Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s recent visit to China from April 10-16 revealed the depth and confidence that highlight Pakistan-China relations. The much repeated refrain of an “all-weather friendship” between the two countries is now transforming itself from the erstwhile “purely defensive and strategic” in nature to one of deep economic engagement.

Apart from being the keynote speaker at the Boao Forum for Asia, the Pakistan President had a weighty itinerary that included meeting Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo and the China People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) Chairman, Jia Qinglin. The final stretch of his visit saw an interaction with the provincial leadership of Xinjiang province in Urumqi.

With the defence component in the relationship remaining very strong - China handing over the first of the four frigates it is building for the Pakistan Navy and reiterating its support for closer defence cooperation - it is the sheer magnitude of economic projects between the two countries that needs closer attention in India.

While the rest of the world in its obsession with the ongoing “global war on terror” has labelled Pakistan as a “potential failed state” and ignored its sound economic performance in the last decade, Chinese policy makers have identified and sensed an opportunity to develop economic linkages with a country that in their opinion is a “win-win” one. For starters, with bilateral trade crossing over USD 6 billion, there is a new sense of optimism in enhancing this figure to USD 15 billion within the next five years. According to an article by Fazal ur-Rehman of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), under the ‘Early Harvest Programme’ operational since January 1, 2006, China does not levy any tariff on 767 products from Pakistan. The two countries are also moving towards setting up a Free Trade Area. To facilitate economic projects initiated by the two sides, the Pakistan-China Investment Company Limited (PCICL) was set up earlier this year with a paid-up capital of USD 200 million.

Significantly, Chinese investments in Pakistan have shown a rapid acceleration with their focus on energy, infrastructure, transportation and telecommunications. On the energy front, the Neelum-Jhelum hydel project, the Muzaffargarh power project, and three potential sites for hydel power in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) at Harigel, Jagran II and Jhing are the focus of Chinese investments. The 781 kilometre White Oil Pipeline from Karachi to Mahmood Kot commissioned by the Pak-Arab Refinery (PARCO) was to receive equipment and material from the China Petroleum Engineering Construction Corporation in a multi-million dollar deal. When completed, this pipeline will be able to transport 12 million tons of refined petroleum products annually. There is also a proposal to extend the pipeline from Mahmood Kot in Punjab province to Peshawar – a length of around 460 kilometres. Once the pipeline project – from Port Qasim to Peshawar – is completed, Pakistan will have the necessary infrastructure to transport petroleum products to Xinjiang region of China. It is worth noting that irrespective of the eventual fate of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project, the pipeline networks in Pakistan are oriented towards China.

On the infrastructure front, Chinese state owned entities have been asked to expand and upgrade the Karakoram Highway for access by “all types of traffic.” The Gwadar deep sea port (Phase One and Two) and the Makran coastal highway are two high profile projects completed with Chinese assistance. In the realm of transportation, Pakistan has sought China’s assistance to develop a railway link between Gwadar and Karachi along the Makran coastal highway and to establish a rail link between Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the Xinjiang region in China. This railway line, it is hoped, will benefit trade and commerce in that region and provide an “energy corridor” to transport oil and gas from Gwadar to China. Under an existing agreement between the two countries, the Dong Fang Electric Corporation and the China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation are providing locomotives and passenger coaches to Pakistan railways.

In telecommunications, the China Mobile Communication Corporation (CMCC) – the world’s largest mobile services operator – has already invested more than USD 700 million in acquiring PakTel and intends to invest another USD 800 million in “revitalising” and transforming one of the world’s fastest growing mobile telephony markets. The CMCC’s investment in Pakistan is over and above a separate investment made by Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company (ZTE) to manufacture and install digitally switched lines in Pakistan.

The mineral and mining sectors in Pakistan are also beneficiaries of Chinese largesse. Thar coal, Saindak copper and gold mines, and the Duddar zinc and lead mine projects are being developed with Chinese assistance and financing. The Metallurgical Construction Corporation of China holds a ten year lease on the Saindak copper and gold mines which expires in 2011.

The sub-regional aspect to Pakistan-China economic engagement is the emerging emphasis upon fostering and developing closer Pakistan-Xinjiang economic dynamism. In an address to the China Xinjiang-Pakistan Economic Forum in Urumqi, the Pakistan President called for “closer cooperation in trade, commerce and investment” and highlighted Xinjiang’s geographical proximity to Pakistan. It is expected that Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce will promote trade and economic cooperation with the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau of Xinjiang.

Although Pakistan has an adverse trade deficit with China and a limited base of products to export to China, the sheer scale and range of Chinese investments reveal its economic and strategic importance to Beijing. With more than 60 Chinese companies located in Pakistan and investments exceeding more than USD 5 billion and growing exponentially, the Pakistan-China economic relationship is a dynamic vector that cannot be ignored.

In a development that is expected to ease tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese voted in favour of the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) candidate Ma Ying-jeou in the March 22 presidential election. Ma’s victory was unprecedented, as he captured 58 per cent of the total votes cast – a full 16 percentage points more than Frank Hsieh of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Given this historic win, among the most urgent ‘cross-strait’ tasks facing Ma Ying-jeou are resumption of dialogue, re-establishment of strong economic ties, and coming to a concrete understanding on the ‘One China’ policy with the Mainland. While Ma’s approach for better cross-strait ties rightly reflects the KMT’s political agenda, it is to be seen whether China will soften its stance on the ‘One China’ policy given Ma’s refutation of ‘reunification’ under this policy.

Ma’s impressive win gives KMT overall control of Taiwan, especially given that the party had defeated the DPP in parliamentary elections in January 2008. Two important issues that helped KMT gain power were its emphasis upon bettering economic conditions and good governance, along with better cross-strait relations. Under Ma’s leadership, it is assumed that cross-strait ‘political dialogue’, which has remained suspended since 1999, would be resumed. After the election, Ma has already publicly indicated his wish to forge a ‘closer political understanding’ through dialogue with the Mainland. But on the issue of ‘reunification’, he has noted that it can only happen with a ‘democratic China’. However, what makes Ma distinct in Taiwan politics today is his clearly outlined cross-strait policy and intention to pursue peaceful ties with the Mainland without compromising on Taiwan’s identity under the “One China” principle.

On the critical “One China” principle, Ma has said that the November 1992 meeting in Hong Kong (known as “the 1992 Consensus”) between the Beijing-based quasi-official intermediary Association of Relations across the Taiwan Strait and its Taiwanese counterpart the Straits Exchange Foundation should be interpreted as “One China, different interpretations.” What this means in his view is that both sides accept the “One China” principle, though each is free to interpret what it means. As far as KMT is concerned, “One China means “The Republic of China” (ROC) which is the official name of Taiwan.” Elaborating on this, Ma said:

“There is a great difference, very divergent views, but nevertheless the two sides could reconcile their differences by accepting the One China in principle… This is the formula with which we all agreed to disagree … the sovereignty issue. We will never able to solve that problem. The only thing we can do is just to manage it so that it wouldn’t erupt into a major crisis.”

Like Ma, the KMT’s cross-strait agenda rests on “the 1992 consensus,” which was formulated but without a written record. Though time and again officials across the strait have expressed their dissatisfaction at having missed that historic occasion in November 1992 to formulate specific details, it is widely believed that both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT are increasingly in favour of using this consensus as a compromise platform for the “One China” principle. This is clearly evident in the March 26 statement made by Chinese President Hu Jintao, who stated:

“It is China’s consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of ‘the 1992 consensus’, which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.”

Immediately upon learning of the Chinese President’s acknowledgement of “the 1992 consensus,” Ma publicly stated that “you cannot deny that there is progress here.” However, on an earlier occasion, Ma had made it clear that he will not push for talks if “China were to say that there is only ‘one China’, but no room for separate interpretations of both sides…” As a pre-condition for peace talks, he has set two specifics for the mainland: first, China should stop insisting on ‘unification’; and second, it should remove some 1,400 missiles targeted towards the island.

Pushing for a “common market” across the strait with rules that lift investment limits, Ma has called for a ‘mutual non-denial’ agreement under which both Taiwan and the Mainland can co-exist peacefully. Further, there is much interest in KMT to ink a ‘peace accord’ and agree to military confidence-building measures to avoid potential conflicts across the strait. Promoting the KMT’s agenda across the strait, Ma has diplomatically endorsed the April 29, 2005 joint press communiqué between Chinese President Hu Jintao and former KMT chairman Lien Chan, which includes important schemes like consultation on the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international activities and establishing a platform for periodic party-to-party contacts.

At the same time, the newly elected president has forsworn the pursuit of independence. His main policy approaches include: (a) promoting a “common market” similar to the European Union’s (b) establishing direct flights and cargo services between Taiwan and China (c) pushing for a pact similar to the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) that Hong Kong has with China, though not for political purposes.

In a similar vein, Ma’s electoral campaign was based on “three no’s” – no reunification, no independence and no war. This can be said to largely signal the end of ‘identity politics’ in Taiwan, which the DPP had promoted. Many in Taiwan also believe that Ma’s construct of the “three no’s” is designed to reassure three main audiences: Taiwanese, the Mainland and the United States. These “three no’s” have also to an extent relieved the concerns of those Taiwanese who believed that under KMT rule Taiwan may succumb to the pressure of Chinese sovereignty. In addition, Ma’s supporters claim that his conciliatory approach towards the Mainland does not indicate that it would prevent him from criticising China on sensitive issues. In fact, on the ongoing Tibetan crisis, Ma has said that “he would consider boycotting the Beijing Olympics this summer if the crackdown worsened in Tibet.”

From China’s perspective, it seems that the emphasis at the moment has shifted from seeking ‘reunification’ to averting Taiwan from pursuing de jure independence. The real challenge for both sides is to move ahead without straining ties through emphasis upon re-unification or independence. Here, China’s approach towards KMT ruled Taiwan is more important. It is feared that Beijing may not soften its stance on the territorial question in the wake of the challenges it is facing in Tibet and Xinjiang. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to foresee how China-Taiwan ties would evolve in the near future. Though, at the moment, Ma’s victory should be quite palatable to the Mainland because of the KMT’s ostensibly anti-independence approach. At a personal level, for Ma, it is a testing time in terms of bringing Beijing to the negotiating table on issues like ‘interpreting the “one China” policy’ vis-à-vis ‘unification’ without disturbing the status quo. While Ma’s approach to defusing the ongoing cross-strait tension is certainly a welcome step, it remains to be seen whether China will take advantage of this approach.

The India-Africa Forum Summit is an indication of the coming of age of India’s relations with African countries. While India’s relations with African countries are time tested and historical, nevertheless in recent years this affiliation has been revitalised. Booming trade is an indication of this change. Trade has grown from US$967 million in 1990-91 to $25 billion in 2006-07 (inclusive of oil imports). This transformed relationship is driven by a number of factors.

Changing African Outlook

First, on the political side, there has been an end in sight to some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, often referred as Africa’s world war, has abated considerably. Similarly, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast have moved out of the conflict zone. In Sudan, after years of negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between southern rebels and the Sudanese government in 2005. At the same time, there is a move towards Africans taking charge of their own destiny. This is reflected in the African Union’s (formed in 2002) steps towards conflict resolution. The continent is also embracing the value of democracy and good governance. Some two-thirds of African states have conducted multi-party elections in recent years. Similarly, 24 countries have taken their promises of good governance seriously and signed up for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is an offshoot of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative launched by African countries in 2001.

Second, on the economic plane, there is a transformation underway in the continent. About 20 countries have averaged a growth rate of over 5 per cent during the past decade. According to the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, the average growth rates for Sub- Saharan Africa were around 5.8 per cent in 2007. While rising crude oil and other non- fuel commodity prices may explain the high growth rates of some of these economies, the implementation of radical structural adjustment programmes mandated by the IMF may be the real factor for the steady performers.

Africa’s Growing Strategic Importance

From the geostrategic perspective, there has been a perceptible rise in the importance of Africa for New Delhi. First, India’s growing energy needs have forced it to diversify its oil imports. In the past, India has been dependent on West Asia for its oil imports. In recent years, India, like the US and the other major powers, has recognised the energy potential of African countries. Currently, around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa (including North African countries). Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) have invested in equity assets in Sudan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria, Nigeria-Sao Tome Principe Joint Development Area and Gabon. Private sector companies like Reliance have also invested in equity oil in Sudan. Essar has procured exploration and production blocks in Madagascar and Nigeria. India has recently completed a $200 million project to lay a pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red sea.

Second, there is a growing recognition of the fact that countries on the eastern coast of Africa abutting the Indian Ocean – from South Africa to Somalia – fall under India’s maritime strategic neighbourhood. It has been acknowledged that insecurity in the Indian Ocean region is growing, given the existence of fundamentalist, terrorist, and militant, separatist or extremist organisations and criminal syndicates involved in trafficking in drugs, arms and humans, and piracy. The growth in incidents of piracy in Somali waters in particular threatens the security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). The Indian Navy has been active in its diplomacy in the Indian Ocean, providing maritime security cover during the African Union summit in 2003 and the World Economic Forum in 2004 in Mozambique.

Third, Indian industry has realised the strategic importance of Africa, specifically in commercial terms. This is supported by the Indian government’s fresh look at Africa with the initiatives of Focus Africa and Team 9. New economic initiatives launched by the African governments like the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) have also attracted the interest of Indian investors. There is a growing realisation that African economies are at a stage of development when India could offer the most appropriate technology and products at competitive prices. A recent study by the Federation of Indian Industry and Commerce (FICCI) points out that it is “high time India took a pragmatic assessment of the business opportunities offered by Africa.” The success of the four India-Africa project partnership conclaves held in New Delhi since 2005 – the last one attracted 606 African delegates from thirty three countries, and around 152 projects worth $10.5 billion were negotiated – is an indication of Indian industry’s growing interest in Africa.

Opportunities

India and Africa together make up nearly a third of humanity. Politically, both share similar world views – they acknowledge the growing North-South divide, identify with issues like reforms in institutions of global governance, and face similar challenges of instability and conflict. It is therefore quite natural that countries from Africa and India have come together to collaborate in multiple areas:

Human Resource Development and Capacity building: One of the priority areas for India is developing partnerships in the human resource development process in Africa. In the last forty or more years, India has extended $1 billion worth of assistance in this sector in Africa through the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation Programme (ITEC). This has involved deputation of Indian experts in a number of African countries as well as providing training to Africans in Indian institutions. Over 1000 officials and 15,000 African students receive training in India annually. The challenge is to take this partnership beyond government to the business and corporate levels. This would involve undertaking a needs analysis of each African country as a unit and for Africa as a whole. Finally, it would involve formulation of common human development training, techniques and methods.

Pharmaceuticals and Health

The Indian pharmaceuticals industry leads the effort in the developing world in terms of technology, quality and range of medicines. Further, it has the advantage of low cost of production and R&D. Over the years, India had Africa have dealt with the scourge of communicable disease like malaria, TB and HIV-AIDS. Collaborative research and development partnerships between Indian and African pharma majors would be mutually beneficial. Several Indian pharma and healthcare companies have invested in Africa like Ranbaxy laboratories, Cipla Limited, Aurobindo Pharma and Emcure Pharmaceuticals.

Information & Communication technologies

The Indian government, private sector IT and telecom companies have recognised the potential investment opportunities available in this sector in Africa. African governments have shown interest in accessing Indian assistance to bridge the digital divide. India has already made a vast contribution through building the Pan-African E-Network, which will connect all 53 nations of the African Union through satellite and fibre optic network. The network will connect 5 universities, 53 learning centres, 10 super specialty hospitals and 53 remote hospitals in India and Africa. Leading infotech firms like Tata Consultancy and HCL, NIIT and Aptech have launched operations across Africa.

Agriculture

The majority of African countries are looking for ways and means to fortify their food security. To achieve this, they would like to replicate the Indian “green revolution model” in Africa. Specific areas of collaboration could range from provision of agricultural inputs, agro processing and watershed management. A few Indian companies like the Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. and Water and Power Consultancy services (WAPCOS) are already engaged in water management projects across Africa. Tractor makers like International Tractors Ltd. have already made a mark in Africa. Corporate houses like Dabur and Tata Coffee have also ventured into the agriculture sector in Africa.

Power and Energy

African countries have identified expansion of power projects as one of the priorities in recent years. Opportunities thus exist for Indian companies for setting up power plants that includes laying transmission lines, sub-station structures and railway electrification structures. Indian public sector companies like Bharat Heavy Electronics Limited (BHEL) and private sector firms like Tata Power, Kalptaru Power lines, KEC International, Mohan Energy Corporation and others are making inroads in this sector across Africa. In the alternative energy sector, India’s Suzlon Energy and Mohan Energy Corporation are offering wind energy based solutions. In the hydrocarbon sector, apart from acquiring equity assets, Indian firms have invested in refineries. Essar Energy overseas has invested to acquire stakes in Kenya and Egypt.

Challenges

Major Powers take a relook at Africa: India is not alone in strengthening its ties with Africa. The United States and Europe are also taking steps in this direction, mainly with the fear of Africa exporting its problems – refugees, health problems and more importantly terrorism to Europe and elsewhere. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair set the ball rolling with a defining speech on the “state of Africa being a scar on the conscience of the world” and attempted to erase the scar through the lofty promise of debt relief and increase in aid. President Bush’s recent visit to the continent signifies the fact that Africa has entered the strategic space as far as the United States is concerned. Further, the establishment of the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an indication of the emerging importance of Africa from Washington’s perspective.

China factor: China has been active in forging partnerships all across Africa, offering economic aid and political support, and promising to be an “all weather friend”. The Chinese have been engaging African countries in a big way. The November 2006 Sino- Africa summit that brought together 47 African presidents at Beijing demonstrated Chinese seriousness about doing business with the continent. In February 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao wrapped up a tour of eight African countries promising enormous aid packages. China’s interest in Africa is reflected in the phenomenal growth of its trade with Africa, which ballooned from $6.5 billion in 1999 to $40 billion in 2005.

Instability and Governance issues: Despite the positive outlook, conflicts and poor law and order environments persists in several African countries. Weak and fragile states with limited institutional capacity in enforcing the rule of law are the inevitable challenges in doing business in Africa.

Recommendations

While India enters into a fresh dialogue with Africans, it should be aware that it cannot match the pace or the extent of engagement of the EU, US or China in Africa. Hence it should leverage the strengths of the unique Indian model.

• Forge ties based on a model that stresses Indian uniqueness: India should showcase its long term approach towards Africa, which is based on a triad of training, technological assistance and trade. It should also hinge on empowering Africans.
• Recognise diversity: It is crucial to recognise that Africa is not a monolith, but a continent representing fifty three countries, diverse people and cultures.
• Avoid emulating the Chinese, as there are pitfalls in that approach. In the African perception, the Chinese are following a short term approach based on extraction of natural resources. Things are unravelling for the Chinese as protests and racial anger against them is on the rise in Africa, particularly in countries like Zambia. China’s mercantilist approach has left many Africans disenchanted.
• Rope in the Indian Diaspora: Efforts should be made to strengthen ties with more than three million people of Indian origin on the continent. They could play a greater role in promoting business ties. The presence of African Indian businessmen in the delegations from South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia is a pointer in that direction. Nevertheless, these efforts should not overshadow efforts to build cultural contacts with mainstream Africans.
• Become a shareholder in Africa’s development: The African leadership expects India to become a shareholder in Africa’s development; a shareholder that is well informed of African aspirations and helps them refashion indigenous structures to achieve them.

Yousuf Raza Gilani was nominated by Asif Ali Zardari as the PPP candidate for prime ministership on March 22, 2008. On that occasion, Zardari called upon Gilani “to accept the heavy responsibility and lead the coalition government and the nation to greater heights and a glorious future.” Pakistan’s National Assembly elected Gilani as Prime Minister (264 votes to 42 over Pervez Elahi of PML-Q) two days later.

Gilani started off well by announcing that as Prime Minister (PM) he would first wish to order the release of judges kept under house arrest by the previous administration. Police forces promptly responded to this wish. Even before he was sworn in as PM, police were seen lifting the barricades and setting the judges free. Gilani also invited all parties to join the coalition in the interest of democracy and work together to establish the supremacy of parliament, constitution and rule of law. Many in Pakistan termed it as the ultimate victory of the people.

Makhdoom Gilani also exhibited the right spirit of reconciliation when he decided to meet Makhdoom Amin Fahim. This meeting came in the backdrop of rumours that the PPP would split if Gilani were to be chosen over Fahim. During the meeting, Gilani addressed Fahim as ‘my elder brother” and “my leader” to express his sense of loyalty and respect to the senior leader. It is difficult to say whether this has proved enough to assuage Fahim’s injured feelings at not being nominated for the prime ministership after initial projections to this effect.

Gilani’s Background

Those familiar with the tradition of “Pirs” and “Makhdooms” might not have found Gilani’s spirit of reconciliation surprising. Makhdooms share a wider ‘Sufi’ tradition and respect one another. They have considerable influence in their respective areas. It is important to note that out of the four names suggested for prime ministership, three were Makhdooms. Gilani is a descendant of the famous Qadiriya saint Musa Pak Shaheed of Multan, who came from Iran. Gilani is also related to the Makhdoom of Jamaldinwali and the Pir of Pagara. His mother is from the former family and her sister is married to the Pir of Pagara.

Makhdoom families were pampered by the British and later invited by the Muslim League to join the Pakistan movement. Gilani’s family had in fact joined the movement in the 1940s and were devoted followers of Jinnah.

Born in 1952, Gilani began his political career in the mid-1970s. He joined the Pakistan Muslim League, which was revived by Zia-ul-Haq in the early 1980s. He won the 1985 elections and became a federal minister in Muhammad Khan Junejo’s government. He, however, left Junejo’s cabinet after developing serious differences with him and rushed to Karachi to meet Benazir Bhutto and offered to work with her when she was in the political wilderness.

In the 1988 elections, Gilani defeated Nawaz Sharif and became a minister in Benazir’s cabinet. He was chosen as speaker of the National Assembly when Benazir’s PPP returned to power in 1993. He differed with Benazir over issues where he felt she was in the wrong. He invoked her wrath but inspired her quiet admiration at the same time.

Gilani lost to PML-N candidate, Sikandar Hayat Bosan, in 1997, when Nawaz won a massive landslide in Punjab. He could not join the electoral fray in 2002 because he was arrested on corruption charges by the Musharraf regime and put in jail. He supported his nephew Syed Asad Murtaza Gillani in the 2002 elections. Murtaza won and joined the breakaway PPP faction, which supported Musharraf. This led to rumours that Gilani has switched loyalties to Musharraf.

But such speculation proved to be untrue and Gilani continued to languish in jail for five long years until his release in October 2006. He spent his time in jail productively and wrote his autobiography, Chahe Yusuf ki Sada. After his release, Gilani worked full-time as a party-man and won the confidence of senior leaders within the party. Fahim, who led the PPP in Benazir’s absence, was particularly fond of him for his principles and his devotion to the party.

Gilani’s Agenda

On March 29, Gilani became the first PM of Pakistan to win a unanimous vote of confidence. He unveiled his 100 days’ relief and reform plan the same day to wide acclaim. His agenda reflected a sombre and reconciliatory mood rather than a confrontationist and combative one. It touched upon a whole range of issues – education, terrorism, legislative supremacy, administrative reforms and foreign policy.

Gilani began his address by stating that ‘dahshatgardi’ (terrorism) was the most critical issue to be addressed by his government and held that “the restoration of law and order and total elimination of terrorism will be (its) first priority.” He described extremist forces as “people who had chosen the path of violence as a means of expressing their views”, and appealed to them to give up their approach, talk to the government and join the political forces “in this journey of democracy”. He argued that the roots of terrorism lay in “poverty and illiteracy” and promised to soon evolve a new package for the tribal areas as an “important pillar of our strategy in the war against terrorism”. He proposed the removal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. He also stated that his government would set up a Madressah Welfare Authority to audit funds and provide a uniform syllabus for Madressahs in consultation with all stakeholders. He made it clear that his government’s approach in dealing with extremists will be through dialogue rather than force.

Gilani’s statement on foreign policy was rather brief and signalled no major departure from that of the previous administration. He said his government’s policy would be based on “goodwill and peaceful co-existence” and it would seek relations with all countries on the basis of sovereign equality. He made it clear that his government wanted “strong and close relations with America and Europe” and sought to “promote peace and brotherhood with neighbouring countries”. In line with Musharraf’s policy, he also sought closer ties with the Muslim world and China.

On the Kashmir issue, he stated, to thunderous applause from the house, that the “sacrifices of the Kashmiri people would not go in vain”. He made ‘Kashmir’ appear central to the ongoing India-Pakistan peace process. He said that his government would carry forward the (composite) talks with India, but added that confidence-building measures will be useful only when they lead to the resolution of the problem “in the light of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and international principles.”

His Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Qamar Zaman Kaira, taking this cue has even suggested that the government would follow the Kashmir policy Benazir carved out during the 1990s. In fact, Benazir had followed an inflexible and hard line approach then. Zaman has also called Kashmir the “basic issue” which needs to be resolved for “better ties” with India. Hussain Haqqani, who has been appointed an ambassador-at-large and special advisor on foreign affairs and national security to Gilani, has given a further hint that normalisation of relations with India will be a priority for the new government but no “unilateral concessions” would be made.

On the political front, Gilani announced certain initiatives that are likely to augur well for democracy in Pakistan. He gave the assurance that the PM would henceforth answer questions directly in the house. He also proposed to set up a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ to facilitate the transition from military rule to democracy. On a symbolic note, to underline the supremacy of parliament, he held that the largest national flag would be flown from the parliament house. The message could not have been lost on the adjuncts of the military establishment that his government has replaced.

But the major focus of the programmes highlighted by him was on taking prompt measures to avert an economic crisis. He referred to the problems faced by people in accessing electricity and water as well as shortages in atta (flour) supply. His proposed policies thus provided for farmer-friendly measures, a National Employment Schemes to provide jobs for the poor, austerity measures like cutting down on government expenditures, including 40 per cent cut-down on PM’s house, and a million-housing-units plan to provide home for the homeless.

Significantly, his stand vis-à-vis the Army was cautious. He welcomed the Army Chief’s decision to withdraw serving military officers from civilian posts, but expressed his willingness to accommodate some of them if civilian replacements were not available for the time being. After Musharraf’s retirement, the Army has regained its legitimacy as an important institution in Pakistan and this perhaps explains his moderation. He stressed rather indirectly that it was necessary “for solidarity and progress of the country that every institution fulfilled its specific responsibilities,” and added that “Governance” should remain the “responsibility of only the people”. Strangely, he was silent on the issue of Musharraf’s continuation as President and did not raise the issue of restoration of the judges either.

In an important remark, Gilani acknowledged the sufferings of the Baloch people and promised that his government would work towards provincial autonomy. As a first step, it would remove the concurrent list from the constitution within a year, enabling states to have exclusive authority over certain affairs.

The Future

Gilani has a lot of ground to cover in the coming days. His first 100 days in office may not be a smooth ride, given the challenges he faces at the moment. The ministers he has chosen from different parties will have to work together to fulfil the promises he has made. Moreover, his opening speech was full of general principles and guidelines for his government. But in the coming days he may find it difficult to apply these principles while dealing with more specific and intricate issues like devolution of power to the provinces, Kalabagh dam, sectarian violence and linkages between Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban. He also has to balance his moderate approach towards terrorism with efforts to secure the flow of material help from Western countries.

Gilani has to lead a coalition that survives more on the mutual hatred towards Musharraf than common love for democracy. Sceptics in Pakistan argue that Musharraf’s departure, which looks more certain now than ever before, could lead to the re-emergence of factional rivalries and rip the coalition apart. There is also a suspicion that Gilani may be asked to leave after Zardari’s election to the National Assembly. It is too early to say whether Gilani can fulfil his agenda and succeed in his mission during the 100 days he has set for himself.