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    Bhasha Dam: A Tomb Stone of Gilgit-Baltistan’s Aspirations Priyanka Singh, Alok Bansal January 31, 2009

    This year Pakistan is facing an acute water shortage and the shortage during the current Rabi crop is estimated to be around 35 to 40 per cent, which will adversely affect the wheat output, critical for the country’s food security. Pakistan also faces an acute power shortage, which has exacerbated by the reduced outflow from Tarbela Dam. To tide over the problems, Pakistan is building Bhasha Dam on River Indus, which is the largest dam being built in Pakistan since Tarbela was completed in 1976. Continuous silting has reduced the storage capacity of Tarbela and Mangla dams considerably.

    This year Pakistan is facing an acute water shortage and the shortage during the current Rabi crop is estimated to be around 35 to 40 per cent, which will adversely affect the wheat output, critical for the country’s food security. Pakistan also faces an acute power shortage, which has exacerbated by the reduced outflow from Tarbela Dam. To tide over the problems, Pakistan is building Bhasha Dam on River Indus, which is the largest dam being built in Pakistan since Tarbela was completed in 1976. Continuous silting has reduced the storage capacity of Tarbela and Mangla dams considerably. It had been estimated that to tide over the problems of Pakistan’s water shortages it needed to build a dam of Tarbela’s size (world’s largest rock filled dam) every seven years. However, political discord and lack of clear vision among Pakistan’s ruling elite have prevented even a single dam from being constructed during the last three decades. For a country where agriculture contributes one fifth of the national GDP and employs over 40 percent of the labour force, it could be a costly oversight.

    The experts opine that the ideal site for building a mega dam in Pakistan is Kalabagh, which could provide millions of acres feet of water for irrigation in addition to cheap electricity. Though Punjab, the most populous province of Pakistan has always been supportive of Kalabagh, the other three provinces have been resolutely opposed to it. Although Sindh is opposed to any dam on Indus, NWFP feels that a dam at Kalabagh will inundate large agricultural tracts as well as the thriving city of Nowshera. Inspite of being small, NWFP has always wielded considerable influence on the security establishment of Pakistan and it was therefore impossible for the then military rulers to overlook its objections. Despite General Musharraf’s fervent attempts, a consensus eluded Kalabagh. In fact Asfandar Wali Khan, the ANP leader, went to the extent of asking him to chose between Kalabagh Dam and the federation.

    As a result Musharraf in the year 2006, settled for less ‘contentious’ Bhasha Dam to be built as the first mega dam as part of his ‘Water Vision 2025’, which envisages building at least five dams across Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). The site of the proposed Bhasha dam is located on the Indus River 314 kilometres upstream of Tarbela dam and about 120 km downstream of its confluence with the Gilgit River. Its proponents claim that it could enhance the lifespan of Tarbela dam; by reducing silting. It is also expected to have a longer life span than Kalabagh as the sediment load at Bhasha is considerably lower than at Kalabagh. The construction is expected to start by September 2009 and is estimated to cost a whopping $ 12 billion.

    The dam is slated to have 12 power generating units of 375 MW capacity and the average annual hydel power to be generated by the dam is estimated to be 19,000 GWH. The dam with a height of 272 m,will be the highest roller-compacted concrete dam in the world. There will be 14 gates of 11.0 x 16.5 m size. The gross capacity of the dam will be 7.3 Million Acre Feet (MAF) and the live (usable) capacity of the dam will be 6.4 MAF. A number of roads need to be built to provide access to the project site and the funding requirement has been forecast as Rs 31 billion, however, only Rs 2.6 billion have been provided in the budget for the current financial year. For the project a meagre sum of Rs 200 million has been assigned in the budget and the bulk of funding was expected from the World Bank and the ADB. However, the World Bank has refused to fund the dam or any other project in POK. Moreover, with the global economic slowdown, funding from any international multilateral organisation may become a serious problem and may further slowdown the already slow progress of the project.

    However, the dam will not only take much longer January 2009 5 to build, it will inundate large tracts of land in Gilgit-Batistan. Besides it would also inundate 120 Kilometre stretch of Karakoram Highway, which links China with Pakistan and provides the main access to this otherwise inaccessible region. The dam is therefore strongly opposed by the local population but the hapless population of Gilgit-Baltistan, without any representation in Islamabad’s policy making institutions, has no avenue of getting its voice heard in Islamabad. The local population already has serious grievances against the Pakistan government for the continuing ‘oppression,’ for the last six decades. The government has not only not allowed the people any say in the decision making process, it has even prevented them from forming unions.

    The dam has grave socio-economic and environmental implications. It will displace the residents from at least 32 villages in Diamer District as soon the construction work starts. The large tracts of fertile land, which is extremely scarce in Gilgit- Baltistan will get inundated, making the region even more dependent on Pakistan for its food requirements. The construction will bring in large number of workers from outside the region. As it is the State Subjects Rule, which prevented outsiders from acquiring land in the region has been done away with, consequently, the migrants have been settling in the region and altering the unique ethnic composition of the region. The dam may further disturb the already delicate ethnic and sectarian balance in the region. The construction of a huge reservoir in a tectonic faultline may result in serious ecological complications. The recurrence of a massive earthquake like the one experienced in the Mirpur-Muzaffarabad region of POK in 2005, could lead to severe calamity as a breach in a huge reservoir like Bhasha Dam could inundate most of the cities located downstream on the banks of Indus.

    The fundamental problem with the dam is that while almost the entire inundation will take place in Gilgit-Baltistan, the power plant will be located in Bhasha in NWFP and hence it will receive the royalty from the power generation.Although the entire water in the reservoir will be available for irrigation down stream in Pakistan, not even an acre of land will be irrigated in so called ‘Northern Areas’ (Gilgit-Baltistan). As a sop to the local population the name of the dam was changed from Bhasha to Diamer-Bhasha to give them a false sense of ownership and it was announced that the royalty will be shared with the ‘Northern Areas’. However, NWFP government has refused to share the royalty and Pakistani constitution supports their contention. The provision in the constitution states that the royalty would go to the state where the powerhouse for generating electricity is located. However, this is not a valid justification for the NWFP to reap the benefits of royalty from the dam, as the constitution of Pakistan does not apply to Gilgit-Baltistan, where the dam is actually located.

    There is another dimension of this dam that needs to be highlighted and it is related to the preservation of archaeological assets. In April 2008, there were reports that approximately one thousand rare stone carvings, sculptures and statues of Buddha were discovered at the construction site of the dam. Pakistan as a signatory to international conventions is obliged to protect these heritage sites.

    However,obliterating the region’s pre-Islamic past may suit Pakistan’s political and ideological objectives, but India’s reticence is baffling. The dam is being built in a territory that legally belongs to India and the population of the region, who are ‘de jure’ citizens of India are being persecuted to facilitate its construction. The Government of India must raise its voice against persecution of its citizens. It will be difficult for Pakistan to obtain funding for the project, if India educates the international multilateral organisations about the illegality of the project and consequent violation of the basic human rights of the population of Gilgit-Baltistan. Its unique ethnonationalist character and pristine environment is being threatened to provide irrigation and electricity to Pakistan, without any concurrence of the local population or India.

    (Commentary originally published in January issue of POK News Digest.)

    Bhasha Dam, Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan South Asia IDSA COMMENT
    Indus Water Treaty: Zardari ups the ante on Water Issues Arvind Gupta January 30, 2009

    In an article published by Washington Post on January 28, 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari hinted that Pakistan regards water as a major issue in bilateral relations with India. The article, titled “Partnering with Pakistan,” was a plea to US President Obama to continue to recognize Pakistan’s role in the US’ war on terrorism and regional stability. But Zardari did not miss the opportunity to make a mention of the water. He wrote:

    In an article published by Washington Post on January 28, 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari hinted that Pakistan regards water as a major issue in bilateral relations with India. The article, titled “Partnering with Pakistan,” was a plea to US President Obama to continue to recognize Pakistan’s role in the US’ war on terrorism and regional stability. But Zardari did not miss the opportunity to make a mention of the water. He wrote:

    “The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that lead to extremism and terrorism. We applaud the president’s desire to engage our nation and India to defuse the tensions between us”.

    This passage in the article clearly conveys that Pakistan holds India responsible for the “water crisis” in Pakistan. Zardari wants to involve the US and the international community in the resolution of water issues between India and Pakistan. He is also warning that if the water issue remains unresolved, it could lead to intensification of extremism and terrorism.

    President Zardari’s latest outburst should be seen as a continuation of his public statements in October 2008 in which he had alleged that India was interfering with the flow of river Chenab’s water in violation of the Indus Water Treaty between the two countries. According to media reports quoting Zardari, the issue was taken up by him with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and also with the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad. Zardari alleged on that occasion that the diversion of water by India from the Chenab river was causing agricultural losses in Lahore, Kasur, Okara, Sialkot, Hafizabad, Shekhupura, Faisalabad and Jhang districts in Pakistan. The issue had also reportedly been discussed by the National Security Advisers of the two countries. A delegation of Pakistani officials led by the Pakistani Indus Water Commissioner Jamat Ali Shah visited India to inspect the Baglihar dam project. Pakistan is seeking compensation from India for the diversion of water.

    What is the water “issue” between India and Pakistan? The two countries signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 with the help of World Bank’s mediation. Despite several wars and crises between India and Pakistan, the Treaty has been hailed as a shining example of cooperation between two states on water-sharing. India never stopped the flow of water to Pakistan even during the height of India-Pakistan wars.

    India and Pakistan share six rivers of the Indus basin, grouped into two categories – the Western Rivers (the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum) and the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas). Under the Indus Water Treaty, India has complete right to the use of the waters of the Eastern Rivers while Pakistan has the right to use the waters of the Western Rivers. The Treaty and its annexures are detailed technical documents which contain the restrictions on the usage of the waters. For instance, Pakistan can use the waters of the Western Rivers but India can also use them for irrigation purposes. India is also allowed to build run–of–the- river dams on the Western Rivers. The Treaty also permits India to store 3.5 million acre feet of water. The fact is that India has so far not constructed any storage projects on the Western Rivers. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have demanded abrogation of the Treaty as it restricts the use of the Western River waters which flow through their state.

    Whatever Pakistan might say, the Treaty is extraordinarily generous to Pakistan. Of the total water carried in the six rivers, 80 per cent flows through the Western Rivers and only 20 per cent through the Eastern Rivers. Thus, Pakistan gets over 4/5th of the Indus basin water.

    Under the Treaty, the two countries have set up an Indus Water Commission which is a body of engineers from both sides who are entrusted with the task of implementing the Treaty in letter and spirit. The Indus Water Commission has been holding regular meetings since the inception of the Treaty. The officials of the two sides regularly exchange technical information with regard to the flow of water from the rivers, construction of projects etc.

    Pakistan has often used the provisions of the Treaty to raise objections to the projects proposed by the Indian side and permitted under the Treaty. The Treaty has been used by Pakistan to obstruct and delay the projects allowed under the Treaty on the Western Rivers. The latest example is that of the Baglihar Dam constructed by India on the river Chenab and commissioned in 2008. Pakistan objected to the design of the dam holding that it was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. Pakistan took the case to the “Neutral Expert” appointed by the World Bank in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty to go into the objections. The neutral expert gave a ruling upholding the soundness of the Indian design and suggested some minor changes. The dam was, commissioned eventually but after an avoidable delay of four years as a result of Pakistan’s objections.

    Another project that has been held up due to Pakistani intransigence is the Tulbul Barrage which involves the construction of a barrage at the Wular Lake to improve local navigation. The project will also help Pakistan as it would ensure the flow of water to Pakistan in the lean season. But Pakistan continues to block the project ignoring the benefits that will accrue to both sides. There are many such examples of Pakistan’s obstructionist attitude.

    The Pakistani propaganda on the water issue is aimed at projecting India as a country which is exploiting the river waters of the Indus basin to the detriment of Pakistan. Several Pakistan based terrorist groups have also linked water with jihad in Kashmir. The former “Prime Minister” of the so called “Azad Jammu & Kashmir” Sardar Sikander Hayat used to say clearly, “the freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan’s water security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the Wular Barrage”.1

    Pakistan’s propaganda must be responded to. The fact is that the Indus Water Treaty is generous to a fault to Pakistan. It is unlikely that if the Indus Water Treaty were to be negotiated, Pakistan would get a better deal than what it got in 1960. With water becoming a critical issue in India’s relations with Pakistan and also with China, India has to evolve a well considered strategy aimed at securing its national interest and at the same time minimizing the potential for conflict with neighbours.

    By raising the water issue at this juncture Pakistan is trying to deflect international attention from Pakistan-based terrorism and instead rekindling the international community’s interest in Kashmir.

    India should recognize that Pakistan is upping the ante and trying to make water an “issue” between the two countries. India should call Pakistan’s bluff and suggest renegotiation of the treaty in line with current political, economic, environmental and geo-political realities. That will test Pakistan’s sincerity about “resolving’ the water issue between the two countries. In the meanwhile, India should go ahead with the construction of the Tulbul barrage in the knowledge that it is a win - win project which will pass muster of a neutral expert if Pakistan decides to take it to the World Bank. Likewise, India should build the Kishenganga dam, to which it is entitled. India should also identify storage projects which are in accordance with the Treaty provisions. India should urgently plug the leakage of water flowing to Pakistan through the Eastern Rivers on whose waters it has complete right under the Treaty. While India should favour cooperation over conflict in its relations with Pakistan, it should not let itself be pressured by Pakistan unjustifiably over water related issues.

    India, India-Pakistan Relations, Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan South Asia IDSA COMMENT
    Indo-US Missile Defence Cooperation: Hype or Happening? A. Vinod Kumar January 30, 2009

    In early January 2009, the Financial Times reported “preliminary talks” between US and India on possible sale of systems for an Indian ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield. The daily quoted US embassy officials in New Delhi as saying that technical talks had taken place and that US defence officials had conducted computer simulations with Indian counterparts to demonstrate the capabilities of this technology. The Indian media, and some foreign ones, picked up the story and projected the report as an impending US-India deal on missile defence cooperation.

    In early January 2009, the Financial Times reported “preliminary talks” between US and India on possible sale of systems for an Indian ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield. The daily quoted US embassy officials in New Delhi as saying that technical talks had taken place and that US defence officials had conducted computer simulations with Indian counterparts to demonstrate the capabilities of this technology. The Indian media, and some foreign ones, picked up the story and projected the report as an impending US-India deal on missile defence cooperation. That the report came amidst heightened tensions between India and Pakistan fuelled further speculation.

    However, a closer look at the report indicates media hype rather than actual substance. As the FT report suggests, talks and technical-level interaction has been taking place between the Indian and US defence establishments for the past two years, and much earlier, to explore possibilities of cooperation in ballistic missile defence. Missile defence was one of the potential areas for strategic partnership identified in the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004. Since then, concerned departments in the Pentagon and South Block have been discussing the means by which both countries can partner in this area. However, what puzzled BMD watchers was how such partnership would mould as US and India are placed at diametrically opposite ends of the BMD technological spectrum. The US is striving to develop advanced BMD technologies for mid-course and exo-atmospheric (outside the Earth’s atmosphere) interception with multiple kill-vehicle technologies including laser systems, while India is still struggling with rudimentary air defence technologies, notwithstanding the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) plans for an indigenous BMD system.

    Though ‘cooperation’ remains the buzzword, it is unclear on whether this would amount to technology development or transfer, or off-the-shelf purchases of US systems by India. Soon after the FT report, a Pentagon spokesman denied any talks on sale of BMD systems. Rather, there are vague inferences on technical cooperation, which most in all likelihood could be centred on US ‘assistance’ to Indian BMD experimentations. A Pentagon statement clarifies that Indian scientists were invited to their test facilities – where a series of development tests are being undertaken by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on systems like the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence System (GBMDS) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), among others. How far would such interactions lead to a concrete ‘partnership’ is something which cannot be speculated at this point. There are many reasons for this ambivalence.

    First, Indian BMD experimentations are progressing rapidly after the DRDO convinced the government on its ability to develop BMD technology, despite the jinxed state of many Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) ventures. The agency surprised many when it declared in late 2006 the development of a BMD capability through its Prithvi Air Defence Experiment (PADE). After all, achieving precision interception in a first attempt invites astonishment as even advanced countries like US and Russia have struggled on this technology for decades. The DRDO repeated the feat in December 2007 by declaring ‘successful’ tests of its (Prithvi Air Defence) PAD and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) systems. The PAD was touted as an exo-atmospheric system with 50km range (though an exo-atmospheric system should have the range of over 100 km) while the AAD was to be a lower-tier air defence system at 15-25 km range, which incidentally was also the capability aspired by the Akash. With a development and deployment target for middle of next decade, the DRDO is confident of an indigenous BMD shield, and could have convinced the government to reject plans for external acquisitions.

    Second, as many media reports suggest, outright acquisitions from US comes with concomitant political sensitivities. China and Pakistan would be annoyed by the presence of US BMD systems in India, which would negate the deterrence capability of their nuclear arsenals, just like the GBMDS in Eastern Europe affecting Russia’s deterrence calculus. Being under pressure from the East European BMD and proliferation of US theatre defence systems in East Asia, China would make a hue and cry if India deploys US BMD systems as a shield against Chinese missiles, supposedly deployed in Tibet and other military regions. The FT report quoted an unnamed Pakistani official as saying that Pakistan “will have to take counter-measures to respond” to any agreement between the US and India on missile defence.

    Though it is exactly these two catalysts that warrant an Indian BMD shield, it is unlikely that New Delhi would intimidate its adversaries by acquiring US BMD systems. However, Indian planners feel that these two nuclear neighbours would not be bewildered over an indigenous Indian system or acquisition of Russian systems like the S-300 or S-400. After all, China is known to be reverse-engineering Russian theatre systems like the S-75 and S-300 to develop its own air defence variants like the FT-2000 and the Hongqi. Despite its prowess in missile technologies, China’s capabilities on BMDs are underdeveloped. Though China watchers feel something dramatic is to come. One could anticipate China rattling the world with a major BMD demonstration, just as it did with the anti-satellite test.

    Third, the scope for US partnership with India on BMD technology development is limited. Besides the DRDO’s zealousness for indigenisation, the US would be unwilling to share inputs on advanced baseline interception technologies on which the MDA is struggling to carve out a niche. It is often felt that the only technology US would be willing to share is the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system, which is an air defence system manned by the US Army. One should remember that the US had turned down Israel’s request to transfer the Arrow-II (a US-Israel joint venture) to India, despite it being an endo-atmospheric (range within Earth’s atmosphere) system, though it agreed to transfer the Greepine Radar. Considering that Washington developed cold feet on transferring even an advanced theatre defence system, it is difficult to envisage a US-India partnership on developing an Indian BMD system, which should naturally entail development of longer-range capabilities for boost or mid-course interception.

    This being the milieu, it should be noted that even the US BMD programme is in crisis amidst budgetary constrains placed by the U.S. Congress and concerns that the Obama administration might terminate some existing projects. After more than a decade of development efforts, the MDA is still struggling to deploy its flagship project – the GBMDS. But for the limited deployment in Alaska, the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and its support systems are still undergoing development tests, with that still elusive final ‘precision hit’. A similar fate hangs on projects like the ABL, which has to prove its worth in a crucial flight test later this year.

    However, the MDA had its own morale-booster when the Aegis BMD (integrated on Aegis destroyers) shot down a dysfunctional satellite over Earth’s atmosphere in February 2008. Australia and Japan are acquiring the Aegis, which is currently the only operational mid-course/early ascent interception system. This implies that even India can aspire for this system if US-India BMD cooperation actually fructifies. However, the strategic relationship has not graduated to such levels of military partnering that would convince Washington to share its naval BMD mainstay with a country with whom relations are tumultuous.

    Such scepticism, however, does not completely freeze the possibilities of cooperation in missile defence. A DRDO-MDA tie-up on knowledge sharing and capacity development is a possibility. The DRDO could benefit from the know-how on support infrastructure including surveillance, early warning and targeting systems, which are less controversial. After all, the PAD experiment was undertaken with formidable coverage from the Greenpine radar. Another system that could raise few tempers is the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, which has higher endo-atmospheric coverage and is being deployed by the US Army as an augmentation to the Patriot. Assuming that New Delhi might have declined the Patriot system in place of its request for Arrow-II, it could convince Washington to transfer the THAAD, which is capable of tackling threats from short-range Chinese missiles in Tibet and Pakistani IRBMs.

    However, with little information on the confabulations between the two countries on BMD cooperation, such speculation would only satiate beat reporters. Nonetheless, Washington could use this opportunity to signal out to Moscow with which Pentagon interlocutors are having a tough time convincing Russia on the merits of an East European BMD system. For that matter, Washington is also aware of the fact that Moscow had offered BMD partnership to New Delhi well before Indo-US ties blossomed.

    India-US Relations, Defence Cooperation, Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Nuclear and Arms Control IDSA COMMENT
    Learning from the American Experience in Counter Terrorism Arvind Gupta January 30, 2009

    It has been widely noted that the US has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11. This is because it undertook major reform of its homeland security structures following the 9/11 attacks. India could learn from the wide ranging CT reform in the US after 9/11 and adopt measures suitable in the Indian context.

    It has been widely noted that the US has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11. This is because it undertook major reform of its homeland security structures following the 9/11 attacks. India could learn from the wide ranging CT reform in the US after 9/11 and adopt measures suitable in the Indian context.

    Legal measures

    The first step taken by the US president and the Congress after 9/11 was to pass a wide ranging tough anti-terrorism law, the USA PATRIOT (Providing All the Tools Required for Intercepting and Obstructing Terrorism) Act 2001, which vastly increased the powers of the law enforcement agencies in the areas of surveillance, detention, regulation of financial transactions, detention and deportation of immigrants, collection of intelligence etc. It also expanded the definition of terrorism to include domestic terrorism. The act has a number of provisions to prevent money laundering and to disrupt the financing of terrorism. The Act particularly focuses on foreign entities, individuals and jurisdictions. The law has been criticized in the US for curtailing civil liberties but the Congress went ahead and approved it. The Patriot Act provides the basis of counter terrorism activities of the law enforcement agencies.

    The PATRIOT Act increases the ability of law enforcement agencies to listen to telephonic conversations, search e-mail communications, medical, financial and other records. It eases restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States; expands the authority of the Treasury Secretary to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and enhances the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts.

    Department of Homeland security

    The US effort has been directed towards integrating the activities of the multiple scattered agencies having any connection with internal security. Thus, in 2002, the US created a separate Department of Homeland Security by an Act which created an overarching federal entity responsible for the country’s internal security. The department was created by merging 22 different agencies having 166, 234 personnel and a budget of $40.7 billion. The department of homeland security is responsible for protecting the nation not just from terror attacks but also from natural and manmade emergencies. It is responsible for protecting the country from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological attacks.

    The department oversees and coordinates the activities of nearly 87,000 state and local level agencies or “jurisdictions” having security responsibilities.

    The Homeland security department is necessarily large, given its ambitious mission. It has an annual budget of about $50.5 billion (year 2009). It brings under its umbrella the US Coast Guard, the US Transportation Security Administration, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the domestic nuclear detection office, the US Customs and Border Protection Service, the Federal Law Enforcement training centre, the US Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and a host of other services. A large number of offices, directorates, advisory committess and councils have been created in the department for carrying out the coordination, planning work and to oversee implementation of plans.

    Despite criticism that the Homeland Security Department is too large and unwieldy, it has achieved a lot since its creation. For instance, a Transport Security Administration has been created and equipped to do 100 per cent screening of airline passengers and check baggage. Maritime transportation system and cargo supply chain security has been enhanced through a number of initiatives like Containing Security Initiative. A domestic Nuclear Detection Centre has been created. Homeland Security Department’s various components have huge budgets. For instance, in 2007, $6 billion were spent on Transport and Security administration, $6.3 billion on Customs and Border Protection, $7 billion on US Coast Guard and $5.9 billion on Federal Emergency Management Agency.

    The Department of Homeland Security has undertaken a number of critical projects to improve the safety and security of the nation. The specific ongoing projects of the Homeland Security Department include increasing the number of Border Patrol Agents, erecting a state-of-the-art fence on the border, improving the background check process for immigrants, improving the technologies for passenger and baggage screening, enhancing security assessments in respect of personnel working at the airports and ports, reinforcing maritime safety and security, enhancing the capabilities of US Computer Emergency Readiness Teams.

    Intelligence

    Following 9/11 attacks, the US undertook major reform of the intelligence community. It created a Directorate of National Intelligence which brings together all the 17 intelligence agencies under one umbrella – under the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI). The objective of the DNI is to create a seamless web of information out of the data-bases of various agencies and provide it to users, including those in the private sector, on the basis of need and utility and breaking the barriers between agencies. The DNI’s vision is a bold one but achievable. The main idea behind the DNI’s vision is to ensure that information is shared rapidly across the intelligence community and also with relevant agencies outside the intelligence community so that the active agencies have an edge over the terrorists. The DNI’s aim is to create a seamless integration of people, processes and technologies to achieve the sharing of information.

    Counter Terrorism

    The US has created a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which analyses the terrorist threats and shares this information with all the concerned agencies. The NCTC is the most important source of analysis as well as strategic operation plan for counter-terrorism. It coordinates its CT efforts with the CIA, FBI, Departments of State Defence and Homeland Security as well as specialist departments such as those of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, Health, Nuclear Regulatory Commission etc. NCTC officials chair inter-agency meetings to discuss emerging threats to US interests at home and abroad. Some of the specific things done by the NCTC are:

    • It fuses all-source intelligence and makes it available to all agencies for their operations.
    • It fuses federal, state, and local information and makes it available to all concerned.
    • It has created threat assessment centres which make a picture of current threats to homeland security.
    • It promotes the concept of joint-ness in the intelligence community.
    • It has created infrastructure protection centres.
    • It assigns responsibilities to different agencies for counter-terrorism (CT) operations.
    • It carries out joint CT operations.
    • It has the primary agency responsible for analysis and integration of information.
    • It combines all instruments available for CT: diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement etc.
    • It produces warnings, alerts and advisories as well as analytic assessments on terrorism.
    • It maintains a national data-base on terrorists.
    • It manages a joint operations centre which provides situational awareness of terrorism-related issues developing worldwide.
    • It provides information on terrorism to international partners.
    • It develops, integrates implements strategic operational plans needed for the country’s counterterrorism activities.

    India has been a victim of terrorism for a long time. India also has considerable experience in counterterrorism. A large number of agencies at the central and state level are engaged in counterterrorism activities of different kinds. Indian agencies routinely foil potential terrorism-related incidents. This is reflected in media reports about interception of RDX, busting of terrorist modules and encounters between the police and the terrorists. Unfortunately, as the Mumbai terrorist attacks have shown, Indian counterterrorism efforts are not sufficient to deter the highly motivated and innovative terrorists. The weakness in the Indian effort appears to be the relative lack of coordination amongst Indian intelligence, law enforcement and legal agencies. While the government has taken some steps to strengthen law enforcement by creating a National Investigation Agency (NIA), the coordination amongst multiple agencies is a serious problem which remains to be addressed. In the government departments the culture of information sharing does not exist.

    The government needs to promote the culture of information sharing not only amongst the various agencies but also between the Central and the State agencies. The necessary infrastructure, using the latest information and communication technologies linking the different agencies at various levels needs to be created urgently. Information sharing, threat assessment and a risk-based approach to deal with these threats should become a norm rather than an exception. The government should be in a position to continuously indicate the level of threat that the country faces at any given point of time so that action can be taken by the concerned agencies without having to wait for any specific order from any agency.

    The lack of political consensus on how to deal with terrorism hampers counter terrorism efforts. The government can learn from the experience of the US and other countries which have created effective counterterrorism agencies through unification and integration of CT efforts.

    Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) Terrorism & Internal Security IDSA COMMENT
    Foregrounding ‘Non-Combatant Immunity’ Ali Ahmed January 30, 2009

    A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan. With US inaction, Israel has gone farthest by violating the principle of non-combatant immunity in its just concluded attack on Gaza that claimed over 1300 lives, mostly civilian. In the American case, ‘military necessity’ has dictated targeting indicating that the principle of non-combatant immunity is taken seriously, but not always followed. Thus civilian casualties in operations outside Green Zones in Iraq, in particular spectacular ‘clear and hold’ operations such as Falluja, are treated as unintended ‘collateral damage’. Israel has, on the contrary, focused on civilian targets deliberately, in order to bolster deterrence and to punish the Palestinian population for its continued support to Hamas. Closer home in South Asia, non-combatants have been affected considerably in counter insurgency operations, be it in Nepal earlier or in continuing operations against the Tamil Tigers and in Swat and Bajaur of Pakistan.

    While it is true that any historical survey would reveal that non-combatant immunity has seldom been conceded by warring armies, it is of equal import that the principle has been reinforced by religious, ethical and political commentary over the ages and in all cultures. Medieval religious wars did not respect this principle as the political aim was to proselytize. Siege warfare permitted the logistic shaping of the battlefield in cutting off supplies to the besieged populace. Revolutionary wars tapped the nationalist energy of the populations, thereby bringing in ‘people’ as combatants. Guerrilla wars enlarged the scope of people’s participation. Warfare accompanying these changes identified people in terms of their will as a way of imposing their ‘will’ over an enemy. Social Darwinism of the Nineteenth century presaged the Total Wars of the succeeding century in which the doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’ ensured that civilians were identified with regimes being contested violently. The fire bombings, strategic bombing, concentration camps and the use of nuclear weapons were the culmination of this tendency in warfare. In the Cold War period, deterrence to which is attributed the ‘long peace’ - was based on holding adversary populations hostage. In areas peripheral to the central strategic balance, revolutionary wars, dubbed ‘peoples wars’ predominated. Vietnam and Afghanistan are the most illustrative cases of violations of non combatant status of affected populations. Asymmetric warriors of today assume they are not required to genuflect to this principle, because their political project is based on the terrorism-suppression-alienation cycle.

    Civilian populations have also suffered disproportionately more than regimes from the imposition of sanctions purportedly designed to topple regimes. The classic examples are Iraq in the Nineties and Gaza over the last two years. Sanctions against Iran, and possibly a non-compliant Pakistan, are possible targets. Sanctions appear to be the strategic equivalent of ‘shaping the battle’. The population is punished for the actions of the ruling regime. This is precisely the logic of the terrorist. Islamists too identify Western people with their governments and in making that connection attempt to legitimize their tactic of targeting civilians. The logic of the Israelis ironically vindicates the Islamist position, for in democratic states, in theory the electorate has some control over the government actions. Therefore if actions of western governments are hostile, then in the Islamist narrative the population is to blame for being inert and culpable. The danger of this logic of conflating populations with their governments is the weakening of the immense strides made in human rights and humanitarian law post World War-II.

    Another trend is the displacement of civilian populations due to military operations. Examples closer home are recent population movements in FATA-NWFP and in Sri Lanka in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu. While humanitarian emergencies have accompanied combat operations earlier, the lethality, firepower and shock effects have increased manifold. There is insufficient evidence to document the psychological effects of attacks by drones in the post heroic age. The political effects are more than evident in any case.

    It would appear that non-combatant immunity has been more of an ideal than a fact. But the developments in the Charter era with the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Japan, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions marking its early years have elevated non-combatant immunity from a principle to customary law status in the law of armed conflict. Treaty law has not kept pace in that the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 have not been acceded to yet by most states. There is thus a tension between state practice and this principle.

    The aspect of accountability of the political head for the resulting human tragedy would deter mindless assaults and would facilitate the political plank in terms of resolution options. The International Criminal Court can be energized to pursue crimes of international concern such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Presently there are 108 signatories to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the Court. India is not represented and nor is the USA. The deterrent effect would be substantial. For punishing violators of jus in bello retributive justice through International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts should be pursued until the ICC gains traction. Justice meted out to Milosevic and Karadzic through the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia are examples. This would foster the notion of individualized guilt and would act as a deterrent for key political actors.

    To obviate violations at the ground level, militaries would require factoring in civilian casualties from the beginning in the planning and preparation stage. The after-the-fact arrival of aid, under what passes now as Stabilisation Operations, is no longer enough, given population densities and numbers involved. This should dovetail military planning with execution carried out by civilian administrators in league with NGOs. This should form part of curricular innovation at staff colleges. The Disaster Management organizations in states can be co-opted to follow up to ameliorate conditions in conflict zones. This makes political sense in that it would facilitate peace in post conflict conditions. The example of Iraq indicates that the possibility of Asymmetric War in the aftermath of the conflict could be lessened. For this to happen targeting must be against military targets and needs of the affected populations should be met immediately to deal with advancing military forces. This insight is relevant for India that has adopted a Limited War strategy that may necessitate incursions into Pakistan held territory.

    To the extent that tenets of international law are influenced, modified and eventually replaced by state practice, the principle of non-combatant immunity is endangered. The international community is responsible for pressuring the regime and ensuring compliance. In case it proves inadequate for the latter, there would be a convergence between terrorism and state terrorism, generating a self sustaining cycle in terms of violence and its legitimisation. This would add to the erosion suffered by the international order during the Bush years that resulted in illegal detention and rendition, preventive war and expansive interpretation of military necessity. These issues could be revisited, through perhaps an international conference. This will lend more urgency to the long neglected Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions dealing with protection of persons in both interstate and intra-state conflicts.

    State practice, often determined by strategic considerations, would require taking into account the political benefits of occupying the moral high ground and the need to preempt the alienation-terrorism cycle. Human security concerns are not adequate to persuade states that operate in the dominant realist tradition. Where the political argument fails, as has been found repeatedly to be the case with Israel and the US, setting a precedent for coercing states to comply with norms is imperative. The opportunity offered by Israel’s targeting of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) compound in Gaza should be seized to set up a war crimes investigation by the UN or the ICC, as suggested by the head of its Gaza operations, John Ging. While this is unlikely to dissuade Israel, it could impact calculations of future actors elsewhere. It would help refocus attention on peace making and conflict resolution.

    Israel, Hamas, Gaza, Non-combatant Immunity, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) Military Affairs IDSA COMMENT
    Obama’s Likely Policy Towards North East Asia Rajaram Panda January 29, 2009

    Expectations are high in Japan, both in the general public and amongst the elite, after Democrat Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the American Presidency. Japan was clearly uncomfortable with Republican Bush administration’s pursuit of a unilateralist foreign policy as against Obama’s more pronounced multilateral approach. According to Professor Kenji Takita of Chuo University, multilateralism is closely associated with smart power and therefore Obama’s shift towards multilateralism is likely to undo some of the damage that the Bush administration’s unilateralism has done to American standing.

    Expectations are high in Japan, both in the general public and amongst the elite, after Democrat Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the American Presidency. Japan was clearly uncomfortable with Republican Bush administration’s pursuit of a unilateralist foreign policy as against Obama’s more pronounced multilateral approach. According to Professor Kenji Takita of Chuo University, multilateralism is closely associated with smart power and therefore Obama’s shift towards multilateralism is likely to undo some of the damage that the Bush administration’s unilateralism has done to American standing. Obama’s rise to the presidency is likely to assuage the hurt feelings of some US allies who are likely to reorient their foreign and security policies.

    And yet, contentious bilateral issues are likely to dominate Japan-US relations. This is not to say the security alliance that has remained the lynchpin of the bilateral relationship since the end of World War II will be undermined. On the contrary, the Japan-US strategic partnership will be reinforced under the Obama administration by weaving a web of larger and deeper institutional mechanisms lending greater robustness to the existing relationship.

    Japan would like to seek a resolution to the abduction issue as well as denuclearization of North Korea. Japan is concerned that Obama will come under intense pressure to introduce protectionist trade policies to “defend” the US economy in the face of the current economic downturn.

    It is unclear if Obama will downplay the US security relationship with Japan to mollify China, with which Obama might seek greater convergence of interests, mainly because of deepening economic ties and the need to engage China to keep it from projecting its great power ambitions. While the US-Japan security alliance is destined to remain in place, a robust Sino-US relationship under Obama will reinforce efforts towards creating a power equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region. China is the largest holder of US national bonds, totaling $585 billion (as of September 2008), which means that it is China and not Japan that underwrites the US in financial terms.

    Expectations are high because China has become an engine of growth, with its economy having grown at an average of 9.6 per cent a year for the last 30 years. The country now holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, which stands at $1.9 trillion. Japan is in second place, with slightly more than half that amount. The US and China are deeply interdependent in economic terms, though they may be wary about each other militarily. China holds roughly $1 trillion of $2 trillion in US foreign reserves. Japan will clearly feel uneasy if Obama reorients US foreign policy towards a China centric East Asia.

    This is the concern that continues to lurk in the minds of the mandarins in Kasumigaseki. For the time being, Japan is upbeat in hearing that Joseph Nye is being sent by Obama as US ambassador to Japan. Nye has a huge reputation in Japan and is credited for his efforts to ‘redefine’ the US-Japan alliance after World War II and his contribution to adding teeth to the alliance relationship remains unparalleled. Also, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s observation on 13 January 2009 on the US-Japan alliance relationship will assuage any possible fear in the minds of the Japanese that Obama might drift US foreign policy priorities more towards China at the expense of Japan. Hillary Clinton said: “Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of American policy in Asia, essential to maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and based on shared values and mutual interests”. Thus, it transpires that the current Japanese mood about the Obama administration is overtly optimistic.

    Two issues might assume preponderance in the US-Japan relationship during the Obama presidency: First, the issue of sharing defence burden by Japan and Japan’s greater engagement with Obama’s multilateralism; and second, Japan’s contribution to resuscitate the global economy and how Japan can help salvage the US economy. As regards the first, Obama faces huge challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Palestine, tensions in India-Pakistan relations, and North Korea. Obama would need to mobilize its allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to resolve conflicts under the banner of multilateralism. Hillary Clinton would prefer to negotiate directly with North Korea and set her priorities to de-nuclearize North Korea, while Japan would want Clinton to take up the abduction issue. The Obama administration would be happy with Japan demonstrating greater self-reliance and autonomy in security affairs. Obama would expect greater contribution from Japan to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. This would involve greater burden-sharing and power-sharing. Second, economic difficulties emanating from the global economic meltdown might propel Obama to resort to greater protectionist policies, which might lead to other nations retaliating. The Bush administration, and more precisely the Federal Reserve Board, lowered the official interest rate to zero per cent, thereby weakening the US currency. The Big Three auto makers were also granted a huge amount of federal money just to resuscitate the US economy. If the Obama administration resorts to more extensive protectionist policies, including tariffs, Japan might drift closer to the Chinese market.

    Thus, even while Obama will remain engaged in sorting out the mess in the domestic economy, East Asia is likely to receive lesser attention as compared to Obama’s current preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. As noted, Obama will seek active cooperation with China, while maintaining existing bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea. Therefore, in pursuance of his policy of multilateralism, the Obama administration is likely to seek a new regional security architecture that combines a bilateral alliance system with a multilateral security cooperation regime. Prof. Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University, Seoul, observes: “We can expect the US will shift its emphasis from the logic of balance of power to that of the power of balance.”

    Though Obama may get bogged down for some time in reviving the domestic economy, the nuclear issue in North Korea is unlikely to be left idle. It needs to be remembered that Obama has defined the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defeating global terrorism as the twin pillars of his national security agenda. Hillary has already reiterated the same after assuming office. One possible way to engage North Korea is by promising diplomatic normalization of relations with North Korea for a cessation of its nuclear proliferation activities. Should Obama consider a basic treaty on normalization with North Korea in return for an acceptable verification protocol involving sampling, forensic activities, and access to suspected nuclear sites as well as the transfer of a sizable amount of nuclear materials, Obama would leave a mark of statesmanship for the world to take notice of. But then Bush too tried the option of ‘dismantle first, then we will normalize ties with you’ but failed. Obama might just be lucky?

    In dealing with North Korea, Seoul might be flexible in cooperating with Obama if the latter opts for expediting the rapprochement with Pyongyang provided North Korea agrees to major concessions in verifiably dismantling its nuclear programs and weapons. The proposed trilateral US-China-Japan commission matches well with Obama’s preference towards multilateralism in dealing with the North Korean issue. If these three countries cooperate, it will be vital to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It could mitigate a tense rivalry between China and Japan, as well as a potential conflict between China and the US that will emanate from power transition.

    Thus, Obama’s Asia policy will mark perceptible change in its contour and focus. Obama is lucky to have many eminent experts whose advice would play critical role in shaping Obama’s Asia policy. Jeffrey Bader, who worked at the State Department and National Security Council, headed Obama’s Asia team during the campaign. Other experts who are advisors to Obama are Gerald Curtis, Kurt Campbell (a nominee for the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs and strong advocate of the trilateral summit approach between the US, China and Japan), and Rust Deming, whose collective wisdom will come handy for Obama.

    But things may not be as rosy as it appears. Institutionalization of a trilateral summit could cause serious security concerns in South Korea because of its potential exclusion. Most Koreans still remember how Korea was arbitrarily divided by the calculations of the major powers after World War II. North Korea and Russia will surely oppose the trilateral formula. South Korea would be more comfortable with a six-party summit among China, Japan, Russia, the US and both the Koreas. The complexities of the issues in the East and North East Asian region do not guarantee Obama the reciprocal cooperation from its allies and countries in the region. The nuclear issue in North Korea and the threat it poses is unlikely to go away so soon. Obama cannot take cooperation from US allies for granted. For example, more than 10 years have passed since an agreement to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa was reached, but the move is no where near happening. On North Korea, Japan’s tough stance and strict focus on the abductee problem, is a stark difference with other nations in the Six-Party de-nuclearisation talks. Obama would expect Japan to publicly cooperate rather than only stress the abductee issue.

    Countries in the region have to do away with obsession with short-term gains, tactical and impromptu maneuvering, excessive value orientation, and the politicization of security and foreign policy issues. It is in the interest of both Japan and South Korea to strengthen the alliance relationship with the US by adopting flexible policy options. Such an approach would help maintain peace and stability in the North East Asian region.

    Japan, Obama Administration, US-Japan Relations, United States of America (USA) East Asia IDSA COMMENT
    Obama as Tech president: Leading the Way Cherian Samuel January 23, 2009

    Among the many monikers that Barack Obama has collected as he enters office is that of being the first "Tech President". In the days since his victory, Obama has already brought technology into his Presidency in a big way, starting with the launch of an online site, change.gov, where people could apply for jobs in his Administration and give suggestions on the agenda of his Administration. Other changes include the transformation of the traditional weekly radio address to a video address which can be viewed over video site Youtube, and a complete re-design of the White House website.

    Among the many monikers that Barack Obama has collected as he enters office is that of being the first "Tech President". In the days since his victory, Obama has already brought technology into his Presidency in a big way, starting with the launch of an online site, change.gov, where people could apply for jobs in his Administration and give suggestions on the agenda of his Administration. Other changes include the transformation of the traditional weekly radio address to a video address which can be viewed over video site Youtube, and a complete re-design of the White House website. The makeover of the website was more than cosmetic with the addition of a blog and many other elements designed to fulfil his promise of transparency and openness. While it still remains to be seen how this would work out in practice, one of his main objectives is to enable two-way communication between the president and his people. Obama would no doubt use the lessons learned from his election campaign to fashion his use of the Web as president. One early indicator of the effect of these changes can be seen in the sudden popularity of the weekly address which had over a million viewers on Youtube. His use of the Internet will certainly set a benchmark for other governments to follow.

    Obama understood and used the Internet as a multifarious platform to achieve a variety of goals throughout the presidential campaign. His use of social networking sites such as Facebook and Myspace galvanized young Americans who mobilised in unprecedented numbers to work for his campaign. On the social networking site Facebook, for instance, he had over 3 million fans in contrast to his rival John McCain who had only 200,000. Viral marketing strategies were effectively used to get his supporters to pass on the message to others. The fragmentation of the media universe was countered through a multi-medial online presence ranging from the campaign website to dedicated pages on social networking sites that provided one stop access to anything to do with the campaign. As one commentator put it, he “used the Web to knock down rumours, deflect criticism, direct fire against his opponents, shape and retain his own campaign messages and knock down those of his primary and general election opponents.” He also utilized the Internet for collecting donations of over $500 million.

    Going into the presidency, Obama, by all indications intends to use the same means to carry forward his agenda for change which also includes a change in the pork-barrel way of conducting business in Washington. This might even have to take on the colours of a campaign since there is bound to be intense resistance and he would have to “literally go over the head of his fellow politicians and the media to reach, motivate and deploy his supporters” who can then pass on the message to others. Given the global reach of the Internet and his international popularity, this could extend into a global phenomenon. The Chinese government evidently had this fall-out in mind when it censored sections of his Inaugural Address even if there was no mention of China. In fact, all he said was “"those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent — know that you are on the wrong side of history." With the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests coming up, the Chinese are only too well aware of Obama’s oratorical prowess and its possible impact.

    While other governments have been more pro-active in transferring the business of government online (and suffered the consequences thereof as in the case of Estonia), for the US Government to turn to the Internet to ensure transparency and two-way communication would put increased pressure on other democratic governments to follow suit. The idea of the Internet as a tool of e-governance has been around even in India for quite some time, but lack of digital connectivity and illiteracy have come in the way of effective implementation. Similarly, while politicians have used tools such as short messaging service (sms) and online videos during election campaigns, social networking devices such as blogs are yet to be effectively utilized by Indian politicians or political parties. Nonetheless, with India’s online population rising at a rapid rate, this is a development they must pay attention to sooner rather than later.

    As for the United States, with the President showing the way, even those sections of society and polity that had previously shown resistance to embracing the online universe, such as the US military, are beginning to change their stance. Where the military had earlier clamped down on “milblogs” written by its personnel posted in Iraq, even senior officials are beginning to try their hand at blogging with a view to “help shape the public debate about national security policy by providing more information....” Evidently, a hallmark of the Obama Administration will be a more informed debate on issues that concern American citizens.

    Obama Administration Nuclear and Arms Control IDSA COMMENT
    David Miliband is not Right Thomas Mathew January 22, 2009

    British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, arrived in India on his two-day visit on 13 January, barely a month and a half after the carnage in Mumbai. His visit was controversial for what he said during the visit and it was made worse by his article that appeared in The Guardian on the last day of his visit. It even provoked the normally restrained Ministry of External Affairs to comment that it could do without Miliband’s “unsolicited advice” and that his views were only “evolving”.

    British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, arrived in India on his two-day visit on 13 January, barely a month and a half after the carnage in Mumbai. His visit was controversial for what he said during the visit and it was made worse by his article that appeared in The Guardian on the last day of his visit. It even provoked the normally restrained Ministry of External Affairs to comment that it could do without Miliband’s “unsolicited advice” and that his views were only “evolving”.

    As if designed to provide a peek into his knowledge on terrorism, the article outlined Miliband’s prescription for its resolution. But the British Foreign Secretary did not win praise for his knowledge on the subject, for, he was not right. On the contrary, India was obviously angry as were many in the West.

    Miliband argued that the raison d'être for the existence of terror or of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is the unresolved Kashmir issue. His narrative is that the “resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would help deny extremists in the region one of their main calls to arms, and allow Pakistani authorities to focus more effectively on tackling the threat on their western borders.”

    But his observation that the resolution of the Kashmir issue would serve the twin objectives of jihadis abandoning their armed struggle and release an eager Pakistan to fully combat terror in its western border is too simplistic. At best, it is a vacuous comment that ignores the genesis of terrorism in the sub-continent and the history of the Kashmir issue. More alarming is the former.

    It may not ever be known if the assertions in the article can be attributed to some calculated briefing by the British foreign office or whether they were his interpretation of the sub-continental realities. It may also portend a collective effort by the Obama Administration and Washington’s closest trans-Atlantic ally to bring to bear their combined weight on New Delhi to find a solution to the Kashmir issue in the pious hope of securing Pakistan’s undivided attention in the West’s ‘war on terror’.

    Miliband may know best why he penned the article in The Guardian. But his thesis that the Kashmir issue is the root cause of terror in India, and finding a solution to it would transform Pakistan into a state with a resolute will to wipe out terror elements in its western border, needs to be tested against the realities in the sub-continent.

    Let us examine if LeT has its origins in Kashmir to test if the resolution of the problem would deprive the jihadis of the raison d'être for their existence. The LeT has its origins in the Markaz Dawa Wa’al Irshad, or the “Centre for Invitation and Instructions”, established to organise the mujahids in Pakistan in 1986 by Hafiz Muhammad Sa’eed and Zafar Iqbal who were professors in that country. This was done under the spiritual guidance of a Palestine academic called Abdullah Azzam, who had taught Osama bin Laden Islamic Studies at the King Abdul-Aziz University in his native Saudi Arabia. It is also no secret that the mujahids were enlisted, financed, trained and armed by the US-led alliance for the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

    Lashker-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Toiba, or its other aliases meaning “the Army of the Pure” or “the Army of the Righteous” is the military wing of the Markaz Dawa Wa’al Irshad. It traces its origins to 1993 when Sa’eed, the co-founder of the parent Markaz, established the outfit to conduct jihad or holy war. And where is this so-called holy war to be waged? Is it limited to Kashmir or is it only one of the areas of the militant outfit’s targets?

    LeT has itself declared that the jihadis are trained to engage in a “righteous” war in diverse areas and have many nations in its cross hairs. They have boasted that they have trained and sent jihadis to play a significant role in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, the Philippines and Jammu & Kashmir. The Congressional Research Service which serves as a knowledge bank of the US legislators has also echoed that LeT has close links with both al Qaeda and the Taliban giving it a “global jihadi perspective”. Abu Zubaydah, one of the key al Qaeda operatives to be captured from Pakistan, was also reported to have been arrested from an LeT safe house. Evidently, LeT’s objective is the destruction of India among other nations and the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.

    The LeT-organised transnational mujahideen conference in Pakistan in 1999 provides yet another evidence of its larger goal. The banner on the LeT’s website highlighting the conference had daggers penetrating the national flags of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, India and Israel. This is incontrovertible evidence that the outfit is engaged in a global jihad and that Kashmir falls in one of the nations targeted by the LeT. What better evidence of the transnational goals of the LeT do we need than the words of Pakistan’s current Ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani, that the group sees “United States, Israel and India as existential enemies of Islam”?

    Again, the goal of LeT goes beyond Kashmir and is aimed at bringing the whole of India under Islamic rule. The statement of LeT founder, Mohammed Sa’eed, leaves little doubt on this issue. Addressing the international mujahideen meeting in 1999, he said: “About 15 years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone had told them about disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, insha-Allah. We will not rest until the whole India is dissolved into Pakistan … May Allah bestow martyrdom on us and enter us into the higher ranks of Paradise by His mercy”.

    Given the declared objective of LeT, would the resolution of the Kashmir issue “deny extremists” one of their main “calls to arms”? Obviously, the resolution of the Kashmir issue would not metamorphose the jihadis into saints when LeT itself has not confined its objectives to any geographical area and the establishment of a world Islamic Caliphate is its larger goal. There is grave danger in ignoring this reality. The resolution of the Kashmir issue to the satisfaction of Pakistan would give militant groups like the LeT greater confidence that they could achieve through their terror campaign what diplomacy or conventional military capability has failed to achieve. Their victory in Kashmir would embolden them to undertake larger campaigns just as they did after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. So not only is it not in the interest of India, but also of the Western world, to ensure that the Kashmir issue is not seen as a link in finding an answer to the scourge of terror.

    India, Jammu and Kashmir, United Kingdom, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), India-UK Relations, Pakistan Nuclear and Arms Control IDSA COMMENT
    Redefining France’s Role in Afghanistan: Need for better Strategy Guillem Monsonis January 22, 2009

    In a recent poll for the newspaper Le Parisien, 55 per cent of the French public expressed their disagreement with the presence of the French military in Afghanistan. A number of political and strategic mistakes contributed to this difficult situation being faced by Sarkozy’s government regarding the war in Afghanistan. The situation is also exacerbated by the fact that 10 soldiers of the 8th RPIMA lost their lives in the Uzbin sector in late August after a brilliantly orchestrated ambush by elements of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami which shocked the country.

    In a recent poll for the newspaper Le Parisien, 55 per cent of the French public expressed their disagreement with the presence of the French military in Afghanistan. A number of political and strategic mistakes contributed to this difficult situation being faced by Sarkozy’s government regarding the war in Afghanistan. The situation is also exacerbated by the fact that 10 soldiers of the 8th RPIMA lost their lives in the Uzbin sector in late August after a brilliantly orchestrated ambush by elements of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami which shocked the country.

    France is involved in the Afghan theatre in both the US led Enduring Freedom operation and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 2002. Their main mission has been to secure and monitor the Kabul region and to train the Afghan National Army (ANA). However, very little is known about the missions performed by the Special Forces between 2003 and 2007 in the eastern region close to the Pakistan border. The French Navy led the operation Heracles with the Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier battle group in which Super Etendard Modernises (SEM) aircraft performed strikes, intelligence gathering and show of force in support of the US troops on the ground.

    Islamist strategists perfectly understand what the Achilles’ heel of democratic societies is and use a deadly efficient strategy using all the available non-conventional assets, especially the media, in their asymmetric war against western hi-tech armies. The pictures published by the weekly magazine Paris Match showing the Taliban holding several belongings of the killed French troops gave a severe blow to the already weak French popular support to the war. Recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that Western public opinion is now extremely reluctant to pay the price of blood for their government’s wars. The sequel to the idealistic theory of ‘zero dead war’, which was popularized during the Gulf War (1991) and NATO’s campaign in Kosovo (1999), seems to have survived in post-modern European countries’ perception of war. The sacrosanct ‘right to life’ promoted in developed democratic countries is hardly compatible with long term asymmetric wars against well trained and motivated fighters. In this respect, democracies suffer a relative disadvantage when fighting against fundamentalist militants or authoritarian regimes. In a recent interview, the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Jean Louis Gergolin, complained that “war has deserted our minds". This apathy towards war is doubled by a negative perception of defence expenditures which is seen as a big waste of public money. But as the famous French writer Pierre Corneille wrote, to win without risk is to triumph without glory: France has to accept that the price for defeating international terrorism and stabilizing Afghanistan will be high, and will need a strong involvement on the ground. How should the French government solve the dilemma of rallying public opinion which is ‘proud of its army but worried for its children’?

    Better communication may be the key. Hervé Morin, the controversial French Minister of Defence, refused to use the word ‘war’ to qualify Afghanistan’s operations during a debate in the National Assembly. The French government seems to be exactly reproducing the same mistakes made at the height of the storm in Algeria 40 years ago when the word ‘war’ was replaced by ‘events’. Therefore, Government’s communication on the role of Armed Forces used to emphasise mostly on their humanitarian and developmental duties. The concept of the ‘reconstruction of Afghanistan’ is often used to explain to the general public what the French troops are doing there. This overemphasis on non-combatant activities hides the ground realities the troops are facing in their everyday missions. It was predictable that with the decision to deploy troops in the eastern part of Afghanistan (before this, France was mostly operating in the Kabul region), the exposure of the troops to militant attacks would increase. The government must clearly explain the reasons for the war effort and insist on its long term benefits, as most of the French just don’t see any relation between France’s homeland security and the operations being conducted in Afghanistan, despite Sarkozy’s recent efforts to link both aspects. Explaining that the calm witnessed for a few years in France may not last, as demonstrated by the recent attempt by the terrorists to place an explosive device in a store in Paris, it needs to be emphasized that the success of the war may be crucial in securing the country and therefore it should be a priority.

    In order to achieve this objective, France needs to face another harsh reality: the sustained reduction in French military capabilities. Means simply do not match ambitions. The recent publication of the White Book (Livre Blanc) on defence and national security generated a stormy debate on French military capabilities and objectives. The reduction of 54,000 positions in the armed forces and the resizing of the expeditionary force strength (from 50,000 to 30,000 troops) have been heavily criticized. The lack of intelligence gathering capabilities, especially helicopters and UAVs, is especially problematic in Afghan operations. Without the support of those means, the rigid and predictable convoys of APCs are especially vulnerable to heavily armed attacks by guerrillas with a good knowledge of the terrain. The lack of such capabilities was recently raised by the armed forces who complained about the poor political support Sarkozy has displayed towards the French military establishment. The White Book on defence tries to overcome those gaps and suggest the acquisition of a strong UAV and satellite force by doubling the expenditure in the space military sector.

    While facing an economic slowdown generated by the global economic crisis, France would also need more aerial assets to support land forces. But Paris only deployed 3 multi-role fighter/bombers Rafale F2, 3 Mirage 2000D bombers and aerial tankers. If the deployment of the 4+ generation Rafale was good news in May 2007 (it can carry 6 GBU-12 bombs versus 2 for the Mirage 2000D), the latest French fighters need to be assisted by the Mirage for targeting because they are not suited with a Damocles laser targeting pod. This capability will be acquired in 2012, with the new standard F3. There is also a lack of transport helicopters deployed in the theatre of operations, and Paris is planning to deploy 3 additional helicopters (1 EC-725 Caracal, 2 Gazelles SA-342 and probably some Tiger combat helicopters). This capability gap contributed, along with poor co-ordination between the different units on the ground, to the disastrous patrol mission in Uzbin, where no reinforcements were available for more than one hour.

    For France, the stakes are high. It is not only about defeating the nebula of international terrorism; it is also a question of international status. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France faces strong pressure from several European Members of Parliament who want to replace the French seat by a European one. Paris has to show its capability to deal with international issues like a great power and justify its political primacy in Europe. While France is close to reintegrating with NATO’s integrated command structure, its achievements in the Afghan theatre and the means Paris is able to mobilize will be a strong determinant of its future capacity for influence inside the alliance structures and will also determine the promotion of a still embryonic European defence. The results of this policy will not only be crucial for France’s Grandeur, but will also be indicative of the future role for middle sized powers in the post-cold war international system.

    Afghanistan, France, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Terrorism Nuclear and Arms Control IDSA COMMENT
    Budget Utilisation and Accountability Arvind Kadyan January 21, 2009

    Every year as India approaches the Budget session of Parliament, there are debates in various forums about the adequacy of Budget allocation to meet the modernization plan of the Services considering the threat perceptions/scenario. Due to the economic slowdown world-wide which is likely to affect the revenue collection of the national exchequer this year, the Government may face difficulty in meeting the increased demand from the Defence Forces. Further, we should not forget that electoral compulsions are also likely to play an important role in the coming budget.

    Every year as India approaches the Budget session of Parliament, there are debates in various forums about the adequacy of Budget allocation to meet the modernization plan of the Services considering the threat perceptions/scenario. Due to the economic slowdown world-wide which is likely to affect the revenue collection of the national exchequer this year, the Government may face difficulty in meeting the increased demand from the Defence Forces. Further, we should not forget that electoral compulsions are also likely to play an important role in the coming budget. In such a situation, it is necessary for the Services to see whether budget allocation, particularly in the area of revenue expenditure, is being optimally utilized as well as identify areas where savings can be achieved.

    India’s Defence Budget has grown from Rs. 13,341 Crores in 1988-89 to Rs 1,05,600 Crores in 2008-09. Thus, during the last two decades, the defence budget has increased approximately eight times. Out of the total budget, Revenue Expenditure accounts for 54.54 per cent and Capital Expenditure for 45.46 per cent.

    Keeping in view the increasing budgetary allocations and the geographical spread of users, it has become essential to delegate more financial powers to the Services, particularly in the area of Revenue Expenditure, to ensure better fiscal management, optimum utilization of resources, and time bound implementation of schemes/projects, and improved serviceability of major weapon systems/platforms/equipment. A beginning in this direction was made by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1975. However, a substantial delegation of financial powers was made in 2002 to the level of Services Head Quarters (SHQs) as well as to commands and formations. This was further revised in 2006. The delegation of financial powers is based on operational and functional requirements and not on ranks.

    After enhanced financial delegation in 2006, 46 per cent of the overall procurement budget is under delegated powers of Services and the rest is with the MoD. As a result, 80 to 85 per cent of procurement cases are finalised at SHQs or at lower formations and only 15 per cent of cases require referral to the Ministry. The Services have also been given more power for the import of stores and they have been allowed to conclude Rate contract for common usage items or stores which have a large turn over.

    The main objective of financial delegation was to give powers to various authorities in Services with matching responsibility. It was done to expedite processing of procurement cases and with a view to bringing better fiscal awareness among users (Services). It was also expected that delegation of powers to local authorities would help in achieving economy in procurement of stores/services. Further, it would improve serviceability/ maintainability of equipment as authorities can make purchases of spares according to their requirement if supplies were not being received from central sources.

    If one looks at the impact of financial delegation to lower authorities, there is no doubt that it has had a positive impact on the morale of the Services, particularly in field units or formations, leading to improved satisfaction level among the Services, given that they have some flexibility in procurement of items based on their requirements. Further, units or formations are able to buy stores that are considered essential by them i.e., stores required for providing aid to civil authorities, many of which are not available through central procurement agencies as these are not scaled items i.e. items which have been authorized to the establishment.

    The enhanced delegation of powers has an added advantage in terms of vendor development at the local level. But due to lack of transparency in the system progress on this front is slow as information regarding the requirements of formations is not available to vendors and an initiative to develop the local vendor base is lacking.

    There is regular demand from various authorities to further enhance the delegated financial powers as these are considered inadequate and hamper operational readiness due to delay in decision making, since the proposals are required to be sent to higher authorities for sanctions. There is also the factor of inflation, resulting in Competent Financial Authorities (CFAs) not being able to take procurement decisions. Thus the need for a further increase in financial powers cannot be denied. But at the same time it is also true that most of the CFAs are not able to ensure the uniform flow of expenditure since the phenomenon of ‘March Rush’ still continues. It is a bitter truth that a substantial portion of expenditure is incurred in the month of March. This shows lack of expenditure planning at the Command and lower formation/units level. In such a situation it is difficult to say whether value for money is being achieved.

    Further, there is an increasing trend to purchase Non Standard Pattern (NSP) items by unit/formations. This is not only resulting in increased inventory but also gives rise to maintenance problems, which should be taken into account while introducing new items. If these new items are needed for operational readiness, then the Authorities should take action to formulate a policy on provisioning of new items. The present ad-hoc purchases of NSP items in a large number of cases is being resorted only to utilize the budget and there is no attempt to assess the requirement for such items in the long term.

    Further, there have been instances of lack of co-ordination between Central purchase organizations and Field Authorities. As a result Field CFAs find it difficult to plan their procurement from local sources. This issue needs to be addressed by higher authorities.

    There have been a number of cases where CFAs below SHQs are not using delegated financial power as laid down in the Defence Procurement Manual (DPM). Oversight agencies have brought to attention cases of unfruitful expenditure at regular intervals. This is another area of concern.

    There have been instances when units or formations are allotted money without demand at the fag end of the year. On many occasions, funds are allotted without taking into account the actual needs of the unit to ensure full utilization of the budget allotted for the year. In such cases chances of wasteful expenditure cannot be ruled out. One of the reasons for the March Rush is that there is a fear that if the budget is not utilized to the full extent during the current year, formations may not get sufficient allocations for the following year.

    To ensure that enhanced delegation of financial powers leads to better fiscal management, it was proposed that clear accountability norms be established by delineating measurable performance parameters for each major area of expenditure, such as availability of major equipment/weapon system, maintainability and serviceability, training, etc. Identification of these quantifiable targets was to be done by the Services in six months time but very little progress in this direction has been made. In the absence of this, it is difficult to ensure optimal utilization of resources. The MoD therefore must insist on laying down performance parameters while considering new proposals for delegations.

    In addition, some small steps enumerated below would help in optimal utilization of financial resources at the command level:

    • Service officers working at unit/formation level may be exposed to financial rules and procedures at Young Officers (YO’S), Junior Command (JC), Company Commander (coy cdr) courses, Senior Officers (SO) or even capsule courses at command level.
    • Services should make use of Technology and put up the Priority Procurement Plans (PPPs) on their website so that vendors know the requirements in advance. Transparency will generate more competition and help in achieving the objective of value for money.
    • There should be an institutionalized system for exchange of information between units/formation regarding Rate and Quantity and make of the items purchased by them during the quarter.
    • Need for attitudinal change among CFAs and Integrated Financial Advisors (IFAs) to work as a team to achieve the best results.
    • Introduce Incentive Scheme for achieving savings in revenue expenditure/li>
    India, Defence Budget Defence Economics & Industry IDSA COMMENT

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