Japan

Sino-Japanese relations were in the doldrums for the past decade because of the repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. One consequence was a complete freeze in mutual visits at the highest political levels between 2001 and 2006. Even exchanges at other levels were affected. The ice was broken in 2006 when Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe visited China, and the ice began to thaw when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in 2007.

Tokyo looks at energy security differently than does Washington, or other major global capitals. This persistent and deepening reality—so incongruously at odds with the continual affirmations of solidarity and alliance in the US–Japan bilateral relationship—has substantial grounding in economics. Yet, the contrast in mindset between Japan and the broader world is sharply amplified by differences in domestic institutions and politics. This perceptual gap has major implications for East Asia's energy future and for global geopolitics as well.

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are one of the variables of the distinctly pacifist security policy Japan has followed ever since the end of the war. Japan's ongoing 'normalisation' involves an enhancement of the role and functions of these forces. Although the SDF's role has considerably increased in the past decade, it cannot be characterised as Japan's remilitarisation because of strong domestic and external checks.

The central thesis of this article is that the Asian energy consumers would serve their interests well if they look again at their energy frontiers and define them within the contours of Asian energy interdependence rather than triggering an Asian energy race. The three leading Asian consumers, China, Japan and India, are principal actors in the Asian theatre, and their needs, assessments and policies are going to be central in defining the regional energy security agenda. Their current approaches have placed them more as competitors, which could trigger conflict situations.

Contemporary Japanese nationalism is the principal force behind Japan's gradual shift towards 'normal' statehood and what has been called as 'reluctant realism'. The nature and content of this nationalism is, however, very much dissimilar to that which characterized its militarist past. This nationalist streak is largely elitist and assumes softer undertones as it percolates down to the masses.

Ensuring access to crude oil and natural gas forms a crucial component of India's security calculus. It also critically underlines the significance of sea transportation through which much of these vital resources are traded. With India virtually insular in terms of its land communications, its trade interests are increasingly focused on the maritime domain.

China and Japan issued a joint communiqué in Beijing on October 8 during the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first foreign visit, vowing to promote strategic relations between the two countries in the coming years. Both Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Abe hailed the visit as a positive turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. Abe's visit to China is politically important since it is the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries in the past five years.

The recent nuclear test carried out by North Korea in defiance of warnings by the international community has significantly raised Japan’s security concerns. The test conducted on October 9, 2006 made Pyongyang the second nuclear weapon state in North East Asia after China. It was carried out in the backdrop of already heightened tensions in the region following a set of multiple missile launches by Pyongyang on 5 July 2006. The missiles which had plunged into the Sea of Japan, had even evoked calls for preemptive strikes from a section of the political and defense establishment in Tokyo.