The recent terror attack by al Shabaab in the port city of Barawe in southern Somalia, a suicide bomb attack by Boko Haram in Maiduguri in Nigeria, and an attack on a military post in Mali by an al Qaeda-linked terror group have brought the focus back on terrorism in the African continent. Over the years, terrorism has become the most important challenge to peace, security and development in Africa. The terror activities have grown exponentially in the continent, not only in terms of the number of attacks but also the number of countries affected due to increased proliferation of terrorist groups.

In terms of statistics, according to the IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, the terror attacks by radical groups in Africa have increased by 200 per cent and fatalities by more than 750 per cent during 2009-2015.1 A number of groups have been terrorising the civilians and governments alike in several parts of Africa. While global terror groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda have made their presence felt in the region, other local groups too have gained prominence over the years. The deadliest of these are Boko Haram, al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Shabaab. As a result, an arc of instability is spreading across Africa, from Nigeria in West Africa, Mali in Sahel, Libya in North Africa, to Somalia in East Africa.

Nigeria: Boko Haram down, but not out

In Nigeria, Boko Haram (meaning Western education is sin) continues to target civilians and government infrastructure despite several rounds of operation conducted by the Nigerian Army. Boko Haram, that came up in 2009, had emerged as the ‘world’s deadliest terrorist organisation’ by 2014. In the last eight years, it is said that Boko Haram has taken 20,000 lives, displaced 2.6 million people, created 75,000 orphans and caused about nine billion worth of damage.2 Links with the ISIS, with leadership tussle between Abubakar Shekau and ISIS favouring Abu Musab al-Barnawi, have turned the situation more complex. While there may have been some reduction in Boko Haram-led violence in the country due the Nigerian Army’s counter terrorism campaign, the group continues to expand its operations in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad.3

Sahel: Resurgence of al Qaeda

In Sahel, there is a resurgence of al Qaeda. The four terrorist groups that continue to wreak havoc in the region - AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine and Macina Liberation Front - have recently decided to combine forces and merge into a single group called Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (Group for Support of Islam and Muslims).4 They have also pledged allegiance to the al Qaeda leadership. This regrouping of terror groups is ominous for countries such as Mali and the neighbouring Niger, Cote d’ Ivoire and Burkina Faso that have borne the brunt of their attacks in the past.

Somalia: al Shabaab on offensive

In Somalia, the notorious al Shabaab is on the offensive and in recent months has taken control of some towns after defeating the troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).5 The group has increased its attacks on African Union bases, Somali government facilities, targets in neighbouring Kenya and, for the first time in a show of strength, has also launched attacks in the northern Puntland autonomous region. This comes as a surprise as the al Shabaab had steadily lost ground over the last six years. It lost control of the capital Mogadishu in 2011 and then was pushed out of Somalia’s major cities by the 22,000-strong African Union force deployed in the country.

The withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia and the announcement by the African Union to withdraw AMISOM too (triggered primarily by reduction in funding by the European Union), may have been to an extent responsible for al Shabaab’s comeback. The attacks in the north may be a move to regain control by the pro-al Qaeda al Shabaab leadership, after the recent declaration of allegiance to ISIS by Abdul Qadir Meemen, leader of the faction based in Puntland.6 Another issue of concern is the possibility of revival of friendship between the al Qaeeda of Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Shabaab. In the past, al Shabaab is reported to have trained cadre along with AQAP. The Saudi Arabia-led war against Houthis in Yemen seems to have benefitted the AQAP.7 This group appears to have rapidly gained control over chunks of territory in Yemen. The emergence of nexus between al Shabaab and AQAP could make the situation in Somalia deadlier.

ISIS in North and Southern Africa

The ISIS plan to establish a caliphate in North Africa was thwarted after it was routed out of Sirte, the last ISIS strong hold, in December 2016 by the Libyan National Army, with air support provided by the United States (US). Since 2014, pro-ISIS terrorist groups have been active in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. In Libya, the instability following the collapse of the Muammar al Gaddafi regime, and the presence of numerous indigenous factions and also the porous borders, provided a fertile ground for the expansion of ISIS in the country. Moreover, Libya’s long unmonitored coastline too provided the ISIS with a channel to Europe. Between 2014 and 2016, ISIS expanded its presence in multiple cities in Libya, including Derna, Benghazi and Sirte. While the terror group was driven out of most of the region under its control, there are chances that remnants of the group may reconstitute and again create problems.

In Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia, an ISIS affiliate, has been responsible for a large number of terror attacks in the country. It has also been the main facilitator of ISIS fighters from the country to West Asia. Tunisia, has earned the ignominious tag of being the key recruitment ground for the ISIS (about 6,500) in Syria and Iraq.89

ISIS is recruiting youth from eastern as well as southern Africa to fight its wars in Syria and Libya. In Kenya, coastal Tanzania and Zanzibar, youth from the Muslim communities are vulnerable to the ISIS recruitment drives. Reports suggest that at least 140 youth from South Africa may have joined the ISIS.10 These terrorist outfits are using both internet as well as networks of radical clerics to lure the youth from the region.

Way Forward

There is a growing recognition in Africa that terrorism is a transnational problem and, therefore, there is a need for cooperation at the continental level to effectively deal with it.11 Over the years, African countries have devised various measures to deal with this threat at the pan-African level. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted at Algiers in 1999, had put in place a solid framework to deal with the scourge of terrorism.12 It not only defined terrorism but also laid out areas of cooperation among the member states as well as guidelines for the extradition. This was followed by a Plan of Action on Prevention and Combating terrorism in 2002, which put forward several measures for border surveillance, issue of machine readable passports, checking illegal transfer of weapons, introduction of legislation preventing the financing of terrorism, and sharing of information and intelligence on terror activities.13 The Plan of Action incorporated international standards for combating terrorism, in line with the provisions of the UNSC Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001. It also called for the establishment of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).

However, the most important instrument is the 2004 Protocol to the 1999 Algiers Convention. This Protocol recognised the “linkages between terrorism and mercenarism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, corruption, transnational crimes, money laundering and illicit proliferation of small arms”.14 The Protocol also addressed a major weakness of the 1999 Convention, which is, lack of an implementation mechanism. The 2004 Protocol mandated the African Union’s Peace and Security Council to monitor and facilitate the implementation.

Unfortunately, despite the existence of these instruments, terror networks continue to operate in the region. This is mainly due to the tardy implementation of the counter terrorism framework by the member states. For example, the 2004 Counter Terrorism Protocol needed ratification by minimum 15 states before it could come into force. However, it took more than a decade to finally operationalise this key instrument in 2014. Moreover, some of the key states facing terror attacks such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Chad are yet to ratify it.15 Much of the delay has to do with insufficient financial resources and lack of necessary political will amongst African states to implement it. A large number of countries do not have the funds to enforce the counter-terrorism measures. For example, bonder fencing would be extremely costly and most of the states are in a dilemma about utilising the limited development-oriented funds for such tasks.16 Also, a large number of African countries, while understanding the transnational nature of terrorism, shy away from seeking external intervention or support as it is considered a challenge to their national sovereignty.

Another important factor could be the very nature of states in Africa.17 Most of the counter measures to deal with terrorism have dealt with enhancing the capacities of the states in the continent. However, this has proved to be counterproductive in some cases, as greed and corruption overwhelmed feelings of nationalism amongst section of political elites. For example, it has been reported that in Somalia the arms transfers from the US found their way to al Shabaab due to corruption in the ranks of the Somali National Army.18 Similarly, there are reports that suggest that Boko Haram may have supporters within the state structures in Nigeria, particularly in North Nigeria.19

There is no doubt that terrorism is a global problem and countries across the world including India have for decades suffered from this scourge. While the rise in terrorism in Africa may not impact India directly, there is no denying the fact that this may not remain the case in future. First, recent revival of piracy off Somalia’s northern coast, an area often used by al Shabaab, has reopened the old debate of possible connections between al Shabaab, AQAP and the pirates.20 The fact that the pirates hijacked an India dhow, adds to the vulnerability for the country.21 Second, as Nigeria is India’s largest trading partner in Africa, Boko Haram’s continued attacks in the country makes it an issue of concern for India too. At the Third India Africa Forum Summit in 2015, and during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kenya and South Africa in 2016, the issue of cooperation in counter-terrorism was raised. As African countries look towards the international community in their fight against terrorism, friendly support from India will go a long way in taking the relationship forward.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Numbers Show Dramatic Rise of Terrorist Attacks in Africa Over Past Six Years, HIS Says”, Business Wire, June 27, 2016 (accessed March 30, 2017)
• 2. Freedom C. Onuoha, “Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group”, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, October 27, 2016 (accessed March 30, 2017)
• 3. Ryan Cummings, “Africa’s 2017 Terrorism Outlook”, Centre on Religion and Geopolitics (accessed March 15, 2017)
• 4. “Rising Terror: Extremist groups in Africa’s Sahel announce merger”, The New Arab, March 03, 2017 (accessed March 14, 2017)
• 5. Conor Gaffey, “Somalia’s Al Shabaab militants ramp up attacks after rejecting President’s amnesty offer”, Newsweek, April 10, 2017 (accessed April 10, 2017)
• 6. Joshua Meservey, “Al Shabab’s Resurgence”, The Heritage Foundation, January 04, 2017.
• 7. Michael Horton, “Why U.S. troops may fight alongside Al-Qaeda in Yemen”, The American Conservative, April 05, 2017 (accessed April 10, 2017)
• 8. Joseph Siegle, “ISIS in Africa: Implications from Syria and Iraq”, Centre for Security Studies, Zurich, March 28, 2017 (accessed March 30, 2017)
• 9. Rachel Ehrenfeld, “ISIS Growing Presence in Libya Threatens Europe and the U.S”, American Center for Democracy, February 19, 2016 (accessed March 27, 2017)
• 10. Peter Dube, “Terrorist group Isis makes inroads into southern Africa”, Africa Review, September 29, 2015 (accessed March 27, 2017)
• 11. Simon Allison, “Good talk, not enough action: The AU's counter-terrorism architecture, and why it matters”, Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 66, March 2015 (accessed March 30, 2017)
• 12. “OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999”, African Union Peace and Security (accessed March 27, 2017)
• 13. “Plan of Action of the African Union High-level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa”, Algiers, Algeria, September 11-14, 2011, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (accessed March 27, 2017)
• 14. “Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism”, Addis Ababa, July 08, 2004, African Union Peace and Security (accessed March 30, 2017)
• 15. Simon Allison, n.11.
• 16. Ibid
• 17. Hussein Solomon, “Why Western Efforts at Counter-Terrorism in Africa are Failing?”, RIMA Occasional Papers, 4 (6), November 2016 (accessed March 28, 2017)
• 18. Ibid.
• 19. Ibid.
• 20. “African militants learn from Al Qaeda in Yemen”, Public Radio International, September 10, 2012 (accessed March 29, 2017)
• 21. Dipak K. Dashi, “Somalian pirates hijack dhow with 10 Indian crew members”, The Times of India, April 04, 2017.

Days after US President Donald Trump made his first decisive foreign policy intervention by launching a flurry of Tomahawks into a Syrian air base, in response to the chemical attack blamed on the Assad regime, he has now moved an American naval strike group to the Western Pacific. The move is supposedly a result of the continuing brinkmanship behaviour of the Kim Jong-un regime in Pyongyang, including a series of missile and rocket engine tests,1 along with signs of another impending nuclear test, anticipated to coincide with Kim Il Sung’s birthday on April 15.2

Like his Republican predecessor, George W. Bush, the incumbent US President is also swiftly moving towards proactive foreign policy measures after promises during the election campaign of disassociating the country from international conflict zones and hotspots. The deployment of the strike group days after the action in Syria indicates the possibility of Trump considering military options against the regime in Pyongyang. The key questions that arise then are whether there is space for such an option considering the maverick behaviour of Kim Jong-Un and whether the US and its allies in East Asia (especially South Korea) are prepared for a military backlash from Pyongyang.

The Build-Up

North Korea has been a perennial headache for most post-Cold War US presidents, starting with Bill Clinton, who negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994 to quell a suspected nuclear break-out, which, though, turned out to be effete in dealing with the Kim regime’s nuclear ambitions.3 North Korea was among the nations President George W. Bush identified as the ‘axis of evil’ in 2002, which was among the reasons the Stalinist regime cited to exit the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003. Pyongyang thus became the template of a country misusing the treaty membership to gain access to nuclear resources as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) and going on to exit the treaty and end up building a fledging arsenal.

Though the Bush administration had initiated six-party talks to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme, Pyongyang’s repeated defiance of the commitments given in the talks embodied its rejection of international diktats and its impetuous pursuit of military might.4 The Obama administration, having relied on sanctions and covert actions, could do little (unlike in the Iranian case) to rein in Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear ambitions and the feverish pace at which its missile inventory was developed (with capability to hit US shores). Trump, in his own characteristic style, was dismissive of the North Korean challenge during the presidential campaign and had remarked that he could invite Kim Jong-Un for a dinner in Washington, and can talk him ‘out of those damn nukes’.5 The attack on Syria signals a realisation on the part of the US president that the ‘talking out’ may not be that easy unless he has the coercive wherewithal towards that end.

The China Factor

Trump has been reportedly preparing his action plan on North Korea for discussion with the visiting Chinese President, Xi Jingping. Prior to the visit, Trump had warned that the US will act alone if China fails to pressure Pyongyang to disable its nuclear programme.6 Eventually, the decision to deploy the strike group in western Pacific seems to have been made after taking the Chinese president into confidence. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was quoted stating that following extensive discussions around the dangerous situation in North Korea, Xi had agreed that ‘action has to be taken’ as conditions for discussions with Pyongyang no longer exist.7 He claimed that the US and China have a ‘shared view’ or rather ‘no disagreement’ on the dangerous situation (posed by North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear ambitions) that ‘has reached a certain level of threat that action has to be taken’. Asserting that China also recognises the situation as a threat to its interests, Tillerson defined the agenda thus: ‘we can work together with the Chinese to change the conditions in the minds of the DPRK leadership. And then, at that point, perhaps discussions may be useful’. This could be an indication that sending the strike group to western Pacific entails the initial step towards a mix of coercive diplomacy and compellance strategy, depending on how the projection of force will play out.

Though Beijing is yet to formally comment on Tillerson’s claims, the Global Times, while reporting on the deployment, quotes Chinese analysts affirming that Beijing’s positions have not changed.8 Confirming that both presidents agreed on the severity of the North Korean crisis and have reached some understanding on dealing with it, they, however, insist that disagreements remain and that Beijing seeks to persuade North Korea to return to talks than preferring military action that will lead to ‘unbearable consequences’. Earlier, Global Times had published an editorial (as a response to Trump’s ‘will act alone’ statement, and before Xi’s visit) warning that US has limited options in North Korea and that it should bear ‘major responsibilities for the mess in Northeast Asia’. Stating that piling more sanctions will produce lesser results, the editorial warned that South Korea ‘will be the first one to break’ if US resorts to a military approach.9 The reference to South Korea is particularly underscored by the fact that the Chinese were opposed to the deployment of the US Army’s Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system to protect South Korea from missiles fired from the North. The deployment of the high-power X-Band radar to support THAAD was detested by the Chinese for its capability to peek deep inside Chinese territory and monitor its strategic forces.

Trump’s Options

Tillerson had set the agenda for US action by stating that ‘the No.1 threat in the region continues to be North Korea due to its reckless, irresponsible and destabilising programme of missile tests and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability’. On an earlier March visit to Seoul and Tokyo, Tillerson had stated that ‘strategic patience has ended’ and that a ‘different approach’ was required, which includes ‘all options on the table’ including diplomatic, security and economic measures.10 Careful to omit ‘military’ in this description and affirming that ‘we don’t want things to get to a military conflict’, he had then explained that a military strike will be warranted only to ‘safeguard the region and American forces stationed here’. By that standard, it could be assumed that the deployment of the strike group is only intended at intimidation, hoping Pyongyang could be coerced to return to talks. That would also imply that the US will be ready for military response if Kim sees the US move as ‘an act of provocation’, and decides to launch a military strike, as he habitually warns.

This condition, though, might have altered in recent days with sections of the US media reporting about the military options that Trump is mulling. According to NBC, the National Security Council had listed the return of nuclear weapons to South Korea and killing Kim Jong-Un as among the key options presented to Trump.11 The same report also talks of opposition to returning nuclear weapons to South Korea, after 25 years, and that the USAF is practising long-range strategic bombers to be used in a military assault. Though the full range of military options, including using Special Forces and covert means, are still being debated, everything depends on how Kim will respond to the Carl Vinson in Korean waters.

Though Kim, like his predecessors, is seen as an irrational despot, the options for regime survival will be severely constrained if he unilaterally initiates a military campaign or swift escalation to nuclear level — which also explains Trump’s decision to go proactive. The Trump administration could respond to even a ‘limited conventional’ strike on South Korea with a heavy use of conventional force targeting Kim’s military bases as also his own abode.12 In fact, the Syrian Tomahawk strike might have awakened him to the possibility of a targeted precision strike or strategic bombing aimed at his palace or even bunker-busters to target other ‘secured’ locations. Though this could require specific intelligence inputs, a decapitating strike on the regime’s core edifices will substantially wreck his sway over a supposedly suppressed population, even leading to internal strife (provided political forces are supplemented).

In the event Kim resorts to the nuclear escalation, the scope for an American massive retaliation could be a given. The potential return of nuclear warheads to South Korea, though a clear provocation to Kim, will convey the intention for a massive nuclear response. Even if Kim prefers an all-destruction mode and decides on a pre-emptive nuclear strike, it is likely that the THAAD could be successful in, at least, partly intercepting them, while the ground based interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska (which is the closest US territory) and SM-3/6s on Aegis ships deployed across the Pacific could form the shield against any attack targeted at the US, besides the fact that the American response will be (nuclear) in kind.13 A military confrontation, thus, may not be in Kim’s favour.

What’s in Store?

Much of these scenarios, however, will depend on whether South Korea will be ready to take the body blow as well as whether Kim will bite the bait and engage in hostilities. While reports indicate Seoul already being on board on Trump’s proactive plans, Kim confining to bluster than action will severely erode his credibility, and, along with Chinese and Russian prodding, could force him to return to talks, which though also buys him time to get back to the old cycle of commitments and defiance. In fact, the possibility of all parties getting back to talks seems more probable with indications that Kim’s actual desire is to gain legitimacy for his nuclear arsenal (a la India and Pakistan). A report quotes the Rodong Sinmun, the Korean Workers Party mouthpiece as remarking on March 29 that: ‘North Korea’s status as a nuclear power is being highlighted even more, which is bringing about a fundamental change in the strategic structure of relations with our neighbours. Unless the US ends its scheme of nuclear blackmail against North Korea, we will continue taking steps to advance our nuclear capability’.

Unless Pyongyang launches a premeditated strike on any nation, there will be little legitimacy for a pre-emptive US strike on North Korea. Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be deemed as illegal (since a nuclear weapons ban treaty is yet to be negotiated), as it had used the legal route of Article X to exit the NPT, while its expansion is being restricted by numerous UN Security Council Resolutions that demand a reversal of its nuclear and missile programmes.14 Though Trump can take utilise these resolutions to put pressure on the regime, it is unlikely that even a revival of the Six-Party talks could lead to a dismantling of Kim’s nuclear programme, which has matured from existential to retaliatory deterrence. Notwithstanding Kim’s reliance on nuclear weapons to ensure his regime’s survival, the fundamental security deficit that drives the North Korean nuclear programme – threat from US and its allies – will continue to feed its belligerence in spite of any assurances.15 If at all, Pyongyang’s response to the Syrian strike is a definite pointer:

‘The US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons. The (sic) missile attack is a clear and intolerable act of aggression against a sovereign state and we strongly condemn it… The reality of today shows that we must stand against power with power and it proves a million times over that our decision to strengthen our nuclear deterrence has been the right choice…’ 

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. See Akshit Sanghomla, ‘Timeline: North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests’, The Wire, April 10, 2017.
• 2. ‘Is North Korea planning a sixth nuclear test?’The Hankyoreh, March 30, 2017.
• 3. Besides North Korea agreeing to stay put in the NPT and discard the infrastructure being then constructed for its nuclear programme, the Agreed Framework provided for diplomatic and economic relations between US and North Korea to be restored and both agreeing to keep nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula. See ‘The US-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance’, Arms Control Today, August 2004.
• 4. China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and North Korea were the six parties to the talk. See ‘The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program, CFR Backgrounder, September 2013.
• 5. ‘Trump: I’ll meet with Kim Jong Un in the US’, The Politico, June 15, 2016.
• 6. Trump stated this in an interview to FT. See Lionel Barber, Demetri Sevastopulo and Gillian Tett, ‘Donald Trump warns China the US is ready to tackle North Korea’, The Financial Times, April 2, 2017.
• 7. ‘Tillerson: China agrees on “action” on North Korea as navy strike group sails’, The Guardian, April 9, 2017.
• 8. ‘US shows off military might to North Korea’, Global Times, April 9, 2017.
• 9. ‘Limited options for US to tackle North Korea’, Global Times, April 5, 2017.
• 10. ‘US warns of military option if North Korea continues push for nuclear weapons’, Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2017.
• 11. ’Trump’s Options for North Korea Include Placing Nukes in South Korea’, NBC News, April 7, 2017.
• 12. There are reports of Kim having placed tens of thousands of artillery guns and rocket emplacements, buried in fortified revetments along the DMZ. See Tyler Rogoway, ‘Does US Carrier's About Face In Asia Signal Impending North Korea Showdown?’ The War Zone, April 2017.
• 13. GBI is interceptor missile of Ground-based Mid-Course Defence (GMD) system, the flagship of US BMD programme. The Standard Missile (SM-3) is the interceptor deployed on Aegis ships and Aegis Ashore land-based systems, while SM-6 is an improved version co-developed with Japan.
• 14. See UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea, Arms Control Association, March 2016.
• 15. It should be noted that Pyongyang rejected Bush’s undertaking not to attack the country as it came a year after the ‘axis of evil’ speech and war against the Saddam Hussein regime.

Late on April 6, the United States carried out missile attacks on the Shayrat airbase outside Homs in Syria targeting “aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical storage areas, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems and radars.” The number of casualties and extent of damage to the airbase is not yet clear, but according to Syrian government sources it has “led to losses.” The US action has come as a response to the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun—a town in Idlib province—on April 4 in which more than 70 civilians including children lost their lives and hundreds others were injured. According to the Pentagon spokesperson, the US suspects that the Shayrat airbase was used to launch the sarin nerve gas in Khan Shekhoun, hence it was targeted by the US strikes to prevent future chemical weapon attacks. President Trump said: “Years of previous attempts at changing Assad’s behavior have all failed” and it is in the vital interest of US and its allies “to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.”

The US move to launch attacks on a Syrian airbase is significant because till last week things had looked different as the new administration had shown no inclination to intensify the US involvement in Syria. On March 30, US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley had said that the US is no longer focused on “getting Assad out”. The same day Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, during a visit to Ankara, had said that the fate of Bashar al-Assad “will be decided by the people of Syria.” These statements indicated that the Trump administration is not only disinterested in Syria but also scaling down its rhetoric on the need for a solution involving Assad’s stepping down, unlike the Obama administration which, despite focusing on fighting the ISIS, had maintained the position of seeking to remove Assad by reaching a deal with Russia.

In fact, the Russian decision to enter the war in Syria on behalf of the regime in September 2015 and the fall of Aleppo in December 2016 had indicated that the war has decisively shifted in favour of the Syrian regime. The peace talks in Astana and cease fire agreement anchored by Russia, with Iran and Turkey playing important roles, had further indicated that the US is no longer seriously involved in resolving the Syrian crisis. It was content with supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fight the ISIS. Further, the divided Syrian opposition had more or less lost direction and was on the verge of collapse leading to a situation where the future of Syria had become coalesced with Assad’s fate.

Hence, the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun has come at an interesting time and has raised many questions, especially about the Russian reaction. Though this is not the first time chemical weapons have been used in Syria, it was the deadliest in terms of casualties and indicated the willingness of the Assad regime to test the Trump administration. It raised a question on the 2013 deal between the US and Russia to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile. More importantly, US credibility was challenged because of its inability to take decisive action against the regime that has acted with impunity in dealing with the rebels. The regime’s ability to prolong the war and not cede any space to the opposition and Russian willingness to back the regime and its totalitarian approach created serious doubts about US ability to decisively intervene on behalf of its allies.

The Syrian regime has denied using chemical weapons saying that it was the opposition and terrorist groups that used them. Russia, on the other hand, has stated that the chemical release was a result of an attack by regime forces on a chemical arsenal held by rebels in Idlib. It is, however, possible that the regime used the chemical weapons with the objective of taking complete control of the war and not allowing the opposition to have any say in the future of Syria. It gave two warnings to the rebels that they will not have any space in Syria, that the regime is committed to take control of the whole of Syrian territory and will not hesitate to use chemical weapons to achieve its objectives.

The Russian reaction to the US missile strikes has been strong. Russian presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the US strike is a violation of international law and will have “negative consequences” on the Syrian crisis, adding that it will seriously affect US-Russia relations. The world will have to wait for the next Russian move to know the full extent of the consequences of the US strikes as the future course of the war will depend on how Russia choses to react. It is, however, unlikely to escalate into a full blown US-Russia confrontation because strong statements notwithstanding, it is clear that the US informed Russian forces in advance and took precautions not to target Russian forces.

The US strike is an important development as far as the war in Syria is concerned and indicates a change in its strategy. Until now, Trump had continued the Obama policy of fighting the ISIS and leaving the Syrian regime’s fate to Russia and Iran. But the strike on Shayrat airbase indicates that the US wishes to play a proactive role in deciding the fate of Syria. Tillerson, who is set to visit Moscow next week, said that Russia failed to uphold its responsibility of preventing the use of chemical weapons and added that “either Russia has been complicit, or Russia has been simply incompetent,” underlining that Washington will use the new developments as a bargaining chip with Moscow.

The Syrian decision to use chemical weapons on civilian targets in Khan Sheikhoun in an effort to seek control of the last rebel held territory of Idlib and the US reaction have created a new dynamics in the Syrian crisis. It may not prove to be a game changer but has the potential to seriously reshape the war in Syria and the direction in which it is heading. It also underscores that the US will play a bigger role in finding a solution for Syria than was expected after the fall of Aleppo.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India starting on April 7 has generated an animated debate in Bangladesh. Security analysts, retired bureaucrats and opinion makers have raised concerns about the possible signing of a defence agreement. It is good that the proposed agreement is debated, discussed and various pros and cons are put across to a larger audience. However, what is striking is the absence of a similar debate when Begum Khaleda Zia had signed a defence cooperation agreement with China in December 2002. Analysts who are now questioning the strategic consequences of a defence agreement with India and its meaning for Bangladesh’s sovereignty did not raise such questions about the earlier defence agreement with China. The reason for that could be the fact that Bangladesh’s relations with India and China fall in two completely different categories. Whereas India is projected as a threat by some, China is seen as a proverbial insurance against India. Thus, while a defence agreement with China is understandable, such an agreement with India raises questions about the future of India-Bangladesh bilateral relations.

India has always loomed large in Bangladesh’s security matrix, with its defence planning and security calculus conceived in terms of a threat from India. This despite the fact that more than 2000 Indian soldiers laid down their lives for its liberation – a fact that was officially recognised only nearly 40 years after Bangladesh’s independence when the military backed caretaker government under General Moeen uddin Ahmed invited Indian soldiers who had fought the liberation war to be part of the Victory Day celebration and started the process of recognising the sacrifices made by Indian soldiers and other eminent political personalities and civil society members. General Ahmed also proposed “to usher in a new era of close cooperation between the two armies”, thus changing the narratives of the relationship between the two armed forces. This process of recognising India’s contribution was taken forward by Prime Minister Hasina after she came to power.

Such a change within Bangladesh towards recognising India’s contribution to its independence also reflects how the narrative about India was constructed and nurtured by regimes that dominated the country’s politics after 1975. As a result, until recently, there was hardly any contact between the two armed forces, and training and officer participation in their military academies showed a downward curve over time. This state of affairs began to reverse only after the February 2008 visit of Moeen U Ahmed, the Chief of the Bangladesh Army and the power behind the caretaker government. Until then, India was generally perceived as an ‘unfriendly’ neighbour. And that perception had persisted even after India’s enunciation of the Gujral doctrine. So much so that, even transit facilities that had existed before 1965 were not revived citing possible Indian intrusions and consequently a major security threat. Though begun during the military backed caretaker regime, the change in approach towards India took root after Hasina returned to power in 2009. It is only in the last few years that India and Bangladesh have begun to evolve the habit of working together.

A look at the map of Bangladesh reflects the strategic reality that the two countries have no option but to pursue economic and security cooperation. The emergence of terrorism as a challenge for both countries is also compelling a change in this regard. Against this backdrop, a defence cooperation agreement would serve to consolidate and institutionalise existing bilateral cooperation. It is likely that the defence cooperation agreement with India is not going to be very different from the one that Bangladesh has signed with China.

Between 2008 and now, there have been several visits to Bangladesh by top Indian military officers including the three chiefs. At the political level, visits by the President, Vice President and Prime Ministers Singh and Modi have underlined the importance India attributes to its relations with Bangladesh. Officers of the two countries have begun to attend courses at each other’s National Defence College. The two armies have regularly held the “Sampriti” anti-terror joint exercises since 2009 and also share intelligence. Co-operation reached new levels especially after the Burdwan blasts in 2014, when investigating agencies of both countries were provided access to the suspects arrested by the other.

In spite of such close cooperation between the security agencies, there are attempts by vested quarters to raise questions regarding the proposed defence cooperation agreement. One argument – not exactly new – being employed in this regard is that it would limit Bangladesh’s options and choices and the country would get embroiled in the India-China conflict. Others consider a defence agreement unnecessary and express doubt about India’s ability to supply weapons. Some others want all the outstanding bilateral issues to be resolved before any defence agreement is signed. Then there are those who argue that the proposed defence cooperation agreement is a reaction to the Xi Jingping visit and China’s proposed intention to invest USD 24 billion in Bangladesh. It is true that China’s growing strategic proximity to Bangladesh raise concerns in Delhi, but to conclude that the proposed defence cooperation agreement is a reaction to Sino-Bangladesh cooperation is farfetched.

Here, it is worth recalling the fact that a similar campaign had been orchestrated against the 25 year Treaty of Peace and friendship that India and Bangladesh signed in 1972. The treaty was projected as a surrender of sovereignty. And the opposition to it also had the backing of the Army which saw the treaty as restricting its institutional interest. Unlike in the case of the 1972 treaty, the proposed Defence Treaty has been debated in the Bangladesh media and also discussed widely within the political opposition in and is being negotiated for some time with the involvement of the defence forces. Moreover, the armed forces of the two countries have developed a certain synergy through training and joint exercises in recent years.

Here, it is worth nothing that a scan of the Bangladesh press of December 2002 reveals that neither journalists raised any questions nor security experts debated or questioned the defence agreement signed with China. The text of the Agreement is not public and there is hardly any research in Bangladesh on the implications of that Agreement, in contrast to the volumes that have been written on the 1972 treaty with India. The only noticeable element in the reports on the 2002 defence agreement with China is the then Foreign Minister Morshed Khan’s statement that the agreement is not directed against any other country and would not affect Bangladesh’s relations with India.

Given all this, it is not difficult to conclude that the deep rooted antipathy towards cooperation with India among a particular section of the political elite is very much rooted in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, ideological division and mind-set ingrained in the pre-partition ideology. Some within the ruling Awami League (AL) argue that a defence agreement with India will be politically suicidal for the party in the 2019 elections if it is not matched by a quid pro quo, for example, a deal on Teesta.

It needs to be recognised that a number of unresolved bilateral issues have helped the anti-India constituency in Bangladesh. – a constituency that looks at China as a benign benefactor and an insurance against India. First, the unresolved Teesta river sharing issue has remained a major bone of contention. Bangladesh remains aggrieved that a Treaty for sharing the waters of this river was not signed at the last minute during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in 2011 due to pressure from the Paschima Banga government. In spite of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s assurance during her subsequent visit to Dhaka in February 2015 that she would help resolve the issue, there has been no forward movement on this front. Rather, the issue has become embroiled in India’s domestic politics. The second bone of contention is the issue of BSF firing at the border causing the death of Bangladeshi nationals, even if most of them are involved in illegal activities. A study of Bangladeshi newspaper reports reveals that most firing incidents occur between 3 and 5 AM, a time when smugglers are active. Therefore, the two border guarding forces need to synergise their efforts to curb illegal activities. Though there is coordinated and joint patrols by the two forces, these have failed to curb illegal activities. The third bone of contention that needs to be addressed at the earliest relates to Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), which are a major obstacle for bilateral trade. The Indian Standard Institute is cooperating with the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) for capacity building and quality harmonisation. Perhaps, the two agencies should open a joint office near the border for the quick certification of goods. The Government of India also needs to seriously look into the issue of establishing laboratory facilities near the border to help with the immediate clearance of perishable goods. Energy cooperation can be furthered through joint investment and by encouraging power trade.

While the two countries work on identifying new areas of cooperation, they need to institutionalise the current avenues of cooperation. A defence cooperation agreement would institutionalise capacity building efforts, sharing of intelligence, joint training, and deal with the challenge of terrorism. As the Burdwan blast revealed, unilateral action by one country does not suffice in dealing with terrorism. There is speculation that the two countries may be thinking about the joint production of certain small arms, and India may extend a USD 5 billion credit line for this purpose. There is also a likelihood that cooperation may be enhanced in the maritime domain. Perhaps, India can take steps to further relax visa rules and provide visa on arrival to certain categories of Bangladeshi government officials and armed forces personnel.

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh is a function of geography. Bangladesh is surrounded by India. And it is located astride India and its North Eastern states. Cooperation between the two countries is therefore unavoidable. With non-state actors taking centre stage in the security calculus of both countries, the time has now come to institutionalise the existing security cooperation for meeting the common challenge of terrorism. To succeed, there is a need to shed the old mind-set that prefers the status quo. The fact that the Indian High Commission issues the largest number of visas to Bangladeshi nationals testifies to a reality that the elites in both countries refuse to recognise. Sheikh Hasina’s visit should not, therefore, be seen through the narrow prism of a defence cooperation agreement or Teesta agreement. Instead, it should be seen from the broader perspective of the future trajectory of, and the unexplored potential in, India-Bangladesh relations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.