If current developments are any indicator, the long road to economic integration on either side of the Taiwan Straits has commenced. In a first of its kind, a sixty member delegation led by Chen Yunlin, Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) visited Taiwan from November 3-7, 2008 to hold talks with his counterpart Chiang Pin-kung, Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). ARATS and SEF are two non-governmental organisations authorised by China and Taiwan in the early 1990s to examine the entire gamut of cross-Strait relations. ARATS takes its brief from the Taiwan Office of the State Council in Beijing, while the SEF is guided by the Mainland Affairs Council, a cabinet level agency that deliberates policies towards the mainland in Taipei. Before his current designation as Chairman of ARATS, Chen Yunlin was heading the powerful Taiwan Office at the State Council.

Four agreements were signed during the course of the contentious visit – on direct flights, direct sea transport, the postal services and food safety. With June 22, 2009 set as a date for starting direct passenger flights between the two sides, the air transport agreement, while falling short of an ‘open skies policy’, increases the number of chartered direct flights from 38 to 108 each week. Hong Kong and Macau will continue as transit points for passenger flights. By this agreement Taiwan hopes to attract tourists from the mainland on a regular basis. The agreement on food safety was necessitated by the ‘melamine incident’ in China that has led to a worldwide recall of dairy products and pet food produced on the mainland. The ‘melamine incident’ has made distributors and bakeries suffer huge losses in lost sales in Taiwan and there are proposals calling for the mainland to compensate for the losses incurred.

According to the China Post published from Taipei, the Chairman of the SEF, Chiang pin-Kung portrayed the agreements as “getting the distance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait ever closer not only substantially but also in form.” ARATS and SEF also agreed to have a systematic dialogue process every six months. Three agreements – on direct flights to the mainland, direct sea transport and direct mail, are expected to go into effect within six weeks after they are ratified by the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.

During the course of a choreographed seven minute meeting at the Taipei Guest House, the President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou told the Chairman of ARATS that “Beijing should give Taipei more Lebensraum (perhaps Ma Ying-jeou needs to find another expression, as this term did lead to grave historical crises seven decades ago in Europe) to manoeuvre in international relations.” The reasoning behind this statement is that Beijing should not place obstacles in Taiwan’s path as it seeks membership of international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO). To deflect criticism that he is genuflecting towards Beijing, Ma Ying-jeou reiterated his “three no’s” policy towards China premised upon – “no independence”, “no unification” and “no war” and that “the people of Taiwan were alone to decide their future.” Speaking the language of peace and accommodation – in striking contrast to that of his predecessor – Ma Ying-jeou raised five points of a possible convergence of political vision. Quoted in the China Post, he said, the “the two sides of the strait should face the reality, shouldn't negate each other, should promote the well-being of the people, should proactively deal with disputes by peaceful means, and should expand bilateral cooperation.”

The signing of the four agreements seemed to be the easier task as the ARATS Chairman and his entourage had to face the ire of opposition parties and organisations opposed to their five day visit. At a reception hosted at the Grand Formosa Regent Hotel by Wu Po-hsiung, Chairman of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, the ARATS delegation was “sieged-in” by demonstrators opposed to their presence in Taipei as also those who feel that Ma Ying-jeou is taking Taiwan into politically indefensible territory by encouraging ties with Beijing which has deeply divided the polity and society in Taiwan. For the DPP, much demoralised after the drubbing in the polls which brought the KMT to power, the contentious issue of closer economic relations with China is politically loaded. The DPP’s charge of ‘concessions’ by the Ma Ying-jeou administration towards China has enthused its rank and file, which until recently was dejected by the corruption charges levelled against former President Chen Shui-bian and his immediate family. DPP lawmakers have even gone to the extent of asking Ma Ying-jeou to “end his life” and accuse him of having brought “shame” upon Taiwan by meeting Chen Yunlin. The chairwoman of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, accused Ma of “denigrating the dignity and downgrading the sovereignty of the Republic of China.” In his defence, Ma Ying-jeou justifies his policy of engaging Beijing as flowing from the 1992 consensus, which favoured dialogue between Taipei and Beijing and which was scripted by none other than former President Lee Teng-hui, an icon to many in Taiwan and much reviled in Beijing.

With the ball rolling, the next meeting of ARATS and SEF in Beijing has drawn up a list of issues to focus upon – fighting organised crime, improving quarantine, investment protection, fisheries, educational exchanges and financial co-operation. The importance of financial co-operation has been necessitated by the global financial crisis, which has left in its wake the need for countries and entities of the region to work out mechanisms to protect themselves from its fallout. To conclude, while the pro-active policy of Ma Ying-jeou is yielding dividends to some segments of Taiwan’s polity and economy, the deep divisions resulting from his approach make it necessary for the current leadership to engage the legislature and wider civil society in a comprehensive manner to garner wider support for an ‘economic embrace’ with Beijing.

In August 2006, IDSA published a web commentary titled “Is Kerala emerging as India’s new terror hub?” The events of the past few months, especially the shocking revelation of militants from Kerala operating in Kashmir, have validated the concerns raised by this report.

The August 2006 commentary was prompted by two extraordinary events in Kerala which were in fact indicative of a larger phenomenon of the state turning into a hub of extremist indoctrination and logistical transit point for transnational fundamentalist groups. The first was the arrest of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) activists for illegal gatherings in Binanipuram near Kochi in August 2006 and the second was the burning of a Tamil Nadu government bus near Kochi in 2005 by members of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), protesting against the prolonged incarceration of their leader Abdul Nasser Madhani in Coimbatore.

Investigators pursuing the terror attacks in Jaipur and Ahmedabad earlier this year had stumbled upon SIMI links originating from South India and had reportedly found out that some people involved in these two terror plots were part of the Binanipuram grouping, and later also were leading the training camps in Vagamon, a hilly tract in the Kerala-Tamil Nadu border. The SIMI activists who were arrested by the Kerala Police from Binanipuram in August 2006, were later let off without a proper perusal of the case.

The second is the case of the bus burning by PDP activists. Around eight activists were arrested by the Kerala Police after the incident and then released on bail. Currently, news reports have highlighted the fears raised by the intelligence agencies that a handful of these youths could have made their way to Kashmir.

With the gunning down of at least four militants from Kerala in the last few weeks in Kashmir, the Kerala Police is now trying to unravel a bigger network that is recruiting youths from Kerala for the Kashmir militancy. What they have stumbled upon in the past few weeks has shocked the security establishment and woken them from their slumber for ignoring repeated warnings of Kerala turning into terror hub and a launching pad for pan-Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in the rest of the country.

During the last one month, the Kerala Police has nabbed some recruitment agents from Kochi and Kannur who had facilitated the recruitment of misguided youths from Kerala to join the ranks of jihadi groups in Kashmir. Investigators now suspect that at least 60-70 youths have mysteriously disappeared from the Kochi and Malabar belt and have could have landed up in Kashmir. The shocking revelation of Keralite youths becoming foot soldiers in the Kashmir militancy was first revealed in early October after the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Police gunned down a militant hailing from Kovalam in Thiruvananthapuram. Some documents written in Malayalam were found on his body which brought to light the first case of a Kerala link to Kashmir militancy.

On October 7, two militants identified as Abdul Rehman and Muhammad Fayaz belonging to Kannur and Malappuram districts of Kerala were killed in a shootout with security forces in Lolab area of Kupwara district. Similarly on October 10, three more militants, which included two Keralites and one Pakistani national, were killed in another encounter in Kupwara district. The two from Kerala were identified as Muhammad Yasin and Faizu belonging to Ernakulam and Kannur districts respectively.

Though the Kerala Police initially refused to accept this, they had to retract after the J&K Police reported gunning down more militants hailing from Kerala, which forced the Kerala Police to undertake raids in Kannur and Kochi. The arrest of two recruitment agents – Faisal and Jaleel - in Kochi and Kannur led to the revelation that over 60-70 youths could have gone to training camps in Kashmir and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Jaleel was under watch for some time for receiving telephone calls from one of the militants killed in Kashmir. In fact, the local media reported Jaleel confessing to sending over 300 youths from Kerala to Kashmir, though the Kerala Police denied such claims. Mohammed Yasin, who is originally a Christian hailing from Ernakulam, was a recent convert to Islam and was a history sheeter who made it to Kashmir in early October. The Kerala Police is now questioning an underworld gang leader in Kochi with whom Yasin was earlier involved in criminal activities.

If the Kerala link to the Kashmir militancy was a new phenomenon which has rattled the security establishment, the alleged involvement of Keralite youths in the Jaipur and Ahmedabad bomb blasts revealed thepremeative radicalization of Muslim youths in Kerala duringin the the past few years linked to movements like the SIMI. While some SIMI activists and leaders from Kerala were already under the scanner for their involvement in the July 2006 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai, the arrest of a Bangalore-based software professional hailing from Kerala for the bomb blasts in Bangalore and Jaipur illustrated the level of indoctrination among Muslim youth as a key character of the new wave of home grown fundamentalism in the country.

Though these revelations have caught the security establishment off guard it should be treated more as a case of repeated warnings being ignored about Kerala transforming into a haven for fundamentalist forces and logistics hub for pan-Islamic terrorist groups. The spurt in fundamentalist violence including intermittent small-scale explosions has been a regular phenomenon in the state during the last few years. Though radical groups first emerged after the Babri Masjid demolition, the first indication of such groups acquiring teeth was the abduction and suspected murder of reformist scholar Maulavi Abul Hassan Chekannur in July 1993. The seizure of pipe bombs (nitroglycerine charges in iron tubes) concealed in plastic bags under the Kadalundi Bridge in Malappuram in 1996 gave credence to fears of terror groups gaining roots and possible infiltration by Pakistan’s ISI among extremist groups in this region. Also, two Tamil Nadu bomb blast suspects had reportedly revealed during interrogation about their visits to Malappuram and training people in handling explosives during this period.

Though many isolated events linked with fundamentalist groups continued at regular intervals, since 2005 a series of low-intensity explosions, like the ones in Kozhikode bus station and a fishing boat in a local harbour, and periodic arms seizures across the state were all ominous trends pointing to Kerala turning into an extremist flash point. Adding to this was Kerala’s strategic position as a transit point for hawala rackets. Two years back, the Kerala Police had netted an NRI from the Middle East with access to over Rs 10,000 crores of hawala money. It was believed that a chunk of this money could have been channeled by Pakistan-based groups to other parts of the country.

Complementing such fears were the sporadic rise of newer groups with fundamentalist incarnations, which also highlighted the increasing radicalization of Muslim youth, especially in the Malabar belt, where organizations like the National Democratic Front (NDF) were blamed for orchestrating many instances of communal violence. The NDF have in recent years emerged as a strong alternative to groups like the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) – which was formed by Abdul Nasser Madhani and later reincarnated as the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Madhani himself was incarcerated in Salem jail for a long time as an accused in the Coimbatore bomb blasts case.

After the decline of the ISS and the ban on SIMI, the Kerala Police believes that the NDF, which masquerades as a human rights organization with a pseudo-political character, has been a favourite destination for former cadre of ISS and SIMI. Though the NDF leadership denies any extremist links, its cadre is suspected to be involved in many cases of extremist violence. In fact, Jaleel, who is arrested for recruiting youths for Kashmiri groups, was reportedly an NDF member. The NDF, while not denying Jaleel’s association with the NDF, had announced Jaleel’s expulsion from the group on October 29 well after the Kerala Police arrested him on October 18. A blame game is now on in Kerala with major political parties attacking one another for cultivating groups like the NDF.

If NDF is one organization which has survived without risking a ban despite evidence of its extremist leanings, the same is not the case with SIMI, whose activities are now being monitored, though the damage has already been done. Being an organization with a strong base in Kerala, the SIMI has been functioning clandestinely in the sidelines after the ban. A splinter group led by C. A. M. Basheer, who hails from Ernakulam, is suspected to be involved in the July 2006 Mumbai blasts. Basheer, a trained aeronautical engineer, is known to have received training in Pakistan, and was already booked for his alleged role in the 2003 Mumbai blasts. With the police now suspecting that the Binanipuram and Vagamon meetings could have been launch pads for the Ahmedabad and Jaipur attacks strengthens the suspicion that home-grown terror modules with external assistance have been planning attacks for the past few years before unleashing themselves across the country this year.

While central intelligence agencies have been actively pursuing these groups, especially after the Kadalundi episode, the same level of enthusiasm is not seen as far the efforts of the Kerala Police is concerned. The sheer incredulity with which the Kerala Police initially refused to accept the Kerala link to Kashmir militancy is typical of a demoralized police force unable to cope with the unprecedented security challenges faced by the state, known for its harmonious but sensitive communal mélange. For a mediocre police force acquainted with only petty crimes and political violence, the kind of extremist tendencies cropping up in the state is a professional challenge it is totally unprepared to tackle. Overand above such worries is the high level of politicisation of the Kerala Police, which has eroded its professional capabilities. Various judicial commissions have constantly referred to this aspect.

Though the Kerala Police had acted quickly to round up SIMI activists in Binanipuram, the act of releasing them without proper follow-up, despite impounding seditious literature showing linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist groups, shows the lack of awareness and preparedness to meet such eventualities. Compounding such deficiencies is the failure of the state’s intelligence mechanism which could not track the activities in Vagamon, where some activists involved in recent terror attacks were allegedly trained. While lack of resources and manpower is an usual excuse, a media report recently pointed out that the Kerala Police was among the few state police wings which has not participated in the specialized anti-terror training for state forces conducted by the National Security Guards (NSG) in the past few years.

With such tardy professionalism and politicisation curbing the effectiveness of the police force, it would be totally unprepared to tackle the contingencies that are expected to arise in the coming days from extremist elements in the state. Though Kerala itself has not witnessed any major terror attack, the mere fact that Kerala youths have traveled all the way to join the ranks of Kashmiri militants shows what is in store for the state. A nation-wide crackdown on extremists operating from the state would force them to implode within the peripheries of the state, thus disturbing its tender communal harmony.

While the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 was an elaborate document, the press release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on India’s operationalisation of its nuclear doctrine of January 4, 2003 was, on the other hand, very succinct. While reflexively it may be said that India’s doctrine is predicated on a nuclear retaliation of sufficient magnitude to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ against nuclear use by an adversary against India or its forces anywhere, it is contended here that there has been a shift in the doctrine as explicated in the press release to potentially countenance ‘flexible response’. Since transparency in the nuclear doctrine is important for communication of nuclear intent to potential adversaries, there is a requirement of spelling out the nuclear doctrine in greater measure. This article brings to the fore the need for clarity by challenging the commonly held position that India’s doctrine is one of ‘assured destruction’ by making the case that it can equally be interpreted as ‘graduated deterrence’. In doing so, it highlights an area of potential confusion and recommends that this be addressed.

The understanding widely held is that India’s nuclear doctrine is one of assured retaliation of a massive order or ‘assured destruction’ – defined as a strategy based on a high order counter value threat. This is explicable as it is in keeping with India’s philosophy regarding nuclear weapons as being ‘political weapons’ not meant for nuclear use. Their only utility is to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons by adversaries against India. Since these are not meant for war fighting, they have a role in operationalising India’s philosophy of ‘deterrence by punishment’. This is in keeping with the other pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, namely, No First Use, minimum credible deterrent, unilateral moratorium on testing and amenability to universal nuclear disarmament.

The National Security Advisory Board came up with a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (Draft) positing ‘massive retaliation’ for consideration by the government in August 1999 after the Kargil conflict of that summer. In the Draft, the relevant portion has been articulated thus: “Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor” {Para 2.3 (b)}.1In the wake of Operation Parakram of 2001-02, the government, through a press release from the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, confirmed the adoption of the nuclear doctrine that was explicated in a press release. The appropriate portion is extracted below:

“(ii) A posture of “No First Use”: Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;

(iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”2(Italics added)

The doctrine is now one of ‘assured retaliation’ to nuclear use by an adversary with the proviso that this would be massive in the case of first strike. In other words, retaliation in face of sub ‘first strike’ levels or usage could be of a lower order. In effect, India’s nuclear doctrine has moved away from one of assuredly inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ posited in the Draft to one that potentially includes ‘flexible’ or ‘graduated’ response. This shift from ‘assured destruction’ to ‘graduated deterrence’ has not been adequately registered in strategic commentaries, with most commentators continuing to believe that India’s nuclear doctrine continues to be one of retaliation of a massive order.

In case the sub para (ii) of the press release (reproduced above) is being over-interpreted and meanings not meant to be derived are being arrived at here, then it points to the element of confusion induced by the press release - referred to in the introductory paragraph of this article. There is, therefore, a need to clarify to the strategic community, the interested public and indeed, more importantly, to potential adversaries, exactly what is intended. In case India’s nuclear deterrence is in accord with the popularly subscribed view in the strategic community, then the words ‘first strike’ would require to be substituted by ‘first use’ in a review of the doctrine. In such a case, the official doctrine requires to reiterate the Draft’s wordings that “India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable” (Para 4.1) for any form of nuclear ‘first use’.

Such a critique is not mere hair-splitting for these terms have specific definitions and are not inter-changeable. For the distinction, a resort to noted nuclear pundit Lawrence Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy is in order. ‘First strike’ is the opening volley directed against largely counter-force targets with the intent of crippling the adversary’s means of nuclear retaliation.3 This would amount to nuclear first use of a high order against which massive retaliation would be rational, politically acceptable and legitimate.

First strike is, however, not necessarily the only manner of nuclear first use. A sub-first strike level of nuclear first use is feasible and may even be rational and legally and politically sustainable in the circumstance of the conflict. Against such a form of nuclear first use, such as against military forces that threaten the nuclear threshold of a belligerent, ‘assured retaliation’, may not be the best response option and most certainly should not be the sole response option. On receipt of a nuclear first use by the enemy not amounting to ‘first strike’, several factors would impact nuclear decision making. These include the aspect of self-deterrence; the need for proportionality and discrimination in keeping with the laws of armed conflict; escalatory potential of response options; international pressures; economy of force considerations; need for equivalence between the crime and punishment; and the need to win subsequent peace. Therefore, ‘flexible response’ has much to recommend it. If this is the nuclear doctrine India has apparently moved to, it requires acknowledging this explicitly.

It needs to be highlighted that the possibility of a shift away from ‘assured destruction’ through ‘massive retaliation’ was already thoughtfully worked into the Draft (Para 2.4) in the following manner:

“India's peace time (Italics added) posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:

(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat; and

(b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.”

Interestingly, the term ‘massive’ has not been used in the Draft but finds mention in the press release. That it has not been used in the Draft indicates that retaliation need not have ‘massive’ connotations, so long as its quantum would make it ‘unacceptable’ to the aggressor. ‘Punitive retaliation’ to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage does not necessarily require massive retaliation. Therefore, the quantum of retaliation was left as a matter of political and operational choice to be dictated by the circumstance. The decision maker is thus not constrained in the options available for nuclear retaliation, which could be massive while not being necessarily so.

This is evident from the fact that the Draft does not mention the nature of the retaliation during war time, restricted as it is to the projection of the posture in peace time. For in-conflict deterrence posture to be different from a peace time posture is sensible and has been catered for in the Draft accordingly. Thus, the Draft has been a precursor for the officially adopted doctrine and there is an element of continuity between the two. The nature of the deterrent posture in war time not having been reflected on indicates that other options have not been ruled out. The Draft, in not overly restricting the government’s nuclear options, had potentially ruled in ‘flexible response’, which the official nuclear doctrine has virtually accepted. In case this is an incorrect impression, then there is no reason for the word ‘peace time’ to have figured in the Draft. It has evidently been used advisedly and calls for an interpretation along the line contended here.

Such options could include a quid pro quo, quid pro quo plus or a spasmic strike, as posited by General Sundarji.4 While the peace time posture would appear to rule these out, the nature of the in-conflict deterrent posture – not having been explicated – cannot be said, ipso facto, to have ruled these out. India’s response is to be dictated by the guiding philosophy given in the Draft as: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Action, informed by such intent, while ruling out quid pro quo, could still countenance a quid pro quo plus response. Since the press release explicitly mentions ‘massive’ retaliation only in case of first strike, it rules in the quid pro quo option also. In effect, India has now a nuclear deterrent posture that potentially rules in ‘flexible response’. This marked shift has not drawn any strategic comment and, on that account, requires deliberation by the strategic community and even perhaps, an elaboration by the National Security Coulcil.

The Draft puts its function to serve only as a guide thus: “Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment (Italics added) of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review (Para 1.6).” That this has been done has been communicated through the press release and, therefore, the same can be taken as authoritative. Since this is the critical source document informing thinking on India’s nuclear deterrence posture, there is a need to clarify exactly what is India’s nuclear posture. Is it ‘assured destruction’? Or, does it rule in ‘flexible response’?

Here it must be acknowledged that the Draft was not to be taken as the government’s position, even though it was released for discussion by the then National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri B Mishra. That it was not the official position was clarified after its release by a senior minister in the NDA government, Shri Jaswant Singh. The Draft can, however, be taken as informing the doctrine officially adopted and explicated in the press release. There are elements of continuities and discontinuities between the two. However, the press release is the authoritative statement and is very clear. That it has, however, given rise to an interpretation at variance with the commonly held notion of Indian deterrence, there is a case for clarifying the issue. To this author, the official doctrine is indeed one positing ‘flexible response’ as evident from its use of ‘first strike’ as against ‘first use’ in the relevant sentence. That this fact has not been registered by the wider strategic community is why the point being raised here for wider debate.

The only fallout from acknowledging the shift would be on India’s position that nuclear weapons are only for deterring. This is not affected in a major way by the shift to ‘flexible response’ since having a menu of options does not degrade deterrence. Instead, an ‘assured destruction’ posture is not credible against enemy nuclear first use of a lower order, such as a counter force attack on invading forces on his own territory. Therefore, there is a case for the shift and acknowledging the shift openly. The strategic commentaries that have largely missed the shift should also reflect on its implications. In this manner the public - that has a right to know in a democratic system - and the enemy - that needs to know as per deterrence theory – would be in a better position to appreciate the nuclear doctrine in the correct perspective.

• 1. The Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine is available at:
• 2. Press release on India’s nuclear doctrine is available at:
• 3. Freedman, L., Evolution of Nuclear Strategy; London, MacMillan Press, 1989 (2nd Edition), p. 135.
• 4. Sundarji, K., Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century; New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 2003, pp. 146-153.

Although September coincides with the holy month of Ramzan in the Islamic calendar, the violence in Pakistan during the month surpassed that in August, which itself was the most violent month. Despite the fasting and sanctity accorded to Ramzan in Islam, it is also associated with Shahadat (martyrdom) and people laying down their life during this holy month are often considered Shaheeds (martyrs). This probably explains to some extent the extremely enhanced level of violence in Pakistan during September 2008 and why various Ramzan ceasefires negotiated in August and September floundered. This article attempts to analyse the violence in Pakistan during September 2008 based on media reports.

Like August, September has also surpassed all previous records of violence during a month. During the month, 1,342 lives were lost as against 1,303 during the previous month. However, what was significant was the increased number of civilian collateral casualties. Whilst the number of alleged militants killed declined from 818 to 727, and the number of security personnel from 131 to 59, the number of civilians killed rose significantly from 354 to 556. What is even more significant is that over 550 civilians were injured in collateral fire. High civilian casualties do not augur well for the region as it removes the middle ground and collateral damage sustained due to operations by security forces always leads to increased support levels for the militants.

As in the past few months, out of the three main regions affected by terrorism related violence, namely, FATA, NWFP and Balochistan, the maximum casualties were recorded in FATA, followed by NWFP and Balochistan. In FATA, in 103 (62 in August) incidents during the month, 892 (838 in August) people including militants, civilian and security forces were killed and 240 others were injured. Out of 892 killed, 539 were alleged militants, 336 civilians and 17 security personnel. At the same time 82 alleged militants were injured and over 150 civilians were injured in the attacks in the region.

Most of the casualties were in Bajaur Agency where the security forces, supported by artillery, armour, helicopter gunships and air force jets launched a massive operation to avenge the set back suffered by them in Lowi Sam in early August. The operation had been going on for over a month as September drew to an end and despite usage of heavy weaponry the security forces were finding the going tough against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. The security forces have also propped up a number of anti Taliban tribal armed militia to take on the Taliban. Over 250,000 people from the region, which includes part of the adjoining Mohmand agency, were internally displaced and were forced to seek shelter in NWFP and Afghanistan. The US forces operating from Afghanistan continued targeting militant positions in FATA by using missiles, drones and aircraft operating from across the border. Most of these attacks were carried out in North and South Waziristan agencies. In view of the liberal usage of aerial platforms both by the US forces as well as the Pakistani forces, it would be prudent to take the figures of militant casualties with a pinch of salt as many of those killed in aerial attacks and branded militants could have been innocent civilians.

The sectarian violence in Kurram Agency between predominantly Shia Turi tribe and Sunni Bangash tribe supported by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continued unabated throughout the month. The state was conspicuous by its absence in the region whilst the tribes armed with heavy and automatic weapons continued to clash through out the month.

The month clearly brought out that the political boundaries between NWFP and FATA had blurred completely and the violence was endemic throughout the entire Pakhtoon belt. There was a proliferation of violence in NWFP and in terms of incidents of violence, NWFP even surpassed FATA, even though the casualties were much lower. As against 52 incidents in August there were 126 incidents during the month, which resulted in 292 killings as against 363 in August and more than 182 being injured. 161 of those killed were alleged militants and 102 civilians. 29 security personnel were killed and 38 were injured in various incidents. 45 militants and 99 civilians were also injured. Within the province, Swat valley remained the epicentre of violence in the region and was the venue of fierce fights between security forces and militants. Air force jets and helicopter gunships regularly pounded militant strongholds. On September 26, police in Swat issued shoot-at-sight orders against any masked individual in the district. Militants on their part continued to target political leaders and continued destroying the schools in the region and in a first incident of its kind in the region, on September 22, militants blew up a gas pipeline in Blogram area near Mingora city. Also, on September 2, two Chinese telecommunications engineers along with two Pakistanis were kidnapped in Dir and subsequently shifted them to Swat.

The other major arena of conflict was Kohat District where the road between Kohat and Darra Adamkhel and the Kohat tunnel were occupied by the militants. The security forces entered Darra Adamkhel on September 22, after 25 days of fierce fighting, in which they were supported by air force jets and helicopter gunships. The other areas affected by violence were Peshawar, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu, Kohat and Lower Dir. In a significant incident on September 12, about 100 heavily armed terrorists occupied a municipal building in the Regi Lalma area on the outskirts of Peshawar, the provincial capital, but fled after the arrival of paramilitary troops without any skirmish. It appeared to be a case of testing the will of the government, and a signal that they had arrived right at the doorstep of Peshawar.

In Balochistan, there was reduction in violence and the number of incidents declined from 50 in August to 32 in September. However, despite fewer incidents, 59 people were killed as against 51 in August, and 69 others were wounded. Of those killed, 25 were alleged militants whilst 8 security personnel were killed. In addition, 26 civilian were killed and around 60 were wounded. Despite a ceasefire that had been declared by the Baloch armed groups (Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front and Baloch Republican Army) on September 1, the clashes erupted between BLA and security forces on September 27 in Dera Bugti district and 25 Baloch nationalists and 3 FC personnel, were killed in two days of clashes. The violence in Balochistan was mostly concentrated in Dera Bugti and Quetta districts. The railway tracks and gas pipelines were the favourite targets of the Baloch groups.

There was also an increase in incidents of violence in other parts of Pakistan namely Punjab, Sindh and Islamabad. In 48 incidents, two militants and five security personnel were injured, 92 civilians were killed and 265 injured. Most of the casualties occurred in the attack on Marriot Hotel within the high security zone in Islamabad, where an explosive laden truck exploded on September 20, killing 60 people, and injuring another 250. With the Taliban making its presence felt in Punjab in August, the violence in Punjab has increased considerably. On September 26, a powerful bomb exploded on the railway track near Bahawalpur, resulting in derailment of a passenger train, killing six people and injuring 15 others. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were recovered from the Punjab University Campus in a raid on September 21 and 22. Tribal clashes as well as ethnic and sectarian clashes were reported in Sindh during the month.

During the month, there were about five suicide attacks, of these two were in FATA and one each in NWFP, Islamabad and Balochistan. These attacks resulted in loss of 73 lives and injuries to 268. Attacks in NWFP and FATA were targeted against military targets, whilst those in Balochistan and Islamabad were against taregeting civilians. The maximum devastation was caused by the suicide attack on Marriot Hotel on September 20.

For a number of months, the violence levels in Pakistan have been rising month after month. The rising crescendo of violence does not portend well for the region, especially as it appears to be moving out of its traditional areas in Pakhtoon and the Baloch heartland. Both the Pakistani government and the international community needs to take efforts to initially localise the violence to Pakhtoon regions and then to control and eliminate it.

Table of Casualty Figures in Pakistan - September 2008

1. Based on Pakistani media reports.