Nuclear Cooperation: A Constant in the India–Russia Relationship
Nuclear cooperation has remained a defining attribute of the India–Russia bilateral relationship.
Nuclear cooperation has remained a defining attribute of the India–Russia bilateral relationship.
If the US and Russia fail to negotiate a successor agreement to New START, there is the possibility of an unrestricted arms race with detrimental implications.
Iran is focussing its diplomatic energies on advancing its ‘neighbourhood policy’ and long-term cooperation with China and Russia.
The announcement of the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” by Australia, UK and US, has prompted discussions on several issues, however, the submarine part of the agreement, about leveraging expertise from US and UK and facilitating the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines, is attracting a lot of attention.
The summit brought out ambiguities in America’s policy towards denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. To translate outcomes of the summit into concrete deliverables, Trump administration would not only have to clearly define its denuclearisation action plan in terms of goals, methodology and timeline but also bolster its alliance with South Korea and Japan.
India will have to make a judicious political decision on accepting any additional criteria that the NSG might come up with as a precondition for accepting its membership application.
As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.
Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
Japan’s endorsement of India’s candidature for the four major multilateral export controls regimes seems to be the principal achievement of the Indian PM visit to Japan.
There is a lot of inaccuracy and assumption in reporting Chasma 3 nuclear cooperation between China-Pakistan. It is not conceivable in engineering terms as to how a 300 MWe Chasma 3 can be transformed into a 1,000 MWe project.



