The Russian military blitzkrieg to counter the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s dispatch of his Israeli and US trained and equipped forces to retake the breakaway region of South Ossetia on August 7, 2008 took many by surprise. Moscow brazenly took the war straight into the Georgian heartland routing the Georgian forces in South Ossetia and expelling them from the other main Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia.

Russia spurned Western warnings with disdain and recognised the two breakaway regions as independent nations. Even the soft-spoken Russian President Dimitry Medvedev sounded like a resurrected Cold War warrior, when he declared that Moscow is “not afraid of anything”. Moscow was evidently signalling the exhaustion of its capacity to stomach any more insults.

It was an equally unambiguous message to the nations of the Caucasus, Baltic, Central Asia and Eastern Europe that Russia still retained the power and the will to protect its influence in its “backyard”, however close they may be to the United States. In the process, the Kremlin may have also succeeded in laying to rest any doubts that the European Union might have had that no security arrangement without Russia as an equal partner in it would be able to guarantee the security of nations in the region.

Events leading to the crisis suggest that Russia was indeed looking for an opportunity to reassert itself and regain at least some of its lost eminence. The swiftness with which it moved into Georgia is evidence that it may have been preparing for such a contingency months before the war. Russia’s issuance of passports to its citizens in South Ossetia only months before the outbreak of conflict is but another of the events that lend credence to such doubts.

The immediate provocation for ordering the Russian war machine into action against Georgia was of course the thoughtless Georgian military foray into South Ossetia. The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was the eagerness with which Ukraine and Georgia were pushing their case for membership in NATO, fully supported by the United States. To the Kremlin this was post-Cold War encirclement taking its final form.

It is not that Russia had willingly allowed the erosion of its prestige and power in the region since 1991. It was then fettered by the chaos and economic meltdown that followed the dissolution of Soviet Union. When NATO and the United States moved into Kosovo and humiliated Yugoslavia, a nation considered close to Russia, in 1998-99, Moscow was helpless and it had to swallow its pride. When the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became full members of NATO in 1999, it could do nothing but watch. Later, in 2004, seven more nations, all either former republics of the USSR or falling within the dismantled Warsaw Pact including Poland and the three Baltic countries, joined the Western alliance, it brought the US through NATO to the borders of Russia. If Georgia and Ukraine are inducted, it would mean that NATO would border Russia through half of the 14 nations (Norway, the three Baltic countries and Poland being the others) that share land boundaries with it. Russia would decidedly resist this.

NATO expansion coupled with the increasingly direct US presence in the region has had the Russian leadership worried for some years. The US had also established a military base in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan and is negotiating with others for similar facilities. Ignoring Moscow’s vehement protests, the United States has gone ahead with plans to establish Ballistic Missile Defence systems in the Czech Republic and Poland, ostensibly for intercepting missiles from “rogue” states. But Russia views it as a stratagem to degrade the deterrent value of its strategic forces. The Georgian crisis provided an opportunity for Kremlin to draw the red line and it did so resolutely.

The hawks in Washington have responded to the Russian military intervention by calling for fast tracking the membership of both Georgia and Ukraine in NATO. They have even suggested that if the two nations had been given membership, Russia would not have dared to embark on the military venture because Article 5 of the alliance obligates member nations to “assist” nation attacked by even using “armed force”.

Opinion is divided on whether the Georgian crisis would catapult these two nations into the fast track process to NATO membership. But given the lack of unanimity in the alliance, which works on consensus, this appears to be highly unlikely. Many are of the view that it is the hope of NATO membership and US encouragement that led Mikheil Saakashvili to embark on the ill-fated military adventure in South Ossetia in the first place. George Bush himself trumpeted the US call for NATO membership of the two nations when he undertook a visit to the region in 2008. But the effort was frustrated in April when 10 nations of the 26 in NATO, led by Germany and France, opposed it.

The EU is divided even in its response to the crisis as it cannot ignore Russia either economically or militarily. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is a crippling 40 per cent. For instance, Germany which has the highest GDP amongst EU nations is heavily dependent on Russia for its gas and oil (40 and 35 per cent, respectively) and its trade with Russia was US$ 42 billion in 2007. Germany’s FDI in Russia has also witnessed a phenomenal rise, led by joint energy ventures; the German share was 34 per cent of the total FDI that Russia had attracted in the year. The impetus to growth in FDI was imparted by positive investor sentiments aided by Russia’s robust economic growth and a sharp rise in domestic demand. Consequently, 2008 has witnessed an equally sharp rise in capital inflows into the country, increasing the stake of investor/lending nations in Russia’s growing economy.

Russia is not what it was in the 1990s or in the early years of this century. It is now a “resurgent” Russia that is jostling for the international space that it had lost. It may not even be a shadow of the military power that it was during the Cold War. Compared to its 17.8 per cent share of world military expenditure in 1990, Russia’s present share of 2.9 per cent appears measly. Its conventional force strength has been depleted due to funding problems and closure of many of its R&D defence establishments, casting doubts about its capacity for military intervention. A few flights by TU-95s or TU-142 Bears designed over 50-odd years ago do not constitute a challenge to the United States. Russian conventional strength may also not be a match for NATO forces. But the Georgian crisis gave Russia the opportunity to establish that even its depleted forces are lethal enough to safeguard its “backyard”, with the ultimate guarantor being its formidable strategic forces which can destroy the United States many times over.

Riding comfortably on an average economic growth of over 7.2 per cent in the last five years, and the buoyancy imparted by high oil prices, the coming decade is likely to witness a resurrection of the Russian defence industry. Progress in this regard has already begun with increased outlays for defence R&D and an average growth of more than 19.8 per cent in the defence budget in the last two years (2006-08). Moscow has also recently announced an outlay of US$ 200 billion for the modernisation of its forces and has unveiled plans to induct new-generation nuclear missiles.

Further, the leased deep water port of Sevastopol in the Crimea (Ukraine), a city which has more than 70 per cent ethnic Russians, is home to Russia’s 225 year old Black Sea Fleet. And this port is of critical importance to Russia for its presence in the region and in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is no other deep sea port in the Black Sea that can accommodate large Russian vessels. Russia has leased rights to use the port till 2017. Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the termination of the lease agreement could jeopardize the deployability of its expanding naval fleet. It is also aware that if it loses this base, it could even foresee the US 6th Fleet using this facility. Moscow would not countenance such an eventuality and it can be expected, as it has made clear, to use all the powers in its means to prevent such a development. This could spell instability in Ukraine.

The leadership in Russia is also not what it was in the 1990s. The dithering Yeltsin has been replaced by a more confident and hawkish Putin who even as Prime Minister reigns supreme in Moscow. The Russian leadership would not shy away from using force as the events in Georgia have evidenced. Given widespread domestic support for its military response and the nationalistic sentiments the Georgian crisis has engendered in Russia, it would be difficult for the United States to push its agenda of further NATO expansion without the fear of Russian retaliation. Though the Russian threat that Poland could face nuclear strike for its decision to host US missile defence systems could be plain bluster, it is nevertheless a signal that the Kremlin would not tolerate further threats to its security.

The Georgian military foray into South Ossetia may have thus further complicated Georgia’s chances of getting membership in NATO. That the hope of membership in the Western alliance was also responsible for emboldening Georgia to resort to force has not been lost on the EU. Even before Georgia’s military foray, the German Chancellor had opposed Georgian membership saying “Countries that are enmeshed in regional and internal conflicts cannot become NATO members.” France also echoed similar sentiments at the Summit, stating that NATO enlargement would further provoke Russia.

Given the economic stakes the EU has in Russia, a confident and hawkish leadership in a resurgent Russia, and the dangers of further tension and instability in the region that the issue of NATO expansion has spawned, no consensus is likely to emerge on the pending applications of Georgia and Ukraine. If it did not in April 2008 when the NATO summit was held prior to the Georgian crisis, there is virtually no chance for it to fructify now. Europe indeed realises that it would find it very difficult to live with an insecure and resurging Russia.

After prolonged political and diplomatic negotiations between Iraq and the United States, President George Bush announced on September 9 the decision to withdraw around 8000 troops by the end of February 2009. The withdrawal would be done in a phased manner - a Marine battalion by November 2008 and an Army brigade by February 2009.

The decision came after repeated demands by Iraqi authorities for a clearly demarcated timeline on the pull out of American troops. Averse to issuing any such timeline, the United States has insisted that troop withdrawal would depend upon the ground situation and that it favoured a phased withdrawal. The UN-mandated term for the coalition forces will end on December 31, 2008 and the United States intends to remain in Iraq beyond that period till the situation comes under total control. It therefore wants to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with Iraq that would allow US troops to operate in Iraq even after the UN mandate expires. This deal is yet to be finalised and is under negotiation. The Government of Iraq maintains that the security situation has improved and that its security forces are capable of controlling the situation in the country. Though violence on Iraqi streets continues to mar peace, casualty figures are certainly lower than that for previous years. Apart from the security situation, there are also other ticklish issues that seem to stand in the way of a SoFA.

One controversial issue is immunity of US troops from prosecution under Iraqi law. The United States wants such immunity, but Iraq maintains that all American soldiers should come under the purview of Iraqi law. Similarly, the power of US troops to detain Iraqi civilians is also a contentious issue. The United States wants its troops to have the power to detain any Iraqi they find suspicious or dangerous. In addition, it also wants power for its troops to conduct military operations without the prior approval of the Iraqi government. Iraqi authorities are opposed to these measures and have said that these will be an affront to their sovereignty. Another issue that remains unresolved is the status of prisoners held by US forces in Iraq. Some 21,000 prisoners are being held by US troops at present without being charged with any crime.

Iraqi Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki has strongly declared that, "[w]e cannot sign an agreement unless it will preserve the sovereignty and national interests of Iraq," and added that, "[a]ny foreign soldiers on Iraqi soil must have a specific time frame and not be open-ended, and Iraqi blood must be protected and cannot grant full immunity." Thus, for the Iraqis, the issue is about the preservation and exercise of their sovereignty including independence of decision making.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made an unscheduled visit to Baghdad on August 21 to discuss the issue of troop withdrawal from Iraq. After meeting Iraqi officials, she declared that the United States and Iraq are “very very close” to signing an agreement. Iraqi authorities have repeatedly maintained that the United States has agreed for complete withdrawal of troops by 2011, but this has been rejected by the United States. In a statement issued on August 25, Noori al-Maliki said that, "[t]here is an agreement between the two sides that there will be no foreign soldiers in Iraq after 2011." This was promptly contradicted by White House spokesman Tony Fratto who said that negotiations are still continuing and “we have not yet finalized an agreement." While the Iraqi Prime Minister is under severe domestic pressure to ask foreign troops to leave, the United States is in no hurry to pull out its forces. Behind the façade of leaving a stable Iraq, the United States intends to lengthen its military presence in the country.

At present, the United States has more than 144,000 soldiers in Iraq. Withdrawing a mere 8000 of them in a span of six months is certainly not a good testimony of its seriousness to withdraw troops in the near future. Americans would like to continue their military presence in Iraq and exploit the country’s oil wealth. Also, a strong military presence in Iraq would help keep tab on the activities of neighbouring Iran and strengthen America’s strategic grip over the Gulf region. Moreover, the United States continues to be apprehensive about the ability of the Iraqi government and its defence forces to tackle the threat posed by insurgent groups. The potential for an increase in violence is another factor that is likely to delay a full American withdrawal. Thus, keeping in view long term US interests, the Iraqi government’s lack of capacity to respond to an increase in violence, any future security agreement to be signed between the two countries does not look like favouring an early and complete US troop withdrawal from Iraq.

The recent American plan to transfer control of the Awakening Movement’s tribal militias to the Iraqi Army is fraught with risk for the future of Iraq. The improved security situation in Iraq has been attained by maintaining a precarious balance between several countervailing forces. Care has been taken to isolate radical Shia movements like Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi and prevent it from having any share of power in the Shia-majority government led by Nouri al-Maliki. The Kurds have been allowed to continue with their autonomous status, which they had been more or less enjoying since the 1990s, while Sunni Arab tribes in Baghdad and Anbar province were given enough incentives to keep out the al Qaeda. It is this balance which is likely to be harmed if the transfer of control over the pre-dominantly Sunni tribal militias of the Awakening takes place. The Iraqi Army, police and other security organisations are mostly composed of militia members of Shia political parties like the Daawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Iraqi paramilitary units are filled with members of the Badr Brigade, which is the militia of the SCIRI, and is suspected of being behind the abduction, torture and murder of several Sunnis in Iraq. The conflict in Iraq and the worsening Sunni-Shia divide has ensured that the Iraqi government and armed forces would never see the Sunni tribal militias of the Awakening as trustworthy allies.

Though the Awakening movement was responsible for restoring calm in Anbar province and the different districts of Baghdad, the Iraqi government is suspicious of it as most of its members were former insurgents, Baathists, and al Qaeda members. There is also speculation that the movement has been infiltrated by al Qaeda cadres. In August, Iraqi security forces went about arresting the leaders of the Awakening councils. The Iraqi authorities also showed reluctance in inducting Sunni fighters from the Awakening movement into the Iraqi security forces. But the new decision has thrown up questions about how the plan of transfer of control of the militias is going to be implemented. The new initiative is related to the American handover of control of Anbar province to the Iraqi government. It is part of an initiative to reduce US troop presence in Iraq and handover security duties to Iraqi security forces. But if the issue of control over the Awakening Councils is not handled with tact and caution, it can result in renewed Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq. There is growing resentment among several militia commanders of the Awakening due to the treatment meted out to them by the Iraqi government. If the Iraqi government dithers in taking a decision on the matter, the militias might be tempted to rejoin the insurgency.

A new Sunni-Shia conflict will not be like the one witnessed during 2006 and 2007. There will be no divisions, like the one that existed between conservative Sunni tribes and radical Islamist groups, for the United States to exploit and weaken the insurgency. It would be bloodier and more devastating than anything that Iraq has seen hitherto. A comparison of the Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq with other such purported examples in West Asia would show that sectarian strife in Iraq has reached proportions that have rarely been seen in the region. The Iran-Iraq war was often described as a sectarian conflict without taking into consideration factors like the previous history of relations between the two states, historical rivalry between Arabs and Persians and the important fact that the majority of soldiers in the Iraqi army were Shias. Shia opposition activities in the region have been mostly directed against their respective governments for attaining more political rights and not against fellow Sunnis. This has been the case in countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In the case of Iraq, Sunni-Shia divisions have seeped down to the grass roots level. Calm has been restored in many of the districts in Baghdad because of the complete segregation of Sunnis and Shias.

There are parties on both sides who would like the outbreak of such sectarian conflict in order to further their own interests. While the al Qaeda’s activities have been restricted to Mosul, which is described by US authorities as its last bastion in Iraq, it is not completely out of the picture. On the other hand, Mosul is astride entry routes from Syria which has ensured that the group continues to get recruits from the wider region. The former leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, wanted to instigate a Sunni-Shia conflict as he believed that it would hasten the exit of US troops from the country. Al Qaeda might want to regenerate his programme if tensions increase between the two sides. Besides sectarian divisions, al Qaeda also has the chance to exploit ethnic differences like the one that exists between Arabs and Kurds. There are also various renegade factions of Jaish al-Mahdi, over whom Muqtada has little control. These factions, some of which have apocalyptic beliefs, would also be interested in instigating sectarian strife.

What would be the regional implications of a new Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq? It would be worthwhile to compare the Iraqi case with the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s and the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s. Because of weak state institutions, many of the factions in the latter two countries had cultivated strong ties with external players. While factions like various pro-Iranian Shia organisations in Iraq share strong relations with Iran, external players have not had the kind of leverage in Iraqi politics as previously expected. This is because Iraq has had a strong central government for a major portion of its existence as an independent nation. To a certain extent, it has created a sense of national identity among the various sections of the Iraqi population, making them less amenable to external machinations. Saddam Hussein was the culmination of a long evolutionary process whereby a system of government was created which would entail authoritarian rule by a strongman to maintain the unity of a country divided on ethnic, religious and sectarian lines. While the various external players could insulate themselves from the effects of civil war in Lebanon, a Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq could affect the regimes in countries like Syria and Jordan if not Iran. Finally, the challenge of establishing a representative government in Iraq lies in creating enough stakeholders in the major communities which would lead them to believe that a united Iraq would serve their interests better.

Recent developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir have been a source of alarm on a variety of counts. Since the decline of militancy in the Valley in recent years, disaffection was known to have existed, but the extent of it was perhaps underestimated. A related factor of concern is that the uprising in the Valley was not Pakistan-sponsored, and yet generated pro-Pakistan sentiments. The vitiated relationship between Jammu and the Valley that could trigger such immense disruption of normal life was also unanticipated. But perhaps the most serious concern arising out of the recent episode is the revisiting of New Delhi’s relationship with the Kashmir Valley. While some writings have conceptually, and aptly, made the case for better policies to address the serious situation in the State in furtherance of the “idea of India”, yet others have advocated that India should allow Kashmir to secede, paradoxically, in the name of the “idea of India”.

An analysis of these writings reveals that they are based on three kinds of arguments. First, there is the characterization of the unrest in Kashmir as a peaceful movement for ‘Azadi’ akin to India’s Gandhian struggle for independence and therefore different from the militancy in Punjab and the North East. A corollary is that New Delhi’s relationship with Kashmir is analogous to British colonial rule over India, which rather than integrate Kashmir with India has pushed people away. By this argument, separatists in the Valley are not just a “noisy minority”, rather they are like the few million of Gandhi’s followers who stood up to the British Empire.

The second argument is the connection between this movement for Azadi and the “idea of India”. The argument here is that the right of democratic dissent and free association of people are central to the idea of India and since Kashmiris do not wish to freely associate with the rest of India, New Delhi should let go of Kashmir. More precisely, in furtherance of the true spirit of democratic principles, India should grant Kashmiris the right to self-determination. A related point questions India’s double-standards with regards to the accession of Junagarh and Kashmir on the grounds that the fact that Kashmir had a Muslim-majority population was ignored. Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion is the characterization of the protest movement as a referendum in which people are seen as representing themselves.

The third are a series of arguments consisting of practical reasons for granting independence to Kashmir: that despite massive subsidies, periodic elections and use of force, India has not been able to stem the demand for Azadi; that giving up on Kashmir will end the “painful strain” on India’s resources, lives and honour as a nation; that India should not be held hostage to a people half the size of Delhi; that losing Kashmir would not diminish India geographically since people are already accustomed to the special status of Kashmir, and fears of a domino effect will in any case only hinder adoption of other measures like soft borders or autonomy; that giving up on Kashmir will not compromise Indian secularism, since a majority of India’s Muslims do not really relate to Muslims in Kashmir and would not mind if India gave up on Kashmir. These arguments are not only insufficient, but also inappropriate to make the case for Kashmir’s secession from India.

The characterization of Kashmir’s movement as a peaceful Gandhian movement and as a movement for freedom from British rule is fraught with several problems. First, such a characterisation disregards its violent historical antecedents during the 1990s, aided and abetted by Pakistan, that distinguish it from the Gandhian freedom struggle which was peaceful all along. Second, it assumes that there is a consensus on the meaning of Azadi in Kashmir as there was for freedom from British rule. Divisions among separatists on the meaning of Azadi have long been known; there are those who want an independent Kashmir coterminous with the Dogra rulers’ state and those who aspire to accession with Pakistan. In addition, there are those for whom Azadi means respect for the basic freedoms and identity of Kashmiris, not necessarily outside India’s borders. Finally, this argument assumes that peaceful means justify any political end, and conversely that violent means detract from the morality of a movement. This is too simplistic a reason to condemn militancy in Punjab, insurgency in the North-East, and other similar movements in the world. Such movements are often a reaction to ills of governance.

The linking of the granting of Azadi to the idea of Indian is also tenuous. This is so because it is the very “idea of India” that allows for such dissent to be expressed without actually endorsing the demand for secession, in spite of a history of violent militancy and heavy military presence in the Valley. Also, it would be improper to say that India ignored the presence of a Muslim majority in the State during accession. Several recent studies of the history of accession reveal that Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference with a substantial following in the Valley, was instrumental in Kashmir’s accession to India, in opposition to the wishes of both the Muslim Conference and Maharaja Hari Singh. Finally, a protest movement is not a referendum. However, it does convey that there are significant numbers who are unhappy with the prevailing situation, and there is no denying that that is a cause for worry.

Arguments advancing practical reasons for allowing Kashmir to secede are similarly problematic. Granted that after so many years India has not been able to stem the demand for Azadi. This is a result of faulty policies and improper governance, which could be set right. There is urgent need for this not only in Kashmir, but also in several other parts of the country. In Kashmir, New Delhi could begin by initiating less restrictive security policies, bettering human rights record of the security forces, ensuring that funds given to the state are utilised in a manner that improves the standard of living of the common people, improving the connectivity of the state with India and with Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, and implementing the recommendations of various working groups set up by the Prime Minister. Is Kashmir really a strain on India’s resources, lives and honour? One would rather not expend resources in countering militancy and put public money to better use, but the fact of the matter is that India’s economic take-off went ahead in spite of the raging insurgency in J&K through the 1990s.

As for the strain on Indian lives and honour, one really needs much more than a CNN-IBN poll to know if that is how Indian people think of Kashmir. Many would perhaps want the state to be part of India like every other state, and enjoy the benefits of India’s growing economy. Also, allowing Kashmir to secede will certainly diminish India geographically and compromise its security interests, even allowing for the fact that there might not be a domino effect in terms of other parts of the periphery similarly demanding secession.

Finally, India’s secularism is not about thinking about whether India’s Muslims relate to Kashmir’s Muslims, both being heterogeneous communities. Rather, it is about giving assurance to every religious community, especially one that also perceives itself to be ethnically different, that India does respect its culture and distinctiveness. More importantly, it is also about not letting the state and the “idea of India” be hijacked by groups claiming to represent the majority.

Historical grievances and futuristic aspirations have been the bases for the Kashmiri demand for Azadi, which has tended to be articulated sometimes in religious idiom. Today, this is a sizeable voice that needs to be heard. This is precisely what democracy is all about. The decline of militancy and international condemnation of Pakistan’s role in Kashmir present an opportune moment for allowing democracy to flourish fully in this sensitive border state and provide a renewed opportunity for all sections of Kashmiris to subscribe to the idea of India as a plural political entity guided by civic nationalism. Let not the imperatives of geopolitics, which have for long guided India’s policies towards Kashmir, come in the way of operationalising the idea of India.