Encouraging developments on either side of the Taiwan Straits have taken place recently, considerably reducing the ‘shrill atmospherics’ surrounding ‘independence’ and ‘invasion’ by several notches. The primary determinant driving these developments has undoubtedly been the Kuomintang’s (KMT) coming to power in the legislative elections held in March 2008. The electoral drubbing faced by the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) came about for several reasons – over-playing of the ‘independence card’, which, beyond a point, became a classic instance of the ‘law of diminishing political returns’; the overall slowing down of economic growth; continuous scandals surrounding former President Chen Shui-bian, especially during his second term in office; and, at the international level, the shrinking support for Taiwan even from “allies” like the United States, all of which necessitated a ‘course correction’ through electoral means.

To his credit, Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT leader and Taiwan President since May 20, 2008, has not wasted any time implementing his policies of a ‘closer tilt’ towards Beijing. On April 12, 2008, Vincent Siew (then Vice-President elect) met the Chinese leader Hu Jintao at Bo’ao, a seaside resort in eastern China for a brief meeting – becoming the highest ranking elected public figure from Taiwan to do so. And on May 29, 2008, Wu Poh-hsiung, Chairman of the ruling KMT held a ‘historic’ meeting with Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Given the historical animosity the two parties have had for each other since the civil war six decades ago, this meeting by all accords was a pleasant and path breaking one. On June 13, 2008, Chiang Pin-kun, the Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) based in Taiwan, resumed talks after nine years with the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) headed by its Chairman Chen Yunlin. The SEF and ARATS are “government approved non-government organizations” (GONGO’s) with the brief to engage in talks associated with cross-straits issues. Talks between the SEF and ARATS’ two interlocutors, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan (both since deceased), were suspended in 1999, following then Taiwan president Li Teng-hui’s proposal for a special “state to state” model to mark cross-straits relations.

To reverse the current economic downturn in Taiwan, the Ma Ying-jeou administration sees closer economic relations with Beijing as a much needed incentive to spur domestic economic growth. The ‘economic agenda’ of the KMT government towards Beijing includes securing broader access to the mainland market especially the swelling ranks of the ‘new middle class’ estimated to be growing at one per cent every year, permission for financial services businesses from Taiwan to operate on the mainland, the need to end the ‘double taxation’ regime currently in force, and the removal of investment restrictions from Taiwan on the mainland. Proposals for drafting common technical standards and the creation of mechanisms to resolve commercial disagreements are on the anvil, and by any standard are far reaching proposals in their endeavour to prepare a roadmap for ‘gradual economic integration’ with the mainland.

For Ma Ying-jeou, the ‘economic agenda’ is the current priority for now, to be followed later by themes revolving around Taiwan’s shrinking “international space” and a “peace accord” – points he had raised in a recent interview carried by the New York Times. Taiwan’s constrained international appeal stems from it being recognised by only twenty three countries while Beijing is recognized by one hundred and seventy one countries. Taiwan also has been prevented from becoming a member of various multilateral forums primarily due to Beijing’s persistent lobbying. For Ma Ying-jeou, the “peace accord” he proposes would only be possible if China were to ‘remove the hundreds of short and medium range missiles it has aimed at Taiwan’ and the ‘security’ of its people is assured and not held hostage to a climate of fear and threats.

Reflecting the liveliness of domestic politics in Taiwan, the DPP naturally has been very vocal in its opposition to the current ‘winds of change’ between Beijing and Taipei. For DPP lawmakers, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung’s suggestion on direct charter flights between the mainland and Taiwan bypassing Hong Kong – where Taiwanese airliners are currently allowed to operate – was a matter of “national security laws to be decided upon by relevant government agencies.” Chiang Pin-kung’s agreement with Beijing on establishing representative offices by both sides also came in for flak from the DPP, as not being authorised by the Mainland Affairs Council – Taiwan’s apex policy making organ on handling relations with China.

Following the agreement signed on June 13, thirty six weekend return chartered flights between the two sides will commence from July 4 to eight destinations in Taiwan (Hualien, Kaohsiung, Kinmen, Penghu, Taichung, Taipei, Taitung and Taoyuan) and five destinations on the mainland (Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai and Xiamen). Separately, in a relaxation of existing tourism norms between the two sides, Taiwan will now allow a maximum of three thousand tourists (comprising group tours only) from the mainland every day for a period not exceeding ten days. The decision to allow more tourists from the mainland has not gone down well with some sections in Taiwan who have been darkly hinting at the problems faced by Hong Kong’s Disneyland and the manner in which SARS was not acknowledged by mainland authorities when it first broke out in 2003.

The high-level visits and renewal of the “dialogue” between the SEF and ARATS have taken place with an extraordinary rapidity that for the moment has generated optimism on both sides of the Taiwan straits. Though praiseworthy, the KMT administration needs to be cautious and ensure that the ‘thaw’ does not become in the near future a case of going too soon and too fast… and not knowing where to stop!

Insurgency movements in India’s northeast would appear to be even more intractable and beyond solution if not for the ongoing ceasefires and peace negotiations between the government and two dozen outfits in various states. Products of the efforts by community based organisations, official initiatives or the plain bankruptcy of ideas of the rebel outfits, such negotiations have been the harbinger of tranquillity in many areas of the region.

There are only two cases of successful resolution of insurgencies in the northeast: the Mizo insurgency which culminated with an accord in 1986 and the Bodo insurgency led by the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) which ended with the disbandment of the outfit in 2003. Even when states like Manipur and Assam continue to be conflict ridden and violence prone, ongoing negotiations with outfits – like National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) and Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) in Assam, Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC) in Meghalaya, National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and its rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) in Nagaland, the Nayanbashi and Joshua factions of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura and several Kuki outfits in Manipur – continue to keep violence from assuming unmanageable proportions.

The greatest gain of the peace negotiations has been an immediate dip in the levels of violence between security forces and insurgents. Apart from an expected decrease in the casualties among security forces, the reduction of civilian fatalities is another positive outcome of the ceasefire regimes. In Nagaland, fatalities among civilians – 104 in 1997 and 144 in 1996 – have dipped substantially after the NSCN-IM entered into negotiations with the government in August 1997. Since then (between 1998 and 2007) death of civilians in insurgency-related incidents has averaged a little over 17 per year. In comparison, in Manipur, where none of the principal Meitei insurgent organisations are under a ceasefire agreement with the government, civilians account for a sizeable proportion of the insurgency-related deaths. Between 2004 and 2007, 472 civilians were killed in Manipur, more than one third of the total fatalities in the state.

Engaging insurgents in protracted negotiations has ultimately led to a closure of their ‘back to the jungle’ option in most cases, even when the peace parleys are seen to be unproductive. The most important example of this trend is that of the NSCN-IM in Nagaland, which has held countless rounds of dialogue with the Union Government in India and abroad. Since the last couple of years, talks have reached a stalemate over the outfit’s demand to integrate the Naga-inhabited areas of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh under one geographical and administrative unit christened as “Nagalim”. Even though the top leadership of the outfit has threatened to call off negotiations and return to the jungle in face of the Government’s alleged insincerity in resolving the issue, for all practical and tactical purposes such an option is non-existent for the outfit. Ten years of ceasefire has allowed the outfit to run an extremely beneficial extortion regime and establish a parallel government of sorts in the state. It has also allowed the security forces to gain unrestricted knowledge of the outfit’s dynamics and the state’s human terrain. NSCN-IM would find it extremely difficult to restart its insurgent campaign in the unlikely event of a collapse of the peace process. It would be constrained to continue its engagement with the government, even while accusing New Delhi of propping up rival groups to undermine its position.

In other cases, protracted negotiations have also led to the demise of certain movements, making the high profile peace processes look like surrender ceremonies. The January 2004 peace talks between the NLFT-Nayanbashi faction in Tripura is an example. All the cadres of the outfit chose to surrender and avail the rehabilitation package of the state government, even when the outfit’s commander-in-chief Nayanbashi Jamatiya called off the ongoing talks and went back to Bangladesh. In Assam, former Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia’s pragmatic use of the tactic of negotiations led to the surrender of thousands of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) cadres in the mid-1990s. The Bru insurgent outfit from Mizoram, Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) passed into oblivion following a three and half year long peace process, even though the April 2005 peace deal with the State Government remains unimplemented. Thus, while military actions have not helped end insurgencies in the Northeast, negotiations have remained a key tactic of the government at marginalising and diminishing the influence of these outfits.

Critics argue that in many cases ceasefires with insurgent outfits have not progressed beyond periodic extensions of the agreements. For example, the tripartite ceasefire agreement with the NDFB in Assam is stuck in a limbo since April 2005. The outfit is yet to hold a single round of dialogue with the Government. Outfits like the DHD and UPDS in Assam and ANVC in Meghalaya are in a similar state of affairs. However, the mere fact that the outfits have stuck to the peace processes in spite of such delays underlines the success of the strategy.

Ceasefires and subsequent negotiations have, indeed, emerged as a successful tool of conflict management in the northeast. This, on the other hand, appears to have introduced a sense of vacillation among active outfits, who view such peace processes as tactical ‘honey traps’. Many outfits including the ULFA are said to be watching the progress of the Government’s negotiations with the NSCN-IM before committing themselves to a peace process. The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in Manipur still speaks of a United Nations mediated plebiscite in the state to resolve the conflict. Thus, successful culmination of at least some of the processes of negotiation would remain the key to more outfits opting for such a path.

Most of the negotiations have yet to reach their desired objective of peaceful resolution of the conflicts. However, gains from these processes, as far as keeping violence at low ebb is concerned, have been significant. There is some truth in the arguments of critics that these processes have legalised terror by allowing a regime of extortion and abduction by the outfits under ceasefire. Some fine tuning and greater enforcement of the ground rules outlined in the ceasefire negotiations are the need of the day in harnessing a very effective tool of peace making.

With elections looming large in both countries and the Indo-US nuclear deal facing its moment of truth, the inevitable question will arise as to who has gained how much from the Strategic Partnership that was signed with great fanfare in July 2005. This is not withstanding the fact that the failure of the nuclear deal would undoubtedly be a setback for both countries and besmirch the reputations of those leaders who had put their personal prestige on the line. It would also reflect poorly on the political parties and the governments involved in various ways.

Strange as it may sound, the Strategic Partnership has not been without its intangible benefits to both countries. For the United States, the in-your-face aspect of the partnership and the nuclear deal has served as the proverbial foot in the door. It has lead to changing mindsets and increased understanding of why it does what it does as the world’s leading superpower, something that is apparent from a cursory glance at India-centric discussion boards on the Internet. Indifference towards the United States on the part of the Indian public has been replaced by interest, even in its domestic politics; to Indians, the United States is a much more real and sharper entity than it was a few years ago. Its perceived hostility towards India has largely receded from public memory, as evidenced from repeated opinion polls which show that the US is seen in a favourable light by large sections of the Indian public. In fact, the latest Pew Global Attitudes Opinion Poll shows the United States as having gained even more popularity over the year in urban India, with ratings rising up to 66 per cent from 59 per cent in 2007, second only to Poland in the 24 countries polled. The global sub-prime crisis notwithstanding, India tops the list of those countries that see the United States as having a positive impact on the global economy.

That the United States understands the increased relevance of people-to-people relations and considers them worth nurturing is evident from the large-scale deployment of its diplomatic officers to India and even in its efforts to streamline visa processing. This would go some way towards explaining why there has been a 38 per cent rise in the number of Indian students going to the United States over the past seven months, at a time when the US is recording the lowest number of international student applicants. In this regard, the US has also met with success in its efforts to widen the ambit of the Fulbright scholarships, with the Indian government agreeing to make it a full fledged bilateral venture, and doubling the number of scholarships available under the scheme.

India has also benefited in terms of increased mind space, more so especially amongst niche audiences, such as the business and strategic communities in the two countries. As far as the strategic communities in the two countries are concerned, a global book industry has sprung up virtually overnight, either explaining, extolling or bemoaning the rise of India and China. Seminar circuits have also been abuzz with discussions on this phenomenon as well as the strategic partnership between India and the United States. Such publicity is not without its benefits. The “India” effect may also be partly attributable to the speculation that Fareed Zakaria, a card carrying member of this tribe, has been mentioned as a possible Secretary of State in a future Administration. Another India-born strategic analyst, Ashley Tellis, is the South Asia advisor to the presumptive Republican candidate John McCain with unconfirmed reports suggesting that he was initially approached by the Democratic contender Barack Obama’s team to be their South Asia advisor.

Yet another constituency that has benefited in intangible ways from the focus on India in the United States has been the Indian American community, or more precisely, the professionals in this community. Their role as a bridge to one of the world’s rising powers has boosted their efforts in being mainstreamed into American life. Whilst Indian Americans had risen to the top in the technology industries by virtue of their innate talent and brain power, glass ceilings are being progressively broken in other spheres, ranging from the performing arts to politics, a process that could be said to have been accelerated by increasing awareness of India. The repositioning of the ‘India’ brand and multiple instances afforded to brand recall as a result of the Strategic Partnership have bested what any advertising campaign would have to offer.

Other intangibles waiting in the wings for the consummation of the nuclear deal include confidence in collaboration in high technology and dual use items, and even global crude prices. No doubt there has been a tremendous improvement in the climate for business and awareness of opportunities. However, businesses have shied away from collaborating in the above fields in the face of the perceived fences that exist or might be created by the US bureaucracies as a result of nuclear proliferation related legislation that, like it or not, hang like a dark shadow over all such dealings. Even though officials in both countries have gone to great lengths to convince businesses that most of the obstacles have been removed, as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words.

Sharp swings in global crude prices in response to events ranging from natural weather calamities to rebel insurgencies have shown that they are, on the one hand, speculation driven, and on the other, draw inspiration from the futures market. The only weapon in the armoury of major oil consuming nations to counter this is renewed emphasis on alternative sources of energy. With India’s rising demand for energy, the green light to turn to nuclear energy in a big way might even conceivably prick the oil price bubble and might conceivably prove to have been the biggest intangible benefit of the Strategic Partnership. The question whether this will prove to be an eternal wait. And till then, the benefits scale would appear to be tilted in favour of the US.

In a disturbing sign, the Chinese seem to have brought up Sikkim and not Arunachal Pradesh back to the table during the recent visit of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China. The belief was that China had implicitly recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003, and as such there was no dispute on the matter with China. China’s recognition of Sikkim was interpreted as a quid pro quo for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003.

In an article in the Indian Express on October 6, 2004, this author had argued that Beijing – even after the 2003 commitment – maintains the position that Sikkim is a historical issue between India and China and ‘‘hopes’’ it will be resolved as bilateral relations improve. That though the Chinese have not yet raised the border issue in the Sikkim portion, they might bring it up in future. And that, the recognition of Sikkim as a part of India will depend on the demarcation of the boundary to the satisfaction of the Chinese. Similarly, the trade agreement between Sikkim and Tibet is also without prejudice to the status of Sikkim.

The Sino-Indian relationship, with a strategic dimension since 2005, has progressed by leaps and bounds, pushing the trajectory of trade growth currently at $40 billion and now set to hit $60 billion by 2010. But will it withstand the strains of repeated Chinese frowns at the border? New Chinese provocations have come since July 2007, ranging from the demolition of Indian forward posts in North Sikkim, objection to Indian troops’ deployment in the Siliguri Corridor, objection to the Prime Minister’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, cyber intrusion on Indian computer networks, laying a fresh claim in “Finger Area” and now expressing “unhappiness” over India reopening its airbase at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh.

Why does China play checkers, when India has been going out of its way to save Beijing from facing embarrassing prospects over the Olympics torch relay? China surprised India by laying claim to the 2.1 square kilometre “Finger Area” in Sikkim and threatened to demolish the stone cairns, usually fiddled only by rustling Yaks.

On Tibet, India was fulfilling its commitment, but China almost expressed contempt for India and its democratic form of government; peremptorily summoned the Indian Ambassador in the middle of the night and threatened to withdraw the Olympic torch if India cannot ensure its security. It wanted India to crack down on the Tibetans and even specified the type of security that should be adopted for the relay. These events ominously gave an impression that the government had waffled on its Tibet policy and was bending over backwards to please the Chinese. The debate over the Indian response contrasted from being totally meek to a sharp display of realpolitik maturity. Op-ed contributors thought Mukherjee’s warning to the Dalai Lama had diminished India as a democracy and made everyone “feel small”. Nearly everyone empathised with the Tibetans, but at the same time realised the inability to offend China. Chinese could correctly assess the Indian public mood. For they know for sure that New Delhi has a soft government with its foreign office not willing to take a confrontationist line, its military not in a mood to fight, a large section of its political class, across party lines, amenable for concessions to China, and most importantly Indian intellectuals, including think-tanks, have become ardent aficionados or acolytes of China.

On this score, even the Dalai Lama should now gracefully accept defeat, collect his passport from Chanakya Puri and return to Lhasa for he should know that the answers for his problems lie in Beijing and not in New Delhi or in Western capitals. After all, he also knows that the religion he practices, though it came from India, the same lineage and tradition also prevails in China. The ultimate salvation for the Tibetans naturally lies not in the West but in the East. The Dalai, so far, has successfully played the democracy and human rights game, and in the process inflicted enough damage on China. It is now time for him to reconcile with China and take up a larger responsibility for the revival and restoration of Buddhism in China. India could potentially moderate his future plan but now lacks a sense of imagination. After all, Buddhism is no longer on India’s agenda after Nehru’s death. In fact, it is China which is fast assuming the leadership role of the Buddhist world. Therefore, it is not too late for the Dalai Lama to quickly resume his traditional “Priest” role for China, at least for the Dhamma’s sake. And, in the process, if he can revive the spiritual bonds among Indian, Chinese, Tibetans, and rest of the Asians, then possibly he would have achieved the task of laying the foundation for a new architecture of peace and destiny in Asia.

Mukherjee’s visit also clearly indicates that we have not gained any leverage in Beijing for our handling of Tibetan protests. Instead, the Chinese look more belligerent and claim fresh areas. Clearly, China seems to be making a dubious shift in its position. China has been aiming to snatch Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh through negotiation, but now understands the difficulty stemming from the Indian domestic angle. The pleading by Chinese leaders to make Tawang an exception is well known. But now knowing that this is unattainable, Beijing is possibly resorting to another trick by reopening the Sikkim card as a leverage to pressurise India over Tawang. They may be intending to withhold formal recognition of India’s sovereignty and say – give us Tawang or face new consequences in Sikkim. Recall the PLA-owned think tank’s latest article A warning to the Indian Government: Don’t be Evil, which warned India to stay away from the “path of confrontation” and not to “misjudge the situation”.

The PLA has started using the Tibet railway since December 2007 and is steadily ramping up its military infrastructure (road, rail and air) capabilities in Tibet close to the Indian border for dual usage. The Tibet crisis and India’s acquiescence may have emboldened the Chinese to further assert the point that Tibet is incomplete without Tawang and that it is crucial for Tibet’s security. Beijing could bring up fresh obstacles. A case is being built up that internationally branded terrorists are active on Indian soil. Beijing will next ask New Delhi to dismantle the Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala set-up. The PLA may even be contemplating a limited military pursuit to capture Tawang, while India still thinks that China’s position in Tibet is tenuous. They have been cautioning New Delhi on Arunachal Pradesh and very soon they would say – we had warned you before!

The External Affair Minister’s visit to China has not broken any new ground. Beijing seems to have given a snub to Mukherjee by cancelling his planned meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. But significantly he has not allowed Beijing to set its agenda on Sikkim. The progress on our concern over the trans-Himalayan Rivers is also little. So, was the visit only about aid diplomacy to deliver relief materials worth $5 million to quake victims in Sichuan? We could have done this better through spiritual diplomacy.

On Tibet, Mukherjee seems to have got a pat on his back but the Chinese leadership was probably not happy with Indian media coverage of the Dalai Lama. Mukherjee may have reiterated India’s position on Tibet, though it is not clear whether the phrase Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is being used.

All in all, the visit appeared as a bit of a disappointment with no substantive breakthrough being made on any of the controversial issues. The Chinese, on the other hand, visibly appeared reluctant to move ahead in a positive way and keen to play checkers with India.

India needs to be watchful of China’s moves in South Asia. In Pakistan, Chinese firms are constructing a hydro project on the Neelam River in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Their profile is ever growing in Nepal. In Sri Lanka, China has surpassed India and Japan by providing $1 billion in aid with no strings attached. After Gwadar, it is building a port in Sittwe (Myanmar) and one at Hambantota (Sri Lanka). Reports suggest that Chinese weapons are pouring into the Northeastern states. The news channels splashed fresh satellite images of China building a major underground nuclear submarine base on Hainan to control the Indian Ocean Region.

Given China’s unpredictable behaviour, it would be too early to drop one’s guard. Instead, India should exploit the current window of opportunity and assert its position before it gets closed once the Olympics are over. The reopening of Daulat Beg Oldi is a thoughtful and an unusually sharp decision. We should consolidate our position further and reopen Chushul and Fukche.

India could also reopen the issue of Skasgyam Valley, ceded to China by Pakistan. And, if Chinese continue to make diversionary moves, India should reclaim the ownership of Minser Enclave, composing of several villages, located inside Tibet on the bank of Mount Kailash. Minser was a sovereign part of India until mid-1960s, which New Delhi forgot about due to apathy and it deserves a revisit before the final boundary settlement.