystem of semi-conductors, with its myriad types, the many different parts of the process — ranging from design to production to testing, and the infrastructure required — from dust-free environments to the availability of water. In 2013, the government had got to the stage where approval was granted to two consortiums led by Jaypee and HSMC to set up fabs with an investment of Rs 63,000 crores but financial closure could not be achieved despite the government offering a 40 per cent subsidy.
With the current semiconductor demand of $40 billion expected to rise to $100 billion by 2025 for just the electronics industry, the time is indeed right to begin production of semiconductors within the country. Though the EoI covers all the bases from setting up facilities in India to acquiring assets outside India, additional alternatives should include expanding the scope of the existing government-owned production facilities in ISRO/DRDO.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol by White Supremacists and members of far-right militias brought to stark attention the political divisiveness in the United States.
The January 6, 2021 attack on the US Capitol, the seat of the country’s legislature, by an angry mob that sought to disrupt the confirmation process of Joseph Biden’s election as US President, resulted in the death of five people, while over a hundred were injured. The looting and the vandalism by hundreds of armed rioters, inflamed by the calls of the incumbent president, Donald Trump, to “save America”, following Biden’s victory in the 2020 US presidential elections, lasted for several hours.1 Biden won 306 Electoral College votes, as against Trump’s 232 and was able to swing key states such as Georgia in his favour, which historically supported Republican candidates.
The assault sparked widespread condemnation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Christopher Wray, declared that the riot was an incident of domestic terrorism.2 Republican lawmakers, such as Rep. Mo Brooks of Alabama and Rep. Paul Gosar of Arizona, among others, charged that members of Antifa, a Left-wing political movement, came disguised as pro-Trump supporters and committed the assault, despite the lack of any evidence supporting such claims.3
Reports instead flagged White Supremacists, some of whom were already on the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database, as having participated in the attack.4 The FBI has since charged over 300 persons, including members of militias such as the far-right ‘Oath Keepers’ and the neo-fascist ‘Proud Boys’.5
Domestic political violence in the US
The US has had a long history with domestic terrorism. The 1970’s witnessed an incendiary wave of Left-wing extremism. The Vietnam War, racial tensions and the growing fervour of anti-establishment sentiments, particularly amongst the college-aged youth, contributed to the emergence of such an ideology.6 Even groups such as the ‘Weather Underground Organization’ (WUO) that violently railed against war policies, racial inequality and corporate practices, or fringe outfits such as the ‘Symbionese Liberation Army’ (SLA), a revolutionary anarchist group, attempted to rouse the general public to their cause.7
Another phenomenon of public violence fairly unique to the US is mass shootings and gun violence. Although most perpetrators are not driven by purely political factors to commit such acts of violence, incidents such as the 2016 Orlando shooting, stand out. Nearly 50 people were killed by an American gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS.8
The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, perpetrated primarily by Timothy McVeigh, killed 168 people and injured nearly 700. This was the highest number of casualties in US history as a result of a domestic terrorist act. McVeigh was an extremist radicalised due to White supremacist and anti-government views.9 He was especially upset at the 1993 FBI raid on the Branch Davidian complex in Waco, Texas, which housed members of a cult. McVeigh was hanged in June 2001.
The September 11, 2001 attacks, the most devastating terrorist attacks on American soil, resulted in a more active US counter-terrorism engagement overseas, including regime change efforts in places like Iraq, at enormous cost to US lives and exchequer. Domestically, after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created and stringent legislations like the Patriot Act, were enacted.
Far-right movements have been fairly ubiquitous within the fabric of the American polity, with groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, representing a particular tradition of extremism rooted within the notion of White supremacy. The 1980’s saw a startling rise in far-right support and mobilisation — perhaps due to the traction populist rhetoric on issues like elitism and free trade gained, distinct from the historical brutalities associated with far-right ideologies like Nazism and Fascism, a trend that further escalated in the 21st Century.10
Far-right extremism coupled with White supremacist ideology has since formed a fairly volatile concoction. The 2017 Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally organised by Neo-Nazi and self-proclaimed ‘alt-right’ leader, Richard Spencer, was attended by hundreds of members of far-right militant organisations.11
The rally sparked counter-protests and incidents related to it claimed the lives of three and injuries to over 30 people. Critics charged that Spencer’s views on White superiority and extremism were not condemned strongly by Trump, given the fact that he declared those participating in the rally, as well as those publicly opposing it, as “fine people”.12
Going forward
Despite the stark political polarisation, the successful transfer of power from Trump to Biden does indicate the strength of the US political system and processes. The Biden administration, meanwhile, is exploring the possibility of enacting a domestic terrorism law.13
Although the Capitol Hill attack was termed as an act of ‘domestic terrorism’ by heads of law enforcement agencies like the FBI, perpetrators are not being prosecuted on domestic terrorism charges as existing US laws do not have such enabling provisions.14
Furthermore, despite a general consensus on the fact that there is a necessity to focus inward rather than solely externally when it comes to counter-terrorism, there are still contentions regarding the nature, purpose and implications of a domestic terrorism law.
The debate relates to whether there exists a need for a new legislation or whether there is simply a problem with enforcing existing legislations that already contain provisions against terror financing, enhanced surveillance and other domestic security measures, including border security, among others. Possible conflicts with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly and the Second Amendment’s assurance that any citizen may bear arms, is also being debated.15
The US, it seems, still has an arduous path to traverse in order to deal more effectively with issues such as White supremacy and domestic terrorism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Even as the India-Pakistan ceasefire decision on the LoC is in effect, India has affirmed that there would not be any let-up in its counter-terrorism efforts.
The decision by India and Pakistan to ‘cease firing along the Line of Control (LoC) and all other sectors’, with effect from the midnight of February 25, 2021, is being seen as an important thaw in the bilateral relationship that was at an all-time low.1 The decision came about after talks between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO’s) of both countries. This joint statement is the first such understanding between India and Pakistan in nearly two decades, after the 2003 ceasefire agreement.
In 2019, during the Indian general elections, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan Niazi had famously said that there was a “better chance of peace talks with India” if Prime Minister Narendra Modi was voted back to power.2 PM Modi had earlier made a surprise stop over at Lahore in 2015 to attend the wedding of the grand-daughter of the then Prime Minister and PML-N Chief, Nawaz Sharif.3
While these were two bright spots, 2016 witnessed a downward spiral in bilateral relations with terror strikes at Pathankot and Uri, followed by a surgical strike by India in September 2016. The February 2019 Pulwama attack worsened the relations further. India retaliated by launching aerial attacks on campsites in Balakot on February 24.
The conflict escalated further in 2019 with the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A on August 5, 2019 and re-organisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Political, commercial, cultural and sporting ties were snapped and cross LoC movements were completely stopped. The High Commissioners from both countries were re-called. Imran Khan had asserted that until Article 370 was restored to its original form, there was no chance of any political dialogue with the Indian government.
Pakistan upped the ante across the LoC and ceasefire violations escalated manifold. Reports noted that the number of violations in September 2019 was nearly three times that in the previous years for the same month.4 In 2020, the number of ceasefire violations along the LoC were over 5,000, with 46 fatalities. This was the highest number of ceasefire violations since 2003.5
The Imran Khan government also invested its energy and time in highlighting alleged Indian atrocities in Kashmir at national and international forums. Khan even demanded a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers to discuss Kashmir, which was not supported by Saudi Arabia.6 The Pakistan government moreover submitted anti-India dossiers at the UN.
However, from the start of 2021, Pakistan has exhibited signs of being open to measures to reduce tensions. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa, at the passing-out ceremony of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) cadets on February 2, stated that it was “time to extend the hand of peace in all directions”.7 He added that India and Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue in a dignified manner.
Pakistan also accepted the invitation by India to attend the Health Secretary-level South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) virtual meeting-cum-workshop on February 18, 2021 to discuss the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. This virtual meeting was addressed by PM Modi.
At the virtual conference of SAARC Heads of State held earlier on March 15, 2020, PM Modi had proposed a regional Coronavirus Emergency Fund to mitigate the risks associated with the pandemic in the South Asian region, with India pledging an initial contribution of US$10 million.8 At that time, the proposal received extensive support from the SAARC members, except Pakistan.
Meanwhile, India also allowed the use of its air space to Imran Khan’s aircraft on his February 2021 trip to Sri Lanka. During this trip, Khan stated that the Kashmir dispute can only be resolved through dialogue.9 The Chief of Army Staff Gen. M.M. Naravane, a day before the ceasefire agreement, while addressing a webinar, was cited as stating that “unsettled borders and violence on the borders help no one” and that continued engagement with Pakistan could result in an understanding on the border.
Even as the ceasefire agreement has been welcomed by analysts, there was speculation that an exchange of views between National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and Special Assistant to the Pakistan PM, Moeed Yusuf had played a part in the development. Yusuf, in a series of tweets on February 25, rejected this claim and stated that the decision came about only as a result of the talks between the two DGMOs. Earlier in October 2020, Yusuf had stated that India had expressed an interest in dialogue.10 This was denied by the Ministry of External Affairs.11
The ceasefire decision marks the softening of stances on both sides, which has renewed hopes of a new beginning. There are talks of the revival of the SAARC Summit meeting, cancelled in 2016 when it was supposed to take place in Islamabad. Speculations are rife that PM Modi will participate in it as and when Pakistan hosts the summit. There is a hope that as a follow-up to the DGMO’s hotline talk, the High Commissioners will be reinstated on both sides, which may open up possibilities of a restart of trade and travel.
While there are optimists on both sides, many in Pakistan are questioning the Khan government’s decision to agree to the ceasefire. Imran Khan himself has placed the onus on India to keep the LoC peaceful. Some analysts argue whether it is wise on the part of the government and the army to talk peace with India, without resolution of the Kashmir issue. There are those who insist that India agreed to the ceasefire keeping its own self-interest in mind, and was a tactic to possibly avoid a two-front war.12
Be that as it may, with the ceasefire in effect, it will certainly help India and Pakistan diffuse tensions along the LoC. India on it part has affirmed that there would not be any let-up in its counter-terrorism efforts. It is time perhaps to take additional, incremental steps, towards peace and reconciliation. These could include re-starting cross-LoC trade and connectivity, which could create the right environment for fruitful dialogue to resolve outstanding issues between the two South Asian neighbours.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative will help African countries in the fight against the COVID pandemic and foster stronger ties based on the principle of South-South cooperation.
The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak has left a mark on countries across the world. Africa is no different with the virus impacting countries across the region. African countries launched a robust response to deal with the pandemic. As a result, Africa has fared significantly better than other parts of the world, a year after the outbreak.1
India shares a close partnership with African countries. In recent years, India has visibly enhanced the level of political and economic engagement with the region. Amidst the current pandemic, India has continued its diplomatic engagement with the region. The Vaccine Maitri (Friendship) initiative, launched by the Indian government, provides fresh opportunity for furthering cooperation with Africa, particularly in the health sector, which has been a crucial part of India’s partnership with Africa.
India-Africa Health Cooperation
The India-Africa development cooperation in health sector has gained greater salience in view of the several global and regional health policy instruments. Prominent amongst them are the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want’, launched by the African Union.2 These instruments call for ensuring healthy lives and promoting wellbeing for all. India’s national health policy also echoes these goals.
Over the years, India, well known as the pharmacy of the world, has provided low cost, generic drugs to several African countries to combat HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other infectious diseases. The Indian firm Cipla, has supplied anti-retroviral medicines for HIV/AIDS treatment to African countries at a minimal cost. Its Dollar-a-Day treatment programme has helped several African countries. Similarly, pharmaceutical firm Ranbaxy Laboratories has been very active in Africa for decades.3
Another important initiative, the Pan-African e-Network, first launched in 2009 and relaunched as the eVidya Bharti e Arogya Bharti (eVBAB) project in 2019, has connected hospitals in 54 African countries with medical practitioners in India to provide consultations and comprehensive tele-medicine training opportunities for African doctors, nurses and paramedics.
Covid-19 Pandemic
Africa has around 3.9 million confirmed COVID 19 cases, as of March 11, 2021.4 Maximum cases have been reported in South Africa (1.5 million) followed by Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria and Kenya. From the outset, India maintained contact with countries in the region, and exchanged information on the management of the pandemic.5
With a population of around 1.3 billion, India is facing a major battle of its own fighting COVID-19. However, the country has demonstrated capacity to support its partner countries. Since the coronavirus pandemic began, India has been at the forefront of supplying medicines and generic drugs to others.
India supplied hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol tablets, test kits, and other medical equipment for about 90 countries, including 25 from Africa.6 India has also helped with capacity building by offering health care training for COVID-19 management and protocols to several countries in Africa through the e-ITEC courses.
India’s defence forces have played a key role in implementing the country’s health cooperation initiatives with the African continent. Under Mission Sagar initiative, the Indian Naval Ship, INS Kesari, supplied COVID-related relief to Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar and the Comoros. Similarly under Mission ‘Sagar-II’, Indian Naval Ship, Airavat, sailed to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea with medicines and material to support their fight against natural calamities and COVID-19 pandemic.7
Such missions are aligned with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of SAGAR — Security and Growth for All in the Region. They highlight the importance accorded by India to relations with its maritime neighbours, including those in Africa. These early responses during the pandemic have been buttressed by the Indian drive to share the Made-in-India vaccines across the world.
Vaccine Maitri Initiative
The inequity in the access and distribution of the Covid vaccine has left the African countries and India equally aghast. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has warned that vaccine nationalism “could undermine decades of progress in human development, while investing in vaccination for all would benefit international trade in the near future”.8 President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa has also drawn attention to the problem of vaccine hoarding by developed countries.9
India has constantly raised its voice against vaccine nationalism and has supported initiatives calling for international cooperation to ensure global access to the vaccine.10 At a time, when rich and powerful countries are resorting to vaccine nationalism, India launched the Vaccine Maitri initiative. This initiative marks the supply of Made-in-India COVID vaccine for free or at a marginal cost to countries around the world. The leading Made-in-India vaccines are Covaxin, manufactured by Bharat Biotech and the Oxford-AstraZeneca Covishield, produced by the Serum Institute of India.
The Vaccine Maitri Initiative has been launched in line with India’s philosophy of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (the world is one family), as flagged by Prime Minister Modi during the Vaccine Summit in June 2020.11 As the largest vaccine producing country in the world, India has gifted millions of doses of the COVID vaccine to countries across the world, including in Africa.
Seychelles was the first African country to receive the Indian made vaccines. During the handing over ceremony, Sylvestre Radegonde, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tourism of Seychelles, noted that this “gesture cements the ties of solidarity, friendship and cooperation which exists between our two countries.”12
Similar sentiments were echoed by other African countries that received the vaccines, including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
As India rolls out its pandemic diplomacy with African countries, an important challenge is from criminal networks that may either hijack the consignments or supply fake vaccines. South African police recently busted a fake Covid-19 vaccine distribution network.13 Three Chinese nationals were arrested in this incident. In past, China has been involved in supplying fake medicines under the Made-in-India tag to African countries.14
In recent years, China’s footprint has also been rising in the African continent. This is visible in the increase in bilateral trade along with investments in large infrastructure projects in several African countries. During the pandemic, China has pledged to supply Sinopharm vaccines to around 20 African countries.
India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative will no doubt help African countries in the fight against the pandemic and foster stronger ties based on the principle of South-South cooperation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Greater attention needs to be focused on effectively countering threats of radicalisation affecting India from Southeast Asia.
The incidence of jihadist radicalisation in India, across all its states, remains remarkably low when compared to West Asia, Africa and even Europe. Of the 177 ISIS sympathisers arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) since 2014, Tamil Nadu, at 34, accounted for the largest number of those arrested, as of February 2020. 26 ISIS sympathisers were arrested from Maharashtra, 25 from Uttar Pradesh, 19 from Kerala, 17 from Telangana and 11 from Jammu and Kashmir.1
Tamil Nadu accounting for the high number of arrests may be the result of a specific campaign launched by the NIA in Coimbatore in 2019, wherein seven operatives were arrested for propagating ISIS ideology on social media with the intention of carrying out attacks both in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.2 Nevertheless, the NIA arrests have certainly highlighted pockets of growing jihadist radicalisation in Tamil Nadu.
Historical Context
The state witnessed sporadic incidents of violent extremism in the past, when groups like Al Umma carried out the infamous Coimbatore blasts in February 1998. The blasts were in response to communal riots in the city, the previous year. A total of 58 people were killed and over 200 injured in 12 bomb attacks in 11 places.
The blasts were a criminal conspiracy to target L.K. Advani, leader of the BJP who escaped unhurt during an election rally. S.A. Basha, the founder of Al Ummah, was among the more than 180 arrested and convicted by the courts. An accused, N.P. Noohu, evaded arrest for 20 years but was eventually arrested in Kerala in 2018.3
The early and late 2000s did not witness major extremist activities. However, with the advent of ISIS in India, there were instances of youth getting radicalised locally and through social media. In 2014, Tamil Nadu police arrested two persons in Ramnathapuram district for printing and selling ISIS T-shirts. Later, a photo on twitter was widely circulated showing 26 youths clad in black T-shirts with ISIS emblem posing in front of a mosque.4
In April 2015, Subahani Haja Moideen, a native of Tirunelveli district, went to Iraq to join ISIS. After undergoing religious and arms training, he was deployed with an ISIS military formation, Umar Ibnu Khatab Khatiba, headed by French national Abu Suleiman, who was later killed. Haja Moideen returned to India in September 2015 and attempted to procure explosive chemicals from Sivakasi, with the sole intention to carry out terrorist attacks in India.5 After his arrest in October 2016, he was found guilty by the NIA Special court and sentenced to life imprisonment.
According to the Intelligence Bureau (IB) dossier, the Al-Umma outfit, which subsequently changed its name to The Base Movement, carried out several blasts in Mallapuram court premises in Kerala and outside the BJP's office in Malleshwaram in Bengaluru in 2016.6 Affiliated to Al Qaeda, this outfit also sent out threatening letters to the judiciary, prisons and senior government officials.
Diaspora Concerns
Tamil Nadu borders Kerala and Karnataka, states with large migrant populations exposed to radicalism in West Asia. A large Tamil diaspora reside in Southeast Asia as well. Radical Salafi jihadist groups are active in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia (particularly the restive Aceh province), southern Philippines, and Malaysia.
Tamilians constitute a sizeable section of the local populations in some of these countries. These people still have active links with the place of their origin. It is reported that there are almost 19 lakh Tamils in Malaysia, about 500,000 in Singapore and 75,000 in Indonesia.
This population is susceptible to the propaganda of various Islamist groups in the region, some of whom are affiliates of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, such as Jemaah Al-Islamiyah and Lashkar Jundullah (Indonesia), Abu Sayyaf group (Southern Philippines), and Kumpulan Mujahidin (Malaysia).
Analysts flag instances of Tamilians getting radicalised in South East Asian countries.7 In 2014, a Singaporean Tamil, Haja Fakrudden, travelled to Syria and joined ISIS. Another Singaporean, Gul Mohammed Mariakar, was deported to India for distributing jihadi literature and radicalising Usmal Ali, who joined ISIS in Syria. The ISIS’ media wing, Al Isabah, had in the past also released speeches of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in the Tamil language.8
The Tamil-Muslim mistrust in Sri Lanka has spilled over into Tamil Nadu. About 72,000 Muslims from Sri Lanka’s Northern Province were forcibly expelled by the LTTE in October 1990.9 This is suspected to have created a sense of resentment among some sections of Tamil Nadu’s Muslims.10
The Saudi–funded Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ) came into the limelight during investigations into the 2019 Easter bombings in Sri Lanka.11 The main group behind the Easter bombings was the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ), termed an ‘ideological offspring’ of TNTJ, by analysts.12
Conclusion
The focus of study for jihadist indoctrination and violence by Indian security experts has largely been confined to the Af-Pak front or limited to the country’s western coastal states. Equal attention needs to be given to countering threats of radicalisation affecting India from Southeast Asia as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and America enjoy amity in their bilateral relationship, but both share adversarial relations with China. What has cemented their global strategic partnership is the threat that both countries perceive from China. This pattern appears set to continue into the medium term.
When the China-India-United States triangle began to form in the early years of this century, it most closely resembled a ménage á trois. All three dyads in the triangle – India-China, India-US and China-US – were characterised by equally amicable relationships. Each country had an overall positive and cooperative policy towards the other two. India’s relationship with China recovered from the stumble caused by India highlighting China as the principal reason for the 1998 nuclear tests. The two countries built on the understanding reached in the 1990s on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border. In 2005, they agreed to a set of political parameters for settling the boundary dispute. Bilateral trade began to zoom. And India and China began to coordinate positions in trilateral and multilateral groupings such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Russia-India-China (RIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), World Trade Organization (WTO), climate change negotiations, etc.
India-US relations also traced a similar trajectory after the 1998 nuclear tests, which the United States perceived as a huge setback to its non-proliferation policy objectives. Dense economic linkages especially in the information technology sector were accompanied by a spurt in the growth and influence of the Indian diaspora in the United States. Further, the combination of the challenge of international terrorism and the imperative of shaping the evolving international order in which Asia appeared set to emerge as the centre stage led India and America to conclude the nuclear deal and the defence cooperation framework in 2005.
At the same time, China-US relations also began to recover from controversies such as the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and the EP-3 incident of 2001 involving a collision between US and Chinese military aircraft near Hainan. America persisted with its bet on deepening China’s integration into the international system by welcoming China into the WTO. By 2005, China was proclaiming its peaceful rise to great power status, and America was gently urging China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
The year 2005 was thus a geopolitical sweet spot for all three dyads in the triangle. They appeared to be in an amicable and stable ménage á trois. Things unravelled thereafter between both China and India and China and the United States, whereas the India-US relationship has witnessed steady progress. Two factors are responsible for this change in the pattern of the triangular dynamic. The first is the alteration in the underlying balance of power between China and India and China and the United States, caused by China’s meteoric rise as the world’s factory and the new fount of investment, America’s decline in both economic and political spheres signified by the Great Recession and the domestic and global disruption caused by the Trump presidency, and India’s inability to sustain high growth rates. The second, inter-linked, factor is the strategic rivalry that underlies China’s relationship with both India and the United States.
The India-China boundary dispute has persisted since China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950. Negotiations both before and after the 1962 War have failed to yield a mutually acceptable solution. China, according to one expert, has come to the conclusion that the Line of Actual Control and eventually the border has to be consolidated on the ground. As a result, the last few years have witnessed repeated standoffs between the two militaries along the disputed border areas. The latest such standoff, which actually led to the loss of life for the first time since 1975, began in April 2020 when China attempted to impose a territorial fait accompli on India. While disengagement began a few days ago, the series of standoffs since 2013 portends further eruptions. Second, India and China conflict also extends to their respective status. India aspires for multipolarity not just in the international system but also in Asia where it does not want to play second fiddle to China. China, however, appears committed to denying peer status to India. It continues to block Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and remains non-committal on India’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. A third source of conflict revolves around access to key geographical regions. China is acutely concerned about its Malacca Dilemma – that its commerce through the Indian Ocean might be throttled at this choke point. By virtue of the geostrategic location of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India is in a commanding position to monitor the approaches to the Malacca Straits. For its part, India is concerned about China’s penetration of both the Himalayan security perimeter through close ties to Nepal and of the maritime security perimeter by gaining a lease over Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Indian concerns also extend to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses the territory of Kashmir under Pakistan’s occupation, thus undermining Indian sovereignty, deepening China’s stakes on the Kashmir issue, and enhancing Chinese support for Pakistan.
In the case of China and the United States, the two countries have entered what Professor Graham Allison calls the Thucydides Trap between a reigning hegemon and a rising challenger. America is keen on retaining its 75-year long primacy in East Asia, which is manifested in treaty commitments and military forces stationed in, deployed to, and rotated through the region. China has, however, articulated the importance of establishing a new type of great power relations with America, which entails US abandonment of treaty commitments to East Asian allies and withdrawal of military forces stationed or deployed in the region. In addition, the China-US conflict extends to political ideology. America remains committed to a world composed of democratic states, which, it believes, would usher in the so-called Kantian peace. Democracy is, however, anathema to the Chinese Communist Party, which is determined to maintain its monopoly over power in domestic politics and can therefore be logically expected to support and advocate non-democratic forms of government around the world.
In contrast to the return of rivalry in the relationships between China and India and China and the United States, the India-US relationship has broadened and deepened into a comprehensive global strategic partnership. This, despite the history of estrangement between these two democracies throughout the second half of the 20th century. Although India and America regularly found themselves on opposite sides of key issues, none of these actually involved a conflict over issues such as territory, status, sphere of influence, and ideology that actually contribute to the growth of strategic rivalry. In addition, what has cemented the partnership is the threat to their vital national interests that both India and the United States perceive from China.
As a result, the triangular dynamic among China, India and the United States has come to resemble a stable marriage – another ideal type identified by Professor Lowell Dittmer 40 years ago. India and America enjoy amity in their bilateral relationship, but both share adversarial relations with China. This pattern appears set to continue into the medium term. India is stepping up defence preparedness and contemplating force restructuring to become better prepared and capable against China in the wake of the now unwinding military crisis. The Biden administration has categorised China as America’s “most serious competitor” and expressed its determination to “confront China’s economic abuses” and “counter its aggressive, coercive action”. And India and the United States have resolved to closely cooperate in support of freedom of navigation, territory integrity, and a robust security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
Select References
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
WhatsApp’s updated terms of service and privacy policy raise important questions on data privacy and data security.
WhatsApp updated its terms of service and privacy policy in January 2021 and asked its users to compulsorily comply with it if they wished to continue using the app.1 The updated terms would enable the app to collect the metadata of users such as mobile phone number, phone model, call logs, approximate location, duration of interactions, etc. and share it with business accounts and WhatsApp’s parent company, Facebook.
WhatsApp has stated in its updated policy that if users choose to click on ads while using Facebook or Instagram, it may be used to provide personalised ads in the future based on user metadata.2 WhatsApp will be needing the consent of users in Europe for Facebook to even access their metadata like phone numbers or call logs.
The users may also choose to not give their consent and still continue using WhatsApp. For users in the rest of the world, as of now, the date to accept the policy changes in order to continue using the app has been extended till May 15, 2021, from the earlier deadline of February 8, 2021.
WhatsApp’s move has raised important questions on data privacy, data security and most importantly, the freedom of choice of individuals. This is especially so since the option to opt out of the policy changes was not provided. The changes also appeared discriminatory in nature since they applied only to users outside Europe and the United Kingdom — jurisdictions where there are strict data protection laws.3
With a user base of more than 340 million, WhatsApp is one of the most popular messaging apps in India, accounting for the largest number of subscribers, followed by Brazil and the US.4 There was a backlash among users soon after the alert of the updated policy. A large number of users shifted to rival messaging apps like Telegram and Signal.5
The massive influx of new users to Signal led to the disruption of its services on January 15, 2021.6 Telegram became the most downloaded non-gaming app worldwide for January 2021, with 24 percent of total downloads from India, according to the latest data provided by analytics firm, Sensor Tower.7
Responding to the negative backlash, WhatsApp clarified via its own status updates that nothing had changed with respect to personal messaging, given that all personal conversations were protected with end-to-end encryption and no contacts and location updates were shared with Facebook, except for some business accounts.
The Issue of Data Privacy
WhatsApp’s new policy changes have led to growing concerns about the manner in which business data will be treated and how it will affect the privacy of the customers.8 For instance, many companies use this platform to deliver lab reports, air tickets, and other confidential information to customers.
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), has termed the policy changes as unfair and unacceptable in their current form, and has sought clarifications from WhatsApp regarding its information privacy.9 The differential treatment to the citizens of the country, as opposed to European citizens, was highlighted as a matter of concern.10
The Delhi High Court, hearing a petition challenging the apps’ new privacy policy on grounds that it violated the right to privacy guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, stated that WhatsApp is a private app and downloading the app itself was not mandatory for citizens.11 It also highlighted the fact that not just WhatsApp but many other apps have similar terms and conditions.
It is pertinent to note that in February 2021, the government imposed a ban on nearly 60 apps, including TikTok, under section 69A of the Information Technology Act.12 Concerns regarding data collection, data security and user privacy — precisely the reasons regarding which MeitY has now sought clarifications from WhatsApp, were responsible for that ban.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgement by a nine judge bench in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India case in 2017, had held that data privacy is under the ambit of Right to Privacy, protected as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner of the case, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.), had submitted that making Aadhar mandatory and linking it to the grant of state benefits was violative of the right to privacy of individuals.13 The Court in this judgment also overruled the previous judgments in the Kharak Singh vs State of UP (1962) and M.P Sharma vs Satish Chandra (1954) cases, in which it had held that Right to Privacy was not a Fundamental Right.
Data protection and privacy currently is regulated under the provisions of the Information Technology Act 2000. Article 21 of the Constitution has also evolved over a period of time to include the right to privacy as an essential component of the Right to Life. In the absence of a specific legislation on data privacy, however, the Union Government in July 2017, after the judgement by the Supreme Court in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy case, formed the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee to deliberate on a data protection framework for the country. The Committee submitted its report in July 2018.
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019, which was tabled in the Lok Sabha in 2019, is currently under consideration by a parliamentary committee. As and when it is passed, it would be India’s first legislation on protection of personal data based on the recommendations of the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee. The committee recommended privacy by design on part of data processors and individual consent as essential frameworks to govern data sharing. It also called for the Right to be forgotten — the ability of individuals to limit, delink, and delete personal data on the internet.14 A specific regulatory mechanism of this kind is the need of the hour since private tech giants play a very significant role when it comes to managing and handling personal data.
The Way Forward
Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Facebook are among the ten top-most valuable companies in the world and they all belong to the data sector. These tech-giants own a substantial amount of Big Data, the high volume of information generated by users using their services. Technological advances have enabled these companies to collect, store and process such data. Their ability to do so, however, should not infringe upon basic human rights. Providing safeguards to personal data using the highest-possible privacy settings by default, asking for consent and granting the right to revoke the consent anytime, are important standards in this regard. As India constantly strives to ensure the safety and sovereignty of the cyberspace and of personal data, the direction which the WhatsApp saga will take will be keenly watched.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sadyr Japarov was sworn in as the President of the Kyrgyz Republic on January 28, 2021, after months of political upheaval.
Within a span of four months, the Kyrgyz Republic has witnessed power shifts, provisionally and definitively, among three presidents and five prime ministers. Most recently, Sadyr Japarov was sworn in as president on January 28, 2021, after winning the presidential elections held on January 10. Ulukbek Maripov, a former Chairman of the Accounts Chamber, was sworn in as the Prime Minister on February 3.
The January 10 presidential elections were the critical consequence of months of political upheaval that followed the contentious October 4, 2020 parliamentary elections. The opposition alleged widespread irregularities in the elections to the 120-member unicameral parliament (Jogorku Kenesh, or the Supreme Council). The parties aligned with the government of then President-elect, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, had emerged victorious in those elections.
The opposition incited protests, stormed government buildings, and demanded the conduct of new elections as well as the release of politicians controversially put in prison. A former elected member of the Supreme Council – Sadyr Japarov, serving an 11-year sentence for being involved in the kidnapping of a local official in 2013 during anti-corruption protests at the Kumtor gold mine – was among those freed from prison by his supporters.
Subsequently, the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda annulled the results of the parliamentary elections, and Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov resigned on October 6, 2020. The very next day, Japarov was nominated as the interim prime minister by feuding opposition groups. A state of emergency was declared by President Jeenbekov, first on October 9 and then on October 12, of which only the latter got endorsed by the Parliament on October 13.
When Jeenbekov resigned on October 15, Japarov was declared as the acting President, after the Speaker of Parliament, Kanat Isayev, declined to hold the office. Japarov, therefore, went from being a parliamentarian to prisoner to assuming the roles of acting Prime Minister and acting President, within a short period of time.1
The interim government decided to postpone parliamentary elections, earlier scheduled to be held in December 2020, till June 2021 and to instead hold early presidential elections in January 2021, along with a referendum on whether the country should have a presidential form of government.2 Japarov stepped down from his posts in November 2020 to become eligible to run for the office of President, since the Kyrgyz constitution bars interim leaders from contesting in elections.
The January 2021 elections saw seventeen claimants to power. Kyrgyz voters, of which just under forty per cent turned out, voted in favour of Japarov, while in the referendum, the majority voted for a return to a presidential form of government.3 In the Kyrgyz Republic, tenures of political leaders have been intricately linked with referendums for constitutional change. The January 2021 referendum vote for a presidential system is being viewed as having a better chance of ensuring accountability.4
Analysts note that the strong ‘anti-elite’ and ‘anti-establishment’ feelings in the electorate helped Japarov in securing victory in the elections.5 He was viewed as a nationalist, receiving the popular sympathies for being allegedly wronged by the establishment. Japarov also promised a strong government sans corruption.6
Regional reactions
Kyrgyzstan is viewed as Russia’s traditional sphere of influence and China’s strategic backyard. Both Russia and China have been monitoring the period of political turmoil with cautious non-intervention. Japarov reiterated his country’s strategic alliance with Russia and assured the continued status of Russian as the country’s official language.7 President Vladimir Putin, in his greetings to Japarov, pledged to cooperate to develop bilateral relations for mutual benefit.8
Kyrgyz-Russian relations, though, are not without challenges. Over half-a-million Kyrgyz workers in Russia face a host of issues, including charges of discrimination, in addition to the precariousness imposed on them by the COVID-19 crisis.9 Japarov, at multiple instances, has promised to create economic opportunities domestically for migrant workers.
However, no concrete policies have been put forth. The economy has also been ravaged by the pandemic and systemic corruption. GDP growth forecast for 2021 has been reduced from 4.5 per cent to 4 per cent.10 Kyrgyzstan scored 31 out of 100 in the Corruption Perceptions Index, lower than the 36 out of 100 average regional score of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.11
As for Kyrgyz-China relations, Japarov has difficult choices to make. In the violent uprisings that followed the October 2020 events, given long-standing apprehensions against the foreign-funded mining industry, Chinese-run mines were among the facilities occupied by protesters. A Chinese-owned oil refinery in Kara Balta, country’s largest, was threatened.
Beijing conveyed its concerns about the safety of its interests and enterprises in Kyrgyzstan, in meetings that the Chinese Ambassador had with the Kyrgyz Foreign Minister on October 16. The Kyrgyz Ambassador to China was also summoned by the Chinese Foreign Security Commissioner on October 19.12
Nearly 40 per cent of the country’s external debt, at $1.8 billion, is owed to China.13 While previous governments have secured temporary deferments, Japarov has also considered voluntary financial contributions from citizens to make the repayments.14 The auctioning of government assets is also part of the menu of choices. Developing the Jetim-Too iron ore deposit to pay off Chinese debt has also been deliberated upon.15
Conclusion
Analysts note that a failure on the part of Japarov to deliver on his campaign promises concerning the economy could lead to inevitable discontentment. A draft constitution, endorsed by Japarov in November-December 2020, seeks to undo the 2010 Constitutional referendum, and introduce a new consultative council, People’s Kurultai. This proposal, on which a referendum will be held later in the year, has drawn widespread criticism from the opposition, legal experts, journalists, and human rights activists. Political-economic compulsions created by external actors, in addition to the intensifying economic expectations, could lead to another political crisis. While popular support for Japarov could perhaps help tide over minor non-accomplishments, failure to deliver on the plethora of promises on ensuring economic prosperity could make his position untenable as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific not only accommodates Russia’s clamour for ASEAN centrality but also complements its Greater Eurasia construct.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent uncharacteristic statement of “India being an object of the Western countries persistent, aggressive and devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies”1 has reignited the debate on India and Russia’s increasingly divergent outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Lavrov at the 2020 Raisinia Dialogue had expressed confidence of India “being smart enough to understand” the Western “trap” of the Indo-Pacific and “not get into it”.2
The tone, tenor and timing of Lavrov’s December 2020 statement insinuates Russia’s apprehensions of a fundamental shift in India’s foreign policy playbook which traditionally has placed a premium on strategic autonomy, with Russia as one of its key pillars.
These developments have the potential to cast a shadow on India-Russia bilateral ties. The pertinent question is whether New Delhi and Moscow can find common ground in the evolving geo-strategic construct.
Asia-Pacific vs Indo-Pacific
India and Russia’s divergent outlooks appear to stem from the latter’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific construct in favour of Asia-Pacific. This is predicated on Kremlin’s assertion that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a US-led initiative designed to contain China and Russia.3
Russia has viewed attempts to formulate a new rules-based Indo-Pacific order as a Western strategy to override international law, thereby circumventing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where Russia holds veto power.
Russia’s Indo-Pacific opposition is also based on its perception that it undermines the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality, an organisation with which Russia has intensified its engagement.4 Russia also holds that the construct is limited in its geographical scope as it excludes Africa and the Persian Gulf, regions where Russia has increased its strategic footprints in recent times.5 Seeing no tangible gains from this redefined construct, Russia continues to emphasise on the Asia-Pacific.
However, when viewed critically, Asia-Pacific remains limited in its scope and geographical reach. It does not reflect the shift in the centres of growth and influence from the Asia-Pacific to regions beyond East and South-East Asia encompassing South Asia and Africa.
Notably, Asia-Pacific excludes India, a nation of 1.3 billion with a $3 trillion economy and a sprawling coastline that includes the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which straddle the Malacca Straits. This makes India a key stakeholder in the maritime commons of not only the Indian Ocean but also the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, it is questionable whether the Indo-Pacific really is an American construct. Christened by an Indian scholar and structured by Japan’s former-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Indo-Pacific and its adoption by several stakeholders who appear to maintain an independent foreign policy, is a reflection of its inclusive character and wide acceptance. This includes the ASEAN states, earlier seen as the fulcrum of Asia-Pacific.6
There also does not appear to be any appetite among these stakeholders to view the construct through the American lens of Great Power rivalry and contestation. This is unsurprising given their economic interdependence with China. A strategy of containment and confrontation with China appears passé. The recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, whose signatories include China, ASEAN countries and two QUAD members (Australia and Japan), reflects the same.
The overriding consensus among the Indo-Pacific stakeholders appears to be the joint construction of a stable and inclusive security architecture that promotes peace and harmony. This reflects the new economic and security realities which are anchored in the recognition of the Indian and Pacific Oceans being interconnected and interdependent, particularly given the indivisible nature of security.
Therefore, developmental partnerships that eschew unilateralism and coercive behaviour would be in the shared interests of the majority. A corollary of this would be the shared concerns of its stakeholders about China’s peaceful rise. Pertinently, this is a concern that is prevalent even among Russian experts.7
The Indo-Pacific stakeholders’ strategy appears predicated on putting diplomatic pressure on Beijing to strengthen the foundations of peaceful co-existence. The strategy, however, may not necessarily be China specific. Moreover, majority of stakeholders view expansion of the Indo-Pacific’s frontiers to the east-coast of Africa and ASEAN centrality as intrinsic to the construct.
In relation to the QUAD, Russia maintains that it is a military alliance designed to contain China and Russia. An alternative view to this would be that the QUAD is a plurilateral dialogue mechanism designed to complement the Indo-Pacific in building synergies in infrastructure, capacity building, connectivity and tackling non-traditional security threats. Perhaps, the QUAD Plus collaborative framework may help in overcoming its image of offering exclusionary membership.
In these circumstances, opting to remain outside the Indo-Pacific tent is likely to prevent Russia from participating in these nascent attempts to create a stable regional security architecture.
Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Opportunity for Russia?
Even as it rejects the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s growing stakes in the region tell a different tale. This is reflected in its new partnerships with ASEAN, SAARC, African and Gulf countries, anchored in its weapons and natural resources diplomacy. The jurisdiction of its Pacific Fleet extends from Vladivostok right up to the Persian Gulf, effectively highlighting Russia practising an Indo-Pacific strategy.
This nascent network of new relationships could help fulfil Russia’s long-cherished dream of gaining access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, Russian maritime expeditions made frequent port calls in the region in the 19th century, marked by a full time consulate at Batavia, the capital of Dutch East Indies Company.8
Russia’s vocal opposition of Indo-Pacific appears tactically linked to its necessity of an entente with China. With Beijing’s support being critical to overcome Western pressure on its policies, the Kremlin as quid pro quo appears to increasingly back China in its core areas of strategic concern by doing the diplomatic heavy-lifting.
However, its advocacy seems to be tempered with a selective approach. For instance, instead of supporting Beijing on the issue of the South China Sea, Russia has called for preventing the dispute’s internationalisation.9 Similarly, Russia has qualitatively stepped up its engagement with the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam — countries who have long-running territorial feuds and sovereignty claims with China.
Therefore, Russia appears to be performing the deft balancing act of not upsetting the Chinese applecart while continuing to pull at certain apples sensitive to China, creating a strategic space for manoeuvre.
The Indo-Pacific, on the other hand, can likely be one of Russia’s tools to stay relevant on the global stage. Today, an increasingly bipolar US-China global narrative runs the risk of leaving Russia in its trail, given Moscow’s relative decline. This necessitates Russia adopting independent positions in one of the world’s most dynamic regions to project the image of a pole in global affairs.
Being China’s junior partner undermines Kremlin’s great power ambitions. Russia, therefore, likely stands to gain from the multipolarity and multilateralism that the Indo-Pacific seeks to promote. A strategic repositioning could not only help Russia overcome Western attempts to isolate it but also broaden the horizons of its pivot to Asia beyond China.
It, therefore, makes strategic sense to explore congruence with the nuanced Indo-Pacific vision of non-American stakeholders, including the QUAD members. Notably, Russia appears to enjoy stable relations with all the key stakeholders, with the exception of the US.
However, this is likely predicated on Russia’s willingness to reimagine a new geo-strategic maritime role for itself. Russia’s unique geographical position of straddling the Heartland and Rimland at a time when the Indo-Pacific’s emphasis has been on visualising the continental and maritime areas of the two oceans as a seamless strategic space does seem to provide it the necessary tools. Russia remains as much an Asian power as it is a European one with 2/3rds of its territory and 15 per cent of its population based in Asia.
At a time when Russia is recalibrating its identity from a European to a Eurasian one, its Greater Eurasia construct, envisioned as a harmonious strategic space from Lisbon to Jakarta, seems to aptly complement the Indo-Pacific.10 Interestingly, the core content of the Greater Eurasia construct appears similar to Indo-Pacific, with its emphasis on being open and inclusive, stress on dialogue and building developmental partnerships and connectivity, respecting international law, and eschewing confrontation.
With the Russian Far East being the connecting tissue between Greater Eurasia and Indo-Pacific, Russia could tap into the expertise and resources of Indo-Pacific countries beyond China, so as to develop its Far East. This region remains one of Russia’s least developed regions. Similarly, exploring congruence in building of new regional supply chains in Indo-Pacific could help Russia overcome its Achilles heel – its weak global economic competitiveness.
Exploring an India-Russia Congruence
A framework of India-Russia strategic cooperation in this space already exists, as outlined by Prime Minister Modi in the seminal ‘Act Far East’ policy launched in Vladivostok in 2019.11 This was seen as the lynchpin of harmonising the two countries strategic outlook. However, Lavrov’s recent outburst, seen largely through the prism of tensions in Russia-West ties, seems to suggest a continuing gap between the Indian and Russian viewpoints.
Inevitably, the push and pull of Russia-US confrontation has complicated India’s foreign policy options. Similar to Russia’s strategic necessity of an entente with China, a closer partnership with the US appears to be in India’s interests.
However, it is likely that India will continue its independent course of action anchored in multi-alignment. Russia remains India’s traditional partner and a pillar of India’s strategic autonomy. The challenge will likely be to convince Russia of India’s long-term independent Indo-Pacific vision.
It is, therefore, essential to continue to strive for congruence. What can possibly bridge the gap are both nations’ similar but as yet parallel visions of a stable security architecture and shared concerns over hegemonism.
India’s vision of Indo-Pacific appears to not only accommodate Russia’s clamour for ASEAN centrality and inclusion of East Africa but also complement the Greater Eurasia construct.
A Russia-India-Japan trilateral could be a new vector, given the fact that India and Japan’s Indo-Pacific visions seem to be the closest to Russia’s strategic comfort. This trilateral holds potential with Japan seeking a new modus vivendi with Russia. This was reflected in ex-Prime Minister Abe’s speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in 2019, an event where Indian and Japanese premiers were the guests of honour.
As India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar had stated in 2019, “Russia is a Pacific Power which has Indian Ocean interests” while “India is an Indian Ocean power with very strong and growing Pacific interest”.12
The litmus test of this traditional partnership will be to harmonise each other’s viewpoints, to the extent possible, and ride out the storm. Perhaps, a logistics sharing pact, long in the offing, could provide the much needed momentum.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The rapidity and selflessness with which India rolled out millions of doses of vaccines as aid despite the massive requirements of its own vaccination drive, is being particularly appreciated by world leaders and observers.
Speaking at the first UN General Assembly Session he attended in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India’s foreign policy is governed by its age-old maxim of ‘’Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’’ (The World is One Family).
As soon as the coronavirus hit the world, India emphasised the imperative of collaboration to overcome the inimical health and economic impact of the virus. It was with this objective that the Indian government organised a virtual meeting of SAARC leaders on March 15, 2020. A SAARC Fund to combat the disease was established, with India contributing an amount of $10 million.
In the initial months of the pandemic, India, by virtue of the fact that it is the ‘pharmacy of the world’, ramped up production of essential medicines like hydroxychloroquine, paracetamol etc. as well as Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) kits, ventilators and masks. It should be noted that at the start of the pandemic, India’s production capacity to manufacture such equipment was negligible. However, India was very quickly able to significantly augment its production competence to not only meet its own domestic requirements but also emerge as a significant exporter of these items.
The United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) failed miserably to provide leadership in dealing with this crisis. The UN Security Council (UNSC) could not meet in March 2020 because China was chairing the body and did not want questions to be raised on its actions of deception and hypocrisy, after the virus first erupted in Wuhan and spread around the world. Even when the UNSC met to discuss the issue in April 2020, it could not agree on any concrete course of action because of deep divisions amongst the members.
Speaking on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the UN in September 2020, PM Modi pointed out that the world body faced a ‘crisis of confidence’ as it operated on outdated structures. On the same occasion, Modi affirmed that India’s vaccine production capacity will be used to help humanity in fighting the virus.
Roll Out of ‘’Vaccine Maitri’’ (Vaccine Friendship)
India produces 60 per cent of all vaccines manufactured in the world. The head of the WHO recently complained that the developed countries monopolised the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines for their own populations and were not making them available to developing countries.
In accordance with the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy enunciated by Modi at the beginning of his first term in 2014, Bhutan and Maldives became the first two countries to receive 150,000 and 100,000 vaccines respectively, on January 20, 2021. Bangladesh and Nepal received two million and one million doses on January 21. Myanmar received 1.5 million doses, Seychelles 50,000 doses, and Mauritius 100,000 doses on January 22.
The two million doses gifted by India to Bangladesh were the single largest consignment of vaccines provided by India to any country thus far, prompting the Bangladesh Health minister to comment that India had stood by his country during the Liberation War of 1971 as well as during the pandemic. Bangladesh was supposed to get 110,000 doses of free vaccines from the Chinese firm Sinovac Biotech, but its reluctance to contribute towards the development cost of the vaccine, led to a deadlock.
India’s vaccine assistance reached Nepal within a week of a request made by Nepalese Foreign Minister during his visit to New Delhi on January 15, 2021. India’s gesture to Nepal came at a time when its ties have been strained by a territorial dispute as well as concerns over China’s expanding political and economic influence in the Himalayan nation. China, which had promised Nepal help to deal with the pandemic, is yet to receive Nepali clearance for its Sinopharm shots.
It is pertinent to flag that there is huge demand for vaccines in some of the above mentioned countries who are desperate to revive their tourism-dependent economies. This has provided an important opportunity for the Indian government to expand and strengthen its outreach.
All the above vaccine supplies by India were made on a gratis basis. Several of these countries are among the reportedly 90 countries including South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UAE and a host of others that have signed commercial agreements with Indian manufacturers, supplies pursuant to which will be made in the coming days.
Regulatory approvals by Afghanistan are awaited to effect supplies to it. Shipment of 500,000 doses to Sri Lanka was effected on January 27, 2021. India has also conducted training programmes for its neighbours to help them in the vaccination drive.
Apart from countries in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, Brazil and Morocco, close strategic partners, also got 2 million doses each on January 22. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro thanked PM Modi for sending the vaccine supplies and equated the gesture with that of Lord Hanuman bringing the holy 'Sanjeevani'. PM Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominican Republic called for assistance from India ‘with great humility and respect … to make our population safe’.
The US State Department, the WHO, Bill Gates and several others have spoken warmly and appreciatively of the selfless manner in which India is helping several developing countries with the vaccines.
India’s ‘Vaccine Maitri’ Mission appears to have taken China by surprise and put it on the back foot. Global Times, the mouth piece of the Chinese Communist Party, has started spreading lies and making disparaging remarks about the safety, efficacy and capacity of India to produce vaccines in adequate numbers. This is even as countries like Cambodia, Nepal and Bangladesh have refused to take China’s vaccines because of quality concerns or terms of supply.
China’s ‘iron friend’ Pakistan, meanwhile, has been informed that it could send its aircraft to Beijing to airlift 500,000 doses of the vaccine. This is in stark contrast to the dispatch effected by India to Nepal and Bangladesh in Air India special flights. Brazil which had also imported Chinese vaccines, is wary of using them because it finds that their efficacy is just around 50 per cent, which is much lower than all other vaccines in use in the world.
Conclusion
What has been particularly appreciated by observers is the rapidity and selflessness with which India rolled out millions of doses as aid despite the massive requirements of its own vaccination drive. While the world is witnessing the aggressive and threatening demeanor of China, the humane and caring attitude of India, in stark contrast, is evident. In the rapidly evolving global geo-political landscape, the healing and supportive actions by India through supply of Covishield and Covaxin vaccines will have a huge impact in promoting peace, security, cooperation and prosperity in the region and the world. India’s ‘Vaccine Maitri’ initiative has further strengthened its image as the first responder in emergency situations. This is all the more commendable when there are only five countries in the world who have thus far been able to successfully manufacture Covid-19 vaccines.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pages