Nuclear Cooperation: A Constant in the India–Russia Relationship

Arc of India–Russia Nuclear Relationship

The India–Russia nuclear relationship goes back to the Cold War years. In 1961, an ‘Agreement Between India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for Scientific and Technical Co-Operation in the Field of Peaceful Utilisation of Atomic Energy’, defined the framework of nuclear partnership between the two countries.[2] Parallelly, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, India was also receiving assistance from the US under President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme. It was the era of the Cold War, when both superpowers utilised nuclear power to consolidate their respective spheres of influence and diminish the impact of the opposing camp.

However, the India–USSR nuclear relationship blossomed in the ensuing years. In contrast, the India–US relationship nosedived, as relations between the two superpowers were a zero-sum proposition during the Cold War. The long-term foundation of the India–Russia nuclear relationship was established when the USSR and its successor, Russia, continued the policy of nuclear cooperation with India, despite the sanctions imposed by the US on India’s nuclear programme in 1974 and 1998. When the US imposed sanctions on Delhi and sought to isolate it in the atomic domain in 1974 and 1998, the Russian Federation continued nuclear cooperation, thereby ensuring continuity and strengthening the foundations of the India–Russia nuclear relationship for the long term.

In 1988, the then-Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and the leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, signed an agreement to establish two reactors of 1000 MWe each at Kudankulam on India’s southern coast; the project was later expanded to six reactors in 2008.[3] Apart from the civil nuclear arena, the Russian role in India’s nuclear submarine programme has been substantial,[4] with Moscow leasing Delhi its nuclear submarines for training.

The 23rd Annual India–Russia Summit Meeting

During President Putin’s recent visit, the nuclear-related discussions included the scheduled completion of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP), emerging nuclear technologies, joint development of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), nuclear fuel and localised production of nuclear equipment. President Putin referred to the operationalisation of two of the six reactors at KKNPP,[5] each capable of producing 1000 MWe, and the two sides “welcomed the progress achieved in construction” of the remaining reactors in a time-bound manner.[6] This partnership aligns with India’s goals of producing 100 GW of nuclear energy by 2047. India is also keen to localise nuclear equipment production and to pursue joint development of NPPs, which was discussed during the bilateral talks.[7] The two sides also decided to cooperate in the field of “peaceful use of atomic energy and related high technologies”.[8]

Putin also assured India of an uninterrupted fuel supply to support its economic growth.[9] In the joint statement, both sides agreed to “broaden” their nuclear cooperation in the fields, including “fuel cycle, life cycle support for operating KKNPP and non-power applications”.[10] Coinciding with Putin’s visit, Rosatom delivered the first consignment of nuclear fuel for loading of the third reactor at KKNPP. Six more flights are expected to operate between Russia and India to supply an entire reactor core and some reserve fuel. The fuel provided by Rosatom’s fuel company is advanced nuclear fuel, TVC-2M, which supports a longer fuel cycle of 18 months compared to the traditional fuel’s 12 months.[11]

Furthermore, India reiterated its intention to allocate an additional site for another nuclear plant with Russia-designed reactors, as announced in 2018.[12] India is interested in the VVER-1200 reactor design, an evolution of the VVER-1000 used at KKNPP, with enhanced safety features and increased power output. As the name indicates, reactors used in KKNPP are capable of producing 1000 MWe, whereas VVER-1200 reactors can produce 1200 MWe, with additional passive safety features that are activated during contingencies. A Rosatom press release states that a working meeting between the Directors of Rosatom and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in Mumbai noted that relevant organisations in both countries were discussing the “technical specifications for a new nuclear power plant in India featuring VVER-1200 reactor units”.[13]

India and Russia also explored cooperation in emerging nuclear fields, including the construction of Russian design-based Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in India and the development of floating nuclear power stations.[14] In a written reply to a question in the Indian Parliament, Jitendra Singh, Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Atomic Energy, stated that the two countries were cooperating on the construction of Russian-designed SMRs in India.[15] During the joint press conference, Putin also emphasised the significance of these emerging technologies for India’s increasing clean energy requirements. He stated

We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors.[16]

Drivers of India–Russia Nuclear Cooperation

First, Russian support for India’s nuclear programme, even during challenging times, has fostered bilateral trust and cooperation. In turn, this has helped sustain the long-term partnership between the two countries. This is despite the absence of robust economic ties. Before the Russia–Ukraine War in 2022, total trade between India and Russia stood at around US$ 10 billion. However, the latest trade figures amount to US$ 65 billion, primarily due to Russia’s oil exports. Bilateral trade is heavily skewed in favour of Russia, with Indian imports amounting to US$ 61 billion and exports to Russia at US$ 4.5 billion.[17] While the two sides seek ways to address the trade imbalance, nuclear collaboration has remained the mainstay of the bilateral relationship, apart from defence ties.

Second, the India–Russia nuclear partnership is no-strings-attached, allowing its constituents to pursue nuclear relations with other countries, showcasing strategic autonomy. The Indian market and power demand are substantial enough to afford India the flexibility to pursue nuclear partnerships with multiple players.

Third, the institutional memory of overcoming pressure from third parties in the past has made the India–Russia bilateral nuclear relationship resilient. In the late 1980s, as the Cold War was waning, Washington took exception to the India–USSR nuclear cooperation, creating a brief impasse during the transfer of the Charlie-class SSGN.[18] However, both countries resolved the issue in the broader context of India–Soviet ties. Similarly, Russia’s denial of cryogenic engines to India proved a temporary setback in the bilateral relationship, as both sides resumed cooperation in the nuclear and space domains in subsequent years.

Finally, the India–Russia bilateral agreement to expand nuclear cooperation in a third country[19] paves the way for India to export its nuclear expertise, in the absence of membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The two countries are already collaborating on the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant project in Bangladesh.

Conclusion

Nuclear cooperation has remained a defining attribute of the India–Russia bilateral relationship, making it, as External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar states, the only major-country relationship that has lasted for more than six decades.[20] Therefore, the recent declaration by both sides of continuity in the nuclear relationship should be regarded as a success. Nuclear relations between India and Russia have played a crucial role in sustaining the bilateral partnership. Moreover, as the partnership allows both countries to pursue relations with third countries in the nuclear domain, it expands the scope for furthering bilateral relations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] “Joint Statement Following the 23rd India – Russia Annual Summit”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 December 2025.

[2] “Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 6 October 1961.

[3] “Agreement Between India and Russia on Cooperation in the Construction of Additional Nuclear Power Plant Units at Kudankulam Site as well as in the Construction of Russian Designed Nuclear Power Plants at New Sites in India”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 December 2008.

[4] Kerry R. Bolton, “Indo–Russian Defence Cooperation and INS Arihant: Some Geopolitical Implications”, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring, January–March 2013, pp. 52–61.

[5] “Media Statements by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of India”, President of Russia, Official Website, 5 December 2025.

[6] “Joint Statement Following the 23rd India – Russia Annual Summit”, no. 1.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] “Media Statements by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of India”, no. 5.

[10] “Joint Statement Following the 23rd India – Russia Annual Summit”, no. 1.

[11] “Russia Ships Fuel for Kudankulam’s Third Reactor”, The Hindu, 6 December 2025.

[12] “Action Plan: For Prioritisation and Implementation of Cooperation Areas in the Nuclear Field Identified Jointly by India and Russia”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 October 2018.

[13] “Head of Rosatom State Corporation and Head of the Department for Atomic Energy of the Government of India Hold Talks on Expanding Cooperation”, Rosatom Digital Press Office, 10 November 2025.

[14] Ibid.

[15] “Parliament Question: Agreements with Russia’s Rosatom”, Press Information Bureau, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 3 December 2025.

[16] “Media Statements by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of India”, no. 5.

[17] “Brief Embassy Report on Bilateral Relations – ITJ Division, DGCI&S, Kolkata. India-Russia Bilateral Relations”, Indian Trade Journal, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2024.

[18] Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-Russian Defence Relationship Will Continue to Withstand Washington’s Displeasure”, Centre for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania, 1 July 2019.

[19] “India-Russia Joint Statement During Visit of President of Russia to India”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 October 2018.

[20] “‘India-Russia Ties The Only Constant in World Politics’, Says EAM Jaishankar”, Hindustan Times, 27 December 2023.