Since the beginning of the Lula administration in 2003, Brazilian foreign policy has been re-oriented towards a renewed and more extended approach to regional politics. Under Lula, Brazil’s foreign policy approach to South America has been outlined by a kind of ‘pragmatic solidarity’ towards its neighbours. Rather than a purely altruistic approach to regional relations, Brazilian diplomacy has delivered a number of ‘regional public goods’ (both material and symbolic) to win over the support of neighbours traditionally reluctant to recognise Brazil’s leadership role in the region.1 This foreign policy strategy has been named by Rubem Barbosa, former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington and London, as diplomacy of ‘generosity’.2

As a regional power, Brazil sought to enhance political influence by engaging in a number of diplomatic missions throughout the region. Brazilian diplomacy has intervened in several domestic and international crises involving Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Haiti. In 2004, Brazil sent a small force to war-torn Haiti taking over from American and French forces commanding the UN peacekeeping operation (MINUSTAH) in that Caribbean island. The key leadership role played by Brazil in Haiti, under the auspices of the UN, has significantly raised Brazil’s international profile as a regional power.3

Rather than being based on classical power attributes or ‘hard power’, Brazil’s influence in regional politics has been achieved through “normative leadership” and the use of ‘opinion-shaping instruments’.4 In this regard, the strategy of leading by example has been a strong feature of Brazilian foreign policy. In 1998, for example, during a ceremony in the US State Department to mark Brazil’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazilian Foreign Minister, Luis Felipe Lampreia, hailed Brazil’s example as a force for peace and co-operation in South America. In his words,

We believe Brazil has a positive role to play in the world. Brazil is proud to live in harmony with all its ten neighbors, and to have done so uninterruptedly for well over a century. South America today is at once the least-armed region in the world and we have accelerated economic integration. We are setting an example of cooperation and solidarity.5

Brazil’s investment in ‘soft power’ as a means to increase its regional and global stature is illustrated by its willingness to promote democratic rule and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms. More recently, it played an important role within the ‘Rio Group’6 while mediating disputes between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela over the killing of a key member of the Farc guerrilla group by the Colombian armed forces within Ecuadorian territory.7

The revival of ‘Bolivarianism’ by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela as an alternative source of regional identity is a clear sign of a division in the process of region building led by Brazilian diplomacy. However, the attractive power of Brazil’s economy and its pragmatic stance on regional and global politics have outflanked Venezuela’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ in the struggle for the hearts and minds of Latin American neighbours. Under Lula, the Brazilian government has invested in the diversification of Brazil’s already powerful industrial sector and spent political energy trying to establish new (and reinforcing old) regional institutions. Moreover, the recent discovery of massive oil reserves in Brazil’s Southern coast has allowed Lula to minimize the importance of Venezuela’s only “trump card” to win regional influence.8

Notwithstanding the Brazilian government’s increasing political engagement in South America, the actual recognition of its regional leadership role should not be taken for granted. According to Lima and Hirst, for example,

The expansion of Brazil’s political involvement in local crises, together with growing trade and investment activities with its South American neighbours, has not led to any easy or automatic acknowledgement of the country’s regional leadership in world affairs.9

The advent of open regionalism, which flowed from changes to the international political economy of trade and the reconciliation between newly democratising governments in Brasilia and Buenos Aires in the late 1980s, resulted in the formation of a common market in the southern cone (Mercosur). While trade initially surged within the region, the dominance of the Brazilian economy over the others was underscored by the unilateral decision to devalue its currency in 1999, a move that precipitated a meltdown in the Argentine economy and demonstrated that even the newly founded benevolent relationship could have a negative impact upon its neighbours.

In May 2006, the nationalisation of the gas and oil sectors by the Bolivian president Evo Morales negatively affected bilateral relations with Brazil whose investments, through the state-owned giant Petrobras, are close to US $1 billion. Moreover, Brazil has struggled to gain support among its neighbours for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, with Argentina and Mexico openly rejecting Brazilian claims. More recently, Argentina has angered Brazilian trade representatives by joining forces with India, China and Indonesia to block a trade agreement at the latest Doha round of trade talks. Buenos Aires in turn has accused Brazil of betrayal by moving away from Mercosur’s commonly agreed position on the liberalization of the industrial sector.

Bilateral diplomatic relations with the United States, the hemispheric hegemonic power, are also a key element of Brazil’s regional engagement. For the US, Brazil has small strategic interest in South America, if compared with India, for example, which is geographically located in a crucial region for the US’ ‘War on Terror’. However, bilateral links have been growing due to co-operation in the strategic area of biofuels. Moreover, the Bush administration has strongly invested in Brazil as an alternative source of regional leadership given the divisive role played by Venezuela in regional politics. Diplomatic relations between Brasilia and Washington have also been marked by tensions, mostly as a result of the growing American military involvement in the Colombian conflict in the shared Amazon region. The protection of Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon area has become a central aspect of Lula’s national defence strategy and the US military presence in the Colombian Amazon is seen as a potential threat to regional stability. Similarly, Lula has strongly reacted against criticism by transnational environmentalists, backed by Western governments, who place responsibility for the protection of the Amazon rain forest beyond the authority of the Brazilian government.

The increasing economic involvement of China and Russia in Latin America is perceived by Brazilian diplomacy as a positive development. China has become a major importer of Brazilian commodities and total trade between the two countries grew five-fold between 2000 and 2003 to a value of $8 billion. Similarly, in a recent trip to Brazil, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev affirmed Russia’s interest in deepening political co-ordination with Brazil, India and China (BRIC) to create a new global financial structure. In the security dimension, however, the newly established military ties between Russia and Venezuela can further strain the already troubled relations of Bogotá, Washington and Caracas with likely spill over consequences to neighbouring nations such as Brazil and Ecuador.

In spite of persistent suspicion towards Brazil’s actual interests in regional politics, its global stature and regional assertiveness has instilled admiration and respect by smaller states in the region. Similarly, its macro-economic stability and democratic credentials have worked as a powerful ‘soft power’ instrument vis-à-vis Brazil’s neighbours. Even Argentina, its most strident rival, has been trying to emulate some of Brazil’s foreign and domestic policy successes. In this respect, South-South alliances, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), represent an important asset to Brasilia’s goal of consolidating its position of leadership in South America. The recognition of this trilateral arrangement by the international community at large will further legitimate the new role of Brazil as a global leader and as the proper representative of South American interests.

• 1. As part of this foreign policy strategy, Brazil has pardoned a long-standing Bolivian debt as well as unfavourably accepted the Bolivian government’s terms concerning the nationalisation of Brazilian assets in Bolivia. It also made substantial donations to Paraguay and also accepted Asuncion’s demands to renegotiate the Itaipu Treaty which is the legal instrument for the economic exploitation of the largest operational hydroelectrical plant in the world in the shared Paraná river.
• 2. Lula’s “diplomacy of generosity” has generated a heated domestic debate about Brazil’s long and short-term foreign policy goals in South America. See, for example, R. Barbosa, “Diplomacia da Generosidade”, O Globo, May 13, 2008.
• 3. For example, the weekly magazine The Economist referred to Brazil’s presence in Haiti as “a small force, but of huge symbolic significance […] Brazil has begun to flex its muscles as a regional superpower.” For more, see, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy: A Giant Stirs,” The Economist, June 11, 2004.
• 4. C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
• 5. L. F. Lampreia, Albright, Lampreia Hail Brazil’s Accession to NPT (Transcript). Washington D.C.: US Department of State, 1998, p. 10.
• 6. The “Rio Group” was established in 1986 at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is as a permanent mechanism of political consultation and co-ordination among Latin American and Caribbean States.
• 7. “Colombian Leader’s Raid Gamble Pays Off,” The Washington Post, March 11, 2008.
• 8. “Quietly, Brazil Eclipses and Ally,” The New York Times, July 7, 2008.
• 9. M. R. S. Lima and M. Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities,” International Affairs 82 (1) 2006, p. 21.

If all things go well, Bangladesh should have an elected government in January 2009 following the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) elections. Contrary to much scepticism, the caretaker government headed by Fakhruddin Ahmed has embarked upon fulfilling its promise of holding free and fair elections on December 29, 2008. This caretaker government received groundswell support because it was viewed as an instrument of democracy in Bangladesh, something that the previously elected government was unable to deliver at the end of its tenure in 2006.

The achievements of the caretaker government in the spheres of political reforms and anti-corruption have been mixed. The inability of the anti-corruption commission to investigate fully and provide clinching evidence resulted in hundreds of the arrested persons being set free; on one particular day, the High Court granted bail to over 200 persons. The caretaker government has received flak for being lenient towards members of the religious parties. More importantly, it chose to ignore the Islamist group wielding its influence in the social sector. The attempt to introduce a bill ensuring equal rights to women was squarely squashed by these groups. Some members even went about destroying baul statues, symbols of the country’s secular ethos, but administrators preferred to look the other way.

Despite these, institutional growth in Bangladesh has been visible in the last 23 months. Not only has the judiciary become independent, but the Election Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission also became autonomous and assertive. This is likely to go a long way in ensuring democratic governance in Bangladesh. The People’s Representative Order ordinance introduced in July 2008 prescribed the rules and behaviours for political parties as well as candidates. These rules made it necessary for the Jamaat Islami to rename itself as the Bangladesh Jamaat Islami and forced it to open its membership to non-Muslims as well. However, as demanded by the law, none of the political parties have agreed to completely dissociate themselves from their student groups, nor have they disclosed their sources of funding. Internal democracy within political parties has never found much favour with Bangladeshi leaders, though the Awami League can be credited for having introduced some reforms at its grassroots level. This is not true for other political parties like Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jatiya. This time around, Jatiya Party leader Ershad has assumed the role of a queen maker, having negotiated for 48 seats from the Awami League led 14-party coalition.

The ability to transform an electoral democracy into a functioning democracy will largely depend on the role the two main political parties play in the ensuing months. Irrespective of the outcome, the Jatiya Sangsad would have to emerge as the centre piece of politics. Mature political behaviour would require not returning to the culture of street protests and violence, which are a sure recipe for increasing the influence of the Islamists and the military in the country’s political affairs.

The election holds significance not only for Bangladesh but is being watched keenly by all regional and extra regional powers. India is no exception in this regard. Any political development in Bangladesh directly impinges on its largest neighbour. Indeed, in India, there is a high level of expectations albeit mixed with apprehensions about the direction that post-election Bangladesh would take. Notwithstanding which of the two major political alliances is voted to power, India would have to seriously re-examine its Bangladesh policy in the light of a number of recent developments. Some of India’s policy options include:

• Early return of democracy in Bangladesh serves India’s interest. Though the caretaker government offered a tension-free political climate and opportunity, by its very nature it has been a temporary arrangement. Any prolongation of the caretaker government would mean subversion of democracy and rule of law. Despite the obvious problems with elected governments, an early restoration of democracy and the holding of free and fair multiparty elections serve Indian interests.
• Shared cultural affinity could be a liability if there is no holistic Indian policy towards Dhaka. The border states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura share geography and cultural linkages with Bangladesh and they also have greater economic and trade interactions with it. The understanding and experience of these states could provide valuable inputs to New Delhi to enhance bilateral co-operation. At the same time, bilateral relations should not be governed exclusively by the needs of and pressures from these border states, and especially that of West Bengal.
• Security issues would need tangible action and not declaration of intention. While the caretaker government was appreciative of India’s security concerns, there were very little tangible changes on the ground. An elected government in Bangladesh, by its very nature, would be less accommodative than the caretaker government of technocrats. India therefore should be willing to scale down its expectations once an elected government takes over in Bangladesh.
• Leaders from Bangladesh should not be allowed to use Indian territory for political campaigns. In recent years, New Delhi has allowed visiting Awami leaders to criticise the BNP government and its leaders. This has generated unnecessary controversies and ill-will in Bangladesh and generated an impression that India was indulging in partisan politics.
• Unilateral trade concessions offered by India would have to be implemented and strengthened. During the 2007 SAARC summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh unilaterally offered to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers for imports from Bangladesh. It is in India’s interest to facilitate trade and economic engagement with Bangladesh. Even if the outcomes are limited, they offer a strong economic constituency in that country and could strengthen bilateral ties. This is so even if Bangladesh is unable to reciprocate Indian economic concessions.
• The strengthening of private entrepreneurship. Long-term economic co-operation alone could provide substance to bilateral relations and might enable both countries to overcome their political differences. Economic interactions would have to be promoted primarily through private and non-governmental enterprises because perceived official patronage proved to be problematic for large projects (for example, Tata investments).
• India should continue the current policy of remaining neutral and uninvolved. Without appearing to be overtly pro-Indian, key Western players such as the US, UK and EU have worked closely with New Delhi while dealing with Bangladesh. Such a posture serves India well and New Delhi should continue to maintain a correct distance vis-à-vis various constituencies within Bangladesh.
• India would have to create time-bound bench marks to monitor progress. Irrespective of which political party forms the next government, India would have to keep the momentum flowing. At the same it would have to establish clear bench marks for bilateral relations. These should not only be realistic but should include tangible targets that should be monitored periodically. Otherwise, India would have squandered the window of opportunity that has been provided by the non-political caretaker government.

In the aftermath of the recent Mumbai attacks, India’s patience for governments giving space to extremists is in deficit. The onus thus would now be on the newly elected government in Dhaka to not only show its earnestness in that sector but also to send a clear signal that Bangladesh is equally keen to continue its engagement with India. Despite the last few years of political uncertainty, Bangladesh has been able to maintain a steady growth. Deepening economic engagement with India will further speed up this growth. The favourable political conditions in Bangladesh for the last two years have enabled the two countries to address some of the key issues in their bilateral relations. It is in the interest of both that their joint willingness to work together be reflected in future relations as well.

The staggered attacks on Mumbai across seven places were extremely demanding on time and resources required for counter operations. The attacks have also amply demonstrated that there is no scope for any lacunae in India’s security apparatus. The guard has to remain up to prevent the real ‘9/11 of India’.

The overall role of Indian security personnel and their sense of dedication were exemplary as has been widely acknowledged. Most experts agree that a terrorist takeover of a hotel as large as the Taj Mahal Palace is a daunting task for any counterterrorism outfit, given the enormity of the place and the problems faced in effectively sanitising such an area. However, some analysts, especially from Israel, have been critical of conduct of the Indian security forces operations in Nariman House, where five Israeli hostages were killed by the terrorists. They also consider the 12-hour battle to liberate this building as "unreasonable".

In a complex hostage-type situation, it is essential that counter-operations are launched speedily and with surgical precision to ensure quick neutralisation of the terrorists and safety of the hostages. Towards actualisation of the same, it is essential that Indian specialised troops continuously hone their skills, remain well trained and respond effectively when facing a threat. To optimise on the expertise available with other nations, a series of defence cooperation events with suitable countries to enhance training standards and further strengthen Indian counter-terrorism capabilities should be undertaken on a priority basis. In this context, the news of the co-option of investigating agencies from the United States and the United Kingdom in the Mumbai probe is indeed a welcome step. To enhance synergy of action in the field of counter-terrorism between India and other countries, Indian defence forces must devote greater focus to co-operation in sub-conventional areas.

As far as the United States is concerned, its defence forces (including the Marines and the Special Forces), after their Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, have built significant skills. Indian security forces should endeavour to utilise this American experience to enrich their own combat capabilities. India currently has a large number of bilateral defence co-operation events with United States. In the wake of Mumbai, an added thrust could be given to the following to learn from the American experience, expertise and technological lead:

Brainstorming Sessions. These could be held between the perspective planners and representatives of Special Forces who may also get embroiled in such challenging tasks. Lessons from this incident could be gainfully utilised for brainstorming the Course of Action followed and better options, if any , available, with American counterparts. Additionally, the preferred course of handling similar challenges in future could also be discussed.

Command Post Exercises. Armies of both countries could conduct command post exercises, wherein mechanics of exercising optimal command and control over multi-organisational agencies involved in an incident can be debated. There is also a need to share ideas and experiences on the establishment of suitable Command Centres in such situations.

Intelligence Sharing. Counter-terrorist operations warrant rapid dissemination and sharing of intelligence. This calls for a paradigm shift from ‘Need to Know’ principle to ‘Need to Share’ principle, since terrorists invariably plan, train and strike in different countries. The exact methodology of intelligence sharing also needs to be crystallised. Though there are a number of joint working groups currently in place in this domain, there is however a need to make them more meaningful and shed the misconstrued image of symbolism alone. Therefore, sharing of quality intelligence, even in the mutually decided ‘Classified’ fields, may also have to be resorted to.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain. With trends of terrorist activities shifting to high value targets in urban areas, there is a need to share views on the conduct of such operations (especially operating in small teams), and the identification of ‘Friend or Foe’ to obviate fratricide occurrences. It is important that tactics, techniques, procedures and best practices available with American forces, as well as doctrinal innovations, where relevant, should be imbibed by Indian defence forces.

Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons. Many operational tasks in urban areas may necessitate the use of non-lethal weapons especially when there is risk to lives of own citizens with whom the terrorists may have mixed together. Non-lethal weapons may reduce non-combatant fatalities and collateral damage. The US Marine Corps Pacific conducts periodic Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Seminars, which, in addition to paramilitary personnel, should also be regularly attended by Indian Army representatives.

Technology Upgrade. It is prudent that India constantly upgrades the equipment profile, including night observation devices, of its forces likely to be tasked with counter-terrorist operations so that terrorists can are denied any technological advantage.

Miscellaneous Activities. Some of the other areas where India must undertake meaningful programmes are in the fields of amphibious warfare, counter ‘improvised explosive devices’ measures, management of casualties in case of terrorist strikes, simulated exercises for assessing own response and identifying weaknesses.

Considering the international dimension of threats posed by terrorists, both India and the United States would benefit by sharing their counter-terrorism expertise and increasing joint activities to address regional and global terrorist threats.

Investigations into the attacks in Mumbai and subsequent developments point to the role of the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as the key player that orchestrated the well coordinated attacks. The lone arrested terrorist is a Pakistani national and he has provided minute details of the events leading up to the attacks. Indian claims about elements within Pakistan being responsible for the attack have also been endorsed by the United States. The Pakistani link to terrorist attacks around the world and the tolerance the country shows towards terrorist groups within its territory is becoming a phenomenon far less tolerable to the civilised world.

The arrested terrorist, Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman alias Kasab, told investigators that the group of ten LeT terrorists who participated in the attack operated without any local help or assistance from ‘home-grown terrorists’. This group of LeT terrorists trained for a year and half in at least four camps in Pakistan and on one occasion met with the LeT leader Mohammad Hafeez Saeed. American intelligence analysts suspect that former officers of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and of the Pakistan Army also helped train the Mumbai attackers. It has also been found out that another Lashkar leader, Yusuf Muzammil, whom Kasab named as the plot’s organizer, fielded phone calls in Lahore from the attackers during the siege in Mumbai. In addition are telephone intercepts, the journey details of the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai, and several other details.

It is natural that in the view of such damning evidence as well as given the long history of Pakistan’s covert wars in India’s territory, India seeks Pakistan’s accountability and action against terrorist elements operating from within its own territory. The existing India-Pakistan joint anti-terror mechanism also puts the onus on Pakistan to cooperate and act against these elements, especially given that its nationals have been found involved in this terrorist attack. So far, however, such expectations have been belied.

Pakistan back-pedalled on India’s request to send the ISI chief, after initially agreeing to it. The civilian government is believed to have come under pressure from the Army and the ISI, which continue to be the most influential power centres in Pakistan. There are also obvious attempts to play to the gallery which is dominated by the jihadis for whom India and the United States are among the greatest enemies of Islam.

While the civilian government’s predicament can still be understood and its reaction expected, what has defied logic is its outright rejection of the pile of emerging evidence against people whom President Zardari described as “stateless actors”. Zardari rejected that the arrested terrorist is a Pakistani. This is at best a poor attempt at seeking a clean chit for a country which is said to be involved in every terror attack that has taken place around the world in the post 9/11 period.

Pakistan continues to maintain that it is a victim of terrorism just like India, forgetting to realise that its beleaguered condition is primarily a result of its own policy of creating these jihadi monsters and subsequently losing the capacity to control them. Moreover, there is a clear distinction between the terrorist attacks within Pakistan, which are led mostly by the al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban that are annoyed with the country’s alliance with the United States, and the terrorist targeting of India by jihadi outfits like the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. The latter continue to enjoy patronage of the Pakistan Army and the ISI and their operations have never been disrupted either during Pervez Musharraf’s reign or under the present civilian government. The LeT’s reincarnation Jama’at-ud-Dawa is no less a lethal terrorist formation in spite of its professed engagement in welfare activities. These outfits remain the tactical arm of Pakistan’s India policy and at no point of time have they ever targeted the Pakistani establishment.

The Pakistan government has rejected India’s demands to deport a host of terrorist leaders, including underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad. Forgetting to restate its routine denial that Dawood Ibrahim, declared as a global terrorist by the US State Department, resides in its territory, the Pakistan government has argued that these persons, if found involved in the Mumbai attacks, would be tried according to Pakistani law. It needs mention here that the demand for their deportation to India is a long-standing one and Pakistan has not paid any heed to such requests in spite of the series of confidence building measures between the two countries. In addition, Pakistani strategists, speaking in the same tone as their government, point fingers at the supposed inability of Indian intelligence to prevent the attack on Mumbai. While whether intelligence preparedness could actually have prevented an attack of this nature is being fiercely debated in strategic circles, this in no way absolves Pakistan of its critical role in supporting these terrorists. Some analysts have also spoken about the possible supporting role that could have been played by the “alienated discriminated Indian Muslims” in the Mumbai attacks, ignoring the fact that terrorism in India is yet to crystallise around any central motivating ideology and is by no means uniquely Islamist.

Pakistan has also threatened to move its forces from its western borders with Afghanistan to its eastern border with India in the event of a military move by India. This as usual has set the US administration in a flurry because of the worry that this would dilute the American War on Terror on the ‘western borders’ of Pakistan. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Admiral Mullen’s visits are being seen as an exercise in conflict prevention between the two nuclear armed rivals. India needs to makes it clear to the US administration that its short sighted counter terrorism policies in South Asia have been counter productive in dealing with terror in Afghanistan and the implosion within Pakistan. It is time that India’s concerns are taken on board in framing American policy towards Pakistan, given that groups from safe havens in that country directly impinge upon India’s territorial integrity, cultural ethos and economic prosperity. India cannot be reactive to American policy towards Pakistan; it has to be proactive. Else, the endless cycle of terror will engulf the entire region.