India-US Relations

Of the several agreements signed during the recently concluded US presidential visit to India, one initiative that has been lost to sight is on Cyber Crimes. As part of the larger counter-terrorism effort and realizing the importance of cyber security and cyber forensic research, India and the US have agreed to enhance cooperation to tackle Cyber Crime. This will lead to a greater sharing of expertise in the areas of tracing computer viruses and software worms and network analysis.

• Prasad P. Rane
• March 07, 2006
• IDSA Comments

President George W. Bush will be on his first official trip to India from March 1 to 3. India has travelled the road from natural partner to strategic partner to a global partner of the US in merely a few years. The new equation between India and the United States depends to a large extent on the manner in which business and trade ties progress in the future.

• Vaishali Basu
• February 28, 2006
• IDSA Comments

When the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States signed a joint Statement on July 18 last year, which included, inter alia, a move towards lifting the three decades old regime of technology denials on India and an implicit recognition of India's nuclear weapons programme, negative reactions were expected: disbelief and distrust in India, and outrage from the non-proliferation lobby in the US, still deeply convinced of the need, even after thirty years, to "cap, roll back and eliminate" India's nuclear weapons ambitions.

• Arundhati Ghose
• January 06, 2006
• IDSA Comments

One of the major objectives of the United States in entering into the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement is to bring about an early freezing of the Indian weapon-usable nuclear materials stock at the minimum possible level. India, in turn, obviously wants to retain all the accumulated inventory of such materials, as well as the facilities to produce the additional material we consider essential for a minimum deterrence, out of IAEA safeguards. Obviously, each country wants to manoeuvre the separation plan to suit its specific objective.

• A. Gopalakrishnan
• January 05, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Two rounds of negotiations have been held between Indian and US officials to negotiate implementing the Indo-US nuclear agreement, embedded in the Joint Statement issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush on July 18, 2005. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's talks with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas D Burns in Washington last week was the second round.

• P. R. Chari
• January 05, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants – even on a turnkey basis – or nuclear fuel from any NSG membercountry.

• R. Ramachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

• K. Subrahmanyam
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?

• Rajiv Nayan
• August 04, 2005
• IDSA Comments

The joint statement issued at the Manmohan Singh-Bush summit held in Washington (July 18) has generated considerable interest and anxiety in both countries for the manner in which it has addressed the nuclear issue. It merits recall that the nuclear determinant has bedeviled the bi-lateral relationship between the US and India for well over three decades since India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 – which was further exacerbated after the May 1998 Shakti nuclear tests that gave India a de facto nuclear weapon status.

• C Uday Bhaskar
• July 25, 2005
• IDSA Comments