LTTE Political Head P. Nadesan’s recent call to Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi to “turn into a supporter of LTTE struggle” in an interview to ‘Kumudam,’ a Tamil weekly, is an example of the outfit’s efforts to woo Tamil Nadu and Karunanidhi in particular. It also underscores the importance of Tamil Nadu for the LTTE at a time of its most pressing crisis. Of late, the Tigers seem to have increased their dependence on, and activities in, Tamil Nadu, which they consider to be a rear base. Though the LTTE have supporters within Tamil Nadu’s political sphere, by wooing the DMK chief and Chief Minister Karunanidhi they hope to put pressure on the Indian government to alter its present pro-Rajapaksa approach. However, two key questions remain. Will the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister take up the Sri Lankan Tamil cause and exert pressure on the Centre to alter its present Sri Lanka policy? And, is Tamil Nadu a rear base for the LTTE?

The LTTE have reached a critical stage in their history, with the military situation looking graver than ever before. Sri Lankan forces have pinned them down to Mullaitivu and Killinochchi in the North and are threatening their very survival. The LTTE are at best trying to prevent a further loss of strength and military hardware. Consequently, as a tactical move, they have begun to show keenness in attracting the attention of India and that of Tamil Nadu in particular to earn respite from their present acute difficulties. Hence, the appeal to Karunanidhi—considered a leader of world Tamils—to come forward to assist them “in their struggle to establish a Tamil Eelam state.”

The appeal seems to be a conscious effort to reach out to Karunanidhi in particular and Tamil Nadu political leaders in general and win back their sympathy and support. Incidentally, it was not so long ago that Velupillai Prabhakaran made it a point in his November 27, 2007 `Heroes Day' address to express `gratitude' to the leaders and people of Tamil Nadu for their `support' to the cause of Tamil Eelam and requested them to continue their support and help the LTTE in the `freedom struggle'. The former leader of the political wing S.P. Tamilselvan too paid his gratitude to Karunanidhi for expressing grief over the demise of Anton Balasingham – the outfit's former ideologue and chief negotiator.

The LTTE’s pressing desire to re-establish links with Tamil Nadu and to cultivate the DMK chief is geared towards ensuring their immediate survival, rather than a reflection of the hidden agenda of creating a pan-Tamil Eelam. What they are looking for right now are essential items, military supplies, medical facilities and safe houses in Tamil Nadu.

Notably, while MDMK chief V. Gopalswamy, PMK head Ramadass and Dalit Panthers of India’s Thirumavalavan are hailed as selfless contributors to the Tamil Eelam cause, Karunanidhi is admired at this point of time because, unlike others, he is firmly entrenched in the seat of power both in Tamil Nadu and at the Centre. Moreover, the LTTE has no option but to warm up to the DMK chief even though he is viewed as being opportunistic—supporting the Tamil cause when needed and being non-committal otherwise—by the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tigers. Though the sudden increase in arrests of LTTE cadres and supporters in Tamil Nadu in recent weeks is a perturbing factor for the Tigers, they are making concerted efforts to reach out to Tamil Nadu.

In the absence of major casualties among Tamils in Sri Lanka as a result of the Sri Lankan military offensive, the Tigers could potentially seize upon the influx of Tamil refugees and the fishermen issue to advance their objective. In fact, the LTTE is trying hard, albeit unsuccessfully, to achieve a shift in the political and public opinion in Tamil Nadu against the Sri Lankan Government by firing on Indian fisherman and transferring the blame on to the Sri Lankan Navy. At the same time, the case filed in the Chennai High Court by AIADMK chief Jayalalitha demanding that the Government of India retrieve Kachchativu could serve as a boon for the Tigers since the issue can create tensions between India and Sri Lanka. Any strain in India’s relations with Sri Lanka will be favourable for the Tigers. While popular support for the AIADMK’s effort may not have shored up appreciably, the Tigers think that the issue has the potential to push the Tamil Nadu government into taking a more hard line approach on Kachchativu given the prevailing competitive politics between the two Dravidian parties. Nevertheless, the LTTE’s first preference is to woo Karunanidhi and by extension the central government in New Delhi. This seems to be the present goal of the LTTE.

However, the DMK government does not seem to be very enthusiastic in taking up the Sri Lankan Tamil cause at present given the political situation in the State and the forthcoming parliamentary election. Moreover, though the DMK government is sympathetic and concerned about the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the party’s past history on the issue and the compulsions of coalition politics have considerably influenced the Karunanidhi government to adopt a low profile on the Sri Lankan issue. Equally owing to the above reasons the Tamil Nadu government had been very stern with the LTTE and their supporters in the state, as they do not wish to provide an opportunity to opposition parties in the State to take on the government when Congress is at the helm in the Centre.

But is the LTTE in a mood to abandon its efforts to win support from Tamil Nadu in the days to come? The stakes are high for the Tigers, with the Sri Lankan forces steadily moving into their stronghold. They may well be able to galvanise Tamil Nadu on the fishermen issue and utilize the space thus gained for regaining their eroding strength. The Tigers are well aware of the dynamics of Tamil Nadu politics and the compulsions that the Dravidian parties face on the Sri Lankan issue since Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. However, the series of debacles on the war front has compelled them to turn towards Tamil Nadu despite strict vigilance and the apprehension of their supporters. In fact, it seems that the Tigers are well aware of the critical importance of support from Tamil Nadu than ever before. Thus, the Tigers will continue to woo Tamil Nadu and Chief Minister Karunanidhi in the coming days.

Similarly, the Tigers’ ingress into Tamil Nadu and their activities like smuggling are unlikely to reduce in the near future. In fact, the LTTE appears to be willing to take risks in increasing its activities in Tamil Nadu. It has been reported that out of ten LTTE cadres who sneak into the State five or six go unnoticed because of several factors. First, the LTTE is aware of the lacuna that the Indian security agencies have in surveillance along the Palk Strait in detecting the intrusion of Tigers in the guise of fisherman. Two, the LTTE wants to make use of local organised smuggling groups in Tamil Nadu who are eager to make money from this activity. Three, the shallow sea at Nagapattinam, Karaikal and Ramanathapuram facilitates safe embarkation and the evasion of the Coast Guard.

Tamil Nadu will thus continue to serve as a rear base for the LTTE till the organised smuggling groups and the support provided by fringe Tamil nationalist political groups in the state are dealt with. But this seems unlikely in the present context given the prevailing passive support for the LTTE’s struggle and the criminal-political nexus in the state.

Russian military operations in Georgia and the finalisation of agreement between the US and Poland on the stationing of missile interceptors in Poland are two developments that are likely to have far-reaching but adverse impact on Russia’s relations with the West.

Even Western analysts concede that the recent military conflict was provoked by the Georgian President’s misplaced military adventure on August 7 when Georgian forces pounded Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The Russian military entered Georgia with tanks and aircraft in a swift response. Nearly 2000 people died within a couple of days.

This is the first time since 1990 that Russia intervened militarily in a sovereign country to protect its interests. By giving a strong military riposte to Georgian provocations, Russia has sent clear signals to both the West as well as its own allies.

To the West it has conveyed that it will not take lying down the Western attempts to undermine Russia’s interests in its own backyard. To the countries of the former Soviet space, the Russian message is: Russia will protect its interests in the region of its influence come what may.

Russian-Georgian relations have been strained for some time over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two regions which have broken away from Georgia and want independence. Abkhazia has been demanding independence while South Ossetia wants to join Russia. Russia has issued Russian passports to the 80,000 inhabitants of South Ossetia. Russian peacekeepers, nominally under the CIS umbrella, have been present in both regions since 1991.

Russia has many grievances vis-à-vis the West. In 2004, Georgia saw regime change which brought a pro-US government to power. NATO’s recent offer to Georgia of the alliance’s membership at some future date has annoyed Russia no end. The Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence earlier this year also upset Russia deeply. The West has refused to take heed of Russia’s concerns.

The US has supported Georgia all these years. This created an impression in Georgia that it enjoys US protection. But, during the crisis, the US exercised restraint not to get involved militarily in the conflict. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Tbilisi on August 15, 2008 and met Georgian President Saakashvili. The US sent humanitarian aid to Georgia. President Bush has made several statements of support for Georgia. Defence Secretary Robert Gates has hinted at a complete rethink on US relations with Russia.

Russia’s military campaign in Georgia has stunned the CIS. CIS, currently headed by Kyrgyzstan, has not been able to come up with a substantive statement. Russia expects full support from the CIS which has not been forthcoming.

US-Russian relations have been made worse by the US-Poland agreement to station 10 US missile interceptors in Poland in the next 18 months. The agreement between the US and the Czech Republic on the stationing of early warning radar is likely to be concluded next. The US has rejected Russia’s various proposals for collaboration in missile defence in lieu of the installation of BMD components in Europe. The disagreement between the two countries will further increase tensions.

Russia has long been opposed to NATO’s eastward expansion but has not been able to do anything about it. NATO’s invitation to Ukraine to join NATO has caused deep resentment in Russia. NATO has decided to extend full support to Georgia. It is planning to set up a NATO-Georgia Commission to speed up Georgia’s eventual membership of NATO.

President Medvedev has proposed to Europe a new security treaty which would integrate Russia with Europe and the US in an inclusive security framework. The West has been lukewarm to the Russian proposals.

Russia holds several levers vis-à-vis the West. Being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it can thwart the West’s agenda on Iran. Russia’s cooperation with the West on non-proliferation, terrorism and the Middle East will also be affected. The most important of Russia’s cards is the energy card. Europe imports about 40 per cent of its energy requirements from Russia. It will need access to Russian energy resources. Further, Russia is also active in denying to Europe the energy resources in Central Asia through the Nabbuco pipeline which would bypass Russia. Russia has close economic ties with Central Asian countries. This can be used as an instrument of pressure. Central Asian countries are wary of the Western agenda of democracy promotion. So they cannot afford to anger Russia. Yet, they will be worried about Russia’s willingness to use force to defend its interest.

The West cannot ignore Russia’s resurgence any more. Russia continues to possess nuclear weapons. It is also engaged in an ambitious programme of military modernization. It is one of the top exporters of arms in the world. This gives Russia considerable leverage over its relations with the West. The resumption of patrols by long range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons and the modernization of nuclear capable missiles is also a factor in Russia-Western relations.

Russia has some weaknesses too. It needs Western investments and trade for economic well being. Despite impressive economic growth, Russia has not been able to overcome the problem of poverty. Regional imbalances remain worrisome. Demographic imbalance is also a matter of worry. Russia aspires to be a member of WTO but has not been able to become one because of objections by the West. The Georgian imbroglio will raise apprehensions within the CIS about Russia’s intentions. Russian policies will be constrained by these factors.

Russia is sensitive to its international image. It is particularly proud of its membership of G-8. There are suggestions in the West that Russia should be expelled from G-8. NATO is also considering whether it should continue with NATO-Russia Council forum set up in 2002. It has said, following the Georgian crisis, that it cannot continue to do “business as usual” with Russia.

While both sides have downplayed the talk of return to the “cold war”, the fact remains that the Georgian conflict marks a new low in Russia’s relations with the West. Both sides would need to show exemplary foresight and restraint to prevent further deterioration in their relations. To begin with, the West needs to show sensitivity to Russia’s genuine security concerns and integrate Russia into an inclusive security architecture. Russia, on its part, will need to reassure countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia of its peaceful intentions.

China would be watching the evolving situation with great attention. It might exploit Russian discomfort to improve its own standing in the CIS space. The SCO summit meeting on August 28 in Dushanbe might clarify the SCO’s stand.

The growing tensions between Russia and the West do not augur well for international peace. India has strategic partnerships with Russia, the EU as well as with the US. It has abiding interests in the CIS. It is also an observer at the SCO. While India is not directly affected by the developments in the Caucasus, it will nevertheless need to carefully analyse the implications of the recent developments for its own foreign policy and security.

The above question arises in the context of publicly known government plans of arms procurement amounting to over $64 billion1 as part of the modernisation programme of the armed forces. The majority of these acquisitions will obviously be from abroad and will be concluded in the next five years or more. This was why the recent Indian DEFEXPO was a mega event for major international defence companies. At the same time, the quantum of India’s defence exports has all along been negligible;2 much less than that of Israel, South Korea or even of Singapore3, though some of their exports could be technically called ‘trading’. What then has been the problem with India’s defence industry policy, assuming there is such a policy?

Defence industrial policy in the initial years after independence was guided by the simple phrase called ‘self sufficiency’. This was subsequently modified to ‘self reliance’ in defence production and has become a matter of varied interpretation. While for some it means the ultimate objective of complete non-dependence on imports for defence hardware, for others it means selective self-sufficiency in certain critical technologies. And for some others it is a simple reduction in the ratio of imports to indigenous sources of supply to the armed forces.

However, one can say that India’s defence industrial policy broadly consists of three components: (i) maximisation of indigenous manufacturing and production (ii) License production of what could be obtained from abroad and (iii) direct purchase of those equipment not covered by the other two categories but considered essential for ensuring security. Another important unspoken element was that everything, whether indigenous production, license production or direct purchase, was done within the government set-up in line with the general industrial policy. The recent policy change, of course, demonstrates the intention to involve the private sector in defence R&D and production through licensing and the indirect opening of the defence industrial sector to foreign companies through equity participation and the offset arrangement.

The moot question is: was there something wrong with the past policy objectives? On the face of it, the policy components and objectives appear quite sound and logical for a country like India. In simple terms, it means that indigenous production should be maximised; what could not be produced indigenously should be produced under license arrangement; and those that could not be obtained through these two routes should be acquired by direct purchase. A sound policy indeed. But the soundness of a policy has to be judged from tangible outcomes. Arguably, the problems might not have been in the contents of the policy per se. It is due to the nature defence technology and limitations of vision as embedded in the policy.

The policy objective was essentially to substitute imported equipment with indigenous production in the hope of attaining ‘self-sufficiency’ or ‘self reliance’. Unfortunately, the security imperatives of a country translated into defence equipment are like ‘moving targets’. Neither the technological capability of the defence sector nor its policy instrument as highlighted above was able to catch up with the targets. The increasing quantum of defence imports from year to year, the country’s inability to upgrade the imported equipment held for significant period under license production, and, indirectly, insignificant defence exports amply testify to this situation. The general industrial policy wherein defence items and their productions were kept strictly within the government set-up further compounded the problem. In this context, two aspects of the policy – indigenous production and license production, merit detailed analysis.

Maximising indigenous production would imply more than one thing. It would mean meeting the quantitative requirements in terms of the existing demands of the armed forces for equipment or items at any point of time. It would also mean increasing the varieties of items and equipment required by them. Most importantly, it would mean the ability to meet the challenges of supplying their ever-changing demands of technology specific equipment and items. India’s defence industrial policy has conspicuously failed in this respect. In fact, the implication of this policy is that the country should be able to indigenously produce the challenging demands made by the armed forces. Its logical extension is that defence research and development efforts have to be strengthened through policy focused research and development and adequate resources allocations thereto. It is a known fact that the defence research and development organisation has 50-odd laboratories and establishments. However, its lack of focused research and development is equally well known, though of late it has been able to achieve break-throughs in certain strategic technologies. Moreover, its budgetary allocation has been quite modest even within the overall defence budget4 and until recently it was part of ‘Army Demand’. In fact, the Parliamentary Standing committee on Defence recommended that defence R&D budgetary allocation should be at least 14 to 15 per cent of the total defence budget so that indigenous production to imports in the ratio of 70:30 could be achieved.5 This recommendation was in line with the projected target of the report of the self-reliance committee entitled ‘10 year plan for self reliance in Defence systems’.6 But the fact remains that there is no evidence of adequate policy back-up to attain this desirable but difficult goal. The DRDO does not seem to be suffering from lack of funds per se since only 8 to 10 per cent of its total budget is reported to be spent on fundamental research.7 Perhaps, the solution to this issue lies somewhere else.

How about production under license, another important pillar of the policy? The normal assumption is that production under license would enable the country not only to acquire the capability to produce a particular equipment or product but also help it gain the technical know-how for subsequent upgradation and further technological innovations. For the last fifty-odd years, India has been producing a number of defence equipment under license. Good examples in this regard are the Vijayanta tank and the MIG series of fighter aircraft. But this does not seem to have helped in the development of the Arjun Main Battle Tank and the Light Combat Aircraft. Moreover, India has not even been able to upgrade8 certain fighter aircraft held and operated for a long time by its armed forces. Thus, the above assumption is definitely not correct.

A closer examination of license production arrangements reveals certain interesting features. License production arrangements are more of an ‘institutional framework’ under which various types of contractual agreements could be entered into between the supplier and the buyer. It is not necessarily a proven mechanism of technology transfer as such. It may envisage the setting up of a simple production line or facilities in the buyer country for assembly of the finished parts and components for the final finished product. In such cases, hardly any technology transfer takes place and the supplier does not part with any technical know-how. In fact, the supplier agrees to sacrifice only a small portion of his economic interest. It is also not possible to discern under these circumstances whether the supplier has compensated itself for this marginal loss by way of increasing the cost of the technology or equipment and components thereof. On the other hand, there could be a situation where license production involves an intensive process of technology transfer within and beyond the physical production of the equipment in the host county. This is rare rather than routine. The truth of the matter is that since technology is know-how, it is the function of human understanding. The focus of active mechanisms, implicitly or explicitly, is people. However, the truth is that no foolproof prescription could be given for the effectiveness of technology transfer.9 It all depends on the nature of technology to be acquired. Perhaps, India has learnt it by the hard way the limitations of licence production for attaining the objective of self-sufficiency or self-reliance in defence production.

The fact that defence technology needs long term investment, its obsolescence is high and economies of scale are difficult to attain unlike in other areas of civilian technology are well known. This is essentially because higher capability tends to drive downward the scales of production. In the context of a limited number of customers, this trend is more regressive. On top of this, contrary to logical expectation, the production of the next generation of an equipment or of a different variant does not bring down the cost of the equipment. It has been the British experience that a new generation could cost between one and a half times to four times of the previous variant.10 This is due to the fact that production of the next generation is not a simple straight line trajectory work but involves the integration of various systems, which sometimes may involve a number of companies and agencies, that were not partners earlier.

This leads to the conclusion that the policy of maximising indigenous production without a strong R&D policy back-up would not bring tangible results. License production is more of an economic compromise between the supplier and the buyer, and it does not and cannot bring about significant technology transfer without an inbuilt specific and suitable mechanism. Every country at one point of time or the other will attain a saturation level when it comes to supplying certain categories of equipment for its armed forces. Therefore, the ultimate defence industrial policy goal must be to foster defence exports without which it is difficult to sustain the economic base of a country’s defence industry.

India’s defence industrial policy seems to be lacking in all these important ingredients. Since the industrial base has to be sustained for technological and economic reasons, exports are an essential element of defence industrial policy. This is why many countries and their companies are aggressively competing in the global defence market for exports under different arrangements including license production. It is reported that way back in 1995, the United States government spent more than $7.6 billion in subsidy to help export defence equipment to sustain the economic base of its defence industry. It is a matter of fact that strategic depth in defence production can be increased only by aiming at being ‘internationally competitive’ through the policy objective of defence exports. In the absence of such an approach, India’s defence industrial policy is unlikely to take off in the foreseeable future.

Notes

• 1. This amount is a rough estimate based on media reports. See, for example, Defence & Technology, March/April 2008, pp. 20-21.
• 2. As per SIPRI 2005, India’s total defence exports from 2001 to 2004 were $44 millions, against the total corresponding import of $8.526 billions.
• 3. From 2001 to 2004, the defence import and export figures in US Dollars for Israel were: imports 1675, Exports 1290; for S. Korea: imports 2755 and exports 313; and for Singapore: export 1441, exports 73.
• 4. It hovers around 5 to 6 percent of the total defence budget.
• 5. Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (2006-07), 14th Lok Sabha, p. 18.
• 6. ibid, p. 3.
• 7. Ibid, p. 17.
• 8. If the country has gained under license production, it is in the areas of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). The capability to upgrade is much more technology-intensive for which there is little achievement to be proud of. Upgradation lengthens the life of the equipment and increases its capability and reliability in changed circumstances.
• 9. Ronald D.McLaurin, “A case study of supply side,” in Kwang-II Back, Ronald D. MCLaurin and Cheng-in-Moon, ed., The Dilemma of Third World Defence Industries, CSS-Inha University, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 64-65.
• 10. British Hawk Mk 1 is reported to have cost one and a half times more than its earlier version Gnat MK1, and Harrier GR1 four times more than its earlier generation Hunter F6. Roger Hutton, “Technical Innovation in the U.K. Defence Sector,” in Ian Bellany and Tim Huxley, ed., New Conventional Weapons and Western Defence, Frank Cass, London, 1987, p .43.

Two co-ordinated strikes on July 25 and 26, 2008 in Bengaluru and Ahmedabad killed 54 people and injured nearly 200. In the next few days, 28 bombs including two car bombs were found in Surat, which possibly did not explode due to faulty mechanism. This set of incidents seems to mark a new terrorist tactic – the targeting of important cities to cause significant casualties. Serial blasts of this kind began in India with the October 2005 co-ordinated strikes in New Delhi. Since then, there have been 65 terrorist bombings in 15 different incidents killing about 536 civilians and injuring 1,368 in the Indian hinterland.

Both Surat and Bengaluru were in the news for terror developments only a month earlier. There was a low intensity blast at Honey Park in Surat on June 1, 2008. Investigators found shrapnel at the spot and devices similar to the one used in the Jaipur blasts (May 2008). In another incident, on June 8, 2008, Karnataka Police in the course of a raid on two premises unearthed a large haul of explosives. The material confiscated included seven tonnes of ammonium nitrate in 40 bags, around 40 to 50 gelatin sticks and 100 detonators. Bengaluru Rural District Superintendent of Police (DSP) Vikas Kumar stated that this raised suspicions about their possible use in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). In fact, earlier, on May 10, 2008, the use of ammonium nitrate as an explosive was detected in the Judicial Magistrate First Class court blast in Hubli, the second largest city in Karnataka. This bomb was allegedly triggered by the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The court had been trying some of its activists who were arrested in the Dandeli jungles between Hubli and the coastal city of Karwar, bordering Goa, early this year. The targeting of cities such as Hubli and Surat indicates the possibility of terrorists focusing on similar cities in other states as well especially given that state capitals are now under high security vigilance.

Another noteworthy development is the increasing use by terrorists of ammonium nitrate. Though ammonium nitrate is normally used as fertilizer, it can also be used as a low intensity explosive. And if used in combination with other combustible material like cooking gas and diesel it can produce greater impact. One reason why terrorists in India seem to be opting for ammonium nitrate is that unlike RDX it is easily available in the open market. Nearly 12 million tons of ammonium nitrate is used as fertilizer by Indian farmers every year. Another probable reason could be to provide ‘deniability’ to Pakistan and its Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who are known for supplying RDX and other material to terrorist groups operating in India. However, the use of ammonium nitrate has decreased the lethality of terrorist bombs. Consequently, terrorists are seeking targets that will lead to the maximum number of casualties. It is for this reason that two of the bombs were placed in hospital premises in Ahmedabad designed to go off when people affected by other blasts start streaming into these hospitals for treatment.

The perpetrators of the Ahmedabad blasts were well-trained in the use of explosives. It is also apparent that nearly 100 people were involved in transporting, laying and triggering the bombs. A key finding is the use for the first time of Integrated Chips (IC) in India. Such chips were earlier used by Jemmah Islamiyah cadres in Indonesia and the Philippines successfully. It is possible that terrorists from India might have gone to these countries through Bangladesh for training in bomb assembly. The bombs that exploded in Bengaluru and the ones found in Surat were of similar type, indicating the possibility of their assembly by a common expert. The tactic of triggering explosions on three consecutive days (July 25, 26 and 27) in Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and Surat also points to their ability of co-ordination.

This is the third time that the Indian Mujahideen has claimed responsibility for sequential blasts. It had claimed responsibility for the earlier serial blasts in Lucknow, Faizabad and Varanasi (November 23, 2007) and Jaipur (May 13, 2008). So far, investigating agencies have not been able to gather any clue about this outfit. They believe that it could be a bogus organisation meant to divert investigations.

In fact, several unknown outfits have claimed responsibility for certain blasts in the past. The Bombay serial blasts on local trains on December 6, 1993 were claimed by an unidentified outfit by the name of Mujahideen-Islam-e-Hind (MIeH); the infamous attack of 7/11 in Mumbai was claimed by a new group called Lashkar-e-Qahar; the October 2005 Delhi serial blasts were owned up by an unknown organisation, Inquilabi (Revolutionary) Group; the Varanasi terrorist attack on January 7, 2006 was claimed by a fictitious group called Lashkar-e-Qaharby; the attack on Akshardham temple, Ahmedabad on September 24, 2002 was claimed by an unknown outfit called Tehriq-e-Qasas.

But some speculate that the Indian Mujahideen is an outfit formed by a combination of HuJI-B and SIMI activists (but excluding LeT and JeM). Moreover, the outfit’s repeated claims for attacks and reports trickling in about ISI attempts to create a new, completely Indian, terrorist outfit strengthen the argument for the Indian Mujahideen’s existence.

Urban terrorism is on the rise in India and it is high time the Indian security establishment took note of this emerging threat.