Since the beginning of 2007, there has been a sharp increase in global food prices, especially in developing countries. During the past year, the prices of rice and wheat have risen by 75 to 120 per cent globally. During the last 25 years global food production has gone down and has had a cascading effect upon prices.
Since the beginning of 2007, there has been a sharp increase in global food prices, especially in developing countries. During the past year, the prices of rice and wheat have risen by 75 to 120 per cent globally. During the last 25 years global food production has gone down and has had a cascading effect upon prices. As a result, a spectrum of countries including Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia have been buffeted by food riots, while other countries have sought to mitigate the situation by massive salary hikes of public servants, thus adding to their fiscal burden.
With the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) warning about depleting food stocks, food producing countries have sought to fight inflationary trends by banning exports to meet growing domestic demand. Major rice exporting nations such as Brazil, Egypt, Argentina and India have imposed a ban on rice exports. And the two largest rice exporting countries, Thailand and Vietnam, have been unable to meet market demand. Wanting to cash in on the spiralling demand, farmers in Thailand unsuccessfully tried to increase the number of crop cycles, while in Vietnam during the last three successive seasons rice crops were destroyed by pest. Cumulatively, growing demand, shortfalls in production and ban on exports have contributed to the widespread price rise and food crisis. These developments prompted UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon to urge countries such as Brazil and Egypt to drop export restrictions on certain food items and commodities.
However, the April 2008 UN Study of Global Agriculture has highlighted a number of other factors that have contributed to the current food crisis. Prominent among them are:
Growing production of bio fuels like bio-ethanol and bio-diesel, which are financially more attractive than traditional food crops.
Lack of communication and knowledge of the agricultural system to ensure better yields.
Adverse effects of climate change and global warming upon agriculture.
Negative impact of the removal of farm subsidies and the subsequent rise in the cost of agricultural production in poor and developing nations.
Rapid drop in per capita availability of water; in Central and Western Asia it has dropped by a third since the 1950s.
Large scale environmental displacement in East and South East Asia caused not only by natural calamities but also by shifting production patterns and the construction of dams and cash-crop plantations.
Despite technological improvements agricultural yields in sub-Saharan Africa have actually declined during the past three decades, thereby increasing their dependency upon food imports.
The search for energy substitutes through bio fuel has further hampered global food production. Joining the food versus fuel debate, Jean Ziegler, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has described the use of food crops to create ethanol ‘a crime against humanity’.
The South Asian region has not been immune to the global price rise phenomenon. Its impact on Bangladesh has been far severe. A number of additional factors have further compounded Bangladesh’s problems. Towards the end of 2007 it faced severe floods followed shortly by cyclone Sidr. Its impact was severe on Bangladesh where more than 27 million people depend upon food subsidy. Furthermore, this natural disaster damaged at least 1.8 million tons of standing crops. With the result, the price of a kilogramme of coarse rice, the staple food in Bangladesh, has more than doubled over the past 12 months.
The situation was so grim that the Caretaker government had to intervene, with the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles opening up 75 fair price outlets to provide basic commodities at subsided prices. To control inflationary pressures, the government has opted for buffer stocks, setting a target of procuring 1.2 million tons of rice and 300,000 tons of paddy at the rate of Tk 28 and Tk18 per kilogram respectively. The crisis could ease if the Bodo turns out to be a bumper harvest as many Bangladeshis hope. It is estimated that during the current season rice production would be about 17.5 million tons and wheat production 800,000 tons.
Despite the bumper harvest, experts predict that there would not be any drop in food prices and coarse rice is being sold between Tk 33 and 35 per kilogramme, far higher than the rice procurement price set by the government. According to the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB), during the past 12 months the cost of production has gone up by 54 per cent.
This year, total food production in Bangladesh is estimated at 25.9 million tons and this would be just 100,000 tons short of total domestic demand. To meet the shortfall, Dhaka has ordered the purchase of 400,000 tons of rice from India at TK 30.10 per kilogramme or US $430 per metric ton. Bangladesh’s wish to create buffer stocks through imports has, however, not been trouble free. To meet domestic demand and to control inflationary pressures, India has imposed a ban on rice exports not only to Bangladesh but also to countries such as Saudi Arabia and other South Asian states. Political compulsions have, however, resulted in India making an exception for Bangladesh. During his visit to Dhaka in December 2007, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee agreed to the sale of 500,000 tons of rice to Bangladesh.
As an agricultural economy, Bangladesh relies heavily on food production and hence a bumper Bodo harvest is crucial to resolving the growing food crisis in the country. Even if this does not bring prices down, it should lessen inflationary pressures and keep imports to manageable limits. A food crisis is likely to be extremely unnerving to the neutral caretaker government. With Jatiya Sangsad elections slated for later this year, the government would be keen to keep not only food prices under control but also scarcity under check. Food riots are the last thing on the government’s wish list. Failure to handle relief works following the 1970 cyclone eventually culminated in popular protest against the then military junta. A repeat of such a development over a potential food crisis would dismantle everything that the caretaker government has managed to do since taking office in January 2007.
Bangladesh
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist: Rebels to Rulers
Nihar R. Nayak
May 14, 2008
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), a former rebel group, emerged as the largest political party with 220 seats in the April 10 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. Mainstream political parties like the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML secured the second and third positions with 110 and 103 seats, respectively. For the first time, a newly formed regional political party, Madhesi Janatantrik (Democratic) Forum has secured fourth position in the elections.
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), a former rebel group, emerged as the largest political party with 220 seats in the April 10 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. Mainstream political parties like the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML secured the second and third positions with 110 and 103 seats, respectively. For the first time, a newly formed regional political party, Madhesi Janatantrik (Democratic) Forum has secured fourth position in the elections.
Although the Election Commission of Nepal declared the CA elections as free and fair, some security analysts believe that intimidation by the Young Communist League (YCL) might have helped CPN-M to emerge as the largest party. This is not to deny that the YCL may have tried to reinforce Maoist success, which, in any case, was expected. In fact, almost all political party activists had tried to influence voters by adopting different means to win in the election. As far as the allegation from the losing parties is concerned, it was mostly an afterthought. None of the political parties complained specifically about Maoist intimidation during the polls. Nobody would have expected 60 per cent voter participation if intimidation was rampant.
What are the factors responsible for Maoist success? The first and foremost was failure of the two principal parties — NC and UML — to fulfil the people’s aspirations in the last two decades. Consequently, the CPN-M emerged as an alternative. There was also a popular realisation that the Maoist decision to enter the democratic mainstream was a welcome trend and the alternative was quite forbidding. From personal interactions with common people in and around Kathmandu, one gathered that voters found the Maoist slogan of a ‘New Nepal’ credible.
In fact, CPN-M’s efficient populist campaign over various issues like republicanism, federalism, land reforms and job guarantee had its appeal for the people. Moreover, the Maoists adopted an aggressive nationalist position, which was liked by the majority of the Nepali people even if it might have alienated the Madhesis. The Maoists made a deliberate attempt to whip up anti-India sentiment by alleging that India was trying to divide Nepal by supporting the Madhesis. This is said to have played a major role in the pahadis, traditional supporters of the NC, voting for the Maoists.
Yet another factor that contributed to the success of the Maoists was their strong organisational base. In contrast, the NC and UML were riven by internal feuds. There was a major communication gap between their leaders and workers at the grassroots. Moreover, both these parties were urban-based and ignored rural areas. The NC and UML were perceived by people as elitist in orientation, having a strong base among the upper castes, while CPN-M identified itself with the masses. As far as seat distribution is concerned, the CPN-M reserved 40 seats for women and 30 seats for dalits and other ethnic groups. In comparison, UML had given away 160 out of 220 seats to Brahmins. While the CPN-M gave 33 per cent of the seats to Janjatis and 8 per cent to Dalits, the NC allotted 28 per cent to Janjatis and 5 per cent to Dalits. The UML came third with 25 per cent to Janjatis and 5 per cent to Dalits.
The personality factor also played an important role in these elections. Prachanda carries much greater appeal than the ageing GP Koirala and an unimpressive Madhav Nepal. Since April 2006, Prachanda has been getting more media attention than others. As a result, the youth in Nepal feel proud to associate themselves with the CPN-M in general and Prachanda in particular. At the same time, the people of Nepal assumed, as was revealed to this author, that strong leadership, discipline, and unity of command would help the CPN-M to perform more effectively.
While the CA elections were considered a solution to years of political instability and turmoil, the fractured mandate has complicated the matter further. No single party has secured enough seats to form the government on its own. At the moment, a grand coalition adhering to the Interim Constitution might not be possible due to the resignation of UML ministers from the GP Koirala government. Significantly, the UML and NC have decided not to join the new government headed by the CPN-Maoist until it dissolves paramilitary structures. The coalition government may be deadlocked over many issues since it would be difficult to gain consensus on issues every time.
As long as the political parties are unable to resolve their differences over government formation, the first meeting of the CA cannot take major decisions without all the 601 members present in the house. The first and foremost duty of the new government, therefore, is to nominate the remaining 26 members to parliament. There is also confusion over whether the present government or the new government will nominate those 26 members.
Meanwhile, the United States has been suggesting that the NC should lead the new government. If that happens, then the decision would go against the popular mandate and people might protest against the NC government. Prachanda has gone on record to say that the people have already given the Maoists the mandate by returning them with the largest number of representatives and largest share of popular votes.
Impact on India
For India, the major concern has been links between the Indian and Nepalese Maoists. In the past, these groups have shared their perspectives on the nature of state in India and repeatedly came out with anti-India statements in different fora. However, in recent days, there has been no meeting of minds over the CPN-M’s decision to try the democratic path to power. One can only prognosticate that in view of the responsibilities that the Nepal Maoists will shoulder in the days to come, they may focus more on consolidating their base within Nepal rather than look out and facilitate a Maoist revolution abroad. Indian Maoists have even branded Prachanda a revisionist, which is a slur in communist parlance. Maoists of India do have an independent political dynamic and will remain largely unaffected by developments in Nepal. In case, the Maoists fail in their experiment in Nepal they may in future come together with an even more radical agenda in the sub-continent.
Maoists in Nepal may develop a close strategic relationship with China. Any dispensation for that matter in Kathmandu will play the China card against India as long as it is of strategic value. China would like to take advantage of that. Its interests in Nepal are more focused around Tibet, growing US and Indian presence in Nepal and economic engagement. It has always preferred a nationalistic government in Nepal, which would not allow Tibetan refugees to use Nepalese territory against China. Maoists coming to power would facilitate China to increase its presence in Nepal and offset Indian influence. It could emerge as a strong contender for India in hydro power projects and infrastructure building, especially in northern Nepal.
The Maoists have declared that after coming to power, they would revisit all existing treaties with India. If renegotiation of the India-Bhutan treaty is any indicator, Indian policy makers would not be too averse to the idea of revisiting the treaties. As the Maoists would mature as a democratic political force, one hopes, they will soon shed their rhetoric and settle down for pragmatic policies. However, a lot will depend on the policy preferences of the new government in Nepal, the nature of the relationship between India and China and changes in the regional security dynamics.
India, Elections, Maoist, Nepal
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Kosovo’s Independence: The “Politics” of Geography and Internal Contradictions
Namrata Goswami
May 14, 2008
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 is dividing the world into states that support the move and those opposed to it. It has also emboldened separatist movements across the world.
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 is dividing the world into states that support the move and those opposed to it. It has also emboldened separatist movements across the world.
Prominent among supporters of Kosovo’s independence are the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, while on the opposing side stand China, Russia, Spain, Greece and Portugal. One impact of this divide has been its fallout on the United Nations. Just like NATO’s March 1999 intervention on behalf of Kosovar Albanians without a UN mandate, this time around as well the UN has been bypassed by some of the world’s developed states to further their own geo-strategic interests. So much so that UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon categorically stated that the decision to recognise Kosovo’s independence by important member-states were independent choices, and that the UN was still bound by Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, which recognizes Kosovo as an integral part of the Yugoslav Federation of which Serbia is the successor state. Resolution 1244 had also strictly laid down that future decisions on Kosovo must be guided by the principles of Serbia’s sovereignty over the province and territorial integrity.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has defended the Bush Administration’s prompt recognition of Kosovo’s independence by arguing that Serbia’s gross human right violations in Kosovo in 1998-99 justifies the latter’s declaration of independence and therefore must be viewed as a “special exception” to the twin precepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, it appears that American support for Kosovo’s independence is guided by its interests, which is to establish a permanent military base in Kosovo to enable smooth oil transfers from the Caspian Sea via the Balkans to eventually reach the United States.
Many countries like Spain, Romania, Greece, Portugal and Slovakia argue that the US had decided as early as June 1999 that Kosovo should never be re-integrated with Serbia. This suspicion has to be seen in the context of US behaviour in 1998 and 1999 in the region. In 1998, the US deftly removed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from its list of terrorist groups, described it instead as an insurgency, and deepened ties with the outfit. This, notwithstanding the fact that the KLA had acquired arms training in Afghanistan and Albania, and had funded itself through a well organised drug network in the Balkans. A year later, the US, with KLA support, started building Camp Bondsteel, a permanent military base on 955 acres of open farm land near the Kosovar town of Urosevac, in a display of a long term engagement plan.
The same year it also revealed a plan to build a trans-Balkan oil pipeline by the Albania Macedonia Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO), which is registered in the United States. This pipeline aims to bypass Russia and bring oil from the Caspian Sea to terminals in Georgia, to be subsequently transported by tanker through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Burgas and onwards through Macedonia to the Albanian port of Vlora, for shipment to refineries in the US West Coast. The successful completion of this plan necessitates a US military presence in Kosovo to provide security for the project; Kosovo’s independence facilitates such a presence. Armed with these plans, the US won the support of major European states like Germany, France and Britain and successfully influenced the European Union to bypass the UN Security Council to facilitate a limited form of independence for Kosovo.
The other significant geopolitical factor behind the prompt recognition of Kosovo’s independence by these states is their desire to see a diminution in Russian influence in the Balkans. Russia has steadfastly spoken against Kosovo’s independence and has supported the Serbian view of politically reintegrating the province. Kosovo’s independence thus deals a severe blow to Russia’s position in the Balkans.
In a counter-move, Vladimir Putin warned on April 29 that the West’s recognition of Kosovo might motivate his country to support the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester and South Ossetia. Indeed, Russia has started granting Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia following Kosovo’s independence. Fear of mounting conflict with Russia and the spread of separatist sentiments inflamed by Kosovo’s move have led to deep divisions within Europe. Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Portugal, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania have all refused to recognise Kosovo’s independence.
Kosovo’s declaration of independence has also had an impact on separatist movements in various parts of the world, while at the same time discomfiting states that face such movements. On May 8, 2008, the parliament of the Georgian province of Abkhazia passed two resolutions asserting its sovereignty and independence from Georgia, and called upon the United Nations, Russia and other countries to recognise it as an independent entity. Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh noted that “Kosovo has just boosted everything…. Kosovo is a precedent and we will work in that direction.”
Separatist groups in India are also attempting to draw inspiration from the Kosovo precedent. Yasin Malik, leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), told the Iranian-based Islamic Republic News Agency in February that the international community, and particularly the EU, “should play a pro-active role now towards the resolution of Kashmir issue as they did in case of Kosovo.” The website of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim has congratulated Kosovars on their declaration of independence.
The argument put forth by most separatist groups in India and abroad that Kosovo is an ideal case of self-determination is, however, flawed. These groups deliberately overlook the harsh realities facing Kosovo today. Its territorial landscape is ethnically divided, with most of its 120,000 Serb population residing south of the Ibar River and Albanians in the area north of the river. Already, the province faces partition as Serbs vehemently defy the independence move and continue to be loyal to Belgrade. Since 1999, the ethnic divide has worsened and peace in this UN protectorate is being maintained by 16,000 NATO troops. The only difference now is that instead of a UN protectorate, there is an EU protectorate led by Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith. The situation is akin to that in Bosnia where everyday administration is being carried out by EU bureaucrats with little participation from the Bosnians themselves.
Kosovo’s economy is an even bigger challenge. Unemployment rate is about 50 per cent. Two-thirds of young people are without jobs, leading to crime and drug addiction. Its most important mining project, the Trepca Mines, is in a dilapidated condition. According to Shpend Ahmeti, Director of Kosovo's Institute for Advanced Studies, imports constitute about US $1.9 billion a year whereas exports are a meagre $130 million. Business taxes are much higher than elsewhere in the region and there is an acute lack of reliable power supply. Added to this is the limited rule of law with high rates of organised crime. In addition, as Joost Lagendijk, overseer of Kosovo policy in the European Parliament states, “Kosovo is a poor agricultural country where the energy supply is chaotic, the rule of law needs to be upheld and the economy is almost starting from scratch.” The Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007 rates Kosovo as the world’s fourth most corrupt economy.
Thus, for the near future, Kosovo’s economy will depend on Western aid, its security will be provided by NATO troops and its political future will be overseen by the EU mission. In this context, independence has little or no meaning.
United Nations, Kosovo, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
Referendum for Myanmar’s Constitution in the wake of Cyclone Nargis
Udai Bhanu Singh
May 12, 2008
Howsoever much others may want to distance India from mlitary-ruled Myanmar, the widespread devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis has brought India into the spotlight. That it occurred barely a week prior to Myanmar’s proposed constitutional Referendum on May 10 brought this out in bold relief.
Howsoever much others may want to distance India from mlitary-ruled Myanmar, the widespread devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis has brought India into the spotlight. That it occurred barely a week prior to Myanmar’s proposed constitutional Referendum on May 10 brought this out in bold relief.
Cyclone Nargis is estimated to have left over 22,000 dead with over 40,000 missing. This has delayed the vote to May 24 in 47 townships (40 of the 45 townships in Yangon area and seven in Ayeyawady delta). Balloting would be held as scheduled (May 10) in other areas. The regime has already been conducting advance voting since last month (in its embassies abroad and for civil servants and personnel belonging to the police, fire brigade, etc. who would be on duty on the day of Referendum).
Myanmar announced on February 9 that it would hold a referendum for a new Constitution in May 2008 and (multi-party democracy) general elections in 2010.1 The SPDC issued the Referendum Law comprising twelve chapters for the approval of the draft constitution (Law No. 1/2008).2 It explicitly states in Chapter 1 that “Referendum means the Referendum held for enabling the approval of the draft State Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.” It excludes fives categories from voting, among which are members of religious orders3 and persons who are illegally abroad.4 Both groups constitute important sections of Myanmar. Monks are important not only because they numerically balance the armed forces, but for their moral clout and for knowing the pulse of the people. Those illegally abroad are also usually the more qualified who left in the wake of the August 1988 movement. Aung San Suu Kyi would have the right to cast her vote in the referendum.
On February 19 the draft Constitution had been readied by the 54-member Commission for Drafting the State Constitution led by Myanmar’s Chief Justice Aung Toe. This was the culmination of 14 years of deliberation of the National Convention, which had earlier adopted the fundamental and detailed principles for drafting a new Constitution.5 The draft Constitution has 15 chapters and is available on the internet and copies of the draft are being sold in shops in Myanmar.
Doubts about the fairness of the referendum have been repeatedly raised by the domestic opposition and others, who have criticised measures like advance voting, absentee voting, and the failure to allow international observers and media. The NLD and others have been campaigning for Voting ‘No” in the referendum, while the State apparatus has been advocating a ‘Yes’ vote. The New Light of Myanmar, a Government newspaper, headlined the message that “To approve the State Constitution is a national duty of the entire people today. Let us all cast “Yes” vote in the national interest.6” The US-based Human Rights Watch has said that the referendum would not be free and fair because of the failure of the junta to allow free discussion of the pros and cons of the draft Constitution.
Myanmar has had two constitutions till date: the one framed in 1947 accorded some states the right to secede after ten years. The present draft Constitution (Chapter II, Article 7) explicitly rules out such a possibility: “No part of the territory of the Union, namely regions, states, Union territories and self administered areas etc shall ever secede from the Union.” The 1974 Constitution was Myanmar’s second and was introduced following a referendum. That referendum was held under very different circumstances. The then British Ambassador in Rangoon reported back to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs that “it is not too great a problem to persuade people to vote for the Constitution – to most people any Constitution (and this one is not bad) is preferable to none.” Today, if the same logic were applied, the people of Myanmar should be overjoyed about the new draft as they have also missed a Constitution for a prolonged period of time (since 1988), but that may not really be the case. In the referendum held in 1974, the percentage of vote had been the highest in the ‘Burman’ Burma and the smallest in Shan State where insurgency was then raging (see Appendix). While that criterion may still hold, the additional factor of the cyclone adds a new dimension to the problem as the areas worst affected were Yangon and the Ayeyawady delta (Burman dominated).
If the 2010 elections are held they would be the first in two decades. The results of the last one, the 1990 general elections, were annulled by the State Law and Order Restoration Council on the ground that these elections had been held to elect representatives to a constitution-drafting body and not for a national assembly.7 The SLORC/SPDC formulation was a four step route, of which step four is the Referendum.
The current upheaval follows ominously close on the heels of the upheaval which Yangon and some other cities witnessed about seven months back when the people supported by the Buddhist clergy had come out on the streets in protest against the fuel price hike.
What is interesting (and perhaps worrying, too) is that in the September 2007 upheaval if the monks were perceived, in a sense, as the cause of the crisis, in the present upheaval (in May) they are seen by the common people as saviours. This was an opportunity which the Myanmar Tatmadaw should have snatched and utilised in mobilising the state apparatus towards disaster relief.
India has been steadily strengthening its relations with Myanmar in recent years while seeking to quietly influence the military rulers to bring about the required transformation in the political system. Vice Sr Gen Maung Aye had recently visited India (April 2-6, 2008). Unlike during the 2004 Asian Tsunami earlier when the Indian coastline and islands were affected along with Myanmar, this time only Myanmar is the victim and the damage is serious. Myanmar, which had refused international aid in the wake of the Tsunami, has been forced to accept it this time. It is interesting that the US First Lady Laura Bush acknowledged that Myanmar was more likely to accept aid from a neighbour like India than from the United States. Perhaps that is understandable because the US had just announced the award of the Congressional Gold Medal to Aung San Suu Kyi. India’s relief effort was also acknowledged by Myanmar. India sent two naval vessels (INS Rana and INS Kirpan) and two AN-32 aircraft carrying relief supplies on May 7. Two other IL-76 aircraft reached Yangon on May 8 and May 10.
According to reports, Myanmar’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology had advance information (a week before) about the impending cyclone from at least two sources: the Indian Meteorology Department, and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok. On the face of it, Myanmar disregarding India’s warnings about the impending disaster appear puzzling. However, it is conceivable that the SPDC was afraid about upsetting the build-up to the referendum, which a public scare would have created, and hence did not give the warning the importance or prominence it deserved.
Could India have done more to persuade Myanmar regarding the urgency of the situation? Perhaps Indian diplomacy would have had greater impact if closer and harmonious links had been previously established between the meteorological departments of the two countries. In-house training to Myanmar’s environment, weather and meteorological experts in Indian institutions would not only impart the right kind of expertise to concerned personnel but also establish the appropriate linkages and bonds at the level of experts which could prove crucial in times of natural calamities. Given that non-traditional security issues are generally likely to engage the attention of Indian security planners in times to come, especially in the Indian Ocean region, it would be appropriate that institutional linkages are established beforehand. Possibly, a nodal agency in New Delhi could help network with various government and non-government agencies dealing with environmental issues.
Myanmar, India-Myanmar Relations
South East Asia and Oceania
IDSA COMMENT
Re-energising India-Iran ties
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
May 02, 2008
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan’s announcement at an international seminar that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be converting what was originally meant to be a refuelling stop into an official stop-over in New Delhi on his way home from Sri Lanka generated much speculation about the reasons for and timing of the visit.
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan’s announcement at an international seminar that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be converting what was originally meant to be a refuelling stop into an official stop-over in New Delhi on his way home from Sri Lanka generated much speculation about the reasons for and timing of the visit. Opinions were expressed that the visit would provide the necessary breakthrough in bilateral relations, which had been affected following India’s vote against Iran in the IAEA; that it would provide the necessary incentive to speed up and even resolve long-pending issues on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project; and that it would help iron out the creases in the 2005 LNG project.
But is this so? On the face of it, barring some general statements, no major breakthroughs were made during the visit. On the IPI pipeline, India had asked Iran to dedicate a particular gas field for the project and had sought third party certification of its reserves. Alternatively, it wanted reassurance on alternate sources of supply in the event of depletion of reserves. Moreover, it wanted Iran to hand over custody of the gas at the India-Pakistan border and not at the Iran-Pakistan border as had been suggested by Tehran in order to cut transit risk through Pakistan, and it opposed the three-year price revision clause that Iran had demanded. The Iranian President made no commitments on these issues, saying that his Oil Minister would resolve the same with his Indian counterpart, though he did say that a final draft was expected to be worked out by the three countries within the next 45 days. Even Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon avoided referring to the project as a done deal, though he said that the pipeline was a “doable” project and added that a “lot of work” needed to be done to ensure that it is commercially viable, secure and provides assured supplies.
Nevertheless, despite the continuing ambiguity, Ahmadinejad’s visit did help to inject a greater sense of optimism on the beleaguered project than there has been for a long time. More importantly, it also put India-Iran relations, which was seen as sliding, back on track. But why would an increasingly belligerent Iran, which since 2005 has made a virtue of its defiance, decide to make amends with an India that is seen to be moving inexorably into the US camp.
For Iran, despite public rhetoric, its increasing isolation was beginning to hurt. Though surging oil prices has helped alleviate its economic woes to some extent, it is starved of investment and particularly state-of-the-art technology to develop its vast energy resources and ensure its continued status as a leading energy exporter. Moreover, despite sitting on the world’s second largest gas reserves, it has not succeeded in exploiting its potential. Though several European countries have expressed interest in accessing Iranian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, due to US pressure many of them are wary of getting into big deals that could attract American sanctions. Moreover, it would be difficult for Tehran to breach Russia’s monopoly over the European gas market. Under these circumstances, if Iran succeeds in getting countries like India and China to invest in its energy sector, it would provide the necessary incentive for other countries, including Western states, to invest or expand work in Iran and help the country end or at least lessen its isolation. It is in this context that the IPI project assumes significance.
For New Delhi too, Iran is important, not only because it is a major supplier of oil to India – around 7.5 per cent of India’s oil imports are sourced from that country – but also because Iran is a potentially large energy supplier and conduit for the energy resources of land-locked Central Asia. With oil prices touching $120 a barrel, India’s need for assured energy supplies, particularly gas, has acquired greater urgency. Though India has other supply options and is in fact diversifying its sources to other regions, given Iran’s geographical location between West and Central Asia and South Asia combined with its vast untapped gas reserves, India cannot afford to ignore Iran’s importance. Moreover, with a general decline in oil fields the world over, Iran’s huge reserves are attractive. With Western companies still hesitant to make large investments in Iran, Indian companies have been provided with a golden opportunity of signing up projects before competition increases.
Even prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, there were indications that India and Iran were keen to arrest the drift in their relations. Since 2007, Indian and Iranian officials have resumed bilateral visits as was evidenced by the visit of External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Iran in February, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Safari’s return trip to India in September. In February 2008, Iran’s Finance Minister Danesh Jafri visited India. During an interaction with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, he drew attention to Iran’s geographical location and said that it is well suited to companies interested in the energy sector, both upstream and downstream, as well as mining and the services sector. Trying to allay fears that US sanctions against Iran and the insecure environment in the region were impeding companies from investing in his country, Mr. Jafri emphasised that Tehran had put a legal framework in place and said that the security of foreign investments was ensured through new changes in the law and the Constitution.
Soon thereafter, the Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOECC) participated in two tenders in the offshore sector of India’s oil industry. The company’s managing director, Mas’ud Soltanpur, said that each project was worth over $1.1 billion, and that the company had a very good chance of getting the deal despite several competitors being in the fray.1
Again, prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, a slew of agreements was signed between the two countries. In mid-April, India and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding for co-operation in railways as well as to begin work on the India-Iran-Russia railway line. The MoU also included technical training of Iranian railway personnel, railroad signalling projects, supply of locomotives and spare parts, setting up a joint working group as well as a joint effort to increase co-operation with the national Union of Railways. Iran has also sought India’s help, including investment, in constructing a new track connecting its Free Trade Zone in south-eastern Chabahar to Fahrej, which is located in the central part of the country.2
In April, a few weeks before the Presidential visit, the board of Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), had formally agreed to collaborate with the Hinduja Group-ONGC Videsh Ltd. in developing the Azadegan and South Pars fields, an agreement that had originally been signed between the Hinduja Group and NICO in August 2007. At the time, the deal had not taken off due to the influence exerted by China to get the same contract. But by going ahead with the deal, Iran has signalled that it is once again ready to do business with India.
At the end of the day, President Ahmadinejad’s visit could not have been timed better. With general elections looming round the corner, the Indian government, under increasing pressure from its Left allies to assert its independence, responded firmly that it did not need any guidance on how to conduct its bilateral relations. Neither can Iranian influence on India’s huge Shia community -- the second largest after Iran’s -- be ignored. This was evidenced by India’s surprisingly sharp reply to a statement by US State Department spokesman Tom Casey soon after the presidential visit was announced, that Washington would like to see New Delhi call on Iran to cease enriching uranium and that India should put pressure on Iran to “become a more responsible actor on the world stage.”3
The Iranian President voiced his appreciation for India’s stance. Stating that India and Iran were “true friends,” Mr. Ahmadinejad admitted that India’s vote against Iran on the nuclear issue did have an impact, but that relations between the two countries were “very deep and historical.” He, however, added that “the issue is related to the past, we are looking forward to building better relations.”4
4. .“Iran and India True Friends: Ahmadinejad,” Arab News, April 30, 2008, www.arabnews.com/?page=4§ion=0&article=109484&d=1&m-5&y=2008
India, India-Iran Relations, Iran, Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN
IDSA COMMENT
EC President Barroso’s Visit to China
Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
May 01, 2008
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, led a high-level team of nine European Union (EU) commissioners to Beijing on April 24 and 25, 2008, and met the Chinese leadership. Notable amongst the commissioners who accompanied him were the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, led a high-level team of nine European Union (EU) commissioners to Beijing on April 24 and 25, 2008, and met the Chinese leadership. Notable amongst the commissioners who accompanied him were the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. Though the main purpose of the visit was to start the EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Mechanism, it was significant for being the first visit of a high-level EU delegation to China in the aftermath of the Lhasa Uprising in March and subsequent demonstrations against the Chinese government. Moreover, the demonstrations against the Olympic Torch in Paris and London had introduced a note of acerbity in Sino-European relations. In addition, the European Parliament (EP) has been keeping up the heat on China. Besides other earlier resolutions, the EP adopted on April 23 a resolution titled, “China's policy and its effects on Africa,” which stated that though “China is the EU's second most important trading partner … dialogue with China on democratic reforms, respect for human rights and the rule of law should not take second place to trade and economic relations.” The resolution was also critical of China that “it is responsible for significant arms transfers to conflict-ridden countries, even in violation of UN embargoes in the cases of Darfur, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Simultaneously, the conferment of honorary citizenship on the Dalai Lama by the Paris City Council left the Chinese livid. Demonstrations against the French outlet chain Carrefour in some Chinese cities, an avoidable and ugly incident of the reported assault on a disabled Chinese athlete Jin Jing during the demonstrations in Paris, followed by the mollifying tour of the French president’s envoys to Beijing, all seem to mark the annus horribilis in Sino-French relations, which had remained otherwise cozy during the Chirac years.
In the light of this chain of events, the visit of the EC delegation to China is extremely significant. Xinhua noted that the visit took place “at a time of several Sino-EU disagreements” and that the “differences on the Tibet issue … has recently soured the Sino-EU relationship.” On the European side, analysts and the business lobby have suggested to the EC that it tone down its public criticism of China while remaining firm on the issue of human rights. Prior to the visit, EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson warned against a direct confrontation with China and boycotting the Olympics.
Though the main focus of the EC visit to China was trade, interesting developments in Beijing and Europe cannot be overlooked. Shortly after the meeting between Barroso and Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, an announcement came that the Chinese government would meet the representative of the Dalai Lama. From the EU side, the statement issued by its present Slovenian presidency was equally interesting: “The decision (to hold talks with the Dalai Lama) was announced in a press release on the occasion of the visit to Beijing by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and other Commissioners, and the readiness to hold talks was explicitly stated in a letter sent on 16 April by the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Wen Jiabao, to the current EU Council President, Janez Janša.” While the maiden Slovenian presidency of the European Council may be ‘pleased’ at its achievements, one can however infer that Beijing has also been eager to come out of this imbroglio and was on the look out for a suitable occasion to express its desire to meet the Dalai Lama’s representative. The visit of the EC delegation was thus a much-awaited opportunity for Beijing.
Trade was the main focus of the visit, though it is already a known fact that the growing trade imbalance in Sino-European trade, violations of intellectual property rights, technology transfer and forced joint ventures of European companies with Chinese state undertakings keep dogging their trade dialogue. On the eve of Barroso’s visit, BUSINESSEUROPE, a trade group, wrote an open letter to the EC president pointing out that in 2007 the EU’s trade deficit with China would exceed 170 billion euros. Startling also is the fact that in 2006, “79% of all counterfeit goods seized at EU borders came from China, compared with 54% in 2004.” The European trade group, amongst others, urged the EC to address issues like Chinese state intervention as well as restrictions on importing raw materials from China.
It is obvious that the fastest-growing economy in the world is an attractive place for the European infrastructure, telecommunications and civil aviation industries. Similarly, China is keen on inviting European consumer goods companies like Carrefour, Louis Vuitton, Adidas, Lidl, etc. because of its huge middle class. However, it seems that the European trade and industry lobby would remain anxious while dealing with China for various reasons, including forced technology transfer, copying European higher-end products and a reverse trade towards Europe through their fake versions. Since Europeans consider their reliable and world-known quality products as tools to maintain their supremacy on the global market as well as their affluence, it remains to be seen for how long European companies would find China strategically important to do business in the coming years. Though Sino-European trade has the potential of at least 20 per cent growth, it would be interesting to observe whether European companies begin to look out for markets that are more observant of copyrights and other practices.
The Olympic Torch has already passed through some acrimonious points and the Beijing Olympics would always be remembered in connection with these demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. The reception accorded to the Olympic flame remains varied in different countries given the level of friendship, closeness, ideological loyalty to the Chinese leadership (Pakistan, Nepal and North Korea) and the presence of Chinese and Tibetan Diaspora (Britain, India and the United States). The Chinese willingness to resume dialogue with the representative of the Dalai Lama appears to be a face-saving attempt in the wake of adverse international public opinion. However, six rounds of talks with Tibetan representatives have not borne any result so far. Though the Chinese government has announced a resumption of dialogue, the diatribe against the Dalai Lama continues. The onus lies on the Chinese leadership to prove to the global community that its dialogue with the representatives of the Dalai Lama would be substantial and not merely a tactical gesture. It is true that a breakthrough in dialogue should not be expected soon. But Chinese sincerity would be tested not just before the Olympic Games but after it as well.
Barroso’s visit was indeed an opportunity for Beijing to prove its earnestness before one of its close partners that it is indeed serious and consistent in its dialogue with the representatives of the Dalai Lama. The EC President’s remarks at the joint press conference with Wen Jiabao was also not too critical, but was rather conciliatory. However, if Beijing considers that burgeoning trade interests would ultimately force its trade partners not to take any adverse steps, it might not turn out to be mistaken because it is certain the global community would henceforth be more observant of Chinese affairs and its handling of issues like Tibet and others. In an interdependent world, the attraction of a huge market may not always serve as a trump card.
EU-China Relations, European Union, China
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
ISRO Delivers Ten Satellites at a Go
Ajey Lele
April 30, 2008
India’s Space Programme has been contributing a lot towards bestowing ‘Soft Power’ status to the country over the last couple of years. The success of the PSLV-C9 mission on April 28, 2008 is the latest in this regard. In this mission, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) succeeded in placing ten satellites in space by using a single booster. This is a record given that till date no other country has put a cumulative weight of approximately 825 kilograms spread over ten different satellites in a single attempt into space.
India’s Space Programme has been contributing a lot towards bestowing ‘Soft Power’ status to the country over the last couple of years. The success of the PSLV-C9 mission on April 28, 2008 is the latest in this regard. In this mission, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) succeeded in placing ten satellites in space by using a single booster. This is a record given that till date no other country has put a cumulative weight of approximately 825 kilograms spread over ten different satellites in a single attempt into space.
ISRO’s most reliable workhorse, PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), successfully delivered India’s cartographic satellite CARTOSAT 2A, the Indian Mini Satellite (IMS-1) and eight nano-satellites from abroad into outer space. The cartographic satellite launched is the third of the series and has a resolution of around 0.8 metres. The earlier two were CARTOSAT 1 and CARTOSAT 2 with resolutions of 2.5 and 1 metre, respectively. CARTOSAT-2A also carries advanced digital panchromatic cameras to give black and white pictures. Data generated by this satellite will be used for various cartographic applications, including urban and rural infrastructure development and management. The satellite would also provide useful information in land information systems and geographical information systems. It is expected that this satellite would form a pair with CARTOSAT 2 to enable more frequent revisits to areas under survey. Terrain mapping would become easier with this satellite, which would be offering stereoscopic imagery. CARTOSAT-2A imagery with a spatial resolution of about 80 centimetres matches the best in the world (the American satellite QuickBird is the world’s highest resolution commercial satellite and offers a resolution of 60 centimetres). This Indian satellite would now offer better imagery than the US IKONOS satellite, which has a resolution of one metre. The launch of IKONOS in 1999 was hailed by the New York Times as “one of the most significant developments in the history of the space age.”
The other Indian satellite placed in orbit is IMS-1, India’s first micro satellite, which weighs 83 kilograms. This unit integrates many new technologies and has miniaturised subsystems onboard. Payloads aboard are meant for earth imaging, space science, atmospheric and ocean studies. India proposes to make available the data generated by this satellite to various research organisations, universities and institutions in developing countries free of cost. Understanding the financial and technological limitations of such institutions in having a state-of-the-art infrastructure for data reception, ISRO has made efforts to evolve easier methods of data reception. Data generated by IMS-1 will be transmitted to user terminals, which will constitute of a normal computer along with a radio frequency downlink and an antenna.
The eight nano satellites that PSLV-C9 carried to space are CanX-2, Cute-1.7+APD II, Delfi C3, AAUSAT-II, COMPASS-1, SEEDS-2, CanX-6 and RUBIN-8. The overall weight of all these systems together is approximately 50 kilograms. These satellites belong to countries like Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Japan. They were built to learn the art of fabricating satellites by academics and to test nano technologies for their applicability in satellites. Antrix Corporation, ISRO’s marketing agency, is charging these countries for the launch of these satellites.
For ISRO, the mission was a technological challenge. Though this was the PSLV’s thirteenth flight, it was only its third in the ‘core-alone’ configuration. Incidentally, the earlier two core-alone configuration flights were undertaken for placing satellites in lower orbits, while this mission was the first flight into a polar orbit. The core-alone configuration involves sending the four-stage PSLV rocket without the booster-straps. In normal configuration, the PSLV has six booster motors around the first stage and is capable of placing payloads weighing up to 1,600 kg in polar orbit. PSLV C9 had a much reduced payload of around 825 kg; hence the launch configuration needed a change. Also, to put ten satellites at the right time in precise orbits one by one was a tricky task. The success of this launch also proves the merit of the ejection mechanism that ISRO has developed.
The success of this mission should not be viewed in isolation. Over the last four decades, ISRO has made significant progress and has many successes to its credit. Many other challenging missions are in the offering. The much talked about moon mission, Chandrayan 1, is expected to get ‘space-borne’ within the next two to three months. Subsequently, in a year’s time, India also proposes to undertake its second moon mission in collaboration with Russia. For India, the moon has strategic relevance because of the presence of various minerals and Helium-3 on its surface, which could offer some solutions to the energy problems on earth.
Immediately after the success of the PSLV C9 launch, ISRO also disclosed the broad outline of the 'Indian human space flight'. This would be a space vehicle carrying a crew of two to low earth orbit. The astronauts are expected to stay in space for a duration of seven days. The mission is planned to be launched in 2015 and could cost around Rs. 10,000 crore. The Union Cabinet is expected to approve this mission shortly.
By launching ten satellites together, out of which eight were under commercial agreements, ISRO has showcased the trustworthiness of its launch capabilities to the world. On commercial count, ISRO’s success is significant. It is likely to bring in more business proposals. Already, during the last year, ISRO had successfully launched an Italian and an Israeli satellite under commercial agreements. In fact, since late 1990’s, India has taken piggy back payloads for a few countries onboard its own missions. Antrix Corporation also offers Technical consultancy and a wide variety of other services. It appears that India is now gradually emerging as a favourite destination for satellite launch services. India is projected to grab around 10 to 15 per cent market share of the global space bazaar in the years to come. Over the years, Antrix has achieved steady and significant progress in terms of financial performance. More than 75 per cent of its earnings are in foreign exchange and it has a sales turnover exceeding Rs. 3000 million. India has also constructed a special state-of-the-art launch pad capable of accommodating different rockets, which was inaugurated in 2005. Unlike launch pads operated by the United States and Europe, which typically are designed for a single type of rocket, ISRO's launch pad is designed to accommodate all of India's existing and planned launch vehicles. The flexibility of this pad (turnaround time is less) is likely to help Antrix in its efforts to win more commercial launch contracts in the near future.
The success of PSLV C9 has demonstrated that ISRO’s space programme is robust with a sound technological base, and that it can match with the best in the world in many areas and has great strategic as well as commercial significance.
Space Technology, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV )
North America & Strategic Technologies
IDSA COMMENT
The Attack on Migrants in Manipur
T. Khurshchev Singh
April 29, 2008
Normal life in Manipur was drastically affected between March 17 and 19, 2008 when 15 migrants were killed by unidentified armed militants. While there have been accusations that local militants might have been behind the killings, militant groups have categorically denied their involvement. There is likelihood that foreign terrorist groups were involved in the killings to create ethnic apprehension and conflict between migrants and natives.
Normal life in Manipur was drastically affected between March 17 and 19, 2008 when 15 migrants were killed by unidentified armed militants. While there have been accusations that local militants might have been behind the killings, militant groups have categorically denied their involvement. There is likelihood that foreign terrorist groups were involved in the killings to create ethnic apprehension and conflict between migrants and natives. Moreover, one fallout of such violence could be the reimposition of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which had been revoked in parts of the state.
Manipur’s Director General of Police (DGP), Joykumar, asserted on March 20, 2008 that the killings were the handiwork of Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), a Manipuri insurgent outfit. But KYKL stoutly refuted the DGP’s claim. In a strongly worded statement, KYKL Publicity and Research Deputy Secretary, Apapabi Mangang, denounced the DGP’s allegation and ruled out his outfit’s involvement in the killings. He further maintained that the DGP’s remarks were malafide. Thereafter, other active insurgent outfits, too, have denied their involvement in the killings.
Even as the government and civil society groups denounced the killings in no uncertain terms, militant outfits such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) demanded a serious and impartial probe. The UNLF in a public statement declared that such mass killings were unpardonable. It further stated that such killings have been sporadic in the past, and that the latest incident was unprecedented. According to the PLA, its fight was against the government of India, not against Indian citizens, migrants or otherwise. According to some security analysts, the March 17-19 killings were exactly on the pattern of those unleashed by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) on Hindi-speaking people in Assam. These killings, analyst maintained, were meant to attract public attention to the insurgents’ demands.
In fact, the denial by locally active insurgent outfits of a role in the killings points to the possibility of external hands. This suspicion gains credence especially because outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have been found to have established links in Manipur. On December 19, 2006, Manipuri LeT activists, Salman Khurshid Kori (23), Abdul Rehman (24) and Mohammad Akbar Hussain (20), were arrested along with two kilograms of RDX, two detonators and one hand grenade by the Delhi police when they alighted from a Jammu-based bus in the Red Fort area. One of those held, Salman Kurshid Kohri, told his interrogators that he was an intermediary between the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) and a LeT module based in Bangladesh. He also disclosed the fact that he visited Bangladesh in May 2006 to firm up ties with the LeT.
The reason why Manipur has become a base for the LeT is because of three factors: 1) there are some like minded people who share a common culture, identity and ideology with the group in the state; 2) the state has unemployed youths who can be indoctrinated easily by the outfit or induced by monetary benefits; 3) and most dangerously, the state shares a border with Myanmar, which opens up a readily-accessible training ground for the outfit. Myanmar’s involvement as a training base for LeT was first revealed by the arrest the trio mentioned earlier. Soon after their arrest, on December 21, 2006, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil and his Myanmar Counterpart Major General Maung Oo discussed the issue and prospects for co-operation in curtailing such activities.
In the context of external involvement, it might be useful to recollect that there was a bomb blast at the ISKCON temple in Imphal on August 16, 2006 which claimed four lives. No outfit claimed responsibility for the blast and in fact several indigenous outfits condemned such an attack on a holy place. Analysts suspect the involvement of the ULFA in this attack and wonder whether this was not a ploy to scare away migrant Bihari labourers to pave the way for Bangladeshi migrants to work in the state. It is also possible that under the influence of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) Bangladesh and/or the support provided by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), some LeT-connected Manipuri armed cadres carried out the attack, ignoring the fact that the migrant population has been an asset to the State. The suspicion on external elements grows because there is strong evidence to suggest that terror groups such as LeT have been expanding their base in Manipur.
Here, one can also raise the issue whether the March 2008 killings were meant to create ethnic apprehensions and conflict between migrants (especially Biharis) and the locals. Sections of Manipuris, especially students (particularly those studying in Patna) and people working outside Manipur were panic stricken that the incident might result in clashes between Biharis and Manipuris elsewhere. In fact, external elements such as the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Jihadi (HuJI) have been trying to initiate identity clashes by attacking (bombing) holy places elsewhere in the country. Instances in this regard include the attacks on Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer in Rajasthan on October 11, 2007, Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad on May 18, 2007, Nurani Masjid at Malegaon in Maharashtra on September 8, 2006, Jama Masjid in Delhi on April 14, 2006, and Sankat Mochan temple at Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh on March 7, 2006.
The fallout of killings of migrants in Manipur could well pave the way for the re-imposition of the AFSPA, which was revoked in some parts of Manipur following the custodial death of Manorama in 2004. Here, it is worthwhile to note that the state government has expressed its wish to retain AFSPA in Manipur. Chief Minister Ibobi has been reported to have stated that there has been a sharp increase in the activities of various insurgent outfits, particularly in the four valley districts, which would call for the re-imposition of AFSPA. Subsequently, he expressed strong opposition to insurgent activities in the state during a session of the Legislative Assembly, where PREPAK hurled a grenade at the Legislative Complex on March 8, 2008 in response to his speech.
In the wake of various speculations floating around and several possibilities existing, it is imperative that the union government as well as the government of Manipur conduct a fair, impartial, and thorough probe into the killings of migrant labourers.
Northeast India, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's United Liberation Front (PULF), Manipur, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), China
Terrorism & Internal Security
IDSA COMMENT
A Test for Democracy in Zimbabwe
Gunjan Singh
April 28, 2008
“There will never ever be change in Zimbabwe. We shall never reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.” – Robert Mugabe (2008).
“There will never ever be change in Zimbabwe. We shall never reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.” – Robert Mugabe (2008).
Presidential elections were held in Zimbabwe on March 29, 2008. For the first time in 28 years after independence, the rule of Mugabe was constitutionally challenged in these elections. The three candidates who contested this election were Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu – PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Simba Makoni an independent candidate. Zimbabwe’s Constitution holds that if the results fail to give a clear majority to any one candidate, a re-election will happen within three weeks. It has been almost three weeks since the election and results have still not been announced. Out of 210 seats, results released by the country's electoral commission give the Movement for Democratic Change 99 seats, compared to 97 for President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party. A breakaway faction of the MDC won 10 seats. Out of the total of 210 seats, 23 seats were called for a recount. On April 26, the Zimbabwe Election Commission declared the results on 18 of these seats. The recount also shows that the opposition is in a majority and that there has been no major change in the numbers.
Presently, there is an ongoing tussle as to who has won the elections between Mugabe (Zanu-PF) and Tsvangirai (MDC), and it appears that this might lead to a constitutional crisis. The political situation in Zimbabwe has been steadily deteriorating for the past few years. Corruption is widespread and the economy is in recession. Mugabe has been the sole ruler of the country for the past 28 years since independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. One can thus say that democracy in Zimbabwe was Mugabe dictated and defined, and not a constitutional one.
The country’s political problems are not limited to Presidential elections alone. There have been three other elections – for the House of Assembly, for the Senate and for local councils. Predictions are that ZANU-PF might have lost to MDC in these as well. In totality, it seems that though Mugabe might have failed to get a clear 51 per cent majority in the presidential polls, there are chances that he might ignore the results and take up the presidency with the support of the armed forces which have greatly benefited from the high level of corruption under Mugabe’s rule.
For a few years after Independence Mugabe was respected for his policies, for the important role he had played in the independence struggle and also for racial reconciliation and development which brought education and health to millions who had been denied these privileges under colonial rule. The economy initially thrived on exports of food, minerals and tobacco. The problem began when Mugabe ordered the often violent take over of farms owned by white people and handing them over mainly to his relatives, friends and supporters who were least interested in farming. This completely ruined the agricultural economy. The situation today has much deteriorated further. A third of the population depends on imported food handouts. Another third has fled the country and almost 80 per cent of the remainder is unemployed. Life expectancy has reduced from 60 to 35 years, the lowest in the world. There is a massive shortage of food, electricity, medicine, water and fuel. The inflation rate is the highest in the world.
When elections were announced in March 2008, the opposition had claimed that there can be no free and fair elections under the existing government and demanded a new constitution. It feared that there would be electoral malpractices. One issue that has come up is the printing of extra voting ballots and the charge that these were used to rig the results. The opposition has claimed that there has been a major discrepancy in the number of voters counted and the number of ballots printed. The role of the army in all this is also open to question and speculation is rife about the course it will adopt in the wake of the political stalemate. It is not yet clear whether it will accept the election results or it will go ahead and help Mugabe retain power.
The media is no longer free and all newspapers and magazines are under government control. Most international media outfits are banned. The April 3 police raids on opposition party offices, foreign journalists and a democracy advocate has raised the spectre of a broader crackdown aimed at keeping the current leadership in power. The raids were described by Biti, the general secretary of the Movement for Democratic Change, as a “coup d’etat”. The MDC has gone to court to try and force the result. It claims that Tsvangirai has won and should be declared president.
The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have all called on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to declare the results early to help restore the belief in democracy. The European Union wants Mugabe to step down so that the country can have a bright and stable future without him at the helm. The stress of unknown results is causing unnecessary anxiety among the people, and there are apprehensions that they might resort to violence thus further worsening an already bad situation.
Zambia has called for an emergency meeting of Southern African leaders to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe. African countries are worried that if results are delayed any further the situation in Zimbabwe might take a violent turn, in a repeat of what happened in Kenya earlier. South African President Thabo Mbeki had been asked by the regional bloc to mediate between Mugabe and the opposition.
But the MDC is of the view that Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" has been a failure. It has also claimed that it will not participate in a run-off. It has claimed that 10 people have been killed in election-related violence and hundreds more have been injured. It also says that 3,000 families have been forced from their homes and more than 400 opposition supporters have been arrested. Tsvangirai met with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and has urged the UN to take action to bring the situation in Zimbabwe under control. He has also appealed to the African Union to show greater concern towards the problem in Zimbabwe. For his part, Mugabe has upped the propaganda in the state-run media and has reappointed his cabinet, half of whom have reportedly lost their parliamentary seats.
It is unlikely that the international community will intervene to save Zimbabwe from the unfolding crisis. The United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions against Mugabe’s government but to no avail. One possible ray of hope is an African initiative. There is a ray of hope in this regard, given the refusal of Southern African countries, under public pressure, to permit a Chinese ship carrying arms for landlocked Zimbabwe to dock and unload its cargo. It is time African countries took the initiative to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe and nudge that country towards a peaceful democratic transition.
Elections, Zimbabwe
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Taiwan Elections Vindicate the Status Quo
Abanti Bhattacharya
April 26, 2008
The KMT’s victory in the March 2008 presidential elections can be essentially attributed to the promises it made to improve economic ties with Mainland China and assure good governance. Ironically, these were partly the same promises that had brought the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) to power in the historic 2000 presidential election. There was no element of surprise to the election results in which Ma Ying-Jeou defeated his DPP counterpart Frank Hsieh. The KMT’s victory does not mean that Taiwan will begin supporting unification with the Mainland.
The KMT’s victory in the March 2008 presidential elections can be essentially attributed to the promises it made to improve economic ties with Mainland China and assure good governance. Ironically, these were partly the same promises that had brought the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) to power in the historic 2000 presidential election. There was no element of surprise to the election results in which Ma Ying-Jeou defeated his DPP counterpart Frank Hsieh. The KMT’s victory does not mean that Taiwan will begin supporting unification with the Mainland. Rather, it signifies the likelihood of the continuation of the status quo in Cross-Strait relations.
Over the years, both KMT and the DPP have deviated from their principled positions on the unification-independence debate. While the KMT has gradually moved towards greater identification with Taiwan, the DPP has gradually shed its staunch position on independence. In fact, they have both moved towards the centre, meaning they neither support independence nor unification.
In 1991, the KMT strictly adhered to the “Guidelines for National Unification,” which advocated the unification of Taiwan with the Mainland and underlined that “both the Mainland and Taiwan are parts of Chinese territory.” In other words, the KMT upheld the ‘one China’ principle. This position changed with the ‘1992 Consensus’, which while upholding the ‘one China’ principle reserved the right of each side to interpret the meaning of ‘one China.’ This marked the beginning of the KMT’s dilution of its original stand and adoption of the status quo position. The 1994 White Paper on Cross Strait relations issued by the KMT government also emphasised the status quo, by stating that China and Taiwan “should exist as two legal entities in the international era.” In 1999, President Lee Teng-hui went even further when he declared that China and Taiwan share “special state-to-state” relationships. But this extreme position was toned down the very next year after the party suffered electoral defeat at the hands of the DPP. KMT leader Lien Chan moved away from Lee Teng-hui’s radical position and consented to follow the 1991 Guidelines for National Unification as well as the ‘1992 Consensus’. At the same time, he added a qualifier to the unification principle, by retaining the ‘Taiwan first’ concept, which implied that the people of Taiwan will decide the status of the island.
The DPP’s initial position, laid down at the party convention in 1999, was that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all the residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.” But in 2000 when the DPP first came to power, Chen Shui-bian, its first President in his inauguration speech, proposed ‘5 NOs’: no declaration of independence, no change in national title, no two-state theory into Constitution, no referendum, and no abolition of the national unification guidelines. These indicated a clear toning down of the independence stand and the adoption of a status quo position. While in 2002, Chen Shui-bian reverted to his independence stand and described Cross Strait relations as “One Country on each side,” which meant “equal sovereignty” of China and Taiwan, by 2004 he once again adopted a status quo position as indicated in his second Inaugural speech, which outlined two opposing propositions. While reiterating the ‘5 NOs’, it also urged a revision of the Constitution so that it could accord with the “contemporary needs of Taiwan.” In 2005, this status quo position was reiterated in the Chen-Soong Ten-Point Joint Statement. Reflecting a conciliatory position again, the 10 Points included an acceptance of the definition of the country’s status in the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, a reiteration of ‘5 NOs’ and a requirement of the consensus of the 23 million people of Taiwan in any change to the status quo of the Island.
In sum, an analysis of the rival party positions suggests three things. First, while the KMT has represented a gradual nativisation, the DPP has also toned down its aggressive pro-independence stand. Second, the two parties’ correlation with the Islander/Mainlander distinction has blurred. And third, the current position indicates that both the DPP and the KMT have come to adopt a status quo position.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus, which Ma Ying-Jeou has adopted as part of his policy towards the Mainland, clearly hints at the status quo position. In short, the Consensus means “one China, different interpretations” and Ma Ying-Jeou has adhered to it saying that it “is just to manage it (the cross-strait relations) so that it wouldn’t erupt into a major crisis.” In his interview to the Times, Ma Ying-Jeou, stating his position on ‘one China’ clearly said, “We don’t have to recognise each other; all we have to do is not challenge and not deny the existence of the other side.” Essentially, by reiterating the 1992 Consensus, Ma Ying-Jeou closed the discussion on the sovereignty issue and shelved the independence-reunification debate to the backburner. Instead, he has put economics at the forefront with the aim of mending economic ties with the Mainland and assuring economic benefits and social stability to the Taiwanese people. In his interview to the Times, Ma Ying-Jeou said that he owed his victory to “the people of Taiwan” who “want a vibrant economy, a clean government, a society with equitable distribution of wealth and a peaceful Taiwan Strait.” Thus, in the KMT’s view, an ending of the current state of hostility between Taiwan and the Mainland does not mean the automatic adoption of a pro-unification stand. Instead, it is aimed at simply facilitating peaceful Cross-Strait relations, which would usher in greater economic growth and prosperity in Taiwan. In other words, the KMT’s position has reduced the divisive politics in Taiwanese society to the extent that it does not hurt the Island’s economy but without in any way resolving the issue of identity politics.
Nonetheless, identity politics, which has divided the Island’s polity into pro-unification (KMT) and pro-independence (DPP) parties, holds strong sway. This was in fact reflected in the economic policies advocated by the two parties. The DPP, in particular, has been reinforcing the localisation movement and resisting closer economic ties with China. This has hurt the business interests of Taiwanese people, and many businessmen faced the threat of eventually being forced to wrap up their investments in the Mainland if they did not cease to support the DPP’s cause. Here it is worth nothing a news report which stated that Taiwanese companies have invested more than US $100 billion in the Mainland. In contrast, the KMT’s election manifesto called for a robust opening up of Taiwan’s economy to China or in Ma Ying-Jeou’s words “maximize the opportunity and minimize the threat.” The KMT’s economic policy, thus, found strong resonance in the Taiwanese business community.
Public opinion in Taiwan also does not show any support for unification with the Mainland. At the same, there is also no clear verdict for independence, as indicated by the referendum results. This is primarily due to the military threat posed by China, with about 1,400 Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan. The two referendums held in tandem with the presidential election, however, failed to pass, as voter turnout did not reach the required threshold of 50 per cent of eligible voters. Nevertheless, they indicate wide support for maintaining the status quo. It has been reported that more than 10 million people voted in support of the island joining the United Nations either in the name of Taiwan or of ROC. Overall, the electoral verdict is in favour of maintaining the political status quo while at the same time increasing economic linkages with the Mainland.
It is being widely regarded that the KMT’s present policy of ‘economy first’ would pave the way for peaceful Cross-Strait relations. However, any such definitive conclusion about the future of Cross-Strait relations cannot be boldly advanced without taking into account the manner in which China attempts to resolve the issues of nationalism and competing identities. Indeed, recent developments in Tibet and the Chinese response point to the difficulties in this regard. It is therefore premature to conclude that the KMT’s victory would ensure peaceful Cross-Strait relations.
Since the beginning of 2007, there has been a sharp increase in global food prices, especially in developing countries. During the past year, the prices of rice and wheat have risen by 75 to 120 per cent globally. During the last 25 years global food production has gone down and has had a cascading effect upon prices.
Since the beginning of 2007, there has been a sharp increase in global food prices, especially in developing countries. During the past year, the prices of rice and wheat have risen by 75 to 120 per cent globally. During the last 25 years global food production has gone down and has had a cascading effect upon prices. As a result, a spectrum of countries including Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia have been buffeted by food riots, while other countries have sought to mitigate the situation by massive salary hikes of public servants, thus adding to their fiscal burden.
With the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) warning about depleting food stocks, food producing countries have sought to fight inflationary trends by banning exports to meet growing domestic demand. Major rice exporting nations such as Brazil, Egypt, Argentina and India have imposed a ban on rice exports. And the two largest rice exporting countries, Thailand and Vietnam, have been unable to meet market demand. Wanting to cash in on the spiralling demand, farmers in Thailand unsuccessfully tried to increase the number of crop cycles, while in Vietnam during the last three successive seasons rice crops were destroyed by pest. Cumulatively, growing demand, shortfalls in production and ban on exports have contributed to the widespread price rise and food crisis. These developments prompted UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon to urge countries such as Brazil and Egypt to drop export restrictions on certain food items and commodities.
However, the April 2008 UN Study of Global Agriculture has highlighted a number of other factors that have contributed to the current food crisis. Prominent among them are:
The search for energy substitutes through bio fuel has further hampered global food production. Joining the food versus fuel debate, Jean Ziegler, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has described the use of food crops to create ethanol ‘a crime against humanity’.
The South Asian region has not been immune to the global price rise phenomenon. Its impact on Bangladesh has been far severe. A number of additional factors have further compounded Bangladesh’s problems. Towards the end of 2007 it faced severe floods followed shortly by cyclone Sidr. Its impact was severe on Bangladesh where more than 27 million people depend upon food subsidy. Furthermore, this natural disaster damaged at least 1.8 million tons of standing crops. With the result, the price of a kilogramme of coarse rice, the staple food in Bangladesh, has more than doubled over the past 12 months.
The situation was so grim that the Caretaker government had to intervene, with the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles opening up 75 fair price outlets to provide basic commodities at subsided prices. To control inflationary pressures, the government has opted for buffer stocks, setting a target of procuring 1.2 million tons of rice and 300,000 tons of paddy at the rate of Tk 28 and Tk18 per kilogram respectively. The crisis could ease if the Bodo turns out to be a bumper harvest as many Bangladeshis hope. It is estimated that during the current season rice production would be about 17.5 million tons and wheat production 800,000 tons.
Despite the bumper harvest, experts predict that there would not be any drop in food prices and coarse rice is being sold between Tk 33 and 35 per kilogramme, far higher than the rice procurement price set by the government. According to the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB), during the past 12 months the cost of production has gone up by 54 per cent.
This year, total food production in Bangladesh is estimated at 25.9 million tons and this would be just 100,000 tons short of total domestic demand. To meet the shortfall, Dhaka has ordered the purchase of 400,000 tons of rice from India at TK 30.10 per kilogramme or US $430 per metric ton. Bangladesh’s wish to create buffer stocks through imports has, however, not been trouble free. To meet domestic demand and to control inflationary pressures, India has imposed a ban on rice exports not only to Bangladesh but also to countries such as Saudi Arabia and other South Asian states. Political compulsions have, however, resulted in India making an exception for Bangladesh. During his visit to Dhaka in December 2007, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee agreed to the sale of 500,000 tons of rice to Bangladesh.
As an agricultural economy, Bangladesh relies heavily on food production and hence a bumper Bodo harvest is crucial to resolving the growing food crisis in the country. Even if this does not bring prices down, it should lessen inflationary pressures and keep imports to manageable limits. A food crisis is likely to be extremely unnerving to the neutral caretaker government. With Jatiya Sangsad elections slated for later this year, the government would be keen to keep not only food prices under control but also scarcity under check. Food riots are the last thing on the government’s wish list. Failure to handle relief works following the 1970 cyclone eventually culminated in popular protest against the then military junta. A repeat of such a development over a potential food crisis would dismantle everything that the caretaker government has managed to do since taking office in January 2007.
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), a former rebel group, emerged as the largest political party with 220 seats in the April 10 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. Mainstream political parties like the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML secured the second and third positions with 110 and 103 seats, respectively. For the first time, a newly formed regional political party, Madhesi Janatantrik (Democratic) Forum has secured fourth position in the elections.
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), a former rebel group, emerged as the largest political party with 220 seats in the April 10 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. Mainstream political parties like the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML secured the second and third positions with 110 and 103 seats, respectively. For the first time, a newly formed regional political party, Madhesi Janatantrik (Democratic) Forum has secured fourth position in the elections.
Although the Election Commission of Nepal declared the CA elections as free and fair, some security analysts believe that intimidation by the Young Communist League (YCL) might have helped CPN-M to emerge as the largest party. This is not to deny that the YCL may have tried to reinforce Maoist success, which, in any case, was expected. In fact, almost all political party activists had tried to influence voters by adopting different means to win in the election. As far as the allegation from the losing parties is concerned, it was mostly an afterthought. None of the political parties complained specifically about Maoist intimidation during the polls. Nobody would have expected 60 per cent voter participation if intimidation was rampant.
What are the factors responsible for Maoist success? The first and foremost was failure of the two principal parties — NC and UML — to fulfil the people’s aspirations in the last two decades. Consequently, the CPN-M emerged as an alternative. There was also a popular realisation that the Maoist decision to enter the democratic mainstream was a welcome trend and the alternative was quite forbidding. From personal interactions with common people in and around Kathmandu, one gathered that voters found the Maoist slogan of a ‘New Nepal’ credible.
In fact, CPN-M’s efficient populist campaign over various issues like republicanism, federalism, land reforms and job guarantee had its appeal for the people. Moreover, the Maoists adopted an aggressive nationalist position, which was liked by the majority of the Nepali people even if it might have alienated the Madhesis. The Maoists made a deliberate attempt to whip up anti-India sentiment by alleging that India was trying to divide Nepal by supporting the Madhesis. This is said to have played a major role in the pahadis, traditional supporters of the NC, voting for the Maoists.
Yet another factor that contributed to the success of the Maoists was their strong organisational base. In contrast, the NC and UML were riven by internal feuds. There was a major communication gap between their leaders and workers at the grassroots. Moreover, both these parties were urban-based and ignored rural areas. The NC and UML were perceived by people as elitist in orientation, having a strong base among the upper castes, while CPN-M identified itself with the masses. As far as seat distribution is concerned, the CPN-M reserved 40 seats for women and 30 seats for dalits and other ethnic groups. In comparison, UML had given away 160 out of 220 seats to Brahmins. While the CPN-M gave 33 per cent of the seats to Janjatis and 8 per cent to Dalits, the NC allotted 28 per cent to Janjatis and 5 per cent to Dalits. The UML came third with 25 per cent to Janjatis and 5 per cent to Dalits.
The personality factor also played an important role in these elections. Prachanda carries much greater appeal than the ageing GP Koirala and an unimpressive Madhav Nepal. Since April 2006, Prachanda has been getting more media attention than others. As a result, the youth in Nepal feel proud to associate themselves with the CPN-M in general and Prachanda in particular. At the same time, the people of Nepal assumed, as was revealed to this author, that strong leadership, discipline, and unity of command would help the CPN-M to perform more effectively.
While the CA elections were considered a solution to years of political instability and turmoil, the fractured mandate has complicated the matter further. No single party has secured enough seats to form the government on its own. At the moment, a grand coalition adhering to the Interim Constitution might not be possible due to the resignation of UML ministers from the GP Koirala government. Significantly, the UML and NC have decided not to join the new government headed by the CPN-Maoist until it dissolves paramilitary structures. The coalition government may be deadlocked over many issues since it would be difficult to gain consensus on issues every time.
As long as the political parties are unable to resolve their differences over government formation, the first meeting of the CA cannot take major decisions without all the 601 members present in the house. The first and foremost duty of the new government, therefore, is to nominate the remaining 26 members to parliament. There is also confusion over whether the present government or the new government will nominate those 26 members.
Meanwhile, the United States has been suggesting that the NC should lead the new government. If that happens, then the decision would go against the popular mandate and people might protest against the NC government. Prachanda has gone on record to say that the people have already given the Maoists the mandate by returning them with the largest number of representatives and largest share of popular votes.
Impact on India
For India, the major concern has been links between the Indian and Nepalese Maoists. In the past, these groups have shared their perspectives on the nature of state in India and repeatedly came out with anti-India statements in different fora. However, in recent days, there has been no meeting of minds over the CPN-M’s decision to try the democratic path to power. One can only prognosticate that in view of the responsibilities that the Nepal Maoists will shoulder in the days to come, they may focus more on consolidating their base within Nepal rather than look out and facilitate a Maoist revolution abroad. Indian Maoists have even branded Prachanda a revisionist, which is a slur in communist parlance. Maoists of India do have an independent political dynamic and will remain largely unaffected by developments in Nepal. In case, the Maoists fail in their experiment in Nepal they may in future come together with an even more radical agenda in the sub-continent.
Maoists in Nepal may develop a close strategic relationship with China. Any dispensation for that matter in Kathmandu will play the China card against India as long as it is of strategic value. China would like to take advantage of that. Its interests in Nepal are more focused around Tibet, growing US and Indian presence in Nepal and economic engagement. It has always preferred a nationalistic government in Nepal, which would not allow Tibetan refugees to use Nepalese territory against China. Maoists coming to power would facilitate China to increase its presence in Nepal and offset Indian influence. It could emerge as a strong contender for India in hydro power projects and infrastructure building, especially in northern Nepal.
The Maoists have declared that after coming to power, they would revisit all existing treaties with India. If renegotiation of the India-Bhutan treaty is any indicator, Indian policy makers would not be too averse to the idea of revisiting the treaties. As the Maoists would mature as a democratic political force, one hopes, they will soon shed their rhetoric and settle down for pragmatic policies. However, a lot will depend on the policy preferences of the new government in Nepal, the nature of the relationship between India and China and changes in the regional security dynamics.
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 is dividing the world into states that support the move and those opposed to it. It has also emboldened separatist movements across the world.
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 is dividing the world into states that support the move and those opposed to it. It has also emboldened separatist movements across the world.
Prominent among supporters of Kosovo’s independence are the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, while on the opposing side stand China, Russia, Spain, Greece and Portugal. One impact of this divide has been its fallout on the United Nations. Just like NATO’s March 1999 intervention on behalf of Kosovar Albanians without a UN mandate, this time around as well the UN has been bypassed by some of the world’s developed states to further their own geo-strategic interests. So much so that UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon categorically stated that the decision to recognise Kosovo’s independence by important member-states were independent choices, and that the UN was still bound by Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, which recognizes Kosovo as an integral part of the Yugoslav Federation of which Serbia is the successor state. Resolution 1244 had also strictly laid down that future decisions on Kosovo must be guided by the principles of Serbia’s sovereignty over the province and territorial integrity.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has defended the Bush Administration’s prompt recognition of Kosovo’s independence by arguing that Serbia’s gross human right violations in Kosovo in 1998-99 justifies the latter’s declaration of independence and therefore must be viewed as a “special exception” to the twin precepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, it appears that American support for Kosovo’s independence is guided by its interests, which is to establish a permanent military base in Kosovo to enable smooth oil transfers from the Caspian Sea via the Balkans to eventually reach the United States.
Many countries like Spain, Romania, Greece, Portugal and Slovakia argue that the US had decided as early as June 1999 that Kosovo should never be re-integrated with Serbia. This suspicion has to be seen in the context of US behaviour in 1998 and 1999 in the region. In 1998, the US deftly removed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from its list of terrorist groups, described it instead as an insurgency, and deepened ties with the outfit. This, notwithstanding the fact that the KLA had acquired arms training in Afghanistan and Albania, and had funded itself through a well organised drug network in the Balkans. A year later, the US, with KLA support, started building Camp Bondsteel, a permanent military base on 955 acres of open farm land near the Kosovar town of Urosevac, in a display of a long term engagement plan.
The same year it also revealed a plan to build a trans-Balkan oil pipeline by the Albania Macedonia Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO), which is registered in the United States. This pipeline aims to bypass Russia and bring oil from the Caspian Sea to terminals in Georgia, to be subsequently transported by tanker through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Burgas and onwards through Macedonia to the Albanian port of Vlora, for shipment to refineries in the US West Coast. The successful completion of this plan necessitates a US military presence in Kosovo to provide security for the project; Kosovo’s independence facilitates such a presence. Armed with these plans, the US won the support of major European states like Germany, France and Britain and successfully influenced the European Union to bypass the UN Security Council to facilitate a limited form of independence for Kosovo.
The other significant geopolitical factor behind the prompt recognition of Kosovo’s independence by these states is their desire to see a diminution in Russian influence in the Balkans. Russia has steadfastly spoken against Kosovo’s independence and has supported the Serbian view of politically reintegrating the province. Kosovo’s independence thus deals a severe blow to Russia’s position in the Balkans.
In a counter-move, Vladimir Putin warned on April 29 that the West’s recognition of Kosovo might motivate his country to support the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester and South Ossetia. Indeed, Russia has started granting Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia following Kosovo’s independence. Fear of mounting conflict with Russia and the spread of separatist sentiments inflamed by Kosovo’s move have led to deep divisions within Europe. Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Portugal, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania have all refused to recognise Kosovo’s independence.
Kosovo’s declaration of independence has also had an impact on separatist movements in various parts of the world, while at the same time discomfiting states that face such movements. On May 8, 2008, the parliament of the Georgian province of Abkhazia passed two resolutions asserting its sovereignty and independence from Georgia, and called upon the United Nations, Russia and other countries to recognise it as an independent entity. Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh noted that “Kosovo has just boosted everything…. Kosovo is a precedent and we will work in that direction.”
Separatist groups in India are also attempting to draw inspiration from the Kosovo precedent. Yasin Malik, leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), told the Iranian-based Islamic Republic News Agency in February that the international community, and particularly the EU, “should play a pro-active role now towards the resolution of Kashmir issue as they did in case of Kosovo.” The website of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim has congratulated Kosovars on their declaration of independence.
The argument put forth by most separatist groups in India and abroad that Kosovo is an ideal case of self-determination is, however, flawed. These groups deliberately overlook the harsh realities facing Kosovo today. Its territorial landscape is ethnically divided, with most of its 120,000 Serb population residing south of the Ibar River and Albanians in the area north of the river. Already, the province faces partition as Serbs vehemently defy the independence move and continue to be loyal to Belgrade. Since 1999, the ethnic divide has worsened and peace in this UN protectorate is being maintained by 16,000 NATO troops. The only difference now is that instead of a UN protectorate, there is an EU protectorate led by Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith. The situation is akin to that in Bosnia where everyday administration is being carried out by EU bureaucrats with little participation from the Bosnians themselves.
Kosovo’s economy is an even bigger challenge. Unemployment rate is about 50 per cent. Two-thirds of young people are without jobs, leading to crime and drug addiction. Its most important mining project, the Trepca Mines, is in a dilapidated condition. According to Shpend Ahmeti, Director of Kosovo's Institute for Advanced Studies, imports constitute about US $1.9 billion a year whereas exports are a meagre $130 million. Business taxes are much higher than elsewhere in the region and there is an acute lack of reliable power supply. Added to this is the limited rule of law with high rates of organised crime. In addition, as Joost Lagendijk, overseer of Kosovo policy in the European Parliament states, “Kosovo is a poor agricultural country where the energy supply is chaotic, the rule of law needs to be upheld and the economy is almost starting from scratch.” The Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007 rates Kosovo as the world’s fourth most corrupt economy.
Thus, for the near future, Kosovo’s economy will depend on Western aid, its security will be provided by NATO troops and its political future will be overseen by the EU mission. In this context, independence has little or no meaning.
Howsoever much others may want to distance India from mlitary-ruled Myanmar, the widespread devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis has brought India into the spotlight. That it occurred barely a week prior to Myanmar’s proposed constitutional Referendum on May 10 brought this out in bold relief.
Howsoever much others may want to distance India from mlitary-ruled Myanmar, the widespread devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis has brought India into the spotlight. That it occurred barely a week prior to Myanmar’s proposed constitutional Referendum on May 10 brought this out in bold relief.
Cyclone Nargis is estimated to have left over 22,000 dead with over 40,000 missing. This has delayed the vote to May 24 in 47 townships (40 of the 45 townships in Yangon area and seven in Ayeyawady delta). Balloting would be held as scheduled (May 10) in other areas. The regime has already been conducting advance voting since last month (in its embassies abroad and for civil servants and personnel belonging to the police, fire brigade, etc. who would be on duty on the day of Referendum).
Myanmar announced on February 9 that it would hold a referendum for a new Constitution in May 2008 and (multi-party democracy) general elections in 2010.1 The SPDC issued the Referendum Law comprising twelve chapters for the approval of the draft constitution (Law No. 1/2008).2 It explicitly states in Chapter 1 that “Referendum means the Referendum held for enabling the approval of the draft State Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.” It excludes fives categories from voting, among which are members of religious orders3 and persons who are illegally abroad.4 Both groups constitute important sections of Myanmar. Monks are important not only because they numerically balance the armed forces, but for their moral clout and for knowing the pulse of the people. Those illegally abroad are also usually the more qualified who left in the wake of the August 1988 movement. Aung San Suu Kyi would have the right to cast her vote in the referendum.
On February 19 the draft Constitution had been readied by the 54-member Commission for Drafting the State Constitution led by Myanmar’s Chief Justice Aung Toe. This was the culmination of 14 years of deliberation of the National Convention, which had earlier adopted the fundamental and detailed principles for drafting a new Constitution.5 The draft Constitution has 15 chapters and is available on the internet and copies of the draft are being sold in shops in Myanmar.
Doubts about the fairness of the referendum have been repeatedly raised by the domestic opposition and others, who have criticised measures like advance voting, absentee voting, and the failure to allow international observers and media. The NLD and others have been campaigning for Voting ‘No” in the referendum, while the State apparatus has been advocating a ‘Yes’ vote. The New Light of Myanmar, a Government newspaper, headlined the message that “To approve the State Constitution is a national duty of the entire people today. Let us all cast “Yes” vote in the national interest.6” The US-based Human Rights Watch has said that the referendum would not be free and fair because of the failure of the junta to allow free discussion of the pros and cons of the draft Constitution.
Myanmar has had two constitutions till date: the one framed in 1947 accorded some states the right to secede after ten years. The present draft Constitution (Chapter II, Article 7) explicitly rules out such a possibility: “No part of the territory of the Union, namely regions, states, Union territories and self administered areas etc shall ever secede from the Union.” The 1974 Constitution was Myanmar’s second and was introduced following a referendum. That referendum was held under very different circumstances. The then British Ambassador in Rangoon reported back to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs that “it is not too great a problem to persuade people to vote for the Constitution – to most people any Constitution (and this one is not bad) is preferable to none.” Today, if the same logic were applied, the people of Myanmar should be overjoyed about the new draft as they have also missed a Constitution for a prolonged period of time (since 1988), but that may not really be the case. In the referendum held in 1974, the percentage of vote had been the highest in the ‘Burman’ Burma and the smallest in Shan State where insurgency was then raging (see Appendix). While that criterion may still hold, the additional factor of the cyclone adds a new dimension to the problem as the areas worst affected were Yangon and the Ayeyawady delta (Burman dominated).
If the 2010 elections are held they would be the first in two decades. The results of the last one, the 1990 general elections, were annulled by the State Law and Order Restoration Council on the ground that these elections had been held to elect representatives to a constitution-drafting body and not for a national assembly.7 The SLORC/SPDC formulation was a four step route, of which step four is the Referendum.
The current upheaval follows ominously close on the heels of the upheaval which Yangon and some other cities witnessed about seven months back when the people supported by the Buddhist clergy had come out on the streets in protest against the fuel price hike.
What is interesting (and perhaps worrying, too) is that in the September 2007 upheaval if the monks were perceived, in a sense, as the cause of the crisis, in the present upheaval (in May) they are seen by the common people as saviours. This was an opportunity which the Myanmar Tatmadaw should have snatched and utilised in mobilising the state apparatus towards disaster relief.
India has been steadily strengthening its relations with Myanmar in recent years while seeking to quietly influence the military rulers to bring about the required transformation in the political system. Vice Sr Gen Maung Aye had recently visited India (April 2-6, 2008). Unlike during the 2004 Asian Tsunami earlier when the Indian coastline and islands were affected along with Myanmar, this time only Myanmar is the victim and the damage is serious. Myanmar, which had refused international aid in the wake of the Tsunami, has been forced to accept it this time. It is interesting that the US First Lady Laura Bush acknowledged that Myanmar was more likely to accept aid from a neighbour like India than from the United States. Perhaps that is understandable because the US had just announced the award of the Congressional Gold Medal to Aung San Suu Kyi. India’s relief effort was also acknowledged by Myanmar. India sent two naval vessels (INS Rana and INS Kirpan) and two AN-32 aircraft carrying relief supplies on May 7. Two other IL-76 aircraft reached Yangon on May 8 and May 10.
According to reports, Myanmar’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology had advance information (a week before) about the impending cyclone from at least two sources: the Indian Meteorology Department, and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok. On the face of it, Myanmar disregarding India’s warnings about the impending disaster appear puzzling. However, it is conceivable that the SPDC was afraid about upsetting the build-up to the referendum, which a public scare would have created, and hence did not give the warning the importance or prominence it deserved.
Could India have done more to persuade Myanmar regarding the urgency of the situation? Perhaps Indian diplomacy would have had greater impact if closer and harmonious links had been previously established between the meteorological departments of the two countries. In-house training to Myanmar’s environment, weather and meteorological experts in Indian institutions would not only impart the right kind of expertise to concerned personnel but also establish the appropriate linkages and bonds at the level of experts which could prove crucial in times of natural calamities. Given that non-traditional security issues are generally likely to engage the attention of Indian security planners in times to come, especially in the Indian Ocean region, it would be appropriate that institutional linkages are established beforehand. Possibly, a nodal agency in New Delhi could help network with various government and non-government agencies dealing with environmental issues.
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan’s announcement at an international seminar that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be converting what was originally meant to be a refuelling stop into an official stop-over in New Delhi on his way home from Sri Lanka generated much speculation about the reasons for and timing of the visit.
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan’s announcement at an international seminar that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be converting what was originally meant to be a refuelling stop into an official stop-over in New Delhi on his way home from Sri Lanka generated much speculation about the reasons for and timing of the visit. Opinions were expressed that the visit would provide the necessary breakthrough in bilateral relations, which had been affected following India’s vote against Iran in the IAEA; that it would provide the necessary incentive to speed up and even resolve long-pending issues on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project; and that it would help iron out the creases in the 2005 LNG project.
But is this so? On the face of it, barring some general statements, no major breakthroughs were made during the visit. On the IPI pipeline, India had asked Iran to dedicate a particular gas field for the project and had sought third party certification of its reserves. Alternatively, it wanted reassurance on alternate sources of supply in the event of depletion of reserves. Moreover, it wanted Iran to hand over custody of the gas at the India-Pakistan border and not at the Iran-Pakistan border as had been suggested by Tehran in order to cut transit risk through Pakistan, and it opposed the three-year price revision clause that Iran had demanded. The Iranian President made no commitments on these issues, saying that his Oil Minister would resolve the same with his Indian counterpart, though he did say that a final draft was expected to be worked out by the three countries within the next 45 days. Even Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon avoided referring to the project as a done deal, though he said that the pipeline was a “doable” project and added that a “lot of work” needed to be done to ensure that it is commercially viable, secure and provides assured supplies.
Nevertheless, despite the continuing ambiguity, Ahmadinejad’s visit did help to inject a greater sense of optimism on the beleaguered project than there has been for a long time. More importantly, it also put India-Iran relations, which was seen as sliding, back on track. But why would an increasingly belligerent Iran, which since 2005 has made a virtue of its defiance, decide to make amends with an India that is seen to be moving inexorably into the US camp.
For Iran, despite public rhetoric, its increasing isolation was beginning to hurt. Though surging oil prices has helped alleviate its economic woes to some extent, it is starved of investment and particularly state-of-the-art technology to develop its vast energy resources and ensure its continued status as a leading energy exporter. Moreover, despite sitting on the world’s second largest gas reserves, it has not succeeded in exploiting its potential. Though several European countries have expressed interest in accessing Iranian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, due to US pressure many of them are wary of getting into big deals that could attract American sanctions. Moreover, it would be difficult for Tehran to breach Russia’s monopoly over the European gas market. Under these circumstances, if Iran succeeds in getting countries like India and China to invest in its energy sector, it would provide the necessary incentive for other countries, including Western states, to invest or expand work in Iran and help the country end or at least lessen its isolation. It is in this context that the IPI project assumes significance.
For New Delhi too, Iran is important, not only because it is a major supplier of oil to India – around 7.5 per cent of India’s oil imports are sourced from that country – but also because Iran is a potentially large energy supplier and conduit for the energy resources of land-locked Central Asia. With oil prices touching $120 a barrel, India’s need for assured energy supplies, particularly gas, has acquired greater urgency. Though India has other supply options and is in fact diversifying its sources to other regions, given Iran’s geographical location between West and Central Asia and South Asia combined with its vast untapped gas reserves, India cannot afford to ignore Iran’s importance. Moreover, with a general decline in oil fields the world over, Iran’s huge reserves are attractive. With Western companies still hesitant to make large investments in Iran, Indian companies have been provided with a golden opportunity of signing up projects before competition increases.
Even prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, there were indications that India and Iran were keen to arrest the drift in their relations. Since 2007, Indian and Iranian officials have resumed bilateral visits as was evidenced by the visit of External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Iran in February, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Safari’s return trip to India in September. In February 2008, Iran’s Finance Minister Danesh Jafri visited India. During an interaction with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, he drew attention to Iran’s geographical location and said that it is well suited to companies interested in the energy sector, both upstream and downstream, as well as mining and the services sector. Trying to allay fears that US sanctions against Iran and the insecure environment in the region were impeding companies from investing in his country, Mr. Jafri emphasised that Tehran had put a legal framework in place and said that the security of foreign investments was ensured through new changes in the law and the Constitution.
Soon thereafter, the Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOECC) participated in two tenders in the offshore sector of India’s oil industry. The company’s managing director, Mas’ud Soltanpur, said that each project was worth over $1.1 billion, and that the company had a very good chance of getting the deal despite several competitors being in the fray.1
Again, prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, a slew of agreements was signed between the two countries. In mid-April, India and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding for co-operation in railways as well as to begin work on the India-Iran-Russia railway line. The MoU also included technical training of Iranian railway personnel, railroad signalling projects, supply of locomotives and spare parts, setting up a joint working group as well as a joint effort to increase co-operation with the national Union of Railways. Iran has also sought India’s help, including investment, in constructing a new track connecting its Free Trade Zone in south-eastern Chabahar to Fahrej, which is located in the central part of the country.2
In April, a few weeks before the Presidential visit, the board of Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), had formally agreed to collaborate with the Hinduja Group-ONGC Videsh Ltd. in developing the Azadegan and South Pars fields, an agreement that had originally been signed between the Hinduja Group and NICO in August 2007. At the time, the deal had not taken off due to the influence exerted by China to get the same contract. But by going ahead with the deal, Iran has signalled that it is once again ready to do business with India.
At the end of the day, President Ahmadinejad’s visit could not have been timed better. With general elections looming round the corner, the Indian government, under increasing pressure from its Left allies to assert its independence, responded firmly that it did not need any guidance on how to conduct its bilateral relations. Neither can Iranian influence on India’s huge Shia community -- the second largest after Iran’s -- be ignored. This was evidenced by India’s surprisingly sharp reply to a statement by US State Department spokesman Tom Casey soon after the presidential visit was announced, that Washington would like to see New Delhi call on Iran to cease enriching uranium and that India should put pressure on Iran to “become a more responsible actor on the world stage.”3
The Iranian President voiced his appreciation for India’s stance. Stating that India and Iran were “true friends,” Mr. Ahmadinejad admitted that India’s vote against Iran on the nuclear issue did have an impact, but that relations between the two countries were “very deep and historical.” He, however, added that “the issue is related to the past, we are looking forward to building better relations.”4
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, led a high-level team of nine European Union (EU) commissioners to Beijing on April 24 and 25, 2008, and met the Chinese leadership. Notable amongst the commissioners who accompanied him were the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, led a high-level team of nine European Union (EU) commissioners to Beijing on April 24 and 25, 2008, and met the Chinese leadership. Notable amongst the commissioners who accompanied him were the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. Though the main purpose of the visit was to start the EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Mechanism, it was significant for being the first visit of a high-level EU delegation to China in the aftermath of the Lhasa Uprising in March and subsequent demonstrations against the Chinese government. Moreover, the demonstrations against the Olympic Torch in Paris and London had introduced a note of acerbity in Sino-European relations. In addition, the European Parliament (EP) has been keeping up the heat on China. Besides other earlier resolutions, the EP adopted on April 23 a resolution titled, “China's policy and its effects on Africa,” which stated that though “China is the EU's second most important trading partner … dialogue with China on democratic reforms, respect for human rights and the rule of law should not take second place to trade and economic relations.” The resolution was also critical of China that “it is responsible for significant arms transfers to conflict-ridden countries, even in violation of UN embargoes in the cases of Darfur, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Simultaneously, the conferment of honorary citizenship on the Dalai Lama by the Paris City Council left the Chinese livid. Demonstrations against the French outlet chain Carrefour in some Chinese cities, an avoidable and ugly incident of the reported assault on a disabled Chinese athlete Jin Jing during the demonstrations in Paris, followed by the mollifying tour of the French president’s envoys to Beijing, all seem to mark the annus horribilis in Sino-French relations, which had remained otherwise cozy during the Chirac years.
In the light of this chain of events, the visit of the EC delegation to China is extremely significant. Xinhua noted that the visit took place “at a time of several Sino-EU disagreements” and that the “differences on the Tibet issue … has recently soured the Sino-EU relationship.” On the European side, analysts and the business lobby have suggested to the EC that it tone down its public criticism of China while remaining firm on the issue of human rights. Prior to the visit, EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson warned against a direct confrontation with China and boycotting the Olympics.
Though the main focus of the EC visit to China was trade, interesting developments in Beijing and Europe cannot be overlooked. Shortly after the meeting between Barroso and Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, an announcement came that the Chinese government would meet the representative of the Dalai Lama. From the EU side, the statement issued by its present Slovenian presidency was equally interesting: “The decision (to hold talks with the Dalai Lama) was announced in a press release on the occasion of the visit to Beijing by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and other Commissioners, and the readiness to hold talks was explicitly stated in a letter sent on 16 April by the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Wen Jiabao, to the current EU Council President, Janez Janša.” While the maiden Slovenian presidency of the European Council may be ‘pleased’ at its achievements, one can however infer that Beijing has also been eager to come out of this imbroglio and was on the look out for a suitable occasion to express its desire to meet the Dalai Lama’s representative. The visit of the EC delegation was thus a much-awaited opportunity for Beijing.
Trade was the main focus of the visit, though it is already a known fact that the growing trade imbalance in Sino-European trade, violations of intellectual property rights, technology transfer and forced joint ventures of European companies with Chinese state undertakings keep dogging their trade dialogue. On the eve of Barroso’s visit, BUSINESSEUROPE, a trade group, wrote an open letter to the EC president pointing out that in 2007 the EU’s trade deficit with China would exceed 170 billion euros. Startling also is the fact that in 2006, “79% of all counterfeit goods seized at EU borders came from China, compared with 54% in 2004.” The European trade group, amongst others, urged the EC to address issues like Chinese state intervention as well as restrictions on importing raw materials from China.
It is obvious that the fastest-growing economy in the world is an attractive place for the European infrastructure, telecommunications and civil aviation industries. Similarly, China is keen on inviting European consumer goods companies like Carrefour, Louis Vuitton, Adidas, Lidl, etc. because of its huge middle class. However, it seems that the European trade and industry lobby would remain anxious while dealing with China for various reasons, including forced technology transfer, copying European higher-end products and a reverse trade towards Europe through their fake versions. Since Europeans consider their reliable and world-known quality products as tools to maintain their supremacy on the global market as well as their affluence, it remains to be seen for how long European companies would find China strategically important to do business in the coming years. Though Sino-European trade has the potential of at least 20 per cent growth, it would be interesting to observe whether European companies begin to look out for markets that are more observant of copyrights and other practices.
The Olympic Torch has already passed through some acrimonious points and the Beijing Olympics would always be remembered in connection with these demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. The reception accorded to the Olympic flame remains varied in different countries given the level of friendship, closeness, ideological loyalty to the Chinese leadership (Pakistan, Nepal and North Korea) and the presence of Chinese and Tibetan Diaspora (Britain, India and the United States). The Chinese willingness to resume dialogue with the representative of the Dalai Lama appears to be a face-saving attempt in the wake of adverse international public opinion. However, six rounds of talks with Tibetan representatives have not borne any result so far. Though the Chinese government has announced a resumption of dialogue, the diatribe against the Dalai Lama continues. The onus lies on the Chinese leadership to prove to the global community that its dialogue with the representatives of the Dalai Lama would be substantial and not merely a tactical gesture. It is true that a breakthrough in dialogue should not be expected soon. But Chinese sincerity would be tested not just before the Olympic Games but after it as well.
Barroso’s visit was indeed an opportunity for Beijing to prove its earnestness before one of its close partners that it is indeed serious and consistent in its dialogue with the representatives of the Dalai Lama. The EC President’s remarks at the joint press conference with Wen Jiabao was also not too critical, but was rather conciliatory. However, if Beijing considers that burgeoning trade interests would ultimately force its trade partners not to take any adverse steps, it might not turn out to be mistaken because it is certain the global community would henceforth be more observant of Chinese affairs and its handling of issues like Tibet and others. In an interdependent world, the attraction of a huge market may not always serve as a trump card.
India’s Space Programme has been contributing a lot towards bestowing ‘Soft Power’ status to the country over the last couple of years. The success of the PSLV-C9 mission on April 28, 2008 is the latest in this regard. In this mission, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) succeeded in placing ten satellites in space by using a single booster. This is a record given that till date no other country has put a cumulative weight of approximately 825 kilograms spread over ten different satellites in a single attempt into space.
India’s Space Programme has been contributing a lot towards bestowing ‘Soft Power’ status to the country over the last couple of years. The success of the PSLV-C9 mission on April 28, 2008 is the latest in this regard. In this mission, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) succeeded in placing ten satellites in space by using a single booster. This is a record given that till date no other country has put a cumulative weight of approximately 825 kilograms spread over ten different satellites in a single attempt into space.
ISRO’s most reliable workhorse, PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), successfully delivered India’s cartographic satellite CARTOSAT 2A, the Indian Mini Satellite (IMS-1) and eight nano-satellites from abroad into outer space. The cartographic satellite launched is the third of the series and has a resolution of around 0.8 metres. The earlier two were CARTOSAT 1 and CARTOSAT 2 with resolutions of 2.5 and 1 metre, respectively. CARTOSAT-2A also carries advanced digital panchromatic cameras to give black and white pictures. Data generated by this satellite will be used for various cartographic applications, including urban and rural infrastructure development and management. The satellite would also provide useful information in land information systems and geographical information systems. It is expected that this satellite would form a pair with CARTOSAT 2 to enable more frequent revisits to areas under survey. Terrain mapping would become easier with this satellite, which would be offering stereoscopic imagery. CARTOSAT-2A imagery with a spatial resolution of about 80 centimetres matches the best in the world (the American satellite QuickBird is the world’s highest resolution commercial satellite and offers a resolution of 60 centimetres). This Indian satellite would now offer better imagery than the US IKONOS satellite, which has a resolution of one metre. The launch of IKONOS in 1999 was hailed by the New York Times as “one of the most significant developments in the history of the space age.”
The other Indian satellite placed in orbit is IMS-1, India’s first micro satellite, which weighs 83 kilograms. This unit integrates many new technologies and has miniaturised subsystems onboard. Payloads aboard are meant for earth imaging, space science, atmospheric and ocean studies. India proposes to make available the data generated by this satellite to various research organisations, universities and institutions in developing countries free of cost. Understanding the financial and technological limitations of such institutions in having a state-of-the-art infrastructure for data reception, ISRO has made efforts to evolve easier methods of data reception. Data generated by IMS-1 will be transmitted to user terminals, which will constitute of a normal computer along with a radio frequency downlink and an antenna.
The eight nano satellites that PSLV-C9 carried to space are CanX-2, Cute-1.7+APD II, Delfi C3, AAUSAT-II, COMPASS-1, SEEDS-2, CanX-6 and RUBIN-8. The overall weight of all these systems together is approximately 50 kilograms. These satellites belong to countries like Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Japan. They were built to learn the art of fabricating satellites by academics and to test nano technologies for their applicability in satellites. Antrix Corporation, ISRO’s marketing agency, is charging these countries for the launch of these satellites.
For ISRO, the mission was a technological challenge. Though this was the PSLV’s thirteenth flight, it was only its third in the ‘core-alone’ configuration. Incidentally, the earlier two core-alone configuration flights were undertaken for placing satellites in lower orbits, while this mission was the first flight into a polar orbit. The core-alone configuration involves sending the four-stage PSLV rocket without the booster-straps. In normal configuration, the PSLV has six booster motors around the first stage and is capable of placing payloads weighing up to 1,600 kg in polar orbit. PSLV C9 had a much reduced payload of around 825 kg; hence the launch configuration needed a change. Also, to put ten satellites at the right time in precise orbits one by one was a tricky task. The success of this launch also proves the merit of the ejection mechanism that ISRO has developed.
The success of this mission should not be viewed in isolation. Over the last four decades, ISRO has made significant progress and has many successes to its credit. Many other challenging missions are in the offering. The much talked about moon mission, Chandrayan 1, is expected to get ‘space-borne’ within the next two to three months. Subsequently, in a year’s time, India also proposes to undertake its second moon mission in collaboration with Russia. For India, the moon has strategic relevance because of the presence of various minerals and Helium-3 on its surface, which could offer some solutions to the energy problems on earth.
Immediately after the success of the PSLV C9 launch, ISRO also disclosed the broad outline of the 'Indian human space flight'. This would be a space vehicle carrying a crew of two to low earth orbit. The astronauts are expected to stay in space for a duration of seven days. The mission is planned to be launched in 2015 and could cost around Rs. 10,000 crore. The Union Cabinet is expected to approve this mission shortly.
By launching ten satellites together, out of which eight were under commercial agreements, ISRO has showcased the trustworthiness of its launch capabilities to the world. On commercial count, ISRO’s success is significant. It is likely to bring in more business proposals. Already, during the last year, ISRO had successfully launched an Italian and an Israeli satellite under commercial agreements. In fact, since late 1990’s, India has taken piggy back payloads for a few countries onboard its own missions. Antrix Corporation also offers Technical consultancy and a wide variety of other services. It appears that India is now gradually emerging as a favourite destination for satellite launch services. India is projected to grab around 10 to 15 per cent market share of the global space bazaar in the years to come. Over the years, Antrix has achieved steady and significant progress in terms of financial performance. More than 75 per cent of its earnings are in foreign exchange and it has a sales turnover exceeding Rs. 3000 million. India has also constructed a special state-of-the-art launch pad capable of accommodating different rockets, which was inaugurated in 2005. Unlike launch pads operated by the United States and Europe, which typically are designed for a single type of rocket, ISRO's launch pad is designed to accommodate all of India's existing and planned launch vehicles. The flexibility of this pad (turnaround time is less) is likely to help Antrix in its efforts to win more commercial launch contracts in the near future.
The success of PSLV C9 has demonstrated that ISRO’s space programme is robust with a sound technological base, and that it can match with the best in the world in many areas and has great strategic as well as commercial significance.
Normal life in Manipur was drastically affected between March 17 and 19, 2008 when 15 migrants were killed by unidentified armed militants. While there have been accusations that local militants might have been behind the killings, militant groups have categorically denied their involvement. There is likelihood that foreign terrorist groups were involved in the killings to create ethnic apprehension and conflict between migrants and natives.
Normal life in Manipur was drastically affected between March 17 and 19, 2008 when 15 migrants were killed by unidentified armed militants. While there have been accusations that local militants might have been behind the killings, militant groups have categorically denied their involvement. There is likelihood that foreign terrorist groups were involved in the killings to create ethnic apprehension and conflict between migrants and natives. Moreover, one fallout of such violence could be the reimposition of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which had been revoked in parts of the state.
Manipur’s Director General of Police (DGP), Joykumar, asserted on March 20, 2008 that the killings were the handiwork of Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), a Manipuri insurgent outfit. But KYKL stoutly refuted the DGP’s claim. In a strongly worded statement, KYKL Publicity and Research Deputy Secretary, Apapabi Mangang, denounced the DGP’s allegation and ruled out his outfit’s involvement in the killings. He further maintained that the DGP’s remarks were malafide. Thereafter, other active insurgent outfits, too, have denied their involvement in the killings.
Even as the government and civil society groups denounced the killings in no uncertain terms, militant outfits such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) demanded a serious and impartial probe. The UNLF in a public statement declared that such mass killings were unpardonable. It further stated that such killings have been sporadic in the past, and that the latest incident was unprecedented. According to the PLA, its fight was against the government of India, not against Indian citizens, migrants or otherwise. According to some security analysts, the March 17-19 killings were exactly on the pattern of those unleashed by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) on Hindi-speaking people in Assam. These killings, analyst maintained, were meant to attract public attention to the insurgents’ demands.
In fact, the denial by locally active insurgent outfits of a role in the killings points to the possibility of external hands. This suspicion gains credence especially because outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have been found to have established links in Manipur. On December 19, 2006, Manipuri LeT activists, Salman Khurshid Kori (23), Abdul Rehman (24) and Mohammad Akbar Hussain (20), were arrested along with two kilograms of RDX, two detonators and one hand grenade by the Delhi police when they alighted from a Jammu-based bus in the Red Fort area. One of those held, Salman Kurshid Kohri, told his interrogators that he was an intermediary between the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) and a LeT module based in Bangladesh. He also disclosed the fact that he visited Bangladesh in May 2006 to firm up ties with the LeT.
The reason why Manipur has become a base for the LeT is because of three factors: 1) there are some like minded people who share a common culture, identity and ideology with the group in the state; 2) the state has unemployed youths who can be indoctrinated easily by the outfit or induced by monetary benefits; 3) and most dangerously, the state shares a border with Myanmar, which opens up a readily-accessible training ground for the outfit. Myanmar’s involvement as a training base for LeT was first revealed by the arrest the trio mentioned earlier. Soon after their arrest, on December 21, 2006, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil and his Myanmar Counterpart Major General Maung Oo discussed the issue and prospects for co-operation in curtailing such activities.
In the context of external involvement, it might be useful to recollect that there was a bomb blast at the ISKCON temple in Imphal on August 16, 2006 which claimed four lives. No outfit claimed responsibility for the blast and in fact several indigenous outfits condemned such an attack on a holy place. Analysts suspect the involvement of the ULFA in this attack and wonder whether this was not a ploy to scare away migrant Bihari labourers to pave the way for Bangladeshi migrants to work in the state. It is also possible that under the influence of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) Bangladesh and/or the support provided by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), some LeT-connected Manipuri armed cadres carried out the attack, ignoring the fact that the migrant population has been an asset to the State. The suspicion on external elements grows because there is strong evidence to suggest that terror groups such as LeT have been expanding their base in Manipur.
Here, one can also raise the issue whether the March 2008 killings were meant to create ethnic apprehensions and conflict between migrants (especially Biharis) and the locals. Sections of Manipuris, especially students (particularly those studying in Patna) and people working outside Manipur were panic stricken that the incident might result in clashes between Biharis and Manipuris elsewhere. In fact, external elements such as the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Jihadi (HuJI) have been trying to initiate identity clashes by attacking (bombing) holy places elsewhere in the country. Instances in this regard include the attacks on Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer in Rajasthan on October 11, 2007, Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad on May 18, 2007, Nurani Masjid at Malegaon in Maharashtra on September 8, 2006, Jama Masjid in Delhi on April 14, 2006, and Sankat Mochan temple at Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh on March 7, 2006.
The fallout of killings of migrants in Manipur could well pave the way for the re-imposition of the AFSPA, which was revoked in some parts of Manipur following the custodial death of Manorama in 2004. Here, it is worthwhile to note that the state government has expressed its wish to retain AFSPA in Manipur. Chief Minister Ibobi has been reported to have stated that there has been a sharp increase in the activities of various insurgent outfits, particularly in the four valley districts, which would call for the re-imposition of AFSPA. Subsequently, he expressed strong opposition to insurgent activities in the state during a session of the Legislative Assembly, where PREPAK hurled a grenade at the Legislative Complex on March 8, 2008 in response to his speech.
In the wake of various speculations floating around and several possibilities existing, it is imperative that the union government as well as the government of Manipur conduct a fair, impartial, and thorough probe into the killings of migrant labourers.
“There will never ever be change in Zimbabwe. We shall never reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.” – Robert Mugabe (2008).
“There will never ever be change in Zimbabwe. We shall never reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.” – Robert Mugabe (2008).
Presidential elections were held in Zimbabwe on March 29, 2008. For the first time in 28 years after independence, the rule of Mugabe was constitutionally challenged in these elections. The three candidates who contested this election were Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu – PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Simba Makoni an independent candidate. Zimbabwe’s Constitution holds that if the results fail to give a clear majority to any one candidate, a re-election will happen within three weeks. It has been almost three weeks since the election and results have still not been announced. Out of 210 seats, results released by the country's electoral commission give the Movement for Democratic Change 99 seats, compared to 97 for President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party. A breakaway faction of the MDC won 10 seats. Out of the total of 210 seats, 23 seats were called for a recount. On April 26, the Zimbabwe Election Commission declared the results on 18 of these seats. The recount also shows that the opposition is in a majority and that there has been no major change in the numbers.
Presently, there is an ongoing tussle as to who has won the elections between Mugabe (Zanu-PF) and Tsvangirai (MDC), and it appears that this might lead to a constitutional crisis. The political situation in Zimbabwe has been steadily deteriorating for the past few years. Corruption is widespread and the economy is in recession. Mugabe has been the sole ruler of the country for the past 28 years since independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. One can thus say that democracy in Zimbabwe was Mugabe dictated and defined, and not a constitutional one.
The country’s political problems are not limited to Presidential elections alone. There have been three other elections – for the House of Assembly, for the Senate and for local councils. Predictions are that ZANU-PF might have lost to MDC in these as well. In totality, it seems that though Mugabe might have failed to get a clear 51 per cent majority in the presidential polls, there are chances that he might ignore the results and take up the presidency with the support of the armed forces which have greatly benefited from the high level of corruption under Mugabe’s rule.
For a few years after Independence Mugabe was respected for his policies, for the important role he had played in the independence struggle and also for racial reconciliation and development which brought education and health to millions who had been denied these privileges under colonial rule. The economy initially thrived on exports of food, minerals and tobacco. The problem began when Mugabe ordered the often violent take over of farms owned by white people and handing them over mainly to his relatives, friends and supporters who were least interested in farming. This completely ruined the agricultural economy. The situation today has much deteriorated further. A third of the population depends on imported food handouts. Another third has fled the country and almost 80 per cent of the remainder is unemployed. Life expectancy has reduced from 60 to 35 years, the lowest in the world. There is a massive shortage of food, electricity, medicine, water and fuel. The inflation rate is the highest in the world.
When elections were announced in March 2008, the opposition had claimed that there can be no free and fair elections under the existing government and demanded a new constitution. It feared that there would be electoral malpractices. One issue that has come up is the printing of extra voting ballots and the charge that these were used to rig the results. The opposition has claimed that there has been a major discrepancy in the number of voters counted and the number of ballots printed. The role of the army in all this is also open to question and speculation is rife about the course it will adopt in the wake of the political stalemate. It is not yet clear whether it will accept the election results or it will go ahead and help Mugabe retain power.
The media is no longer free and all newspapers and magazines are under government control. Most international media outfits are banned. The April 3 police raids on opposition party offices, foreign journalists and a democracy advocate has raised the spectre of a broader crackdown aimed at keeping the current leadership in power. The raids were described by Biti, the general secretary of the Movement for Democratic Change, as a “coup d’etat”. The MDC has gone to court to try and force the result. It claims that Tsvangirai has won and should be declared president.
The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have all called on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to declare the results early to help restore the belief in democracy. The European Union wants Mugabe to step down so that the country can have a bright and stable future without him at the helm. The stress of unknown results is causing unnecessary anxiety among the people, and there are apprehensions that they might resort to violence thus further worsening an already bad situation.
Zambia has called for an emergency meeting of Southern African leaders to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe. African countries are worried that if results are delayed any further the situation in Zimbabwe might take a violent turn, in a repeat of what happened in Kenya earlier. South African President Thabo Mbeki had been asked by the regional bloc to mediate between Mugabe and the opposition.
But the MDC is of the view that Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" has been a failure. It has also claimed that it will not participate in a run-off. It has claimed that 10 people have been killed in election-related violence and hundreds more have been injured. It also says that 3,000 families have been forced from their homes and more than 400 opposition supporters have been arrested. Tsvangirai met with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and has urged the UN to take action to bring the situation in Zimbabwe under control. He has also appealed to the African Union to show greater concern towards the problem in Zimbabwe. For his part, Mugabe has upped the propaganda in the state-run media and has reappointed his cabinet, half of whom have reportedly lost their parliamentary seats.
It is unlikely that the international community will intervene to save Zimbabwe from the unfolding crisis. The United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions against Mugabe’s government but to no avail. One possible ray of hope is an African initiative. There is a ray of hope in this regard, given the refusal of Southern African countries, under public pressure, to permit a Chinese ship carrying arms for landlocked Zimbabwe to dock and unload its cargo. It is time African countries took the initiative to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe and nudge that country towards a peaceful democratic transition.
The KMT’s victory in the March 2008 presidential elections can be essentially attributed to the promises it made to improve economic ties with Mainland China and assure good governance. Ironically, these were partly the same promises that had brought the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) to power in the historic 2000 presidential election. There was no element of surprise to the election results in which Ma Ying-Jeou defeated his DPP counterpart Frank Hsieh. The KMT’s victory does not mean that Taiwan will begin supporting unification with the Mainland.
The KMT’s victory in the March 2008 presidential elections can be essentially attributed to the promises it made to improve economic ties with Mainland China and assure good governance. Ironically, these were partly the same promises that had brought the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) to power in the historic 2000 presidential election. There was no element of surprise to the election results in which Ma Ying-Jeou defeated his DPP counterpart Frank Hsieh. The KMT’s victory does not mean that Taiwan will begin supporting unification with the Mainland. Rather, it signifies the likelihood of the continuation of the status quo in Cross-Strait relations.
Over the years, both KMT and the DPP have deviated from their principled positions on the unification-independence debate. While the KMT has gradually moved towards greater identification with Taiwan, the DPP has gradually shed its staunch position on independence. In fact, they have both moved towards the centre, meaning they neither support independence nor unification.
In 1991, the KMT strictly adhered to the “Guidelines for National Unification,” which advocated the unification of Taiwan with the Mainland and underlined that “both the Mainland and Taiwan are parts of Chinese territory.” In other words, the KMT upheld the ‘one China’ principle. This position changed with the ‘1992 Consensus’, which while upholding the ‘one China’ principle reserved the right of each side to interpret the meaning of ‘one China.’ This marked the beginning of the KMT’s dilution of its original stand and adoption of the status quo position. The 1994 White Paper on Cross Strait relations issued by the KMT government also emphasised the status quo, by stating that China and Taiwan “should exist as two legal entities in the international era.” In 1999, President Lee Teng-hui went even further when he declared that China and Taiwan share “special state-to-state” relationships. But this extreme position was toned down the very next year after the party suffered electoral defeat at the hands of the DPP. KMT leader Lien Chan moved away from Lee Teng-hui’s radical position and consented to follow the 1991 Guidelines for National Unification as well as the ‘1992 Consensus’. At the same time, he added a qualifier to the unification principle, by retaining the ‘Taiwan first’ concept, which implied that the people of Taiwan will decide the status of the island.
The DPP’s initial position, laid down at the party convention in 1999, was that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all the residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.” But in 2000 when the DPP first came to power, Chen Shui-bian, its first President in his inauguration speech, proposed ‘5 NOs’: no declaration of independence, no change in national title, no two-state theory into Constitution, no referendum, and no abolition of the national unification guidelines. These indicated a clear toning down of the independence stand and the adoption of a status quo position. While in 2002, Chen Shui-bian reverted to his independence stand and described Cross Strait relations as “One Country on each side,” which meant “equal sovereignty” of China and Taiwan, by 2004 he once again adopted a status quo position as indicated in his second Inaugural speech, which outlined two opposing propositions. While reiterating the ‘5 NOs’, it also urged a revision of the Constitution so that it could accord with the “contemporary needs of Taiwan.” In 2005, this status quo position was reiterated in the Chen-Soong Ten-Point Joint Statement. Reflecting a conciliatory position again, the 10 Points included an acceptance of the definition of the country’s status in the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, a reiteration of ‘5 NOs’ and a requirement of the consensus of the 23 million people of Taiwan in any change to the status quo of the Island.
In sum, an analysis of the rival party positions suggests three things. First, while the KMT has represented a gradual nativisation, the DPP has also toned down its aggressive pro-independence stand. Second, the two parties’ correlation with the Islander/Mainlander distinction has blurred. And third, the current position indicates that both the DPP and the KMT have come to adopt a status quo position.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus, which Ma Ying-Jeou has adopted as part of his policy towards the Mainland, clearly hints at the status quo position. In short, the Consensus means “one China, different interpretations” and Ma Ying-Jeou has adhered to it saying that it “is just to manage it (the cross-strait relations) so that it wouldn’t erupt into a major crisis.” In his interview to the Times, Ma Ying-Jeou, stating his position on ‘one China’ clearly said, “We don’t have to recognise each other; all we have to do is not challenge and not deny the existence of the other side.” Essentially, by reiterating the 1992 Consensus, Ma Ying-Jeou closed the discussion on the sovereignty issue and shelved the independence-reunification debate to the backburner. Instead, he has put economics at the forefront with the aim of mending economic ties with the Mainland and assuring economic benefits and social stability to the Taiwanese people. In his interview to the Times, Ma Ying-Jeou said that he owed his victory to “the people of Taiwan” who “want a vibrant economy, a clean government, a society with equitable distribution of wealth and a peaceful Taiwan Strait.” Thus, in the KMT’s view, an ending of the current state of hostility between Taiwan and the Mainland does not mean the automatic adoption of a pro-unification stand. Instead, it is aimed at simply facilitating peaceful Cross-Strait relations, which would usher in greater economic growth and prosperity in Taiwan. In other words, the KMT’s position has reduced the divisive politics in Taiwanese society to the extent that it does not hurt the Island’s economy but without in any way resolving the issue of identity politics.
Nonetheless, identity politics, which has divided the Island’s polity into pro-unification (KMT) and pro-independence (DPP) parties, holds strong sway. This was in fact reflected in the economic policies advocated by the two parties. The DPP, in particular, has been reinforcing the localisation movement and resisting closer economic ties with China. This has hurt the business interests of Taiwanese people, and many businessmen faced the threat of eventually being forced to wrap up their investments in the Mainland if they did not cease to support the DPP’s cause. Here it is worth nothing a news report which stated that Taiwanese companies have invested more than US $100 billion in the Mainland. In contrast, the KMT’s election manifesto called for a robust opening up of Taiwan’s economy to China or in Ma Ying-Jeou’s words “maximize the opportunity and minimize the threat.” The KMT’s economic policy, thus, found strong resonance in the Taiwanese business community.
Public opinion in Taiwan also does not show any support for unification with the Mainland. At the same, there is also no clear verdict for independence, as indicated by the referendum results. This is primarily due to the military threat posed by China, with about 1,400 Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan. The two referendums held in tandem with the presidential election, however, failed to pass, as voter turnout did not reach the required threshold of 50 per cent of eligible voters. Nevertheless, they indicate wide support for maintaining the status quo. It has been reported that more than 10 million people voted in support of the island joining the United Nations either in the name of Taiwan or of ROC. Overall, the electoral verdict is in favour of maintaining the political status quo while at the same time increasing economic linkages with the Mainland.
It is being widely regarded that the KMT’s present policy of ‘economy first’ would pave the way for peaceful Cross-Strait relations. However, any such definitive conclusion about the future of Cross-Strait relations cannot be boldly advanced without taking into account the manner in which China attempts to resolve the issues of nationalism and competing identities. Indeed, recent developments in Tibet and the Chinese response point to the difficulties in this regard. It is therefore premature to conclude that the KMT’s victory would ensure peaceful Cross-Strait relations.
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