Bodo militancy can be effectively resolved by accommodating the only surviving Bodo militant outfit within the existing self-governing territorial council that came into existence in 2003. In the mid-1980s, the Bodos of Assam under its influential student body, the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), which began a vigorous mass movement demanding a separate Bodoland state on the North of the Brahmaputra. The movement lasted for about a decade and resulted in the establishment of a territorially defined self governing council known as Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993. However, the BAC became non-functional due to several reasons leading to the revival of another statehood movement, which saw the emergence of a new brand of militancy spearheaded by the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). In 2001, the outfit gave up the demand for a separate state and reconciled to yet another self-governing council known as Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) constituted in 2003. Even the BTC fulfilled the aspirations of the Bodos only partially. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) opposed the BTC and continued with its agitation.

In 2005, the leaders of NDFB expressed their willingness to give up their core demand of a ‘sovereign Bodoland’, and to settle their grievances within the framework of the Constitution of India. Their demand now is for a separate Bodoland state, which is being supported by Hagrama Mahilary, chief of the BTC, who has noted that the BTC could be scrapped if the NDFB agreed to a separate state. Mahilary had also publicly noted earlier in 2007 that the Bodos must get a separate state within the next two decades.

NDFB, being the only surviving Bodo militant outfit, is attempting to consolidate popular support that was once enjoyed by its arch-rival BLT by raising the demand of a Bodoland state. There is also a feeling among a section of the Bodos that the NDFB might be able to secure a better deal for them. Moreover, the ongoing feud among Bodo political leaders in their bid to control Bodo politics has been a boon to NDFB. For instance, the Bodo People’s Progressive Front (BPPF), a Bodo political party formed in 2005 at the behest of ABSU and the then BLT, underwent a sudden split on the eve of the council elections held in 2005. Post-poll violence continued to rock the Bodo areas with the two rival BPPF camps engaged in violent clashes – attacking villages, torching houses and indulging in vandalism. The split has helped the NDFB to consolidate its position as the dominant group in Bodo politics.

However, the path for a separate Bodo state is ridden with obstacles. Non-Bodos, who constitute the majority in areas that the Bodos would like to be included in their scheme of a Bodoland state, oppose any move in this regard. They are already feeling marginalised following the formation of the BTC and accuse the government of succumbing to the gun culture of the Bodo militants. It is therefore essential that their aspirations are also taken into account. The Assam government also does not favour any division of the state because it may lead to similar demands from tribes such as the Dimasas and the Karbis. Moreover, the Bodo population does not inhabit a contiguous area and are spread over different districts of Assam. These were the major reasons why the government declined to offer a separate state in the two peace deals it had signed with the Bodos in 1993 and 2003.

The government cannot also sideline the BTC as it may lead to another phase of fratricidal clashes, given that most of the leaders of the BTC are former militants. At the same time, the NDFB cannot simply expect to get a better deal than the BTC. In the last five years of its existence, the BTC has been credited with a series of development activities across the four districts that constitute the BTC area of Assam. It is now the turn of the NDFB to respect the wishes of the people and cooperate in the affairs of the BTC. Although both camps may not like to share power at the moment, but in the overall interest of peace and development of the state in general and the Bodo areas in particular, the time has come for the two camps to sort out their differences and work together.

As the peace talks began to pick up, government negotiators too need to take extra measures. Inept handling of the situation could have grave consequences and may even lead to the revival of a full-fledged militancy and another phase of statehood movement.

Although the unfulfilled demand of a separate Bodoland state still looms large among the Bodos, the internal feud between the top leaders, Ranjan Daimary who heads the NDFB and Hagrama Mahilary who heads the BTC, is preventing agreement on a joint stand. The interest of the entire Bodo community makes it imperative that they sort out their differences. Mass-based social organisations like the Bodo Women Welfare Federation and Bodo Sahitya Sabha could play a mediating role in this regard. If these differences are resolved, it may not be difficult to ensure the participation of the NDFB in the next council elections due in 2010 and thus move towards ending the decades-old Bodo militancy.

On October 7, 2008, the PLA Daily reported that the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the four general departments of the Chinese military celebrated in great style the success of the Shenzhou-VII manned space flight mission. Shenzhou-VII, carrying three astronauts (Zhai Zhigang, Liu Boming, and Jing Haipeng) returned successfully on September 28 after conducting a historic spacewalk mission. This success made China the third country after the United States and Russia to conduct a space walk mission.

While the return of Shenzhou-VII impressed many about China’s competence and progress in space science and technology, doubts persist about its military implications. Inferences have been drawn about the possible military applications of China’s space programme, its advances in missile defence countermeasures, as well as in reconnaissance and surveillance. Further, speculation abounds in many Asian and Western countries whether the success of Shenzhou-VII signals Chinese military preparedness in the field of “space warfare”. A series of Chinese successes in space, ranging from the ASAT test to Change-I and the space walk mission have compelled many to review the course of China’s space plans. Indeed, given the Chinese military’s control over the country’s space programme, debate about ‘China as a space power’ both in civil and military terms are quite natural.

In the Chinese perspective, the Shenzhou-VII success implies two things. Politically, the space walk is a matter of national pride and imbued with “political symbolism”, given that it came in the wake of China’s impressive hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Technically, it signifies a concerted space plan. While the timing of the Shenzhou-VII mission was tied up with the country’s National day celebration on October 1, it followed the goals of “scientific development” advocated by President Hu Jintao. This approach is reflected in the Chinese White Paper titled China’s Space Activities in 2006, which states:

“The aims of China’s space activities are: to explore outer space… to meet the demands of economic construction, scientific and technological development, national security and social progress; and to raise the scientific quality of the Chinese people, protect China’s national interests and rights, and build up the comprehensive national strength.”

In political terms, the Shenzhou-VII mission is a great success for the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) as well, which will be celebrating the 60th anniversary of its ascent to power in 2009. If the party is to preserve its legitimacy at a time of increasing tide of democracy and the fading of communist ideology in China, then a grand project like Shenzhou-VII may certainly be seen as providing a unifying cause. The party needs public acclaim that is attendant to such a prestigious project. Rightly, the party also celebrated this success.

Terming it as a “great pride”, many Chinese experts view Shenzhou-VII as a preliminary exercise which holds the key to China’s future aim of building an orbiting station. State media in China reported the success of Shenzhou-VII as the “most critical step” in China’s “three-step” space programme: (a) sending a human into orbit, (b) docking spacecraft together while forming a small laboratory, and (c) building a large space station. Aerospace experts contend that the success of the first of these phases is sure to fast-track the country’s development in science and technology. Officials have tended to promote and highlight these scientific developments from the civilian perspective, while at the same time downplaying the military dimensions.

Whatever perspective the Chinese may wish to portray, China’s concerted space efforts in recent times has come under intense scrutiny especially after the January 2007 ASAT test which left a lasting global impact. This has to be seen in the context of the fact that civilian technological advances could easily be put to military use, particularly at a time when space power has become a pre-condition to leveraging air power in modern warfare. In fact, China’s military-centric space programme has been in news since January 2000 when it launched its first military communications satellite as part of the PLA combat-and-control network. Since then, its space efforts have been linked with its military modernisation programme. In this regard, China’s 2006 Defence White Paper suggests that “…scientific and technological projects, such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out…combining military and civilian needs and to bring about overall improvements in defense-related science and technology.”

To execute these proposed plans, the 11th five-year national plan released on May 10, 2007 sets a platform for achieving some of these hidden military objectives through advances in space technology. For instance, China aims to make a bigger stride in the aerospace industry, and particularly new generation carrier rockets research programme is a highlight of this plan. However, the drive is to develop “dual-use technologies” rather relying purely on military technologies, thus simultaneously achieving economic development and military modernisation. In this context, China’s mega-space plan is reflected in its ever-growing defence spending, which, even according to official statistics, has risen by around 15 percent every year since 1990.

Given the lack of transparency in China’s actual defence budget, it is difficult to approximate the exact figure of its investment in space. But the current five-year plan has made a special allocation for the fields of high-technology, ‘IT solutions’ and space research. It has also highlighted the importance of “non-governmental investment in the space sector.” Following this, the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence had proposed steps like manned space flight and lunar exploration along with other major initiatives like a lunar orbiting mission to acquire three-dimensional pictures, hard-X ray modulation telescope, research on a solar telescope, etc. Economists estimate that China has already created business opportunities worth 120 billion yuan (US $18 billion) from its space technology applications. It seems that for economic conditions to remain robust, space expenditure, whether for military or civil purposes, remains an important factor in China’s space policy. In fact, the Chief designer of the Shenzhou-VII spacecraft has noted that “China’s space exploration started late and the pace/scale of its future space plan [is] in line with country’s economic capacity vis-à-vis science & technology.”

China aims to set up a space station in 2020 and a “simple” space laboratory by 2011. On October 11, Xinhua reported that the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) plans to launch the first satellite of the Fengyun-4 (FY-4) series, the second generation meteorological satellites. It is also reported that the Shenzhou VIII & Shenzhou IX missions will be unmanned to test docking technology. The totality of these initiatives centres on the theme of industrializing space technology and developing future space research. Experts feel that these plans reveal a Chinese desire to establish supremacy in space technology and the strategic goal of preparing for possible future space warfare. It is feared that the planned space station would serve as a repair base for Chinese military satellites.

The achievement of Shenzhou-VII is a reminder of China’s growing confidence and capabilities in space. Though China’s space effort started with the establishment of the Missile and Rocket Research Institute in 1956, the ‘manned space’ effort began in the early 1990s. After almost a decade and a half, the Chinese endeavour is to become ‘self-reliant’ and drive space research activities independently. China’s long-term objectives are to establish a strategic balance with countries like United States and Russia, and to break their monopoly in the utilisation of space. The success of the Shenzhou project is a significant milestone in this regard.

No other recent visit to India has been so eagerly awaited as that of Pushpa Kumar Dahal, alias Prachanda, the Maoist revolutionary turned democrat and Prime Minister of ‘New Nepal’. His party received a thumping mandate from the electorate in the last elections and but for the fact that 50 per cent of the seats were to be filled up by proportional representation, it could have easily crossed the half way mark in the constituent assembly. Thus, under the existing electoral procedure, the Maoists were forced to bank on other political parties to form a government. The process took almost four months after the elections and the Maoists had to join ranks with the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist), Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and a few other minor political parties, that too after threatening to sit in opposition in the wake of the defeats inflicted by a conglomeration of opposition parties on Maoist candidates in the contests for the posts of President, Vice President and Speaker of the Constituent Assembly.

Ever since the establishment of the new government, there has been a vicious anti-India propaganda going on in the Nepalese media. Royalists, licking their wounds since the peaceful expulsion of King Gyanendra from Narayanhati Palace, started an anti-India campaign to put pressure on the new government. This propaganda that India was guiding the policies of the new Nepalese government received a fillip when President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav, a madhesi from the Nepali Congress, declined to visit Beijing for the inaugural ceremony of the Olympics, after having accepted the invitation initially. Anti-India sentiments received a further boost when Vice President Justice Parmanand Jha, a madhesi from MJF, took his oath of office in Hindi, a language which the madhesis have been propagating as their link language for inclusion as one of the official languages of ‘New Nepal’. This inflamed the ‘Kathmandu elite’, which perceived it as Indianisation of Nepal. The bursting of the barrage on River Kosi in Nepal and the consequent inundation further aggravated anti-India feelings.

In order to assuage the anti-India forces and to give an impression that the government is not bowing to Indian pressure, Prachanda visited Beijing for the closing ceremony of the Olympics, a significant departure from the past when all Nepalese politicians visited New Delhi on their first overseas trip after assuming office. The China card has often been used by anti-India forces, but the geographical realities have brought in the realisation that China can never be a substitute for India as far as Nepal is concerned. In the initial days of the Maoist agitation, China had strongly supported the monarchy and had criticised the Maoists for tainting Mao’s name. However, after the success of the popular movement against the monarchy, the Chinese started establishing links with the Maoists and after the elections have managed to win the goodwill of the Maoist leadership in Nepal. An increased Chinese presence in Nepal poses a long-term threat to India and its interests in Nepal.

It was against the backdrop of rising anti-India demonstrations in Kathmandu and castigation of the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade and Transit signed in 1950 as unfairly biased in favour of India, that Prachanda undertook his visit to New Delhi. The anti-India lobby in Nepal has been agitating for the revision of the 1950 treaty and has been apportioning blame on the damaged barrage on Kosi built by India for the loss of life and property in Nepal. They also find fault with various hydro-electric projects negotiated by India with Nepal. On the other hand, in India, feudalistic elements within the establishment, which had hitherto been close to the monarchy, were projecting the Maoists as demons who were ready to paint the while of South Asia red. However, the visit cleared the pall of uncertainty and all of Prachanda’s statements in India were conciliatory. He talked of shared cultural traditions, complementarities of geography and economy and the need for bilateral cooperation based on fundamental principles of International Relations, mutual trust and benefit.

During the visit, he also talked about water resources and Nepal’s potential for generating thousands of megawatts of hydro-power. He announced a target of producing 10,000 MW of hydropower within the next ten years, the bulk of which may be exported to India, as the Indian power deficit is expected to rise to 20,000 MW by then. He also talked of the Kosi tragedy and stressed on the need to look for short term and long term solutions to the problems of floods and inundation and emphasised the need to work together in the field of flood control, to create structures that do not cause inundation or catastrophe on either side of the Indo-Nepalese border.

Prachanda highlighted that Nepal has a unique economic opportunity as it finds itself between the two fastest growing economies of the world. He also thanked India for its enormous support for the socio-economic development of Nepal and expected the relationship between India and Nepal to grow over the years based on the interests of the two people. The joint statement issued during the visit agreed to review the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty and to tackle common problems like floods and border crimes jointly.

The visit naturally generated a lot of euphoria about the future of a ‘New Nepal’ but an interaction with the representatives of various political parties accompanying the Prime Minister indicated that there were still serious differences amongst various political parties including those that are part of the government. Most of these differences related to the creation of a federal Nepal. Madhesi political parties are still insisting on a single province in the entire Terai region, whereas the Maoists are willing to grant federalism but want the Terai to be split into at least three separate provinces. Then there are parties like the Rashtriya Janadhikar Party, which are opposed to the concept of federalism itself and recently exhibited their strength by a successful strike in Kathmandu on this issue. It appears that the Madhesi parties are willing to climb down from their demand of a single Madhes province and may accept the Maoist proposal, but the issue that could really divide the polity is the issue of language. Madhesis want Hindi to be recognised as one of the official languages of Nepal, since according to them more people understand Hindi than Nepali in Nepal. Even the Nepali Congress accepts this demand based on the rationale that if Nepali can be one of the official languages of India, why cannot Hindi be an official language of Nepal? However, the Maoists view Hindi as a foreign language and are ready to consider official language status for Maithili, Avadhi or Bhojpuri, which are dialects of Hindi, but not Hindi. This is a problem that will definitely bog down the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly at some stage.

However, there are other pressing problems facing ‘New Nepal’, the security sector reforms being the most significant among these. The non-Maoist political parties had agreed to the amalgamation of the Maoist militia with the Nepalese Army, but now want the militia to shed its Maoist ideology before being inducted into the Army and the induction to be restricted only to a small percentage. On top of this, most political parties including the Maoists agree that Nepal needs to prune down its army given that the country cannot afford such a large standing army. A senior Maoist leader who came to New Delhi indicated that all the members of the Maoist Armed militia, who are qualified, will be inducted in the Army, which will subsequently be pruned down gradually. On the question of recruitment of Gorkhas into the Indian Army, he said that it was an anachronism and needed to be stopped but it is not going to be stopped in the near future.

The other problem facing the government is representation of Madhesis in various organs of the state. Presently, they are conspicuous by their absence in the Army, and their presence in bureaucracy is also miniscule. However, the new government has ‘in principle’ agreed to the induction of Madhesis in the Army and will have to do a fine balancing act to induct them while pruning the overall strength of the Army. Industrialists have been assured by the Maoists that their industries do not face imminent nationalisation, and during his visit Prachanda sought investment in Nepal both from the government as well as the private sector in India.

Nepal is on the threshold of history and in the process of writing a new constitution. It has come out of a deep morass and if it succeeds in tiding over its problems, it could provide a role model for many conflict-ridden states. During his visit to India, Prime Minister Prachanda exhibited statesmanship and a penchant for taking all sections of society together. The international community has generally welcomed the changes in Nepal and its peaceful transition to a federal republic. The initial actions of the government are indicative of consensual politics and quest for economic growth. However, former royalists and anti-India lobbyists have tried to paint the Prime Minister’s successful visit to India as a sell out, despite Prachanda’s success in getting a commitment from India for the revision of 1950 Treaty as well as US$ 5 million for flood victims in Nepal. But the masses have not really bought their propaganda and have been supportive of the government. It appears that the visit has removed mutual suspicions and could usher in a new phase of bilateral relations, with potential for a mutually beneficial relationship.

On September 13, five serial bombs shattered the weekend peace across several popular market complexes in New Delhi, killing 30 innocent civilians and injuring nearly 90. An elusive outfit calling itself “Indian Mujahideen” (IM) claimed responsibility for the bombings via an email sent to national media houses 10 minutes after the first blast at Karol Bagh. In that email, titled “The Message of Death”, the IM asserted that the reasons for the Delhi blasts included: the atrocities against innocent Muslims by the Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS) after the Ahmedabad bombings, the Amarnath land dispute in Jammu and Kashmir, the killings of Christians in Orissa, the arrests of Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) activists on suspicion of alleged terror activities, the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the Gujarat riots. This group had also claimed responsibility for the Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad bombings of May 13, July 25 and July 26, respectively. On closer scrutiny, the stated reasons for the Delhi blasts by the IM, however, appear to be a well rehearsed rhetorical posturing for a target audience that includes not only its social base and funders in India but also possible sponsors abroad. This explains the recurring acts of terror by a hitherto unknown outfit, which is seeking to establish its credibility as an effective actor. That is why in the email sent after the Ahmedabad bombings, the IM categorically demanded of the Lashker-e-Taiyabba (LeT) not to claim responsibility for the blast for it would have minimised its own impact as an emerging India-based terror outfit.

The subtext of the Delhi blasts also reveals that the main objective of the IM was perhaps to create social panic by using low intensity bombs across the geographical spread of Delhi: Ghaffar market, Karol Bagh in West Delhi, M-block market-Greater Kailash-I in South Delhi, and Connaught Place (CP) in Central Delhi. This is surely an act of “costly signalling” to showcase to Indian society and the outfit’s own recruits its prowess at social control in the capital of India. Its email refers to this perspective of the outfit, “it’s your own capital—Delhi --with nine most powerful serial bomb blasts -- that are almost going to stop the heart of India from beating.” The bombings were also meant to indicate the inability of the security agencies to thwart such terrorist activities. The email again states “Indian Mujahideen strikes back once more… Do whatever you can. Stop us if you can.” Such language is hardly surprising coming from a terror outfit, but what is perhaps alarming is its ability to carry out repeated attacks. This raises the vital question of how could such terror outfits be deterred from engaging in violent activities with such frequency across cities in India?

The post-facto evidence weaved together by the police after the Delhi blasts indicate that these terror attacks could have been averted had the police acted on intelligence inputs already available prior. Indeed, the Gujarat police was in possession of intelligence on plausible target areas after it arrested an IM cadre Abul Bashar Qasmi after the Ahmedabad blasts of July 26. In fact, it was Qasmi who helped the police in locating the L-18 Batla House address on the night of September 18 where the IM cadres responsible for the Delhi blasts were staying. Qasmi also told the police that the three IM cadres, Mohammad Bashir, Mohammad Fakruddin and Saif Ahmad met three times in August to plan the Delhi blasts after Bashir’s return from Ahmedabad to Delhi on July 26 afternoon. This is damning evidence about police complacency. In fact, intelligence about IM terror activities goes as far back as 2006 after the Hyderabad serial blasts when the then arrested militant, Mohtasin Billa, provided evidence to the police on Qasmi’s involvement in terror activities. Had the police acted on that intelligence promptly, perhaps the chain of terror engineered by Qasmi and his fellow militants in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi could have been averted. And as stated earlier, it was Qasmi’s co-operation that enabled the encounter between a Delhi police team led by Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma and the IM militants on September 19. Inspector Sharma died after he was shot by the militants. IM militants Muhammad Bashir (leader of the IM unit responsible for the Delhi blasts) and Muhammad Fakruddin were killed in the encounter. All this could have been avoided if action had been taken in August and early September.

Averting terror activities requires a dedicated, adequately staffed, well-coordinated and motivated police force. Perhaps, the inability of the police to act on available intelligence could be attributed to the fact that half the police force in any given city in India is utilised for providing security to VIPs and another significant proportion is involved in administrative duties. In Delhi, for instance, there is a huge shortage of police staff even for purely law and order duties, since half the 65,000 personnel are engaged in for VIP security. Moreover, for a population of 1.5 crores in Delhi, there are only 130 police stations, which is highly inadequate. What further affects the effectiveness of the police force is that sub-inspectors and constables are over-stretched and do not have time to attend refresher courses to update their skills in terms of proficiency in the latest technology or concepts in counter terrorism.

Installing Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV), which provide images on suspicious activities in crowded areas, is a good idea as most terror outfits carry out reconnaissance of a likely target area before the actual attack. Significantly, the IM also carried out reconnaissance on September 11 in its target areas in Delhi. This should have been caught on camera and assessed in areas like M-Block market, Ghaffar Market, and CP which had CCTVs functioning on September 13 and before. Yet not much advantage could be taken of this available technology as vital HUMINT abilities required to assess pictorial data were either lacking or the police forces were lethargic. What is worse is that the bomb that went off near the Prince Pan Shop in M-Block market was placed just below the CCTV at an angle of 25 degrees. The CCTV camera at M-Block market could only capture images at an 80 degrees angle range, whereas higher quality CCTVs are capable of capturing images at angles as low as 5 to 10 degrees range in vertical viewing and 6 to 11 degrees range in horizontal viewing depending on the lens type. This further substantiates the fact that the IM unit had carried out an extensive survey of the area and was also aware of the type of CCTV installed there. Significantly, CCTVs captured the image of the auto-rickshaw in which the suspected IM militant, who planted the bomb at Ghaffar market, travelled from Paharganj area to Karol Bagh.

The use of cyber space by the IM is another area of concern. The emails after the Ahmedabad and Delhi attacks were sent through hacked wi-fi connections in Mumbai. Incidentally, the IM’s top leader Mohammad Subhan Qureshi is a highly trained computer specialist and is behind the email manifestos of the IM sent to media houses attached with the latest version of PDF 9 Pro Extended files. 9 Pro Extended is mostly utilised by business and technical professionals and includes features like unifying the widest range of content in a PDF portfolio, creating interactive presentations with Adobe presenter software, and converting virtually any 2D and 3D designs to PDF. This version also helps protect sensitive information, which means that the author alone can tinker with matter existing on the file. To deter this, law enforcement agencies would require expertise in cyber technology if they are to keep pace with the terror outfits’ adeptness in using technology.

Finally, terror acts can be deterred with better implementation of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act instead of enacting newer anti-terror legislations and the attendant risk of human rights violations. The need of the hour is to also think in terms of a well-coordinated anti-terror force at the national level, perhaps something similar to the National Security Guards since the terrorists are well coordinated and spread out across the country in small cellular units. Terror prevention by security forces is, however, not enough. Civil society organisations especially representing the minority communities also need to be tapped into in order to assuage the insecurities felt by these communities. The example of Azamgarh in UP is a case in point. The two IM cadres killed on September 19 and the one arrested belong to Azamgarh. Raids by security forces in Azamgarh thereafter have resulted in a tense situation in the area. This is where local minority leaders and organisations could be utilised to explain to local people the underlying reasons for the raids and how they could co-operate without feeling victimised. The media also needs to be more objective in news reporting and refrain from jumping to conclusions about who is a terrorist unless guilt is proved in a court of law. It is in the interest of India’s national security that terror prevention mechanisms are strengthened and that the nation is not held hostage to the kind of serial bombings that have been witnessed in the past few months.