A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
The world is watching with much fear and anxiety, admixed with some curiosity, the unfolding confrontation between President Trump and Kim Jong-un the supreme leader of North Korea. We still do not know whether the confrontation will lead to hostilities with predictably unpredictable and disastrous consequences or the two sides along with other interested parties will sit down and talk. Trump, with no previous political experience, has been in office for over 100 days. He has not yet put together a full team in the State and Defence departments and hence does not get competent professional advice essential to deal maturely with such a crisis.
Kim Jong-un is the grandson of the founder of North Korea who started the Korean War (1950-53) by invading South Korea, costing five million human lives including 40,000 US soldiers. The world does not have credible information on the schooling and other details of Kim Jong-un who assumed office in 2012. There are reports that he studied in Switzerland and Germany. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is considered a pariah state by the United States and the rest of the West and as such does not have normal contacts with the outside world. The state controls the flow of information inside and with the outside world.
Historical Background
It is necessary to see the current confrontation in a sound historical perspective. The 1953 Armistice ending the Korean War should have been followed up with a peace treaty. DPRK, China, and USSR wanted it. But, for reasons to do with the Cold War, Washington did not want a peace treaty as such a treaty would have required the termination of the US military presence in the Korean peninsula. In fact, Washington unilaterally violated clause 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement by placing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1956 and followed it up the next year with Matador missiles that had the range to hit China and USSR.
In 1962/63, both Moscow and Beijing rejected DPRK’s request for assistance to start a nuclear programme. Following the collapse of the Cold War, the US removed nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1992 and the two Koreas reached a Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange, and Cooperation. Shortly thereafter, the two Koreas issued a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, pledging not to possess, produce, or use nuclear weapons and prohibiting uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
However, Washington did not want to support reconciliation in Korea and resumed joint military exercises with South Korea. DPRK threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), talks followed with Jimmy Carter’s mediation, and in 1994 it agreed to adhere to the NPT and freeze its project against the promise of two light water reactors and humanitarian assistance from the US. Clinton was US President then and given time the agreement might have worked out. Clinton even thought of making a state visit to Pyongyang to seal the deal. His Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did go to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong il.
But Clinton’s successor George Bush condemned DPRK as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and the latter withdrew from the NPT and resumed its nuclear programme. China and Russia took the initiative for the Six Party talks (DPRK, Republic of Korea, Japan, US, Russia, and China) and once again there was progress in narrowing the differences. The Six Party talks resumed even after the 2006 nuclear weapon test by DPRK. At the last round held in 2007, DPRK agreed to freeze its programme and give a full inventory to IAEA; the US agreed to remove DPRK from the list of states sponsoring terrorism; and DPRK and Japan agreed to hold ‘intensive’ discussions’ to resolve their differences.
The US did not, however, accept the validity of the inventory given by DPRK to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, when the latter launched a satellite in April 2009 despite opposition from Washington, the Six Party talks ended without delivering the intended results.
We may note here that DPRK’s nuclear programme is not the only issue. It wants an end to the war, normal relations with the US and Japan, and financial assistance from them. Another point to note is that the annual South Korea-US joint military exercises unnerve DPRK and it makes a point of testing missiles and making aggressive statements to unnerve South Korea and Japan.
Current Confrontation
The current confrontation arose because DPRK, celebrating the 105th birth anniversary of its founder Kim II Sung, wanted to carry out nuclear and missile tests. When such tests are expected, Seoul and Tokyo get nervous. Nervousness does not generate sound policy options.
Washington needs to realize that intimidation will not work for the simple reason that, though DPRK might be destroyed in toto, before that happens Pyongyang is in a position to inflict thousands of casualties on South Korea where there are 28,000 US troops and 60,000 Japanese.
Above all, it is necessary to understand the psychology of Kim Jong-un. A dictator, without the benefit of advice from counsellors who can speak fearlessly and frankly with him, is running a grave risk of taking the wrong decisions.
Trump’s Handling of the Crisis
President Trump has been giving mixed signals, perhaps deliberately, or more likely reflecting the inherent incoherence of his administration. He has said that “all options are on the table”; that Kim Jong-un is a ‘smart cookie’ who got power at a young age and has successfully held on to it; and that he (Trump) would be honoured to meet him “if the circumstances are right”. True to his style, Trump added, “If he came here, I’d accept him, but I wouldn’t give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off when we give them these big state dinners.” He went on to suggest he would serve Kim – and other visiting leaders – “a hamburger on a conference table”. Wittingly or unwittingly, Trump made sure that his public invitation will be seen as an insult in Pyongyang.
Trump’s Expectations from China
President Trump sought President Xi Jinping’s help in resolving the crisis when the two met at Mar a Lago in Florida in the first week of April 2017. Xi agreed to do what he can, but made it clear that there were limits to what he can do. A grateful Trump declared that in his eyes China was no longer a ‘currency manipulator’. The two have been speaking on the phone. Trump seems to have understood the complexity of the issue or is at least understanding it slowly.
The thought that China will successfully compel DPRK to climb down just to please Trump and hand over to him a major foreign policy victory is rather naïve. First, it is in China’s interest to let the issue remain unresolved so that the US, Japan, and South Korea will be compelled to seek its assistance from time to time. Secondly, if the regime in DPRK collapses, there will be an exodus to China with all the attendant problems. Third, if the regime in Pyongyang falls and the two Koreas get united and yet US troops remain there that will not be in China’s interest. Therefore, we may assume that China will try to defuse the crisis but will not like a permanent solution that denuclearizes DPRK.
Abe’s Moves
For years, Prime Minister Abe has been trying to remove the restrictions imposed on Japan’s military by the Constitution. The relevant article reads:
ARTICLE 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Instead of getting the article amended which might not be politically feasible, Abe got the article ‘reinterpreted’ to permit ‘collective defense’ and got the Diet to endorse that interpretation. Abe said that DPRK might send chemical weapons through missiles to Japan. Whether it is a correct professional assessment or not, Abe’s intention was to gain support for his policy for a military without restrictions. Abe has sent Izumo, a helicopter carrier to escort US warships as a way of implementing his new defence policy.
Situation in South Korea
A presidential election is due on May 9, 2017, following the removal of President Park Guen-hye, daughter of Park Chung-hee, who ruled the country from 1961 to 1979. The front runner is Moon Jae-in, a human rights lawyer who wants to open a dialogue with DPRK. Moon Jae-in is opposed to the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missiles that are already under way. Trump publicly asked South Korea to pay the cost of USD 1 billion and Seoul has publicly refused. Trump’s National Security Adviser General McMaster has told his Korean counterpart that Seoul would not have to pay. Trump has threatened to re-open the 2012 Free Trade Agreement with Seoul. One may conclude that Trump’s relations with Moon Jae-in, if he were to be elected, will be rocky.
A Lesson from History
US policy makers might recall the Korean War. The invasion took place on June 24, 1950; US troops were rushed to South Korea under a UN umbrella; as General McArthur was planning to cross the 38th parallel, which was the border between the two Koreas, China through Nehru warned Washington that it would enter the war if that parallel was crossed; Truman did not heed Nehru’s advice to seek an end to the war through negotiations and Nehru was ridiculed for his ‘moral posturing’. Three years and five million deaths later, the cease fire took effect roughly on the 38th parallel.
What is, therefore, required is a dialogue treating DPRK with respect. A summit level meeting between Trump and Kim Jong-un should be preceded by meetings at the diplomatic level, preferably in a third country. In 1994, there was Jimmy Carter to mediate and de-escalate the first nuclear crisis. Carter’s mission was publicly announced, but this time a more discreet contact might be preferable. A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
North Korea, South Korea, Korean Peninsula, Nuclear, United States of America (USA)
The timing of its engagements with Armenia and Cyprus is a clear indication that India is hyphenating its relations with Turkey. By simultaneously engaging with his regional adversaries, India is hoping to influence Erdogan’s attention and priorities.
Coincidence or diplomatic convenience! If India describes its diplomatic engagements with Turkey and its two regional adversaries, Cyprus and Armenia, along those lines, then something is amiss. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit, which begins on Monday, was preceded by the visit of his Cypriot counterpart Nicos Anastasiades. If this was not sufficient, a couple of days earlier Vice President Hamid Ansari completed a successful visit to Armenia. It is not accidental that Turkey has strong and controversial historical baggage vis-à-vis these two countries which has only intensified under Erdogan.
Armenia is a sad chapter in Turkish history. Turkey’s role and involvement in the large scale killing of Armenians in the dying days of the Ottoman Empire have been controversial. Rejecting the claims of genocide, Turkish leaders have been refusing to come to terms with the killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians during the First World War. Describing the deaths as ‘genocide' has been a punishable offense in Turkey. And any reference to the Armenian genocide has been a cause of tension between Turkey and its Western allies.
Though Indian soldiers took part in the liberation of Arab territories from the Ottoman yoke, nationalists and post-1947 India had viewed the First World War merely as a British colonial policy. Hence, it carefully eschewed depicting the Armenian killings as genocide and normalization of relations with Armenia did not alter this position; that is, until this week.
The highpoint of Vice-President Ansari’s engagements in Armenia was his visit to the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute at Tsitsernakaberd in the capital. Meeting students and faculty members of the Yerevan State University, he conveyed a powerful message: “There cannot be two opinions regarding the killings of the innocent people, be it in this region, Asia, Africa or in Latin America. We are obliged to adopt the universal values.” Responding to questions about the Turkish denial, Ansari remarked that the Armenian killing “raised a question certain states would find it hard to reply to.” The inference was simple. Despite the nomenclature, Turkey cannot run away from its historical responsibility vis-à-vis the Armenians.
If this were not sufficient, India hosted Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades a couple of days before Erdogan's arrival. In July 1974, the Turkish armed forced occupied northern Cyprus and paved the way for the Declaration of "Turkey Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983. No country in the world has recognized, let alone condoned, the Turkish occupation and international efforts towards ending the division of Cyprus have been unsuccessful. Erdogan's hard-line positions are partly blamed for the stalemate in the UN-mediated peace efforts.
But are these engagements coincidental? While Cyprus and Turkey are looked after by the Central Europe Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, Armenia comes under the Eurasia Division. However, Poland comes under Central Europe, and the Vice-President visited Poland from Armenia. One can easily exclude ‘coincidence' as the explanation for this week's parleys. What then could be India’s message to Erdogan?
Despite winning all the elections since he first became prime minister in 2003, Erdogan’s domestic popularity is on the wane and is manifested by his narrow victory in the recent referendum for a change over to the presidential system. His foreign policy successes are also limited. In recent years, especially since the onset of the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia in December 2010, the Turkish leader has turned belligerent and mercurial towards his neighbours and allies. By depicting Turkey as the model for Arab countries facing domestic upheavals, Erdogan revived the historic Arab-Turkish animosity and fears of neo-Ottomanism. As a result, some of his erstwhile allies became his new adversaries.
Erdogan also has frosty relations with some of India’s close friends in the region. The killing of 10 Turkish citizens by Israel during the Gaza flotilla controversy in May 2010 resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries which were restored only in 2016. Erdogan, however, faced his own Mari Marmara moment of apology and remorse following the shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi-24 attack aircraft in November 2015. Above all, his professed bonhomie with Bashar al-Assad nose-dived following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
The diplomatic row over the participation Turkish citizens in EU countries in the recent referendum and Erdogan’s comparison of some European leaders with Hitler only made matters worse. Thus, while Turkey is important, Erdogan is becoming a new Ahmadinejad – a controversial and divisive figure.
For long, India was at the receiving end. Both during and after the Cold War, Turkey has been closer to Pakistan than to India. This has not changed significantly under Erdogan and on core issues like Kashmir and admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which Ankara is a member), he is less than forthcoming. Though not opposed to India’s entry, Turkey also wants its long-time ally Pakistan to simultaneously join the NSG.
While Turkey is still a major regional power in the Middle East, New Delhi would not be able to ignore its diminishing fortunes and fault lines. The timing of its engagements with Armenia and Cyprus is a clear indication that India is hyphenating its relations with Turkey. By simultaneously engaging with his regional adversaries, India is hoping to influence Erdogan’s attention and priorities.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
At a time of heightened nationalism over the Ukrainian confrontation, these events cast doubts about the narrative of a stable political system.
In one of the largest public protests witnessed in Russia in the last five years, a wave of demonstrations swept across the country on March 26. Led by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the protestors rallied against systemic corruption in the Russian state. The trigger was Navalny’s exposure of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s opulent lifestyle. These demonstrations follow the growing trend of brief strikes in different regions by truckers, teachers, pensioners and labourers. At a time of heightened nationalism over the Ukrainian confrontation, these events cast doubts about the narrative of a stable political system. Given the scope and importance of these protests, and the impending Presidential elections in 2018, the pertinent questions are: What are the root causes of these protests? How different are they from the last big demonstration in 2012? And, will they reshape Russia’s political landscape? Incidentally, this year marks the centennial of the 1917 Revolution, which has left a deep imprint on the Russian psyche.
Prevailing Economic Discontent
Given the tone and tenor of the protests, it appears that their key driving force is the festering dissatisfaction over the ongoing economic crisis. In the last three years, the Russian economy has faced the double whammy of Western sanctions and lower hydrocarbon prices, which have exposed its structural deficiencies. It has resulted in the economy shrinking by more than 4.5 per cent.1 More importantly, real disposable income has fallen by 12.3 per cent, leading to an increase in poverty and unemployment levels.2 Several regions, particularly the ‘monotowns’, suffer from unsustainable levels of mounting debt.3 Against this backdrop, Navalny’s anti-corruption message has struck a chord with a section of Russian citizens. For them, Navalny’s discourse that the elites not making sacrifices for the country appears timely and therefore salient. This has also led to a growing perception among political analysts that the social contract between the state and the people – of promoting economic growth in return for political stability – could unravel in future.
Comparison between 2012 and 2017 Demonstrations
The fundamental difference between the 2012 and 2017 protests lies in their orientation. The former was rooted in perceived malpractices during the Presidential elections and in the notion that the Russian electorate has been taken for granted. This was reflected in the swapping of positions between then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev. The tone, therefore, was much more political in nature. It was also largely restricted to the more politically vibrant cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, with undercurrents of western support.
The recent protests are, however, notable for their geographical spread, spanning more than 85 cities across 11 time zones. This reflects the extensive participation of people, even in areas that have been the traditional support base of the government. Notably, Navalny campaigned in only a fraction of these cities. State-owned Russia Television pointed out the involvement of 8,000 protestors in Moscow, 3,000 in St. Petersburg, 1,500 in Novosibirsk, 500 in Vladivostok, 400 in Tomsk and 300 in Irkutsk.4 Independent media agencies cited much higher numbers.
More significantly, these protests highlight the undercurrents of a demographic shift in Russia. A large number of protestors comprised of young people who were born after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.5 Their orientation on stability, economic growth and the likelihood of making sacrifices for their country remain mostly uncharted. Thus, the emergence of this section as an active stakeholder adds new vigour to the Russian political landscape. This is reflected in their willingness to court arrest by participating in unsanctioned protests. In Moscow alone, more than 600 people were detained.6 Also, their embrace of technology has seen them rely more on social media to mould their views rather than depending on the largely state regulated print and electronic media. As a result, live updates during protests, on platforms like Vkontakte, helped them coordinate better.
A Revolution in the Making?
It is, however, is unlikely that a new Russian revolution is in the offing. Economic discontent, highlighted as the root cause of the protests, is likely to wane in the future. Fiscal indicators reveal that the worst of the Russian crisis is over. The economy is projected to grow in excess of 1.4 per cent in 2017.7 Unemployment and inflation levels are likely to be more manageable, declining to the range of 4 to 5 per cent from a peak of 13 per cent.8 The outlook for next year is also on similar lines. This positive sentiment has been reinforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9
More significantly, the protestors targeted Prime Minister Medvedev rather than President Putin. In the Russian system of governance, the Prime Minister guides the economy. Putin’s popularity remains in excess of 80 per cent. He is credited with ensuring stability and restoring Russia’s great power status. The domestic discourse is also geared to encouraging Russian resilience against perpetual adversaries. And Putin is emblematic of this romanticised manifestation. It is, therefore, unlikely that a movement capable of unseating him will evolve in the near future. Further, the number of protestors, though youthful and vocal, has been quite small. During the protests, they objected to any comparison with the 2014 Ukrainian Maidan Revolution. Doubts also exist about their ability to mount a prolonged campaign. If push comes to shove, it is likely that Putin will deflect attention by appointing a new Prime Minister. He could also channel the protests to overhaul the administration by appointing younger technocrats. This could help taper the existing fault-lines. Incidentally, Medvedev’s popularity in the aftermath of the demonstrations has declined by a whopping 10 per cent, even as Putin’s remains unaffected.10
The government, meanwhile, appears to have adopted a two pronged strategy to keep a lid on the protests. First, the clampdown has been measured, with the majority of detained people being let off with a warning or a token fine. This is in sharp contrast to the stern action taken in 2012. Such an approach can be also viewed through the lens of allowing protestors to give vent to their frustrations. And second, the government has sought to discredit Navalny and increase its regulation of the social media.11 Plans to create a loyal youth following are in the pipeline. Consequently, it is unlikely that a regime change is in the offing even though corruption might be the government’s weak-spot. Opponents like Navalny are, however, likely to use this opportunity to increase their political footprints by riding the wave of anti-corruption. This might lead to a more vibrant political discourse in the future. But the perfect storm that will replicate the events of 1917 is not visible on the horizon.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. “Реальные доходы россиян снизились на 12,3% за два года” [The real income of Russians decreased by 12.3% in two years],” Itar-Tass, December 20, 2016, at http://tass.ru/obschestvo/3889149. Accessed on April 16, 2017.
3. “Current State of Russian Regions Public Debt for the 8 Months of 2016,” National Rating Agency, October 2016, at http://www.ra-national.ru/en/. Accessed on April 16, 2017.
Turkish Referendum: Will it lead to Autocratic Rule?
Md. Muddassir Quamar
April 20, 2017
The post-referendum changes in Turkey will have far reaching implications not only for the form of government but also for the long-term future of the republic and adversely affect democratic consolidation.
The result of the April 16 referendum in Turkey on the constitutional amendment bill proposing to change the current parliamentary form of government to a presidential system has not thrown a surprise. As expected, the pro-change side gained more votes, though its margin of victory was lower than expected. Though the official result has not been announced yet, according to the state-owned Anadolu Agency, the ‘Yes’ side led by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ally the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) received 51.41 per cent of the votes cast, while the ‘No’ side backed by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) received 48.59 per cent. Interestingly, if only domestic votes are counted, the ‘Yes’ vote falls to 51.18 per cent, indicating that it received overwhelming support among diaspora voters. Some parts of Turkey witnessed protests after the results became clear, even as ‘Yes’ supporters celebrated their victory on the streets of Ankara and other cities.
President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım have claimed victory and termed the result of the referendum as historical, while the opposition CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has alleged rigging of votes and demanded the annulment of the referendum. The last-minute decision of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) to consider unstamped ballots as legitimate has come in for severe criticism and raised doubts about possible rigging of votes in favour of the ‘Yes’ side. The opposition has alleged that 1.5 million unstamped ballots have been counted, which is significant given the low victory margin of 1.38 million votes. International observers, especially from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have termed the referendum as unfair since the opposition did not have a level playing field. Such criticisms gain credence because the referendum was conducted under emergency rule and a growing crackdown on opposition leaders and journalists as well as continued purges in the bureaucracy, judiciary and military after the July 2016 coup attempt.
Here, it is necessary to recall that the controversial constitutional amendment bill, passed by parliament earlier this year, has faced serious criticism and opposition from a cross-section of the Turkish population. Those opposed to the amendment see it as a bid by Erdoğan to prolong his stay in power and gain lifetime immunity on corruption investigations. Further criticism has come from intellectuals and liberals who argue that the new system vests extraordinary powers in one individual, thus raising the chances of an autocratic dictatorship. The president under the new system will not only be the head of state and head of government but will have the power to appoint and dismiss all higher officials as well as the power to nominate judges. In addition, the president will also have the power to issue decrees with the effect of law in social and economic areas, although parliament will have the power to override these decrees.
Another significant provision that has come in for criticism is that the president can not only maintain links with a political party but can also be its leader. This will change the longstanding tradition of Turkish presidents being the symbol of neutrality and national unity. The Turkish parliament under the amendment will lose some powers but will still have the authority to annul presidential decrees. However, the possibility of one party gaining parliamentary majority with its leader as president is what has alarmed the opposition as well as international observers. For instance, if Erdoğan who gave up the leadership of AKP after becoming president in 2014 decides, as widely speculated, to return as leader of that party and gets elected as president in the next election due in 2019, and if the AKP were to simultaneously regain a majority in parliament, then it will effectively put him at the helm of the state, the government, the ruling party, and practically in control of parliament. Thus, the possibility of an unfettered one-man dictatorship, as feared by the opposition and intellectuals and perhaps desired by Erdoğan himself, cannot be completely ruled out.
The post-referendum changes in Turkey will have far reaching implications not only for the form of government but also for the long-term future of the republic and adversely affect democratic consolidation. Turkey, which until a few years ago was lauded for effecting a successful marriage between Islamism and democracy and upheld as a ‘model’ for the Muslim world, has witnessed a slide since mid-2013 when then Prime Minister Erdoğan, acting tough on the Gezi Park protestors, decided to crackdown on the opposition, intellectuals and journalists questioning decisions of the AKP government. The situation has not improved since and Turkey has been courting one or the other controversy due to rash government decisions. The July 2016 coup provided the license for the AKP to take action against anyone questioning the government’s decisions or motives and purges have since continued. The three-month state-of-emergency that was imposed soon after the attempted coup has been extended thrice, the latest with effect from April 19. The Kurdish problem has re-emerged after the break down of peace negotiations with the militant Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the revival of a civil war like situation in the Kurd-dominated south-eastern province. Moreover, Turkey’s Syria policy has come in for scathing criticism both internally and externally while its relations with Europe is at an all-time low.
Turkey has witnessed sharp political divisions in the run up to the referendum and Turkish society appears deeply divided. A large section of the people do not support the constitutional amendment, although a majority, as visible from the referendum results, supports the presidential form of government and expects it to bring stability and better governance as propagated by the AKP. Nonetheless, given the sharp divisions and the narrow margin of victory, the AKP will do well to ponder upon its policy choices and actions against the spectrum of opposition leaders and intellectuals and work towards national reconciliation. However, the lure of power might prove to be too strong for Erdoğan and this, if backed by popular support, which he currently enjoys, may push Turkey further towards autocracy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
What to make of the combination of Trump’s missile strikes in Syria, changes of mind about China and Russia, warnings to North Korea, signals about scaling up military presence in Afghanistan, and outreach to Turkey?
April has been an eventful month geopolitically so far. President Trump carried out a much-trumpeted-about Tomahawk missile strike at the Syrian regime, held responsible by him for a nerve-agent attack on the village of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, a province largely held by rebels. Trump has changed his mind on China, which he previously accused as a ‘currency manipulator’. He has also changed his mind on ‘resetting’ relations with Putin and US-Russia relations are at their ‘lowest point’ in years. Trump has issued a harsh warning to North Korea to stop missile and nuclear tests. There are signals that Trump would scale up the US military engagement in Afghanistan. Trump has congratulated, with alacrity, Turkey’s President Erdogan on his referendum victory. Are all these developments related to one another?
Syria
On March 30, 2017, the US stated that it no longer wanted to topple President Basher al-Assad and would instead concentrate on defeating and destroying the Islamic State (IS). Assad, on life-support provided by Russia and Iran, must have heaved a sigh of relief. He might have thought that over time he could free himself from the life-support system and even recover the lost territory in full.
The chemical attack occurred on April 4. Strictly speaking, it is not yet known as to who carried it out, although circumstantial evidence points to Assad. The Pentagon has claimed that two SU-22 aircraft took off from the Shayrat airbase to carry out the attack. It is difficult to believe that Assad would have used chemical weapons as he was winning militarily and diplomatically. However, it cannot be ruled out that Assad, emboldened by Washington’s signal, might have thought that he could get away with it since Trump was focused on fighting the IS. Assad might have also recalled that Obama, after ordering a strike in August 2013 following a much bigger chemical attack, had second thoughts.
The other possibility is that the rebels might have carried out the chemical weapons attack in order to blame Assad. The Russian explanation at the UN Security Council was rather convoluted: Syrian planes bombed a rebel military area that had stored the chemical weapons and the toxic stuff was released because of the bombing. What is perplexing, however, is that the Russian Ministry of Defense on its Facebook noted that the bombing occurred between 11.30 AM and 12.30 PM, whereas the chemical attack occurred hours earlier in the morning. Incidentally, this entry, which the author had seen days ago, is now missing.
Perhaps, the Tomahawk strike was primarily meant to improve Trump’s domestic standing, prove how different he was from Obama, and also to signal that he did not have any soft corner towards Putin with whose help, Trump critics say, he got elected. Contacts between Trump’s election team and Russia are under investigation and Trump might eventually face some embarrassment, if not worse.
Russia
The Tomahawk missiles were meant to serve as a warning to Assad as well as his principal supporter Putin. The Pentagon gave notice of the operation to the Russian military as required under the ‘de-confliction’ agreement of October 2015 to avoid air accidents between the two sides while operating in Syrian air space. There was no injury to any Russian personnel. The Syrian government has claimed that six soldiers and nine civilians, including four children, were killed in the US missile strike.
One might assume that Russia would have shared the warning with Syria in which case it is difficult to figure out why the children were there. The Pentagon has claimed that 20 per cent of Syrian war planes have been destroyed, but independent verification is as yet not available.
Russia responded sharply and said that the missile attack was an act of aggression in violation of international law. It announced plans to fortify air defence. In theory, Russia could have shot down the missiles, but obviously it exercised restraint.
US Secretary of State Tillerson had scheduled a visit to Moscow before the chemical attack. He attended the G7 meeting at Lucca in Italy before going to Moscow. He tried hard, with the help of UK’s Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, to get the G7 to agree to new sanctions on Russia for its failure to prevent the chemical attack. The G7 rejected the proposal for sanctions, with Italy and Germany insisting on a proper inquiry to determine who was responsible before considering sanctions.
Here, we may note the diplomatic style that has come into vogue now. Boris Johnson had announced with much fanfare that the G7 would agree to sanctions. Tillerson had told the media at Lucca that he was carrying a tough message to Moscow to abandon its support for Assad or else. Trump called Assad ‘an animal’ and ‘a butcher’.
Tillerson found out in Moscow that Russia was far from intimidated by his threats. There was the usual red carpet at the airport, but no meeting with Putin was scheduled. Lavrov and Tillerson met courteously, but not cordially. Lavrov pointedly asked what the US policy was as he had heard different things from different officials. He also made it clear that there was no question of yielding to the demand to withdraw support to Assad. Finally, there was a two-hour meeting between Tillerson and Putin, but without any breakthrough. Days later, Russia, Iran, and Syria met at the foreign ministers’ level and support for Assad was reaffirmed. Public demands beget public rejections.
What is important to note is that Trump cannot, at least for a while, start a ‘reset’ with Russia. Here, the larger question is: Does Trump have a set of core principles and convictions or was it all slogans to get elected? We also should note how a neophyte President is being educated and tamed by the establishment.
North Korea / China
On April 6, Trump was hosting a dinner for China’s President Xi Jinping at his luxurious Mar-a-Lago Club in Florida. Two events of geopolitical importance had occurred before Trump welcomed his guest. First, China gave Ivanka Trump provisional approval to sell her brand of jewellery, clothing, bags, and spa services in the whole country. Second, Trump had given the green signal for the Tomahawk missiles to be aimed at the Shayrat airbase.
Trump waited until dessert – the ‘most beautiful chocolate cake’ – was served to inform his guest about the missile attack. After a pause of 10 seconds, Xi asked the interpreter to repeat the sentence. To the relief of an anxious Trump, Xi said that “anybody that was so brutal and uses gases to do that to young children and babies, it's OK.” This is Trump’s version. One may wonder whether the subtle Chinese figured out that the missiles were also meant for Putin and concluded that China’s ambition to be a co-equal of the US was getting a boost.
Trump, ever keen on doing a business deal, concluded one with Xi: In return for Xi’s help in changing the behaviour of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Trump will not start a trade war with China. He declared that China was no longer a ‘currency manipulator’.
Vice President Pence spent the Easter in Seoul. He administered a strong warning to North Korea from the demilitarized zone not to ‘test President Trump’s resolve’. Pence declared that the era of ‘strategic patience’ practiced by Obama was over and ‘all options are on the table’. Pence had to do some damage control as Trump had said earlier that South Korea and Japan were not paying back for the security they were getting from the US and that they should be left to look after themselves.
North Korea does not seem to have been intimidated. It has threatened all-out war in case of US aggression. The threat is to be taken seriously. The US might be able to destroy the whole of North Korea, but before that happens Pyongyang can strike killing a million in South Korea according to war games done by the Pentagon. Japan has already made contingency plans to evacuate the 60,000 Japanese in South Korea. The 30,000 or so US troops in South Korea are also vulnerable.
China has discontinued civilian flights to Pyongyang. And if reports are to be believed, it has also suspended coal imports from North Korea. The latest is that China has asked the US to abandon the projected anti-missile system to be installed in South Korea. When it comes to bargaining, Trump and his son-in-law will discover that Chinese leaders are a shade sharper than them.
Afghanistan
The Trump Administration has decided to scale up its military presence in Afghanistan and to oppose the inroads that Russia and China are making into that country. On April 13, the Pentagon dropped the biggest conventional bomb, the 11-ton MOAB (mother of all bombs) at Shadel Bazar, near the Pakistan border, reportedly killing 100 IS fighters and, more importantly, destroying underground tunnels used by IS now but built with US funding at the time of the Soviet occupation. The MOAB was a signal to the IS and Taliban that the US is going to stand solidly by the Afghan government in Kabul which controls only 60 per cent of territory.
On April 14, the US boycotted a conference on peace in Afghanistan held in Moscow and attended by Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics. Washington made it clear that it was not pleased with Russia’s leading role in this endeavour. On April 16, US National Security Adviser McMaster, a serving General, arrived in Kabul. He came to find out whether there is a need to add more to the current US troop level of 8400. In 2011, the US had 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and some in the US military think that Obama was in undue hurry to withdraw all of them. McMaster has visited Pakistan and India too during this visit.
Turkey
Trump has congratulated President Erdogan on his victory in the referendum that will significantly add to the latter’s powers. It is to be noted that Europeans who have not congratulated Erdogan have expressed concerns about the direction Turkey is taking. Turkey’s admission to the European Union can be written off for now, but Trump, not particularly obsessed with human rights issues in Turkey, is keen to have good relations with that country, a member of NATO with the second largest army and the Incirlik Base built by the US where the Pentagon has been operating since 1955.
Conclusion
We cannot be sure that there will not be any further sharp turns in the future. If China cannot deliver on North Korea, Trump might ‘rediscover’ the former’s role as ‘currency manipulator’. However, the correct action will be to renew the six-party talks (the two Koreas, US, Russia, Japan and China) held between 2003 and 2009. While it is important to stop the nuclear project, it is even more important to ask why North Korea wants nuclear weapons. It wants them only because it feels insecure. It is not beyond diplomacy’s ability to find a solution that guarantees security to the regime in North Korea and combine it with a move for a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. But Trump might not take the lead to resume talks.
As regards Russia, Washington will realize in time that Obama’s policy of ‘demonizing’ Putin will be rejected by Europeans. The Crimea cannot be taken back and on Ukraine there is scope for compromise.
Trump has decapitated the State Department and, unless he has a full team, he will not be able to have a coherent policy. Just as one swallow does not make a summer, a missile strike does not amount to policy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Syria, Russia, North Korea, China, Afghanistan, Turkey, United States of America (USA)
Subsuming Gilgit Baltistan as a province may propel a paradigmatic shift and redrawing of Kashmir strategy across both sides of the Line of Control.
In late March 2017, a motion tabled in the British Parliament titled “Annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan as its fifth frontier” stridently condemned Pakistan for attempting to arbitrarily incorporate Gilgit Baltistan as a province despite its disputed status. Amongst other things, the motion censured the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) because it “aggravates and interferes with the disputed territory.”1 The motion introduced by Bob Blackman, member of the Conservative Party, has added a rare dimension to the debate on Gilgit Baltistan’s proposed provincial status. Till now, the debate was more or less localised, being discussed mainly in the realm of geopolitical equations between India, Pakistan and, at best, China.
The current spell of political tumult surrounding the conversion of Gilgit Baltistan, part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), into Pakistan’s fifth province has gained traction due to CPEC. As the crucial land link connecting CPEC from Kashgar to Gwadar, Gilgit Baltistan is of unequivocal salience to the project. Hence, while CPEC is gradually unfolding in select sectors, a significant proportion of the existing debate on Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is dedicated to speculating whether China is pressing Pakistan to formalise the region’s political status. Based on its territorial claim to PoK, which was an integral part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, India is contesting Pakistan’s consideration of granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan. That, in turn, is adding further bitterness to the frosty India-Pakistan ties.
Geographically, Gilgit Baltistan comprises the larger portion of PoK which has been under Pakistan’s illegitimate control since 1947. Politically deprived for decades, the region remained disenfranchised until 2009 when quasi-political reforms in the form of an Empowerment and Self-rule Order was enacted essentially to contain simmering popular unrest. The provisional act intended to add a semblance of enfranchisement yet without conceding Gilgit Baltistan representation in the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s fix
Elevating Gilgit Baltistan as a province is likely to be a tough call for Pakistan since it could be construed as severing its Kashmir link. All along, the region had been designated as disputed citing its Kashmir connection. Since 1947, based on this construct, Gilgit Baltistan has been perpetually reeling in a state of political deprivation and disempowerment. Further, a provision in Pakistan’s Constitution binds the region to the future of the Kashmir issue. The link is enshrined in Article 257 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which defines the country’s equation with those parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir it continues to hold. The article posits: “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”2
Thus, apart from significant constitutional amendments, the formalisation of Gilgit Baltistan’s political status may necessitate re-formulating the fundamental contours of Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. Pakistan would need to contend with how India would perceive as well as respond to this change. It is believed that Pakistan subsuming a part of PoK may “set a steady precedent” for India and bestow a “viable fall back option” if it decides to think in terms of the full integration of the state of J&K.3 Gilgit Baltistan’s integration into Pakistan is bound to strengthen constituencies within India that advocate J&K’s full integration with the Indian Union. Kashmir is the lifeblood of Pakistan’s India project. It is the focus of Pakistan’s proxies against India – a justification for committing aggression and an excuse to interfere. Pakistan’s long drawn contemplation and purported hesitations on Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is rooted in such contending realties. Pakistan may be looking for a middle path solution, one that does not essentially alter its stated positon on Kashmir. Given that Pakistan is politically and strategically invested in the Kashmir issue, it is difficult to outright fathom whether the country is preparing to forego its perennial stand of enmity with India and instead totally adhere to the Chinese economic agenda. Besides, the move to integrate Gilgit Baltistan may cost Pakistan in terms of the overwhelming support it enjoys among Kashmiri separatists in India. The separatist leadership in J&K, which Pakistan has nurtured for decades, has firmly resisted the idea of granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan and conveyed its stern objections in this regard to the political leadership in Islamabad.4
Cognisant of constitutional constraints and fearing a massive political fallout, the Pakistan government constituted a high-level committee headed by Sartaj Aziz to address the statutory ambiguity of the region. After due deliberations, the committee submitted its report, the specific contents of which have not yet been made public. Rightly so, as within Pakistan, Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is being primarily viewed through the wider prism of the implications and fallout on the country’s larger Kashmir stratagem.
Linking, de-linking
In principle, Pakistan’s bid to alter the status quo regarding Gilgit Baltistan is not new. Be it the revocation of the State Subject Rule, ceding a significant chunk of territory to China in 1963 or transforming the demography of the region in order to dilute its Shia majority – the region has undergone significant changes since 1947. The region had remained administratively conjoined with the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) till the 1949 Karachi Agreement (without Gilgit Baltistan being represented) bifurcated them.5 This was understandably done to siphon off the larger chunk of territory from the then impending UN-mediated negotiations with India. Despite the bifurcation, the region, along with ‘AJK’, is considered part of the Kashmir dispute. The umbilical link between the two entities has persisted nonetheless due to the political deprivation of Gilgit Baltistan. While ‘AJK’ was compensated with an interim constitution in 1974, Gilgit Baltistan’s political status continued to be contingent upon the final resolution of the Kashmir issue.
With a predominant Muslim population, the region was once critical for Pakistan’s plebiscite calculus. Over a period of time, however, the region was reduced to the status of a mere pawn for furthering Pakistan’s strategic objectives. Being handed transient structures of governance for decades, the region later became a commodity of tussle between ‘AJK’ and Islamabad.6 Besides squarely resisting the proposed provincial status, ‘AJK’ has jostled to regain its link with and control over Gilgit Baltistan, hoping that this would bolster its Kashmir politics by bringing in a critical mass of support. Hence, the proposal to accord provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan will only conform to a long-sustained pattern of Pakistan’s political experiments in the region. Without affording it constitutional status, Pakistan has linked and de-linked Gilgit Baltistan from the Kashmir issue only to fulfil narrow strategic purposes.
Chinese persuasion?
Away from the media frenzied interpretations and diplomatic rancour, one must realise that the current debate on provincial status for Gilgit Baltistan is only a facsimile of what transpired not long ago. In late 2015 and early 2016, the debate on provincial status was similar to the current discourse.7 The context and contours in that phase were not materially different and conjectural estimates concerning a possible Chinese angle existed then as well. If we go back to the mid-1980s, the Gilgit Baltistan Bar Association demanded that the region be made a province of Pakistan.8 This makes it amply clear that the demand of provincial status existed well before the Chinese stakes became deep seated. And it has been estimated that the popularity of such a demand is quite high.9 Despite this, it is hard to discount a possible Chinese dimension based on CPEC prospects as a driving force in the current spate of deliberations. The China factor has added energy and speculation at least in the present leg when a renewed effort to constitutionally empower Gilgit Baltistan is being made.
The complete absorption of the region into Pakistan would favour China. Controlling a significant portion of the region, i.e., the Trans Karakoram Tract, the Chinese strategy and objectives are best served with Gilgit Baltistan under Pakistan’s control.10 Secondly, China’s conservative risk-averse model of investment conflicts with imperilling billions in a disputed territory with a provisional status and the future of which is slated to be re-negotiated (by China’s own admission) as per Article 6 of the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement 1963.11
India: logic, deductions, options
While some would argue that Gilgit Baltistan’s assimilation may undermine India’s claim on the region, it cannot altogether dissolve it. Irrespective of the unlawful incorporation, India will continue to uphold its claim on both parts of PoK as it has since 1947. Domestically for years, India’s policy on PoK has been dismissed as being inert and least assertive. However, under a new political dispensation, a concerted effort is being made to alter previously held perception – that PoK is a peripheral issue on the list of India’s strategic priorities. Raising issues concerning PoK, be it compensation for refugees, Prime Minister Modi’s reference to it in his Independence Day address, and the frequency of official public statements on the territory indicate that India could well be thinking in terms of re-drawing the rules of engagement. Lately, Gilgit Baltistan in particular has ascended in India’s strategic calculations due to the Chinese foray into the region. Besides, the extant territorial claim on the region provides validity and strength to India’s objections on CPEC.
The idea of incorporating Gilgit Baltistan reflects Pakistan’s and China’s wish to prioritise shared economic ambitions over territorial interests. However, even as the two countries are seen to be progressing towards mutual accommodation of their interests, India may opt not to complement their approach this time. A standing territorial claim is India’s potential strategic ammunition against China-Pakistan nexus in PoK and India cannot afford to forgo it at the moment.
India-Pakistan bilateral experiments in the past, especially those that, amongst other things, contemplated permanently retaining the status quo, have clearly not worked. India’s fundamental thrust needs to diverge from pre-existing notions and this is possible only once it re-draws its overall strategy and particularly reinforces its policy on PoK. In times of a perceptible qualitative shift in policy formulation and posturing, Gilgit Baltistan’s absorption will yield India an opportunity to re-explore its options in terms of stabilizing J&K. India could choose to engage more with views that advocate J&K’s complete and final integration.
(This is the author’s third in the series of commentaries on Gilgit Baltistan’s proposed provincial status since August 2015. The previous commentaries can be found here and here.)
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Early day motion 1107, “Annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan as its fifth frontier,” The British Parliament, March 23, 2017, at https://www.parliament.uk/edm/2016-17/1107
Why has India chosen to become a member of the International Energy Agency
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
April 19, 2017
Given that over 70 per cent of the world's energy consumption comes under the IEA umbrella, the association with the agency will substantially increase India’s relevance in global energy governance.
At the November 2015 launch of the special edition of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook series on the Indian energy sector, the Agency’s executive director, Dr. Fatih Birol, had noted that “We can’t talk about the future of the global energy markets without talking with India.”1 Therefore, when India joined the ranks of the IEA’s membership on March 30, 2017, albeit as a “Member by Associate”, it was seen as inevitable. Moreover, long before India formally came on board the IEA, it had been engaging with the organisation. As early as 1998, India had signed the Declaration of Cooperation covering issues related to energy security and statistics. Subsequently, it had signed three Joint Statements with the IEA – the last one in 2013 – which covered various areas of mutual interest in the energy spectrum. However, the priority area for co-operation had been in oil and gas security and, to that end, the IEA and India’s Ministry for Petroleum and Natural Gas (Mo&PNG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2011, the first time that the IEA signed one with a key partner country in the area of emergency preparedness.
Interestingly, despite the cooperative nature of the relationship, India has been wary in committing itself to the IEA’s agenda. In fact, before 2011, the then Prime Minister’s Office had asked the Mo&PNG for a position paper on “Whether India should Join IEA”. At that time, the ministry had recommended that while India should collaborate with the IEA’s programmes through agreements and MoUs such as the IEA’s Global Energy Emergency Response System, which dealt with oil supply disruption exercises and contingency plans with member countries, it should not become a member of the organisation per se. The rationale then was that while interacting and cooperating with the IEA would allow India to maximise the strategic depth of its crude oil reserves as well as benefit from the IEA’s technical assistance in the energy sector, it would preclude it from taking on the obligations entailed by membership. As a result, India signed the said MoU, whereby the petroleum ministry and the IEA agreed to work together on strengthening and developing the oil stockholding regime and the emergency response policies as well as the exchange of information in the oil and gas sectors.2
However, over time, and with the increasing move towards greater integration with the global energy market, the government has been interacting more frequently with the Agency, holding high level policy dialogues and workshops, joint research and analyses projects on energy sectors and markets, and exchanging technical know-how and information on future projections.3
The question that therefore behoves asking is this: if India was in any case benefiting from informal interaction with the IEA, why did it go back on its earlier decision and formally join the organisation? The IEA’s rationale for inviting non-OECD countries to join it is evident, as the agency benefits from the growing association of emerging economies by gaining access to their data and by adding to the oil stockpiles in the event of supply disruptions, which is its raison d’etre. Second, given the IEA’s growing role in combating climate change, it allows the promotion of clean energy technologies in some of the world’s largest carbon emitters. But what additional benefits would India gain as a member of the IEA over and above what it has gained as a non-member?
The answer may well lie in the current government’s goal of not only providing access to electricity for the people under its “24x7 Power For All” initiative but also in meeting its climate change targets undertaken under the Paris Climate change agreement. Moreover, it will provide India the geopolitical platform to take the lead in climate and energy issues. As the Minister for Power as well as Renewable Energy Piyush Goyal said on the occasion of India’s accession to the IEA membership, not only is deeper engagement with the IEA a component of achieving the ‘Power for All’ initiative but it would also give India an opportunity to become the voice of the developing world. In particular, he was referring to the International Solar Alliance (ISA) initiative.
The ISA is an Indian initiative that was first proposed by Prime Minister Modi during a November 2015 speech at the Wembley Stadium. On that occasion, he called upon countries with abundant sunlight “stretching between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn” to work for the efficient exploitation of solar energy in order to reduce dependence on fossil based fuels. Thereafter, Modi, along with French President Francois Hollande, launched the initiative in Paris ahead of the COP 21conference in November 2015. The goal of the Alliance is to raise USD 500 billion from public finances matched by another USD 500 billion from the private sector in order to have 1,000 GW (100,0000 MW) global capacity of solar power by 2030.
At the time, however, the Obama administration had been ambivalent about the ISA. Although it expressed support for the concept, it preferred that the ISA be kept as an informal arrangement since a formal ‘treaty arrangement’ would require congressional approval which may not be forthcoming from a Republican-dominated Congress determined to oppose the Democratic administration’s initiative in this regard.4 But India was of the opinion that, without a treaty, the Alliance would lack teeth, particularly in the event of a dispute.
Eventually, the Framework Agreement of the ISA was opened for signature in Marrakesh, Morocco, in November 2016. 121 countries have joined the Alliance whose headquarters is in Gurugram (Gurgaon). The ISA is based on three objectives – lower the price of solar panels and solar power in general by increasing demand; standardise solar technologies through collaboration in technological innovation, which would also help to bring down the price of solar energy; and, foster research and development, particularly in storage technology.
For India, the ISA provides it with a platform to position itself as a leader on the world energy and environment stage. However, given that the success of the initiative will depend largely on the number of countries coming on board, collaboration with other multilateral bodies, including the UN, IEA, IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) as well as corporates and industry, among others, is critical as these will assist in adapting the technologies needed by developing member countries to their specific conditions and economic realities. Given that over 70 per cent of the world's energy consumption comes under the IEA umbrella, the association with the IEA will substantially increase India’s relevance in global energy governance. Finally, and more importantly, the IEA can encourage financial institutions to support India’s energy, particularly, its solar energy programme.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hanging of Mufti Hannan may not mean the end of HuJI in Bangladesh
Anand Kumar
April 19, 2017
Mufti Hanna’s hanging may not mean the end of the terror outfit and definitely not the end of radical ideology in Bangladesh.
At one time, the terror outfit Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (Movement of the Islamic Holy War) was one of the strongest extremist outfits in Bangladesh and its aspiration was the implementation of Shariat rule both in Bangladesh and Myanmar. It was headed by Mufti Hannan, who has now been executed for his involvement in a number of terror activities. His hanging is likely to give a serious blow to the outfit, although this may not necessarily mean its end. Nevertheless, this is an important development in a country which has been battling Islamist extremism and trying to put it under check.
Mufti Hannan had an Islamist background. At the time of Bangladesh’s Liberation War, his father, Noor Uddin Munshi, was a leader of the Muslim League in Gopalganj’s Kotalipara sub-district. Noor was shot dead for committing atrocities against Bangladeshi people during the Liberation War. His house had hoisted a Pakistani flag even after Bangladesh was created.
After his initial madrasa education in Bangladesh, Mufti Hannan went to both India and Pakistan for higher Islamic studies. In India, he studied at a Deoband madrasa and was later a student of the Islamic Studies Department at Aligarh University from where he obtained a Master's degree in 1987. In 1988, he got enrolled at Jamiya Yusuf Bin Nuriya Madrasa in Karachi from where, during the during the Ramadan break in 1990, he moved to Afghanistan to fight the Afghan jihad. It is believed that his indoctrination into militancy took place while studying Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence in Karachi. Before joining the Afghan jihad, he was given 15 days training in Afghanistan in bomb-making and carrying out military assaults. He also provided other recruits to the Afghan jihad and got injured while participating in it.
It was also around this time that the notorious outfit HuJI Bangladesh was born, though its origins are somewhat obscure. Some claim that Moulana Abdur Rahman Faruki from Manirampur in Jessore, along with other Bangladeshi mujahids, founded HuJI in 1989 while they were still fighting in Afghanistan. Faruki was killed in the Afghan jihad while trying to defuse a mine in Khost. Hannan returned to Bangladesh in 1993 and started leading a group of Afghan jihad returnees.
Others say that the Afghan jihad returnees formally launched HuJI at a press conference held in Dhaka on April 30, 1992, after the end of the Afghan jihad. According to them, Moulana Abdus Salam was made its chief. He is presently in jail for his role in the August 21, 2004 grenade attack. Mufti Hannan had also participated in this attack and the prime target was the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina. Though Sheikh Hasina suffered only some serious injuries, 23 members of the Awami League including Ivy Rahman, the then women's affairs secretary of the party, were killed and nearly 150 others injured.
Soon after its formation, HuJI Bangladesh had split into several factions over the method to be adopted in waging armed jihad. Mufti Hannan became chief of one such faction. He developed a close relationship with some leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh. His proximity also grew with other militant groups including the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Rohingya-based outfits active in the Chittagong region.
Hannan was the face of terror in Bangladesh and his outfit HuJI introduced militancy in the country through a bomb attack on a programme of Udichi Shilpigosthi in Jessore in 1999. He created terror across Bangladesh by launching over a dozen grenade attacks on Awami League rallies in his failed attempts to assassinate Sheikh Hasina and other top leaders. He also targeted the former British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury at Hazrat Shahjalal Shrine in Sylhet, religious institutions and cultural programmes including Pohela Boishakh celebrations.
Mufti Hannan was arrested along with his wife and children from a house in Dhaka on October 1, 2005. Subsequently, HuJI(B) claimed responsibility for nearly a dozen attacks between 1999 and October 17, 2005, after which the BNP-Jamaat government was forced to ban the outfit. Speaking to the media after his arrest, an indignant Mufti Hannan had claimed that law enforcers were not supposed to arrest him since some influential ministers of the BNP-led government had assured him that he would be exempted from the August 21, 2004 grenade attack case.
There are at least 17 cases filed against Mufti Hannan for masterminding various terror attacks. Of these, he has been sentenced to death for killing three people and injuring then UK envoy Anwar Choudhury at Shahjalal shrine in 2004. He was hanged after his death sentence was cleared by the apex court and his request for presidential clemency was rejected on April 8, 2017.
Mufti Hannan’s appeal against another death sentence handed down in the Ramna Batamul blast case is currently pending with the High Court. He also faced trial for the failed August 21, 2004 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina who was then the opposition leader. He was given life-term imprisonment in 2003 for plotting to kill Hasina at Kotalipara in 2000 when she was the prime minister.
At one time, HuJI was quite active in India and its involvement was suspected in a number of terror incidents. The US had branded HuJI as an international terror outfit and banned it. But in recent times, the outfit has been less active in Bangladesh after a number of other terror outfits emerged in that country. The most prominent among them has been Jumatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB). A faction of JMB, now called neo-JMB, has even proclaimed its allegiance to the ISIS.
Mufti Hannan was hanged few days before the Pohela Boishakh, the Bengali New Year festival. This festival is celebrated with a great deal of fervour in Bangladesh and in West Bengal. But this festival is also opposed by the Islamists of Bangladesh who see in it a reflection of their Hindu past. The hanging of Mufti Hannan on the eve of Pohela Boishakh might send an important message to the terror outfit that the government of the day in Bangladesh is committed to protect the country’s cultural traditions. It would also boost its confidence in the fight against radical Islamists who have expanded their grip in recent years by targeting and killing atheist bloggers, writers, foreigners and minority groups. But the attempt made by his sympathisers to free Mufti Hannan from a prison van on March 6, 2017 while he was being brought back to Gazipur's Kashimpur prison from the court indicates that there are still some free and active people who are either part of HuJI or support its ideology. Thus, his hanging may not mean the end of the terror outfit and definitely not the end of radical ideology in Bangladesh.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Mother of All Bombs: A New Age Weapon of Mass Destruction?
Ajey Lele
April 18, 2017
Given the advertisement surrounding the use of MOAB, it is possible that the Trump administration is signalling to its adversaries the very lethal weapons in its arsenal and its willingness to use them.
The term Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) was probably used in the print media for the first time following the uproar over Germany’s aerial bombardment of the Basque city of Guernica in April 1937.1 Only a year before, Italy had used mustard and other Chemical Warfare (CW) agents in a region of modern-day Ethiopia. Broadly, the idea behind the use of the term WMD was to depict the heinous form of killing many innocent civilians. Such weapons could be aerial platforms called aircraft to undertake carpet bombing or usage of deadly chemical substances. After the use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War, these weapons too got added to the list of WMDs. Subsequently, the list became complete with the inclusion of biological weapons. In 1956, the then Soviet minister for defence argued that modern warfare would be dominated by WMDs, which include massive use of air forces and rocket forces as well as chemical, nuclear and biological weapons.2
On Thursday, April 13, 2017, the US Airforce dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat over eastern Afghanistan. Known as GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb (MOAB, commonly referred to as the “Mother of All Bombs”) and costing around USD 16 million, this 21,000 pound (9525 kg) bomb was dropped from an MC-130 aircraft with the aid of a parachute and using a satellite based guidance mechanism. The bomb exploded some six feet above the ground and had a blast radius of 1.6 km. According to the post-attack damage assessment, around 100 militants belonging to the terror group ISIS were killed and significant damage to the over ground and underground infrastructure took place (such bombs can break through around 200 feet of reinforced concrete).
Why did the US choose to drop this bomb now when it has had it in its arsenal since 2003? And, why was Afghanistan chosen as a target? Is Nangarhar province where the bomb was dropped modern-day Guernica? The answer could be both yes and no. Unlike at Guernica where there was a need to test the efficacy of aerial bombardment, no such need existed in the case of MOAB. It was tested in 2003 by its developers and it is known that a roughly 10,000 kg bomb provides a yield of 10 to 11 tons of TNT.3 (It may be noted that the Nagasaki nuclear bomb had a yield of 20 kilotons (TNT equivalent) and the one used on Hiroshima 15 kilotons.) Hence, more than a need to test, the US was probably keen to engage in global signalling especially towards North Korea. The idea appears to have been to highlight that the US has non-nuclear options available, which are almost as dreadful, and will not hesitate to use them. With regard to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, there is definitely a requirement for tough action against ISIS. However, the choice of a heavy weapon like MOAB has provoked debate.
Today, the US needs to address multiple threats globally. Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan are not giving US policy-makers and its military any respite. North Korea appears to be challenging US supremacy. In addition, there are strategic challenges from Russia, China and Iran. For years now, disarmament and arms control have been focus areas in the US defence and foreign policy agenda. The US political leadership has been arguing that WMDs pose the greatest threat to Americans as well as to humanity at large. They have ensured that global politics revolves around this issue and have effectively, and selectively, used the issue of WMDs to suit their requirement. For example, hundreds getting killed in Syria in conventional warfighting gets overlooked, but when deaths occur due to use of chemical weapons the US government undertakes an offensive response. Essentially, the use or intention to use of WMDs amounts to crossing a red line. This, however, does not apply to massive damage caused by conventional weapons.
The Trump administration appears to be attempting to handle the existing strategic challenges a bit differently than its predecessors. Its response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria appears to be more along the lines of shock and awe. If the use of chemical weapons was the issue, then it is difficult to understand why only the assets of the Syrian air force on ground were targeted. Probably, it appears that the disproportionate force (59 Tomahawk missiles) was required owing to the accuracy aspects of the missiles. If there had existed some stock of chemical weapons in the area targeted (no information to that effect is available) then the use of such missiles would have proved counterproductive. Destroying Chemical and Biological Weapons without dispersing their deadly contents is a difficult task. Using conventional weapons like Tomahawk missiles could actually help spread chemicals. Instead, the Trump administration should have used the Agent Defeat Weapon or the Agent Defeat Warhead (ADW4), which is designed to disable a WMD storage or production site. The US is known to possess this unique weapon, possibly since 2003.
With regard to Afghanistan, it is difficult to comprehend that just one big bomb is a solution to the challenge posed by ISIS. Given the advertisement surrounding the use of MOAB, it is possible that the Trump administration is signalling to its adversaries the very lethal weapons in its arsenal and its willingness to use them. Would the use of MOAB set off a new arms race’? It would be premature to jump to any such conclusion. However, it is important to note that MOAB is not the biggest non-nuclear bomb. A decade ago, Russia had tested what is known as the Father of All Bombs (FOAB) on September 11, 2007. FOAB was four times more powerful than MOAB.
In addition to these bombs, there are a few other weapons available with the major powers like directed energy weapons, e-bombs and cyber weapons. The use of MOAB raises many questions rather than providing solutions to present challenges. If this is an off-the-cuff reaction by the US administration, then the issue would die down soon. However, if the US feels that Syria and North Korea are challenging WMD deterrence, then the use of MOAB could even be a ploy to test the waters. The US understands that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stands extended in perpetuity but that does not mean that nuclear deterrence is. Is it then trying to change the grammar of existing WMD deterrence and proposing to redefine modern day WMDs?
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. The mass killing of humans/animals and massive destruction this bombing campaign caused was depicted by Picasso in a mural called Guernica, whose replica is placed outside the entrance to the UN Security Council.
2. Eric Croddy and James Wirtz, (Eds), Weapons of Mass Destruction, ABC-CLIO Inc, California, 2005, p. ix.
3. The explosive yield of TNT is considered the standard measure of the strength of bombs.
The many imponderables in sharing the Teesta waters
Gautam Sen
April 18, 2017
Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh.
The Teesta River water sharing issue has loomed large over India-Bangladesh relations for over a decade. It was a key issue in the recent deliberations during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. However, the issue did not excite public opinion at the grass-root level in the north Bengal districts through which the river flows before entering Bangladesh. Political parties in Bengal, with a presence in the affected districts of Darjeeling, Siliguri, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, North and South Dinajpur and Malda, have not taken a strident posture in the matter. The views of the ruling party, Trinamul Congress (TMC), have, however, been articulated by the chief minister who wants issues impinging on the agricultural interests of these districts to be carefully considered before finalizing a water sharing deal.
As against the above-stated position, public opinion in the Teesta water-flow affected districts of Rangpur, Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Gaibandha, Dinajpur and Bogra in Bangladesh have been articulated at various platforms. And their opinion favours a fair sharing of the Teesta waters between the two countries. Notwithstanding the above, there is a view in some official circles in Bangladesh for some time now that Teesta waters are now only a supplementary source of irrigation. With the cultivation cycle changing (more crops being cultivated in other than the lean season), the impact of water scarcity on the country`s agriculture would be relatively less in the future. While failure to conclude the Teesta deal has disheartened the ruling Awami League and its allied circles, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, as expected, has used the failure to criticise the Sheikh Hasina government.
It is necessary to highlight the fact that Sikkim where Teesta originates (from Teesta Kangse glacier), and flows through for a major part of its 459 kilometre long journey (151 kms within Sikkim, and 142 kms along the Sikkim-Bengal border), has not made much of an issue or taken a decisive stand on what should be done to protect its interests in the water sharing bargain. There are six hydel projects (four already operationalised) in Sikkim along the river, which require a suitable southward water draft to generate electricity apropos the developmental needs of the state and the requirements of the Indian electricity grid. India`s Ministry of Water Resources, in concert with sister line ministries, will obviously have to take care of this requirement. But there has not been much of a public discourse on, or indication at the official level of, factoring this aspect in the prospective water sharing process. The Sikkim government seems to be presently dealing with the matter at a low key, for tactical reasons. It does not want any restriction on its Teesta-related power potential, though it would be accommodative to any hydrological measure which controls landslides and concomitant siltation in the river.
There are many imponderables in sharing the Teesta waters on a basis that is satisfactory to both Bangladesh and India. An easy resolution may not be feasible under the hydrological conditions prevailing at present. The dams upstream on the Teesta and its tributaries in Sikkim are creating a substantial reduction in water flow downstream, owing to periodic landslides, siltation, etc., notwithstanding the fact that these dams do not provide for water storage. Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh in the Rangpur command area.
Furthermore, the Teesta Barrage Project (TBP) at Gajoldoba in Jalpaiguri district of Bengal constructed at a cost of more than Rs. 1300 crore may be deemed as another de facto bottleneck in the resolution of the water sharing process. The TBP was conceived as a multi-purpose project in the aftermath of the massive floods in Jalpaiguri in 1968. This was done in an over-ambitious manner for flood control, power generation and irrigation of more than nine lakh hectares of command area in north Bengal. While TBP has contributed to flood control to an extent, particularly downstream of Sevoke (near Siliguri) where the river descends to the flood plains, there has been much less success towards increasing the areas under irrigation in the lower command area, apart from reducing the down-stream flows to Bangladesh. The operation of TBP and water diversion through the Teesta-Mahananda irrigation canal has changed the hydrological character of Teesta river south of Gajoldoba. These developments have contributed to a decline in the area occupied by the active river by more than 50 per cent during the 1991-2014 period. All these developments have had their consequences on the water flow to Bangladesh. Unless these are mitigated, an agreement on Teesta river water sharing between the two countries cannot be realistically expected.
An agreement on Teesta water sharing will have to encompass much more than ensuring a minimum down-stream flow to Bangladesh during the lean season. A comprehensive river basin management approach is a sine qua non for optimum gains, not only for both India and Bangladesh, but also for the riparian regions and states along the Teesta. Viewed in this perspective, an appraisal of Bangladesh`s Teesta Barrage (TB) already operational at Dhoani in Lalmonirhat district will also be necessary. The TB, initiated in 1979 and the first phase completed in 1998, had envisaged an ambitious target of developing an irrigated area of 750,000 hectares of irrigated area. In the existing context of reduced discharge owing to the above-mentioned developments, the irrigation potential of TB is unlikely to be achieved. A via media solution will have to be evolved, factoring in the hydrological conditions presently prevailing and likely in the near future. Till such an appraisal is undertaken, India would be the target of criticism resulting from less than an optimum operational outcome of the TB.
Both in India and Bangladesh, a broad consensus involving the political parties and other stake-holders in the catchment and command areas of Teesta river and its tributaries will be necessary. Attempts for a solution should be initiated seriously at the technical level without delay, involving hydrological and agro-climatic experts of both countries with a proper mandate entrusted to them. A final agreement may be based on the recommendations of experts, followed by a political compromise. Even then, an appropriate outcome may elude us if the experience with the Kalyan Rudra Report on Teesta water management is any indication. The report commissioned by the first TMC government was neither disclosed nor officially accepted by the latter because of its reported recommendation favouring Bangladesh`s position. Notwithstanding this backdrop, there is a need to persevere with efforts to reach an equitable solution on the Teesta water sharing issue so that capital investment towards re-engineering river-basin structures, river training, etc., which may be inevitable in future, can be carried out optimally with avoidable escalation in costs.
The scenario envisaged can only be realised, however, with adequate will of all concerned, particularly at the political and administrative levels. If the situation does not evolve as above, the Teesta river basin may eventually encounter the fate of the Aral Sea and the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal in Central Asia whose hydrology have been substantially impaired owing to injudicious human intervention.
The author is a retired IDAS officer who has served in senior positions in the Government of India and a State Government.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
The world is watching with much fear and anxiety, admixed with some curiosity, the unfolding confrontation between President Trump and Kim Jong-un the supreme leader of North Korea. We still do not know whether the confrontation will lead to hostilities with predictably unpredictable and disastrous consequences or the two sides along with other interested parties will sit down and talk. Trump, with no previous political experience, has been in office for over 100 days. He has not yet put together a full team in the State and Defence departments and hence does not get competent professional advice essential to deal maturely with such a crisis.
Kim Jong-un is the grandson of the founder of North Korea who started the Korean War (1950-53) by invading South Korea, costing five million human lives including 40,000 US soldiers. The world does not have credible information on the schooling and other details of Kim Jong-un who assumed office in 2012. There are reports that he studied in Switzerland and Germany. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is considered a pariah state by the United States and the rest of the West and as such does not have normal contacts with the outside world. The state controls the flow of information inside and with the outside world.
Historical Background
It is necessary to see the current confrontation in a sound historical perspective. The 1953 Armistice ending the Korean War should have been followed up with a peace treaty. DPRK, China, and USSR wanted it. But, for reasons to do with the Cold War, Washington did not want a peace treaty as such a treaty would have required the termination of the US military presence in the Korean peninsula. In fact, Washington unilaterally violated clause 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement by placing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1956 and followed it up the next year with Matador missiles that had the range to hit China and USSR.
In 1962/63, both Moscow and Beijing rejected DPRK’s request for assistance to start a nuclear programme. Following the collapse of the Cold War, the US removed nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1992 and the two Koreas reached a Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange, and Cooperation. Shortly thereafter, the two Koreas issued a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, pledging not to possess, produce, or use nuclear weapons and prohibiting uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
However, Washington did not want to support reconciliation in Korea and resumed joint military exercises with South Korea. DPRK threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), talks followed with Jimmy Carter’s mediation, and in 1994 it agreed to adhere to the NPT and freeze its project against the promise of two light water reactors and humanitarian assistance from the US. Clinton was US President then and given time the agreement might have worked out. Clinton even thought of making a state visit to Pyongyang to seal the deal. His Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did go to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong il.
But Clinton’s successor George Bush condemned DPRK as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and the latter withdrew from the NPT and resumed its nuclear programme. China and Russia took the initiative for the Six Party talks (DPRK, Republic of Korea, Japan, US, Russia, and China) and once again there was progress in narrowing the differences. The Six Party talks resumed even after the 2006 nuclear weapon test by DPRK. At the last round held in 2007, DPRK agreed to freeze its programme and give a full inventory to IAEA; the US agreed to remove DPRK from the list of states sponsoring terrorism; and DPRK and Japan agreed to hold ‘intensive’ discussions’ to resolve their differences.
The US did not, however, accept the validity of the inventory given by DPRK to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, when the latter launched a satellite in April 2009 despite opposition from Washington, the Six Party talks ended without delivering the intended results.
We may note here that DPRK’s nuclear programme is not the only issue. It wants an end to the war, normal relations with the US and Japan, and financial assistance from them. Another point to note is that the annual South Korea-US joint military exercises unnerve DPRK and it makes a point of testing missiles and making aggressive statements to unnerve South Korea and Japan.
Current Confrontation
The current confrontation arose because DPRK, celebrating the 105th birth anniversary of its founder Kim II Sung, wanted to carry out nuclear and missile tests. When such tests are expected, Seoul and Tokyo get nervous. Nervousness does not generate sound policy options.
Washington needs to realize that intimidation will not work for the simple reason that, though DPRK might be destroyed in toto, before that happens Pyongyang is in a position to inflict thousands of casualties on South Korea where there are 28,000 US troops and 60,000 Japanese.
Above all, it is necessary to understand the psychology of Kim Jong-un. A dictator, without the benefit of advice from counsellors who can speak fearlessly and frankly with him, is running a grave risk of taking the wrong decisions.
Trump’s Handling of the Crisis
President Trump has been giving mixed signals, perhaps deliberately, or more likely reflecting the inherent incoherence of his administration. He has said that “all options are on the table”; that Kim Jong-un is a ‘smart cookie’ who got power at a young age and has successfully held on to it; and that he (Trump) would be honoured to meet him “if the circumstances are right”. True to his style, Trump added, “If he came here, I’d accept him, but I wouldn’t give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off when we give them these big state dinners.” He went on to suggest he would serve Kim – and other visiting leaders – “a hamburger on a conference table”. Wittingly or unwittingly, Trump made sure that his public invitation will be seen as an insult in Pyongyang.
Trump’s Expectations from China
President Trump sought President Xi Jinping’s help in resolving the crisis when the two met at Mar a Lago in Florida in the first week of April 2017. Xi agreed to do what he can, but made it clear that there were limits to what he can do. A grateful Trump declared that in his eyes China was no longer a ‘currency manipulator’. The two have been speaking on the phone. Trump seems to have understood the complexity of the issue or is at least understanding it slowly.
The thought that China will successfully compel DPRK to climb down just to please Trump and hand over to him a major foreign policy victory is rather naïve. First, it is in China’s interest to let the issue remain unresolved so that the US, Japan, and South Korea will be compelled to seek its assistance from time to time. Secondly, if the regime in DPRK collapses, there will be an exodus to China with all the attendant problems. Third, if the regime in Pyongyang falls and the two Koreas get united and yet US troops remain there that will not be in China’s interest. Therefore, we may assume that China will try to defuse the crisis but will not like a permanent solution that denuclearizes DPRK.
Abe’s Moves
For years, Prime Minister Abe has been trying to remove the restrictions imposed on Japan’s military by the Constitution. The relevant article reads:
Instead of getting the article amended which might not be politically feasible, Abe got the article ‘reinterpreted’ to permit ‘collective defense’ and got the Diet to endorse that interpretation. Abe said that DPRK might send chemical weapons through missiles to Japan. Whether it is a correct professional assessment or not, Abe’s intention was to gain support for his policy for a military without restrictions. Abe has sent Izumo, a helicopter carrier to escort US warships as a way of implementing his new defence policy.
Situation in South Korea
A presidential election is due on May 9, 2017, following the removal of President Park Guen-hye, daughter of Park Chung-hee, who ruled the country from 1961 to 1979. The front runner is Moon Jae-in, a human rights lawyer who wants to open a dialogue with DPRK. Moon Jae-in is opposed to the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missiles that are already under way. Trump publicly asked South Korea to pay the cost of USD 1 billion and Seoul has publicly refused. Trump’s National Security Adviser General McMaster has told his Korean counterpart that Seoul would not have to pay. Trump has threatened to re-open the 2012 Free Trade Agreement with Seoul. One may conclude that Trump’s relations with Moon Jae-in, if he were to be elected, will be rocky.
A Lesson from History
US policy makers might recall the Korean War. The invasion took place on June 24, 1950; US troops were rushed to South Korea under a UN umbrella; as General McArthur was planning to cross the 38th parallel, which was the border between the two Koreas, China through Nehru warned Washington that it would enter the war if that parallel was crossed; Truman did not heed Nehru’s advice to seek an end to the war through negotiations and Nehru was ridiculed for his ‘moral posturing’. Three years and five million deaths later, the cease fire took effect roughly on the 38th parallel.
What is, therefore, required is a dialogue treating DPRK with respect. A summit level meeting between Trump and Kim Jong-un should be preceded by meetings at the diplomatic level, preferably in a third country. In 1994, there was Jimmy Carter to mediate and de-escalate the first nuclear crisis. Carter’s mission was publicly announced, but this time a more discreet contact might be preferable. A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The timing of its engagements with Armenia and Cyprus is a clear indication that India is hyphenating its relations with Turkey. By simultaneously engaging with his regional adversaries, India is hoping to influence Erdogan’s attention and priorities.
Coincidence or diplomatic convenience! If India describes its diplomatic engagements with Turkey and its two regional adversaries, Cyprus and Armenia, along those lines, then something is amiss. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit, which begins on Monday, was preceded by the visit of his Cypriot counterpart Nicos Anastasiades. If this was not sufficient, a couple of days earlier Vice President Hamid Ansari completed a successful visit to Armenia. It is not accidental that Turkey has strong and controversial historical baggage vis-à-vis these two countries which has only intensified under Erdogan.
Armenia is a sad chapter in Turkish history. Turkey’s role and involvement in the large scale killing of Armenians in the dying days of the Ottoman Empire have been controversial. Rejecting the claims of genocide, Turkish leaders have been refusing to come to terms with the killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians during the First World War. Describing the deaths as ‘genocide' has been a punishable offense in Turkey. And any reference to the Armenian genocide has been a cause of tension between Turkey and its Western allies.
Though Indian soldiers took part in the liberation of Arab territories from the Ottoman yoke, nationalists and post-1947 India had viewed the First World War merely as a British colonial policy. Hence, it carefully eschewed depicting the Armenian killings as genocide and normalization of relations with Armenia did not alter this position; that is, until this week.
The highpoint of Vice-President Ansari’s engagements in Armenia was his visit to the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute at Tsitsernakaberd in the capital. Meeting students and faculty members of the Yerevan State University, he conveyed a powerful message: “There cannot be two opinions regarding the killings of the innocent people, be it in this region, Asia, Africa or in Latin America. We are obliged to adopt the universal values.” Responding to questions about the Turkish denial, Ansari remarked that the Armenian killing “raised a question certain states would find it hard to reply to.” The inference was simple. Despite the nomenclature, Turkey cannot run away from its historical responsibility vis-à-vis the Armenians.
If this were not sufficient, India hosted Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades a couple of days before Erdogan's arrival. In July 1974, the Turkish armed forced occupied northern Cyprus and paved the way for the Declaration of "Turkey Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983. No country in the world has recognized, let alone condoned, the Turkish occupation and international efforts towards ending the division of Cyprus have been unsuccessful. Erdogan's hard-line positions are partly blamed for the stalemate in the UN-mediated peace efforts.
But are these engagements coincidental? While Cyprus and Turkey are looked after by the Central Europe Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, Armenia comes under the Eurasia Division. However, Poland comes under Central Europe, and the Vice-President visited Poland from Armenia. One can easily exclude ‘coincidence' as the explanation for this week's parleys. What then could be India’s message to Erdogan?
Despite winning all the elections since he first became prime minister in 2003, Erdogan’s domestic popularity is on the wane and is manifested by his narrow victory in the recent referendum for a change over to the presidential system. His foreign policy successes are also limited. In recent years, especially since the onset of the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia in December 2010, the Turkish leader has turned belligerent and mercurial towards his neighbours and allies. By depicting Turkey as the model for Arab countries facing domestic upheavals, Erdogan revived the historic Arab-Turkish animosity and fears of neo-Ottomanism. As a result, some of his erstwhile allies became his new adversaries.
Erdogan also has frosty relations with some of India’s close friends in the region. The killing of 10 Turkish citizens by Israel during the Gaza flotilla controversy in May 2010 resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries which were restored only in 2016. Erdogan, however, faced his own Mari Marmara moment of apology and remorse following the shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi-24 attack aircraft in November 2015. Above all, his professed bonhomie with Bashar al-Assad nose-dived following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
The diplomatic row over the participation Turkish citizens in EU countries in the recent referendum and Erdogan’s comparison of some European leaders with Hitler only made matters worse. Thus, while Turkey is important, Erdogan is becoming a new Ahmadinejad – a controversial and divisive figure.
For long, India was at the receiving end. Both during and after the Cold War, Turkey has been closer to Pakistan than to India. This has not changed significantly under Erdogan and on core issues like Kashmir and admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which Ankara is a member), he is less than forthcoming. Though not opposed to India’s entry, Turkey also wants its long-time ally Pakistan to simultaneously join the NSG.
While Turkey is still a major regional power in the Middle East, New Delhi would not be able to ignore its diminishing fortunes and fault lines. The timing of its engagements with Armenia and Cyprus is a clear indication that India is hyphenating its relations with Turkey. By simultaneously engaging with his regional adversaries, India is hoping to influence Erdogan’s attention and priorities.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
At a time of heightened nationalism over the Ukrainian confrontation, these events cast doubts about the narrative of a stable political system.
In one of the largest public protests witnessed in Russia in the last five years, a wave of demonstrations swept across the country on March 26. Led by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the protestors rallied against systemic corruption in the Russian state. The trigger was Navalny’s exposure of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s opulent lifestyle. These demonstrations follow the growing trend of brief strikes in different regions by truckers, teachers, pensioners and labourers. At a time of heightened nationalism over the Ukrainian confrontation, these events cast doubts about the narrative of a stable political system. Given the scope and importance of these protests, and the impending Presidential elections in 2018, the pertinent questions are: What are the root causes of these protests? How different are they from the last big demonstration in 2012? And, will they reshape Russia’s political landscape? Incidentally, this year marks the centennial of the 1917 Revolution, which has left a deep imprint on the Russian psyche.
Prevailing Economic Discontent
Given the tone and tenor of the protests, it appears that their key driving force is the festering dissatisfaction over the ongoing economic crisis. In the last three years, the Russian economy has faced the double whammy of Western sanctions and lower hydrocarbon prices, which have exposed its structural deficiencies. It has resulted in the economy shrinking by more than 4.5 per cent.1 More importantly, real disposable income has fallen by 12.3 per cent, leading to an increase in poverty and unemployment levels.2 Several regions, particularly the ‘monotowns’, suffer from unsustainable levels of mounting debt.3 Against this backdrop, Navalny’s anti-corruption message has struck a chord with a section of Russian citizens. For them, Navalny’s discourse that the elites not making sacrifices for the country appears timely and therefore salient. This has also led to a growing perception among political analysts that the social contract between the state and the people – of promoting economic growth in return for political stability – could unravel in future.
Comparison between 2012 and 2017 Demonstrations
The fundamental difference between the 2012 and 2017 protests lies in their orientation. The former was rooted in perceived malpractices during the Presidential elections and in the notion that the Russian electorate has been taken for granted. This was reflected in the swapping of positions between then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev. The tone, therefore, was much more political in nature. It was also largely restricted to the more politically vibrant cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, with undercurrents of western support.
The recent protests are, however, notable for their geographical spread, spanning more than 85 cities across 11 time zones. This reflects the extensive participation of people, even in areas that have been the traditional support base of the government. Notably, Navalny campaigned in only a fraction of these cities. State-owned Russia Television pointed out the involvement of 8,000 protestors in Moscow, 3,000 in St. Petersburg, 1,500 in Novosibirsk, 500 in Vladivostok, 400 in Tomsk and 300 in Irkutsk.4 Independent media agencies cited much higher numbers.
More significantly, these protests highlight the undercurrents of a demographic shift in Russia. A large number of protestors comprised of young people who were born after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.5 Their orientation on stability, economic growth and the likelihood of making sacrifices for their country remain mostly uncharted. Thus, the emergence of this section as an active stakeholder adds new vigour to the Russian political landscape. This is reflected in their willingness to court arrest by participating in unsanctioned protests. In Moscow alone, more than 600 people were detained.6 Also, their embrace of technology has seen them rely more on social media to mould their views rather than depending on the largely state regulated print and electronic media. As a result, live updates during protests, on platforms like Vkontakte, helped them coordinate better.
A Revolution in the Making?
It is, however, is unlikely that a new Russian revolution is in the offing. Economic discontent, highlighted as the root cause of the protests, is likely to wane in the future. Fiscal indicators reveal that the worst of the Russian crisis is over. The economy is projected to grow in excess of 1.4 per cent in 2017.7 Unemployment and inflation levels are likely to be more manageable, declining to the range of 4 to 5 per cent from a peak of 13 per cent.8 The outlook for next year is also on similar lines. This positive sentiment has been reinforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9
More significantly, the protestors targeted Prime Minister Medvedev rather than President Putin. In the Russian system of governance, the Prime Minister guides the economy. Putin’s popularity remains in excess of 80 per cent. He is credited with ensuring stability and restoring Russia’s great power status. The domestic discourse is also geared to encouraging Russian resilience against perpetual adversaries. And Putin is emblematic of this romanticised manifestation. It is, therefore, unlikely that a movement capable of unseating him will evolve in the near future. Further, the number of protestors, though youthful and vocal, has been quite small. During the protests, they objected to any comparison with the 2014 Ukrainian Maidan Revolution. Doubts also exist about their ability to mount a prolonged campaign. If push comes to shove, it is likely that Putin will deflect attention by appointing a new Prime Minister. He could also channel the protests to overhaul the administration by appointing younger technocrats. This could help taper the existing fault-lines. Incidentally, Medvedev’s popularity in the aftermath of the demonstrations has declined by a whopping 10 per cent, even as Putin’s remains unaffected.10
The government, meanwhile, appears to have adopted a two pronged strategy to keep a lid on the protests. First, the clampdown has been measured, with the majority of detained people being let off with a warning or a token fine. This is in sharp contrast to the stern action taken in 2012. Such an approach can be also viewed through the lens of allowing protestors to give vent to their frustrations. And second, the government has sought to discredit Navalny and increase its regulation of the social media.11 Plans to create a loyal youth following are in the pipeline. Consequently, it is unlikely that a regime change is in the offing even though corruption might be the government’s weak-spot. Opponents like Navalny are, however, likely to use this opportunity to increase their political footprints by riding the wave of anti-corruption. This might lead to a more vibrant political discourse in the future. But the perfect storm that will replicate the events of 1917 is not visible on the horizon.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The post-referendum changes in Turkey will have far reaching implications not only for the form of government but also for the long-term future of the republic and adversely affect democratic consolidation.
The result of the April 16 referendum in Turkey on the constitutional amendment bill proposing to change the current parliamentary form of government to a presidential system has not thrown a surprise. As expected, the pro-change side gained more votes, though its margin of victory was lower than expected. Though the official result has not been announced yet, according to the state-owned Anadolu Agency, the ‘Yes’ side led by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ally the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) received 51.41 per cent of the votes cast, while the ‘No’ side backed by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) received 48.59 per cent. Interestingly, if only domestic votes are counted, the ‘Yes’ vote falls to 51.18 per cent, indicating that it received overwhelming support among diaspora voters. Some parts of Turkey witnessed protests after the results became clear, even as ‘Yes’ supporters celebrated their victory on the streets of Ankara and other cities.
President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım have claimed victory and termed the result of the referendum as historical, while the opposition CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has alleged rigging of votes and demanded the annulment of the referendum. The last-minute decision of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) to consider unstamped ballots as legitimate has come in for severe criticism and raised doubts about possible rigging of votes in favour of the ‘Yes’ side. The opposition has alleged that 1.5 million unstamped ballots have been counted, which is significant given the low victory margin of 1.38 million votes. International observers, especially from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have termed the referendum as unfair since the opposition did not have a level playing field. Such criticisms gain credence because the referendum was conducted under emergency rule and a growing crackdown on opposition leaders and journalists as well as continued purges in the bureaucracy, judiciary and military after the July 2016 coup attempt.
Here, it is necessary to recall that the controversial constitutional amendment bill, passed by parliament earlier this year, has faced serious criticism and opposition from a cross-section of the Turkish population. Those opposed to the amendment see it as a bid by Erdoğan to prolong his stay in power and gain lifetime immunity on corruption investigations. Further criticism has come from intellectuals and liberals who argue that the new system vests extraordinary powers in one individual, thus raising the chances of an autocratic dictatorship. The president under the new system will not only be the head of state and head of government but will have the power to appoint and dismiss all higher officials as well as the power to nominate judges. In addition, the president will also have the power to issue decrees with the effect of law in social and economic areas, although parliament will have the power to override these decrees.
Another significant provision that has come in for criticism is that the president can not only maintain links with a political party but can also be its leader. This will change the longstanding tradition of Turkish presidents being the symbol of neutrality and national unity. The Turkish parliament under the amendment will lose some powers but will still have the authority to annul presidential decrees. However, the possibility of one party gaining parliamentary majority with its leader as president is what has alarmed the opposition as well as international observers. For instance, if Erdoğan who gave up the leadership of AKP after becoming president in 2014 decides, as widely speculated, to return as leader of that party and gets elected as president in the next election due in 2019, and if the AKP were to simultaneously regain a majority in parliament, then it will effectively put him at the helm of the state, the government, the ruling party, and practically in control of parliament. Thus, the possibility of an unfettered one-man dictatorship, as feared by the opposition and intellectuals and perhaps desired by Erdoğan himself, cannot be completely ruled out.
The post-referendum changes in Turkey will have far reaching implications not only for the form of government but also for the long-term future of the republic and adversely affect democratic consolidation. Turkey, which until a few years ago was lauded for effecting a successful marriage between Islamism and democracy and upheld as a ‘model’ for the Muslim world, has witnessed a slide since mid-2013 when then Prime Minister Erdoğan, acting tough on the Gezi Park protestors, decided to crackdown on the opposition, intellectuals and journalists questioning decisions of the AKP government. The situation has not improved since and Turkey has been courting one or the other controversy due to rash government decisions. The July 2016 coup provided the license for the AKP to take action against anyone questioning the government’s decisions or motives and purges have since continued. The three-month state-of-emergency that was imposed soon after the attempted coup has been extended thrice, the latest with effect from April 19. The Kurdish problem has re-emerged after the break down of peace negotiations with the militant Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the revival of a civil war like situation in the Kurd-dominated south-eastern province. Moreover, Turkey’s Syria policy has come in for scathing criticism both internally and externally while its relations with Europe is at an all-time low.
Turkey has witnessed sharp political divisions in the run up to the referendum and Turkish society appears deeply divided. A large section of the people do not support the constitutional amendment, although a majority, as visible from the referendum results, supports the presidential form of government and expects it to bring stability and better governance as propagated by the AKP. Nonetheless, given the sharp divisions and the narrow margin of victory, the AKP will do well to ponder upon its policy choices and actions against the spectrum of opposition leaders and intellectuals and work towards national reconciliation. However, the lure of power might prove to be too strong for Erdoğan and this, if backed by popular support, which he currently enjoys, may push Turkey further towards autocracy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
What to make of the combination of Trump’s missile strikes in Syria, changes of mind about China and Russia, warnings to North Korea, signals about scaling up military presence in Afghanistan, and outreach to Turkey?
April has been an eventful month geopolitically so far. President Trump carried out a much-trumpeted-about Tomahawk missile strike at the Syrian regime, held responsible by him for a nerve-agent attack on the village of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, a province largely held by rebels. Trump has changed his mind on China, which he previously accused as a ‘currency manipulator’. He has also changed his mind on ‘resetting’ relations with Putin and US-Russia relations are at their ‘lowest point’ in years. Trump has issued a harsh warning to North Korea to stop missile and nuclear tests. There are signals that Trump would scale up the US military engagement in Afghanistan. Trump has congratulated, with alacrity, Turkey’s President Erdogan on his referendum victory. Are all these developments related to one another?
Syria
On March 30, 2017, the US stated that it no longer wanted to topple President Basher al-Assad and would instead concentrate on defeating and destroying the Islamic State (IS). Assad, on life-support provided by Russia and Iran, must have heaved a sigh of relief. He might have thought that over time he could free himself from the life-support system and even recover the lost territory in full.
The chemical attack occurred on April 4. Strictly speaking, it is not yet known as to who carried it out, although circumstantial evidence points to Assad. The Pentagon has claimed that two SU-22 aircraft took off from the Shayrat airbase to carry out the attack. It is difficult to believe that Assad would have used chemical weapons as he was winning militarily and diplomatically. However, it cannot be ruled out that Assad, emboldened by Washington’s signal, might have thought that he could get away with it since Trump was focused on fighting the IS. Assad might have also recalled that Obama, after ordering a strike in August 2013 following a much bigger chemical attack, had second thoughts.
The other possibility is that the rebels might have carried out the chemical weapons attack in order to blame Assad. The Russian explanation at the UN Security Council was rather convoluted: Syrian planes bombed a rebel military area that had stored the chemical weapons and the toxic stuff was released because of the bombing. What is perplexing, however, is that the Russian Ministry of Defense on its Facebook noted that the bombing occurred between 11.30 AM and 12.30 PM, whereas the chemical attack occurred hours earlier in the morning. Incidentally, this entry, which the author had seen days ago, is now missing.
Perhaps, the Tomahawk strike was primarily meant to improve Trump’s domestic standing, prove how different he was from Obama, and also to signal that he did not have any soft corner towards Putin with whose help, Trump critics say, he got elected. Contacts between Trump’s election team and Russia are under investigation and Trump might eventually face some embarrassment, if not worse.
Russia
The Tomahawk missiles were meant to serve as a warning to Assad as well as his principal supporter Putin. The Pentagon gave notice of the operation to the Russian military as required under the ‘de-confliction’ agreement of October 2015 to avoid air accidents between the two sides while operating in Syrian air space. There was no injury to any Russian personnel. The Syrian government has claimed that six soldiers and nine civilians, including four children, were killed in the US missile strike.
One might assume that Russia would have shared the warning with Syria in which case it is difficult to figure out why the children were there. The Pentagon has claimed that 20 per cent of Syrian war planes have been destroyed, but independent verification is as yet not available.
Russia responded sharply and said that the missile attack was an act of aggression in violation of international law. It announced plans to fortify air defence. In theory, Russia could have shot down the missiles, but obviously it exercised restraint.
US Secretary of State Tillerson had scheduled a visit to Moscow before the chemical attack. He attended the G7 meeting at Lucca in Italy before going to Moscow. He tried hard, with the help of UK’s Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, to get the G7 to agree to new sanctions on Russia for its failure to prevent the chemical attack. The G7 rejected the proposal for sanctions, with Italy and Germany insisting on a proper inquiry to determine who was responsible before considering sanctions.
Here, we may note the diplomatic style that has come into vogue now. Boris Johnson had announced with much fanfare that the G7 would agree to sanctions. Tillerson had told the media at Lucca that he was carrying a tough message to Moscow to abandon its support for Assad or else. Trump called Assad ‘an animal’ and ‘a butcher’.
Tillerson found out in Moscow that Russia was far from intimidated by his threats. There was the usual red carpet at the airport, but no meeting with Putin was scheduled. Lavrov and Tillerson met courteously, but not cordially. Lavrov pointedly asked what the US policy was as he had heard different things from different officials. He also made it clear that there was no question of yielding to the demand to withdraw support to Assad. Finally, there was a two-hour meeting between Tillerson and Putin, but without any breakthrough. Days later, Russia, Iran, and Syria met at the foreign ministers’ level and support for Assad was reaffirmed. Public demands beget public rejections.
What is important to note is that Trump cannot, at least for a while, start a ‘reset’ with Russia. Here, the larger question is: Does Trump have a set of core principles and convictions or was it all slogans to get elected? We also should note how a neophyte President is being educated and tamed by the establishment.
North Korea / China
On April 6, Trump was hosting a dinner for China’s President Xi Jinping at his luxurious Mar-a-Lago Club in Florida. Two events of geopolitical importance had occurred before Trump welcomed his guest. First, China gave Ivanka Trump provisional approval to sell her brand of jewellery, clothing, bags, and spa services in the whole country. Second, Trump had given the green signal for the Tomahawk missiles to be aimed at the Shayrat airbase.
Trump waited until dessert – the ‘most beautiful chocolate cake’ – was served to inform his guest about the missile attack. After a pause of 10 seconds, Xi asked the interpreter to repeat the sentence. To the relief of an anxious Trump, Xi said that “anybody that was so brutal and uses gases to do that to young children and babies, it's OK.” This is Trump’s version. One may wonder whether the subtle Chinese figured out that the missiles were also meant for Putin and concluded that China’s ambition to be a co-equal of the US was getting a boost.
Trump, ever keen on doing a business deal, concluded one with Xi: In return for Xi’s help in changing the behaviour of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Trump will not start a trade war with China. He declared that China was no longer a ‘currency manipulator’.
Vice President Pence spent the Easter in Seoul. He administered a strong warning to North Korea from the demilitarized zone not to ‘test President Trump’s resolve’. Pence declared that the era of ‘strategic patience’ practiced by Obama was over and ‘all options are on the table’. Pence had to do some damage control as Trump had said earlier that South Korea and Japan were not paying back for the security they were getting from the US and that they should be left to look after themselves.
North Korea does not seem to have been intimidated. It has threatened all-out war in case of US aggression. The threat is to be taken seriously. The US might be able to destroy the whole of North Korea, but before that happens Pyongyang can strike killing a million in South Korea according to war games done by the Pentagon. Japan has already made contingency plans to evacuate the 60,000 Japanese in South Korea. The 30,000 or so US troops in South Korea are also vulnerable.
China has discontinued civilian flights to Pyongyang. And if reports are to be believed, it has also suspended coal imports from North Korea. The latest is that China has asked the US to abandon the projected anti-missile system to be installed in South Korea. When it comes to bargaining, Trump and his son-in-law will discover that Chinese leaders are a shade sharper than them.
Afghanistan
The Trump Administration has decided to scale up its military presence in Afghanistan and to oppose the inroads that Russia and China are making into that country. On April 13, the Pentagon dropped the biggest conventional bomb, the 11-ton MOAB (mother of all bombs) at Shadel Bazar, near the Pakistan border, reportedly killing 100 IS fighters and, more importantly, destroying underground tunnels used by IS now but built with US funding at the time of the Soviet occupation. The MOAB was a signal to the IS and Taliban that the US is going to stand solidly by the Afghan government in Kabul which controls only 60 per cent of territory.
On April 14, the US boycotted a conference on peace in Afghanistan held in Moscow and attended by Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics. Washington made it clear that it was not pleased with Russia’s leading role in this endeavour. On April 16, US National Security Adviser McMaster, a serving General, arrived in Kabul. He came to find out whether there is a need to add more to the current US troop level of 8400. In 2011, the US had 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and some in the US military think that Obama was in undue hurry to withdraw all of them. McMaster has visited Pakistan and India too during this visit.
Turkey
Trump has congratulated President Erdogan on his victory in the referendum that will significantly add to the latter’s powers. It is to be noted that Europeans who have not congratulated Erdogan have expressed concerns about the direction Turkey is taking. Turkey’s admission to the European Union can be written off for now, but Trump, not particularly obsessed with human rights issues in Turkey, is keen to have good relations with that country, a member of NATO with the second largest army and the Incirlik Base built by the US where the Pentagon has been operating since 1955.
Conclusion
We cannot be sure that there will not be any further sharp turns in the future. If China cannot deliver on North Korea, Trump might ‘rediscover’ the former’s role as ‘currency manipulator’. However, the correct action will be to renew the six-party talks (the two Koreas, US, Russia, Japan and China) held between 2003 and 2009. While it is important to stop the nuclear project, it is even more important to ask why North Korea wants nuclear weapons. It wants them only because it feels insecure. It is not beyond diplomacy’s ability to find a solution that guarantees security to the regime in North Korea and combine it with a move for a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. But Trump might not take the lead to resume talks.
As regards Russia, Washington will realize in time that Obama’s policy of ‘demonizing’ Putin will be rejected by Europeans. The Crimea cannot be taken back and on Ukraine there is scope for compromise.
Trump has decapitated the State Department and, unless he has a full team, he will not be able to have a coherent policy. Just as one swallow does not make a summer, a missile strike does not amount to policy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Subsuming Gilgit Baltistan as a province may propel a paradigmatic shift and redrawing of Kashmir strategy across both sides of the Line of Control.
In late March 2017, a motion tabled in the British Parliament titled “Annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan as its fifth frontier” stridently condemned Pakistan for attempting to arbitrarily incorporate Gilgit Baltistan as a province despite its disputed status. Amongst other things, the motion censured the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) because it “aggravates and interferes with the disputed territory.”1 The motion introduced by Bob Blackman, member of the Conservative Party, has added a rare dimension to the debate on Gilgit Baltistan’s proposed provincial status. Till now, the debate was more or less localised, being discussed mainly in the realm of geopolitical equations between India, Pakistan and, at best, China.
The current spell of political tumult surrounding the conversion of Gilgit Baltistan, part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), into Pakistan’s fifth province has gained traction due to CPEC. As the crucial land link connecting CPEC from Kashgar to Gwadar, Gilgit Baltistan is of unequivocal salience to the project. Hence, while CPEC is gradually unfolding in select sectors, a significant proportion of the existing debate on Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is dedicated to speculating whether China is pressing Pakistan to formalise the region’s political status. Based on its territorial claim to PoK, which was an integral part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, India is contesting Pakistan’s consideration of granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan. That, in turn, is adding further bitterness to the frosty India-Pakistan ties.
Geographically, Gilgit Baltistan comprises the larger portion of PoK which has been under Pakistan’s illegitimate control since 1947. Politically deprived for decades, the region remained disenfranchised until 2009 when quasi-political reforms in the form of an Empowerment and Self-rule Order was enacted essentially to contain simmering popular unrest. The provisional act intended to add a semblance of enfranchisement yet without conceding Gilgit Baltistan representation in the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s fix
Elevating Gilgit Baltistan as a province is likely to be a tough call for Pakistan since it could be construed as severing its Kashmir link. All along, the region had been designated as disputed citing its Kashmir connection. Since 1947, based on this construct, Gilgit Baltistan has been perpetually reeling in a state of political deprivation and disempowerment. Further, a provision in Pakistan’s Constitution binds the region to the future of the Kashmir issue. The link is enshrined in Article 257 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which defines the country’s equation with those parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir it continues to hold. The article posits: “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”2
Thus, apart from significant constitutional amendments, the formalisation of Gilgit Baltistan’s political status may necessitate re-formulating the fundamental contours of Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. Pakistan would need to contend with how India would perceive as well as respond to this change. It is believed that Pakistan subsuming a part of PoK may “set a steady precedent” for India and bestow a “viable fall back option” if it decides to think in terms of the full integration of the state of J&K.3 Gilgit Baltistan’s integration into Pakistan is bound to strengthen constituencies within India that advocate J&K’s full integration with the Indian Union. Kashmir is the lifeblood of Pakistan’s India project. It is the focus of Pakistan’s proxies against India – a justification for committing aggression and an excuse to interfere. Pakistan’s long drawn contemplation and purported hesitations on Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is rooted in such contending realties. Pakistan may be looking for a middle path solution, one that does not essentially alter its stated positon on Kashmir. Given that Pakistan is politically and strategically invested in the Kashmir issue, it is difficult to outright fathom whether the country is preparing to forego its perennial stand of enmity with India and instead totally adhere to the Chinese economic agenda. Besides, the move to integrate Gilgit Baltistan may cost Pakistan in terms of the overwhelming support it enjoys among Kashmiri separatists in India. The separatist leadership in J&K, which Pakistan has nurtured for decades, has firmly resisted the idea of granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan and conveyed its stern objections in this regard to the political leadership in Islamabad.4
Cognisant of constitutional constraints and fearing a massive political fallout, the Pakistan government constituted a high-level committee headed by Sartaj Aziz to address the statutory ambiguity of the region. After due deliberations, the committee submitted its report, the specific contents of which have not yet been made public. Rightly so, as within Pakistan, Gilgit Baltistan’s provincial status is being primarily viewed through the wider prism of the implications and fallout on the country’s larger Kashmir stratagem.
Linking, de-linking
In principle, Pakistan’s bid to alter the status quo regarding Gilgit Baltistan is not new. Be it the revocation of the State Subject Rule, ceding a significant chunk of territory to China in 1963 or transforming the demography of the region in order to dilute its Shia majority – the region has undergone significant changes since 1947. The region had remained administratively conjoined with the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) till the 1949 Karachi Agreement (without Gilgit Baltistan being represented) bifurcated them.5 This was understandably done to siphon off the larger chunk of territory from the then impending UN-mediated negotiations with India. Despite the bifurcation, the region, along with ‘AJK’, is considered part of the Kashmir dispute. The umbilical link between the two entities has persisted nonetheless due to the political deprivation of Gilgit Baltistan. While ‘AJK’ was compensated with an interim constitution in 1974, Gilgit Baltistan’s political status continued to be contingent upon the final resolution of the Kashmir issue.
With a predominant Muslim population, the region was once critical for Pakistan’s plebiscite calculus. Over a period of time, however, the region was reduced to the status of a mere pawn for furthering Pakistan’s strategic objectives. Being handed transient structures of governance for decades, the region later became a commodity of tussle between ‘AJK’ and Islamabad.6 Besides squarely resisting the proposed provincial status, ‘AJK’ has jostled to regain its link with and control over Gilgit Baltistan, hoping that this would bolster its Kashmir politics by bringing in a critical mass of support. Hence, the proposal to accord provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan will only conform to a long-sustained pattern of Pakistan’s political experiments in the region. Without affording it constitutional status, Pakistan has linked and de-linked Gilgit Baltistan from the Kashmir issue only to fulfil narrow strategic purposes.
Chinese persuasion?
Away from the media frenzied interpretations and diplomatic rancour, one must realise that the current debate on provincial status for Gilgit Baltistan is only a facsimile of what transpired not long ago. In late 2015 and early 2016, the debate on provincial status was similar to the current discourse.7 The context and contours in that phase were not materially different and conjectural estimates concerning a possible Chinese angle existed then as well. If we go back to the mid-1980s, the Gilgit Baltistan Bar Association demanded that the region be made a province of Pakistan.8 This makes it amply clear that the demand of provincial status existed well before the Chinese stakes became deep seated. And it has been estimated that the popularity of such a demand is quite high.9 Despite this, it is hard to discount a possible Chinese dimension based on CPEC prospects as a driving force in the current spate of deliberations. The China factor has added energy and speculation at least in the present leg when a renewed effort to constitutionally empower Gilgit Baltistan is being made.
The complete absorption of the region into Pakistan would favour China. Controlling a significant portion of the region, i.e., the Trans Karakoram Tract, the Chinese strategy and objectives are best served with Gilgit Baltistan under Pakistan’s control.10 Secondly, China’s conservative risk-averse model of investment conflicts with imperilling billions in a disputed territory with a provisional status and the future of which is slated to be re-negotiated (by China’s own admission) as per Article 6 of the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement 1963.11
India: logic, deductions, options
While some would argue that Gilgit Baltistan’s assimilation may undermine India’s claim on the region, it cannot altogether dissolve it. Irrespective of the unlawful incorporation, India will continue to uphold its claim on both parts of PoK as it has since 1947. Domestically for years, India’s policy on PoK has been dismissed as being inert and least assertive. However, under a new political dispensation, a concerted effort is being made to alter previously held perception – that PoK is a peripheral issue on the list of India’s strategic priorities. Raising issues concerning PoK, be it compensation for refugees, Prime Minister Modi’s reference to it in his Independence Day address, and the frequency of official public statements on the territory indicate that India could well be thinking in terms of re-drawing the rules of engagement. Lately, Gilgit Baltistan in particular has ascended in India’s strategic calculations due to the Chinese foray into the region. Besides, the extant territorial claim on the region provides validity and strength to India’s objections on CPEC.
The idea of incorporating Gilgit Baltistan reflects Pakistan’s and China’s wish to prioritise shared economic ambitions over territorial interests. However, even as the two countries are seen to be progressing towards mutual accommodation of their interests, India may opt not to complement their approach this time. A standing territorial claim is India’s potential strategic ammunition against China-Pakistan nexus in PoK and India cannot afford to forgo it at the moment.
India-Pakistan bilateral experiments in the past, especially those that, amongst other things, contemplated permanently retaining the status quo, have clearly not worked. India’s fundamental thrust needs to diverge from pre-existing notions and this is possible only once it re-draws its overall strategy and particularly reinforces its policy on PoK. In times of a perceptible qualitative shift in policy formulation and posturing, Gilgit Baltistan’s absorption will yield India an opportunity to re-explore its options in terms of stabilizing J&K. India could choose to engage more with views that advocate J&K’s complete and final integration.
(This is the author’s third in the series of commentaries on Gilgit Baltistan’s proposed provincial status since August 2015. The previous commentaries can be found here and here.)
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given that over 70 per cent of the world's energy consumption comes under the IEA umbrella, the association with the agency will substantially increase India’s relevance in global energy governance.
At the November 2015 launch of the special edition of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook series on the Indian energy sector, the Agency’s executive director, Dr. Fatih Birol, had noted that “We can’t talk about the future of the global energy markets without talking with India.”1 Therefore, when India joined the ranks of the IEA’s membership on March 30, 2017, albeit as a “Member by Associate”, it was seen as inevitable. Moreover, long before India formally came on board the IEA, it had been engaging with the organisation. As early as 1998, India had signed the Declaration of Cooperation covering issues related to energy security and statistics. Subsequently, it had signed three Joint Statements with the IEA – the last one in 2013 – which covered various areas of mutual interest in the energy spectrum. However, the priority area for co-operation had been in oil and gas security and, to that end, the IEA and India’s Ministry for Petroleum and Natural Gas (Mo&PNG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2011, the first time that the IEA signed one with a key partner country in the area of emergency preparedness.
Interestingly, despite the cooperative nature of the relationship, India has been wary in committing itself to the IEA’s agenda. In fact, before 2011, the then Prime Minister’s Office had asked the Mo&PNG for a position paper on “Whether India should Join IEA”. At that time, the ministry had recommended that while India should collaborate with the IEA’s programmes through agreements and MoUs such as the IEA’s Global Energy Emergency Response System, which dealt with oil supply disruption exercises and contingency plans with member countries, it should not become a member of the organisation per se. The rationale then was that while interacting and cooperating with the IEA would allow India to maximise the strategic depth of its crude oil reserves as well as benefit from the IEA’s technical assistance in the energy sector, it would preclude it from taking on the obligations entailed by membership. As a result, India signed the said MoU, whereby the petroleum ministry and the IEA agreed to work together on strengthening and developing the oil stockholding regime and the emergency response policies as well as the exchange of information in the oil and gas sectors.2
However, over time, and with the increasing move towards greater integration with the global energy market, the government has been interacting more frequently with the Agency, holding high level policy dialogues and workshops, joint research and analyses projects on energy sectors and markets, and exchanging technical know-how and information on future projections.3
The question that therefore behoves asking is this: if India was in any case benefiting from informal interaction with the IEA, why did it go back on its earlier decision and formally join the organisation? The IEA’s rationale for inviting non-OECD countries to join it is evident, as the agency benefits from the growing association of emerging economies by gaining access to their data and by adding to the oil stockpiles in the event of supply disruptions, which is its raison d’etre. Second, given the IEA’s growing role in combating climate change, it allows the promotion of clean energy technologies in some of the world’s largest carbon emitters. But what additional benefits would India gain as a member of the IEA over and above what it has gained as a non-member?
The answer may well lie in the current government’s goal of not only providing access to electricity for the people under its “24x7 Power For All” initiative but also in meeting its climate change targets undertaken under the Paris Climate change agreement. Moreover, it will provide India the geopolitical platform to take the lead in climate and energy issues. As the Minister for Power as well as Renewable Energy Piyush Goyal said on the occasion of India’s accession to the IEA membership, not only is deeper engagement with the IEA a component of achieving the ‘Power for All’ initiative but it would also give India an opportunity to become the voice of the developing world. In particular, he was referring to the International Solar Alliance (ISA) initiative.
The ISA is an Indian initiative that was first proposed by Prime Minister Modi during a November 2015 speech at the Wembley Stadium. On that occasion, he called upon countries with abundant sunlight “stretching between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn” to work for the efficient exploitation of solar energy in order to reduce dependence on fossil based fuels. Thereafter, Modi, along with French President Francois Hollande, launched the initiative in Paris ahead of the COP 21conference in November 2015. The goal of the Alliance is to raise USD 500 billion from public finances matched by another USD 500 billion from the private sector in order to have 1,000 GW (100,0000 MW) global capacity of solar power by 2030.
At the time, however, the Obama administration had been ambivalent about the ISA. Although it expressed support for the concept, it preferred that the ISA be kept as an informal arrangement since a formal ‘treaty arrangement’ would require congressional approval which may not be forthcoming from a Republican-dominated Congress determined to oppose the Democratic administration’s initiative in this regard.4 But India was of the opinion that, without a treaty, the Alliance would lack teeth, particularly in the event of a dispute.
Eventually, the Framework Agreement of the ISA was opened for signature in Marrakesh, Morocco, in November 2016. 121 countries have joined the Alliance whose headquarters is in Gurugram (Gurgaon). The ISA is based on three objectives – lower the price of solar panels and solar power in general by increasing demand; standardise solar technologies through collaboration in technological innovation, which would also help to bring down the price of solar energy; and, foster research and development, particularly in storage technology.
For India, the ISA provides it with a platform to position itself as a leader on the world energy and environment stage. However, given that the success of the initiative will depend largely on the number of countries coming on board, collaboration with other multilateral bodies, including the UN, IEA, IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) as well as corporates and industry, among others, is critical as these will assist in adapting the technologies needed by developing member countries to their specific conditions and economic realities. Given that over 70 per cent of the world's energy consumption comes under the IEA umbrella, the association with the IEA will substantially increase India’s relevance in global energy governance. Finally, and more importantly, the IEA can encourage financial institutions to support India’s energy, particularly, its solar energy programme.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Mufti Hanna’s hanging may not mean the end of the terror outfit and definitely not the end of radical ideology in Bangladesh.
At one time, the terror outfit Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (Movement of the Islamic Holy War) was one of the strongest extremist outfits in Bangladesh and its aspiration was the implementation of Shariat rule both in Bangladesh and Myanmar. It was headed by Mufti Hannan, who has now been executed for his involvement in a number of terror activities. His hanging is likely to give a serious blow to the outfit, although this may not necessarily mean its end. Nevertheless, this is an important development in a country which has been battling Islamist extremism and trying to put it under check.
Mufti Hannan had an Islamist background. At the time of Bangladesh’s Liberation War, his father, Noor Uddin Munshi, was a leader of the Muslim League in Gopalganj’s Kotalipara sub-district. Noor was shot dead for committing atrocities against Bangladeshi people during the Liberation War. His house had hoisted a Pakistani flag even after Bangladesh was created.
After his initial madrasa education in Bangladesh, Mufti Hannan went to both India and Pakistan for higher Islamic studies. In India, he studied at a Deoband madrasa and was later a student of the Islamic Studies Department at Aligarh University from where he obtained a Master's degree in 1987. In 1988, he got enrolled at Jamiya Yusuf Bin Nuriya Madrasa in Karachi from where, during the during the Ramadan break in 1990, he moved to Afghanistan to fight the Afghan jihad. It is believed that his indoctrination into militancy took place while studying Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence in Karachi. Before joining the Afghan jihad, he was given 15 days training in Afghanistan in bomb-making and carrying out military assaults. He also provided other recruits to the Afghan jihad and got injured while participating in it.
It was also around this time that the notorious outfit HuJI Bangladesh was born, though its origins are somewhat obscure. Some claim that Moulana Abdur Rahman Faruki from Manirampur in Jessore, along with other Bangladeshi mujahids, founded HuJI in 1989 while they were still fighting in Afghanistan. Faruki was killed in the Afghan jihad while trying to defuse a mine in Khost. Hannan returned to Bangladesh in 1993 and started leading a group of Afghan jihad returnees.
Others say that the Afghan jihad returnees formally launched HuJI at a press conference held in Dhaka on April 30, 1992, after the end of the Afghan jihad. According to them, Moulana Abdus Salam was made its chief. He is presently in jail for his role in the August 21, 2004 grenade attack. Mufti Hannan had also participated in this attack and the prime target was the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina. Though Sheikh Hasina suffered only some serious injuries, 23 members of the Awami League including Ivy Rahman, the then women's affairs secretary of the party, were killed and nearly 150 others injured.
Soon after its formation, HuJI Bangladesh had split into several factions over the method to be adopted in waging armed jihad. Mufti Hannan became chief of one such faction. He developed a close relationship with some leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh. His proximity also grew with other militant groups including the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Rohingya-based outfits active in the Chittagong region.
Hannan was the face of terror in Bangladesh and his outfit HuJI introduced militancy in the country through a bomb attack on a programme of Udichi Shilpigosthi in Jessore in 1999. He created terror across Bangladesh by launching over a dozen grenade attacks on Awami League rallies in his failed attempts to assassinate Sheikh Hasina and other top leaders. He also targeted the former British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury at Hazrat Shahjalal Shrine in Sylhet, religious institutions and cultural programmes including Pohela Boishakh celebrations.
Mufti Hannan was arrested along with his wife and children from a house in Dhaka on October 1, 2005. Subsequently, HuJI(B) claimed responsibility for nearly a dozen attacks between 1999 and October 17, 2005, after which the BNP-Jamaat government was forced to ban the outfit. Speaking to the media after his arrest, an indignant Mufti Hannan had claimed that law enforcers were not supposed to arrest him since some influential ministers of the BNP-led government had assured him that he would be exempted from the August 21, 2004 grenade attack case.
There are at least 17 cases filed against Mufti Hannan for masterminding various terror attacks. Of these, he has been sentenced to death for killing three people and injuring then UK envoy Anwar Choudhury at Shahjalal shrine in 2004. He was hanged after his death sentence was cleared by the apex court and his request for presidential clemency was rejected on April 8, 2017.
Mufti Hannan’s appeal against another death sentence handed down in the Ramna Batamul blast case is currently pending with the High Court. He also faced trial for the failed August 21, 2004 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina who was then the opposition leader. He was given life-term imprisonment in 2003 for plotting to kill Hasina at Kotalipara in 2000 when she was the prime minister.
At one time, HuJI was quite active in India and its involvement was suspected in a number of terror incidents. The US had branded HuJI as an international terror outfit and banned it. But in recent times, the outfit has been less active in Bangladesh after a number of other terror outfits emerged in that country. The most prominent among them has been Jumatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB). A faction of JMB, now called neo-JMB, has even proclaimed its allegiance to the ISIS.
Mufti Hannan was hanged few days before the Pohela Boishakh, the Bengali New Year festival. This festival is celebrated with a great deal of fervour in Bangladesh and in West Bengal. But this festival is also opposed by the Islamists of Bangladesh who see in it a reflection of their Hindu past. The hanging of Mufti Hannan on the eve of Pohela Boishakh might send an important message to the terror outfit that the government of the day in Bangladesh is committed to protect the country’s cultural traditions. It would also boost its confidence in the fight against radical Islamists who have expanded their grip in recent years by targeting and killing atheist bloggers, writers, foreigners and minority groups. But the attempt made by his sympathisers to free Mufti Hannan from a prison van on March 6, 2017 while he was being brought back to Gazipur's Kashimpur prison from the court indicates that there are still some free and active people who are either part of HuJI or support its ideology. Thus, his hanging may not mean the end of the terror outfit and definitely not the end of radical ideology in Bangladesh.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given the advertisement surrounding the use of MOAB, it is possible that the Trump administration is signalling to its adversaries the very lethal weapons in its arsenal and its willingness to use them.
The term Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) was probably used in the print media for the first time following the uproar over Germany’s aerial bombardment of the Basque city of Guernica in April 1937.1 Only a year before, Italy had used mustard and other Chemical Warfare (CW) agents in a region of modern-day Ethiopia. Broadly, the idea behind the use of the term WMD was to depict the heinous form of killing many innocent civilians. Such weapons could be aerial platforms called aircraft to undertake carpet bombing or usage of deadly chemical substances. After the use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War, these weapons too got added to the list of WMDs. Subsequently, the list became complete with the inclusion of biological weapons. In 1956, the then Soviet minister for defence argued that modern warfare would be dominated by WMDs, which include massive use of air forces and rocket forces as well as chemical, nuclear and biological weapons.2
On Thursday, April 13, 2017, the US Airforce dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat over eastern Afghanistan. Known as GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb (MOAB, commonly referred to as the “Mother of All Bombs”) and costing around USD 16 million, this 21,000 pound (9525 kg) bomb was dropped from an MC-130 aircraft with the aid of a parachute and using a satellite based guidance mechanism. The bomb exploded some six feet above the ground and had a blast radius of 1.6 km. According to the post-attack damage assessment, around 100 militants belonging to the terror group ISIS were killed and significant damage to the over ground and underground infrastructure took place (such bombs can break through around 200 feet of reinforced concrete).
Why did the US choose to drop this bomb now when it has had it in its arsenal since 2003? And, why was Afghanistan chosen as a target? Is Nangarhar province where the bomb was dropped modern-day Guernica? The answer could be both yes and no. Unlike at Guernica where there was a need to test the efficacy of aerial bombardment, no such need existed in the case of MOAB. It was tested in 2003 by its developers and it is known that a roughly 10,000 kg bomb provides a yield of 10 to 11 tons of TNT.3 (It may be noted that the Nagasaki nuclear bomb had a yield of 20 kilotons (TNT equivalent) and the one used on Hiroshima 15 kilotons.) Hence, more than a need to test, the US was probably keen to engage in global signalling especially towards North Korea. The idea appears to have been to highlight that the US has non-nuclear options available, which are almost as dreadful, and will not hesitate to use them. With regard to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, there is definitely a requirement for tough action against ISIS. However, the choice of a heavy weapon like MOAB has provoked debate.
Today, the US needs to address multiple threats globally. Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan are not giving US policy-makers and its military any respite. North Korea appears to be challenging US supremacy. In addition, there are strategic challenges from Russia, China and Iran. For years now, disarmament and arms control have been focus areas in the US defence and foreign policy agenda. The US political leadership has been arguing that WMDs pose the greatest threat to Americans as well as to humanity at large. They have ensured that global politics revolves around this issue and have effectively, and selectively, used the issue of WMDs to suit their requirement. For example, hundreds getting killed in Syria in conventional warfighting gets overlooked, but when deaths occur due to use of chemical weapons the US government undertakes an offensive response. Essentially, the use or intention to use of WMDs amounts to crossing a red line. This, however, does not apply to massive damage caused by conventional weapons.
The Trump administration appears to be attempting to handle the existing strategic challenges a bit differently than its predecessors. Its response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria appears to be more along the lines of shock and awe. If the use of chemical weapons was the issue, then it is difficult to understand why only the assets of the Syrian air force on ground were targeted. Probably, it appears that the disproportionate force (59 Tomahawk missiles) was required owing to the accuracy aspects of the missiles. If there had existed some stock of chemical weapons in the area targeted (no information to that effect is available) then the use of such missiles would have proved counterproductive. Destroying Chemical and Biological Weapons without dispersing their deadly contents is a difficult task. Using conventional weapons like Tomahawk missiles could actually help spread chemicals. Instead, the Trump administration should have used the Agent Defeat Weapon or the Agent Defeat Warhead (ADW4), which is designed to disable a WMD storage or production site. The US is known to possess this unique weapon, possibly since 2003.
With regard to Afghanistan, it is difficult to comprehend that just one big bomb is a solution to the challenge posed by ISIS. Given the advertisement surrounding the use of MOAB, it is possible that the Trump administration is signalling to its adversaries the very lethal weapons in its arsenal and its willingness to use them. Would the use of MOAB set off a new arms race’? It would be premature to jump to any such conclusion. However, it is important to note that MOAB is not the biggest non-nuclear bomb. A decade ago, Russia had tested what is known as the Father of All Bombs (FOAB) on September 11, 2007. FOAB was four times more powerful than MOAB.
In addition to these bombs, there are a few other weapons available with the major powers like directed energy weapons, e-bombs and cyber weapons. The use of MOAB raises many questions rather than providing solutions to present challenges. If this is an off-the-cuff reaction by the US administration, then the issue would die down soon. However, if the US feels that Syria and North Korea are challenging WMD deterrence, then the use of MOAB could even be a ploy to test the waters. The US understands that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stands extended in perpetuity but that does not mean that nuclear deterrence is. Is it then trying to change the grammar of existing WMD deterrence and proposing to redefine modern day WMDs?
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh.
The Teesta River water sharing issue has loomed large over India-Bangladesh relations for over a decade. It was a key issue in the recent deliberations during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. However, the issue did not excite public opinion at the grass-root level in the north Bengal districts through which the river flows before entering Bangladesh. Political parties in Bengal, with a presence in the affected districts of Darjeeling, Siliguri, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, North and South Dinajpur and Malda, have not taken a strident posture in the matter. The views of the ruling party, Trinamul Congress (TMC), have, however, been articulated by the chief minister who wants issues impinging on the agricultural interests of these districts to be carefully considered before finalizing a water sharing deal.
As against the above-stated position, public opinion in the Teesta water-flow affected districts of Rangpur, Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Gaibandha, Dinajpur and Bogra in Bangladesh have been articulated at various platforms. And their opinion favours a fair sharing of the Teesta waters between the two countries. Notwithstanding the above, there is a view in some official circles in Bangladesh for some time now that Teesta waters are now only a supplementary source of irrigation. With the cultivation cycle changing (more crops being cultivated in other than the lean season), the impact of water scarcity on the country`s agriculture would be relatively less in the future. While failure to conclude the Teesta deal has disheartened the ruling Awami League and its allied circles, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, as expected, has used the failure to criticise the Sheikh Hasina government.
It is necessary to highlight the fact that Sikkim where Teesta originates (from Teesta Kangse glacier), and flows through for a major part of its 459 kilometre long journey (151 kms within Sikkim, and 142 kms along the Sikkim-Bengal border), has not made much of an issue or taken a decisive stand on what should be done to protect its interests in the water sharing bargain. There are six hydel projects (four already operationalised) in Sikkim along the river, which require a suitable southward water draft to generate electricity apropos the developmental needs of the state and the requirements of the Indian electricity grid. India`s Ministry of Water Resources, in concert with sister line ministries, will obviously have to take care of this requirement. But there has not been much of a public discourse on, or indication at the official level of, factoring this aspect in the prospective water sharing process. The Sikkim government seems to be presently dealing with the matter at a low key, for tactical reasons. It does not want any restriction on its Teesta-related power potential, though it would be accommodative to any hydrological measure which controls landslides and concomitant siltation in the river.
There are many imponderables in sharing the Teesta waters on a basis that is satisfactory to both Bangladesh and India. An easy resolution may not be feasible under the hydrological conditions prevailing at present. The dams upstream on the Teesta and its tributaries in Sikkim are creating a substantial reduction in water flow downstream, owing to periodic landslides, siltation, etc., notwithstanding the fact that these dams do not provide for water storage. Unless an integrated view of Teesta basin management is adopted, the water and power needs of Sikkim and Bengal cannot be attended to in juxtaposition to the needs of Bangladesh in the Rangpur command area.
Furthermore, the Teesta Barrage Project (TBP) at Gajoldoba in Jalpaiguri district of Bengal constructed at a cost of more than Rs. 1300 crore may be deemed as another de facto bottleneck in the resolution of the water sharing process. The TBP was conceived as a multi-purpose project in the aftermath of the massive floods in Jalpaiguri in 1968. This was done in an over-ambitious manner for flood control, power generation and irrigation of more than nine lakh hectares of command area in north Bengal. While TBP has contributed to flood control to an extent, particularly downstream of Sevoke (near Siliguri) where the river descends to the flood plains, there has been much less success towards increasing the areas under irrigation in the lower command area, apart from reducing the down-stream flows to Bangladesh. The operation of TBP and water diversion through the Teesta-Mahananda irrigation canal has changed the hydrological character of Teesta river south of Gajoldoba. These developments have contributed to a decline in the area occupied by the active river by more than 50 per cent during the 1991-2014 period. All these developments have had their consequences on the water flow to Bangladesh. Unless these are mitigated, an agreement on Teesta river water sharing between the two countries cannot be realistically expected.
An agreement on Teesta water sharing will have to encompass much more than ensuring a minimum down-stream flow to Bangladesh during the lean season. A comprehensive river basin management approach is a sine qua non for optimum gains, not only for both India and Bangladesh, but also for the riparian regions and states along the Teesta. Viewed in this perspective, an appraisal of Bangladesh`s Teesta Barrage (TB) already operational at Dhoani in Lalmonirhat district will also be necessary. The TB, initiated in 1979 and the first phase completed in 1998, had envisaged an ambitious target of developing an irrigated area of 750,000 hectares of irrigated area. In the existing context of reduced discharge owing to the above-mentioned developments, the irrigation potential of TB is unlikely to be achieved. A via media solution will have to be evolved, factoring in the hydrological conditions presently prevailing and likely in the near future. Till such an appraisal is undertaken, India would be the target of criticism resulting from less than an optimum operational outcome of the TB.
Both in India and Bangladesh, a broad consensus involving the political parties and other stake-holders in the catchment and command areas of Teesta river and its tributaries will be necessary. Attempts for a solution should be initiated seriously at the technical level without delay, involving hydrological and agro-climatic experts of both countries with a proper mandate entrusted to them. A final agreement may be based on the recommendations of experts, followed by a political compromise. Even then, an appropriate outcome may elude us if the experience with the Kalyan Rudra Report on Teesta water management is any indication. The report commissioned by the first TMC government was neither disclosed nor officially accepted by the latter because of its reported recommendation favouring Bangladesh`s position. Notwithstanding this backdrop, there is a need to persevere with efforts to reach an equitable solution on the Teesta water sharing issue so that capital investment towards re-engineering river-basin structures, river training, etc., which may be inevitable in future, can be carried out optimally with avoidable escalation in costs.
The scenario envisaged can only be realised, however, with adequate will of all concerned, particularly at the political and administrative levels. If the situation does not evolve as above, the Teesta river basin may eventually encounter the fate of the Aral Sea and the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal in Central Asia whose hydrology have been substantially impaired owing to injudicious human intervention.
The author is a retired IDAS officer who has served in senior positions in the Government of India and a State Government.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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