The Indian reaction to the terrorist attacks in Jaipur has so far been quite predictable. As usual the media has congratulated the citizens of Jaipur for ‘resilience’ and maintaining communal amity, while at the same time lambasting the security set-up in the state as well as in the centre including each and every security, intelligence and investigative agency and their working procedures, lack of coordination, absence of a central agency, etc. First of all, it has to be underscored that Jaipur was very important in the terror target book. The message being sent especially to tourists from abroad is that no Indian city is safe from terrorist attacks. Foreign ministries of some nations in their travel advisories have mentioned Jaipur in the aftermath of the attacks, though the tourist season is over. Secondly, though Indian agencies have successfully thwarted terrorist attacks, smashed terror modules and recovered explosives from terrorists, these achievements have gone unnoticed or have been covered with less enthusiasm by the media.

In official parleys and in the circle of strategic and security experts, the establishment of a federal agency devoted to inter-state crimes and cross-border terrorism is being talked about. Given the nature of federalism in India, the establishment of a federal agency and its nature and mandate have to be at first agreed to by the states and then will come the necessary legislative enactments and ultimate operationalisation, which is a lengthy process. Moreover, it is also argued that as there is already a plethora of agencies, a federal agency would be a further burden on policymakers. The government is therefore being urged to ensure better coordination amongst agencies as well as structural revamping of the whole Indian security setup.

Whenever the formation of a dedicated federal agency is talked about, the obvious parallel drawn is with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI has two clearly drawn priorities: national security and criminal. Under its national security priorities, the FBI works on three broad areas, namely, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Intelligence and Cyber Crime. Nonetheless, as far as a single agency working on terrorism is concerned, the FBI cannot be an ideal template because it works on various other issues as well. It is also not true that India has not established dedicated centres in this regard. In 2003-2004, the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) came into being, though the reality is that those who were primarily responsible to build, operationalise and run these organisations are of the opinion that these two organisations are not performing optimally on various grounds. While their revitalisation and optimisation are imperative in the aftermath of Jaipur, the establishment of a federal agency may be deliberated upon. But before that, some international instances of the working of such agencies need to be taken into consideration.

In 2003, Britain started its Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). With representation from all three British intelligence services, the Foreign and Home Offices as well as the Defence Intelligence Staff, which comes under Chief of Defence Intelligence, the main tasks of the JTAC are to assess the overall threat level in the United Kingdom and issue threat warnings pertaining to international terrorism. Similarly, in December 2004, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) started its work in Germany. We must remember that in Germany the federal states (Länder) enjoy wide powers and that various law-enforcement, investigating and other agencies work under the federal and state governments. Bringing all these agencies to agreement and forming a dedicated counter-terrorism centre was definitely a daunting task. GTAZ, which at present has the staff strength of 190, has representatives from German foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, state police forces, military counter-intelligence and federal migration authorities. Most important among the eight tasks entrusted to GTAZ are threat assessment, daily briefing, information and resource sharing and Islamist terrorism.

Some dissimilarities between the Indian and European conditions should be borne in mind while following these models. Firstly, the population strength in India is far grater than in these countries. Secondly, in the post-Madrid (3/11) and post-London (7/7) scenario, European governments have been predominantly focusing on terror networks related with Radical Islam as well as their international linkages and ideological fountainheads. Integration of the immigrant Muslim communities, especially the youth, is therefore of utmost importance for them. However in India, apart from the challenges of cross-border and home grown terrorism, the Indian security apparatus has to be ever vigilant about residual but internationally-linked terror cells and the revival of militancy in Punjab as well as activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Southern flank. And finally, despite resistance from national governments, a trend of Europeanization of national security services and investigative agencies to make the space of European Union (EU) more secure is visible.

As far as a federal agency is concerned, the instance of the Federal Office for Criminal Investigations (BKA), which works under the German Federal Ministry of Interior, may be taken into consideration. Though the BKA is a fairly old organisation, it has, however, been continuously evolving to tackle the challenge of the changing nature of threat. The mandate of BKA in a federal structure is clear:

“According to the German Constitution, for the most part police jurisdiction in Germany lies with the 16 German states. However, the diversity resulting from the principle of federalism should not lead to uncoordinated activity that creates obstacles for police work.”
The main divisions of the BKA focus on international co-ordination, state security, organised crime and Information Technology. It also works through its liaison offices in different parts of the world.

While deliberating upon the establishment of a federal agency these international experiences may be considered. However, in the Indian context, the proposed federal agency may face some problems initially. Law and order is in the concurrent list of the Indian constitution. States have a major role to play in maintaining law and order. They may raise objections against independent search, arrest, confiscation of evidence and investigations done by the proposed agency. They may also be apprehensive about an all-powerful federal agency interfering in their sphere. On the other hand, the federal agency may eventually need a federal prosecuting agency or designated courts to deal with terrorism. However, most important is that states have also to fill the vacant posts in state police, strengthen their field intelligence and establish close co-operation among the state and central agencies at the ground level. Free flow of information to the federal agency is of utmost importance for the survival and success of the organisation.

Strengthening existing organisations like MAC and JTFI are also paramount. These two organisations should have participation from organisations dealing with financial intelligence, border management, cyber crime and customs authorities and may be built as state-of–the-art centres that would solely deal with terrorism. Experts appointed must think ahead of the terrorists and be innovative in their approach to solve the multi-faceted and extremely complicated terror scenario in India. In order to build a national terrorism database, not only Indian think tanks should be involved but assistance and expertise must be taken from the private sector as well. Only if we think along the lines of strengthening existing structures, merging organisations as per need, and establishing a federal agency, could the present challenge be effectively responded to. A national consensus must be built upon for which a national debate is the need of the hour.

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Ukraine and Georgia’s loss became Russia’s overall gain. Ukraine and Georgia wanted to get the invitation for the pre-membership programme in NATO, which is the last step to full membership. Before the summit, President Bush went to Kiev and promised Ukrainian leaders that he would do all to support their country’s membership in NATO. But strong opposition from France and Germany put paid to Ukrainian and Georgian hopes.

Ironically, in Ukraine, society in general does not seem to be very enthusiastic about NATO membership. Most people are not even aware of this programme and some even feel that NATO is an aggressive military bloc. However, a pro-NATO membership movement started in September 2007 and the government continues to favour membership. In contrast, in Georgia, both civil society and government are favourable towards membership in NATO.

Ukrainian leaders have tried to convince Russia and other NATO members that their country would prove to be the most pro-Russian member in the organisation mainly because Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is situated on its territory, but to no avail. Both Ukraine and Georgia ask why they cannot become NATO members when Russia has established co-operative links with the organisation.

NATO-Russia formal relations began in 1991. Russia even joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 and participated in the Western Balkans till the Kosovo air campaign. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was formed in 2002, which laid out the foundation for co-operation in joint decision making and joint action on a range of common goals and interests with regard to Euro-Atlantic security issues. NRC meetings take place regularly at a high government level. Thus, the Bucharest Summit was also considered as a NRC Summit, in which the heads of all 27 states participated. In 2007, NATO and Russia even celebrated the 10th anniversary of their partnership. Significant areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia over the past few years include the issues of non-proliferation, arms control (CFE, open skies, nuclear experts’ consultations,) military-to-military co-operation, defence reform, civil emergencies, search & rescue at sea, counter-narcotics training, etc. At the NRC meet in Bucharest, negotiations on Land Transit and Air Transport as well as on Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) took place.

The question of Putin’s invitation to participate in the Bucharest Summit was one of the most discussed issues before the Summit, as many expected Putin to reiterate his strong anti-West stance by delivering a speech similar to that in Munich on February 10, 2007. But Putin was constructive in his remarks and elaborated upon all the issues discussed, though he did mention Russia’s differences with other NATO members on the issues of Kosovo, the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, missile defence and NATO enlargement. There was no joint statement at the end of Summit, particularly given the differences on missile defence as well as on enlargement. Participants agreed only to the Chairman’s statement, in which NATO Secretary-General touched upon important issues at the Summit.

One such issue concerned Land Transit Support for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Though there was no concrete agreement, a letter signed by NATO Secretary-General and Putin spoke about the establishment of a route for the transfer of non-lethal weapons through Russia to Afghanistan. This might, however, take some time to be implemented in practice because other countries are also involved; the transit route will wind through Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics.

The other important issue mentioned by NATO Secretary-General in his concluding statement was the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Putin clearly pointed out at the NRC meeting that if the NATO allies do not change their position, Russia will completely withdraw from the CFE. According to Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the CFE treaty as well as the issue of missile defence will remain an issue for discussion between NATO and Russia for quite sometime.

The most important issue at the Summit was the question of NATO enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia. The communiqué of NATO allies pointed out that Ukraine and Georgia both will become NATO members in future, but it is not yet clear when this will happen. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that this issue is certainly going to constrain NATO-Russia co-operation in future. Nonetheless, in December 2008, the foreign ministers of NATO member-states will discuss the question of Ukraine and Georgia joining the NATO Membership Action Plan once again. However, Russia is bound to do everything possible to stop Ukraine and Georgia from receiving NATO membership.

As far as the outlook for NATO-Russia relations is concerned, there will be co-operation on Afghanistan, which is something that NATO allies are interested in. According to Scheffer, Russia is keen on pushing NATO to develop relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Though this issue was not discussed at Bucharest, it is likely to be raised by Russia in future. But some NATO allies are not satisfied with the CSTO’s role and do not wish to co-operate with Russia in this regard. Therefore, the idea of NATO-CSTO cooperation might not fructify in the near future.

The question of Russia in NATO has been coming up repeatedly from 2000 onwards, when Putin indicated that his country would be interested in becoming a NATO member at some point in time. But Putin’s suggestion has not been taken seriously by the Western allies and it is not seen as feasible at this juncture. But what is possible and important is to formulate and conduct regular NATO-Russia dialogue and other practical co-operation. As it is said, NATO needs Russia and Russia NATO.

“[China] feels that the Himalayas alone in this nuclear age are not enough to guarantee its national security, especially in view of Tibet’s strategic location. [It], therefore, ideally wants a China of small, preferably pro-Chinese, neighbours on the cis-Himalayan region separating the two Asian giants.”

- Dawa Norbu

Nepal constitutes one of the cis-Himalayan regions, which Dawa Norbu had once described as the “new buffer zone”, after the old buffer (Tibet) came under China’s sovereign control in 1951. Its strategic importance can be fathomed not only from its geo-political location, being sandwiched between the two rising Asian giants but also from its transformation into a new buffer zone between India and China in the 1950s. This buffer has assumed even more importance in the current times with Royal Nepal being transformed into a People’s Nepal in the aftermath of the Maoist victory in the election to the Constituent Assembly (CA) on April 10, 2008. The victory of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CPN(M) a one- time rebel group, has significant geopolitical repercussions for the region. The growing concern in India is, therefore, whether the Maoist Nepal would come under the Chinese sphere of influence, or is it going to chart a policy of equi-distance between India and China.

Certain developments suggest China’s growing influence in Nepal and the latter’s cozying up with the former. To begin with, both Nepal and China are planning for greater economic linkages and there are proposals for connecting the two countries with as many as ten roadways. China has also promised to construct a railway line from Lhasa to Khasa at the Nepal-China border within five years. According to news reports from Nepal, China has agreed to provide assistance worth about Rs 460 million (RMB 50 million) to Nepal for the construction of Syaphrubesi-Rasuwagdhi Road.

Apart from road and rail linkages, there has been a sudden proliferation of China Study Centres (CSC) all along the Indo-Nepal border with their number rising from 7 in 2005 to 19 till February 2008. These study centres, which were initially set up in 2000 as civil society groups to promote cultural interaction, have become effective tools for advancing Chinese perspective on key issues concerning Nepal. These centres also disseminate the benign role of China and caution the Nepalis about India’s hegemonic intentions.

Diplomatically, from 2006 onwards, there has been a perceptible shift in the Chinese stand towards Nepal. China apparently regarded the Royal take over of Nepal in 2005 as the latter’s internal affair. But after the 2006 People’s Movement, China stated that “key to resolution of crisis in Nepal lies in conciliation among the constitutional forces”… and urged the King to “reach out to the political parties to restore democracy and peace in the country.”

Another major indicator of growing Chinese influence on Nepal is the latter’s crackdown on Tibetan protests in April this year at the behest of China. Time magazine reports that Beijing has also deployed security officials inside Nepal, to help detect fleeing Tibetans and keep a lid on unrest. There are even reports of Chinese security agents preventing a reporter and photographer from Agence France-Presse from working inside Nepal. These activities demonstrate Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the country despite their stated policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

For China, Nepal is important as it is integral to China’s peripheral diplomacy. China believes that the March 2008 Tibetan unrest is very much the handiwork of international forces operating from Nepal. In order to secure its southern periphery, which it considers most vulnerable, it feels the need to monitor clandestine activities in Nepal. Therefore, China is likely to play a significant role in determining the future shape of Nepalese politics under the Maoists. From this perspective, China’s conception of Nepal as a new buffer acquires significance. Further, Nepal is important for China in order to check the rise of India. In recent years, China is increasingly exploiting anti-Indian feelings prevailing among the Nepalese and the China Study Centres have been employed in a big way to achieve this objective. This strategy is a part of its larger strategy of building friendly relations with India’s immediate neighbours in order to isolate and marginalise India’s influence in the region. Moreover, China’s rapid rise has deemed it necessary to seek more and more resources to fuel its economic growth. Nepal has a huge resource of hydro-electricity and, according to one estimate, it is only second to Brazil with 83,000 megawatts of energy.

Ever since the Maoists became the dominant partner in Nepal’s coalition government in the post-Janaandolan period, China started to revisit its Nepal policy. It may be noted that earlier China had branded the Maoists as anti-government forces. With the victory of the Maoists in the election to the CA, the Chinese “have beefed up their interests in Nepal” and the Chinese leadership is cozying up with the Maoists. Just after the elections, it sent its first nine-member official foreign ministry delegation to Nepal headed by Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ha Yafei. There are also reports of high-level meetings between Nepali and Chinese officials regarding the government formation in Nepal. China is also eyeing to tap the hydro-electricity power and two of its companies are in the fray for winning the bids on hydro-power projects.

For Nepal, building close ties with China is important as it could gain enormously from China’s rapid rise and spiraling economic growth. A decade of civil-war has left Nepal’s economy in a dismal state. Its growth rate is a meagre 2%, inflation is around 9%, unemployment rate is 42%, about a third of its population is under the official poverty line, and more than half the population is illiterate. More importantly, China serves as an alternative platform for its political and diplomatic bargaining vis-à-vis India. There is a huge dependence of Nepal on India for economic needs. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner accounting for more than 60% of its trade. About 12 of the 13 trade routes of Nepal are via India. About 50% of Nepal’s remittances come from India. Thus, for strategic and economic reasons, the Maoists feel the urgent need to cultivate deeper ties with China on the one hand, and reduce their dependence on India on the other. This, therefore, also explains why the Maoists are calling for renegotiating the 1950 Indo- Nepal Treaty. In fact, one of the top CPN(M) leaders, Babu Ram Bhattarai told Nepal Telegraph on May 10th that it was only because of the open border that Nepal could not achieve economic prosperity. The Maoists are also insistent on reviewing the Gorkha recruitment by the Indian Army. All this evidently suggests that the Maoists are essentially calling for re-negotiation of the relationship with India. Also, the alleged ideological affinity of the Maoists with the Chinese Communists is seen as an added advantage which China is likely to exploit in future.

There is a growing awareness in India about the Maoists developing a close relationship with China, much to the displeasure of India. In fact, there are speculations in some political and intellectual quarters that in the typical style of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Maoists would initially strengthen their position by forging a unified front with other parties and then gradually overshadow them and assume monopolistic hold on Nepal’s democratic space. It would be then very difficult to dislodge the Maoists from power and they would rule Nepal autocratically. Such an autocratic state would naturally find a close ally in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

However, there are also beliefs in certain quarters that there is not much scope for any deepening of China-Nepal relations. Rather, Maoist Nepal would opt for a policy of equi-distance between India and China. Clarifying his stand on equi-distance policy, Maoist chief, Prachanda said in an interview to the CNN-IBN on May 18th, “…we will not side up with one country against the other. We will maintain equidistance in political sense and not in terms of cooperation and other things.” Nepal has deep civilizational and cultural ties with India. Historically, the political forces in Nepal have had deeper political linkages with India than with any other country. In fact, India was instrumental in bringing about the 12-point Agreement between the alliance of seven parties and the Maoists’ party in 2005 in New Delhi.

In summation, the Chinese challenge is real. That with the end of 240-year-old monarchy, Nepal’s politics would chart a new path is a reality. Nepal, being a sovereign country would like to deal with India on an equitable basis. Given geographically contiguous, culturally similar and economically closer relationship with India, Nepal perhaps also realizes that it would be quite impractical to ignore its southern giant at the behest of building strategic ties with the northern giant. Also geopolitically, being sandwiched between the two Asian giants, Nepal does benefit from following an equi-distance policy. With globalisation, shifting Asian balance of power, rise of China and emergence of India, Nepal is, thus, likely to opt for a balanced approach with both India and China, which would eventually pave the path for its own economic growth and stability. For India, the challenge is to support Nepal to gain economic and political stability without being domineering and create a win-win situation. In fact, India has to deftly handle its Nepal policy keeping in mind the growing Chinese influence in Nepal.

The first half of May 2008 (2-16) witnessed an epochal multilateral event that passed off virtually unnoticed in the countries involved. It saw the first ever combined maritime exercise among the navies of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSAMAR). The lack of attention to it was hardly surprising given that the venue was the wide blue yonder, and the fact that the peoples of these countries are only beginning to realise the import of events that occur beyond terra firma.

IBSAMAR is a manifestation of the transformed global geopolitical and security landscape since the end of the Cold War. It is not well known that in the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa sought to forge strong naval ties with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain and New Zealand under the pretext that India was “a major maritime threat.” (Of course, Pretoria’s aim was to avoid strategic isolation flowing out of Apartheid, rather than to meet the stated “threat”). This contrasts sharply with what South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Defence said in 2005, “India and Brazil, with navies in excess of 50,000 strong … in comparison to the South African Navy with lower numbers, can play a major co-ordinated role in the future…. Southern Africa has large stretches of coastline with a limited naval capability to monitor and protect it. This offers an opportunity for our three navies to work jointly in these areas.”

India and Brazil evidently acquiesced to the Minister’s proposal since the first IBSAMAR was conducted off South Africa’s south-western coast, adjoining the Cape of Good Hope. For the exercise, Indian and Brazilian naval units were required not only to transit a substantial distance to the exercise area (over 4,000 and 3,000 nautical miles respectively), but also to endure the exercise-duration. This is a seminal development on two counts. Firstly, it signals the increasing reach and sustainability of navies of “developing countries”. Secondly, it is indicative of an increasing realisation among policy-makers in these countries of the imperative of safeguarding their geographically expanding interests and meeting their international obligations as potential major powers.

The focus of IBSAMAR-08 was on missions linked to human security like safety of shipping, search and rescue, and casualty evacuation. Such an agenda could not have been more appropriate considering that the chosen exercise venue was named "Cape of Storms" by Bartolomeu Dias – the first European explorer to reach here in 1488. It was later renamed as the "Cape of Good Hope" because of the optimism engendered by the opening of a sea route to India, though the vagaries of nature continue to imperil seafarers here. While the Suez Canal provides a shorter and safer route today, the number of ships circumnavigating Africa is on the rise since their tonnage is increasing beyond what is permissible for passage through the Suez. Besides, advances in marine engineering technology have enabled vessels to cruise at much higher economical speeds, thereby reducing the motivation to use the Suez Canal. Some 30 per cent of the Persian Gulf oil bound for Europe and the Americas continues to be routed around the Cape. While 30 to 50 oil tankers used to sail around the Cape every month a decade ago, the number currently ranges between 90 and 100.

The larger objective of IBSAMAR was to derive training value and achieve ‘operational-compatibility’ among the three navies. Such exercises would therefore also serve other convergent maritime security objectives, facilitating combined operations against low-intensity threats and even traditional military missions under the UN mandate.

For India, IBSAMAR was an effective instrument to showcase its foreign policy. It served to dispel the apprehensions of India’s growing strategic relationship with the United States and its allies, which arose in some quarters following the high-level Malabar and TRILATEX naval exercises of 2007. IBSAMAR followed in wake of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) launched in February 2008, which was also devoid of US participation. As an Indian initiative, IONS has itself contributed to India’s image as a stabilising factor. Together with IONS, IBSAMAR reinforces the point that India’s geopolitical engagement is ‘multi-vectored’ and not directed against any country, including China. Furthermore, IBSAMAR would supplement IONS in its envisaged aim of maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

It is noteworthy that the in-principle decision to conduct IBSAMAR on a regular basis was taken soon after the launch of IBSA in 2003. This not only reinforces the geopolitical import of IBSAMAR, but also indicates that geopolitics may even have been a driver for these combined naval exercises. IBSAMAR would serve to further political ties among the three emerging powers by reinforcing convergence in their common world view, ranging from global order and reorganisation of the UN Security Council to issues of economics and climate change. The global geopolitical scenario has begun to shift incrementally from the post-Cold War unipolar order to a multipolar one. Although it is too early to speculate the future contours of the transformed world, IBSAMAR may well turn out to be a watershed event en route.