Nuclear Weapons

The First Committee vote is a culmination of a long-drawn campaign and marks a dramatic shift in the affairs of the non-proliferation regime.

The key to calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff lies in ensuring that the Indian armed forces are prepared to meet the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons.

This paper discusses such delivery mechanisms commonly known together as nuclear triad in the Indian context. The paper has four major parts. The first part attempts to set the context for the overall discussion. The second, third and fourth parts deals with the evaluation about missile forces, aerial platforms and submarine based platforms for nuclear weapon delivery on the targets.

Clemenceau’s famous statement—‘War is too important to be left to the generals’—represents an essential conflict in civil?military relations during crisis situations, especially with regard to the demarcation of boundaries for civil and military authority in the conduct of war. Where and when, in the conduct of war, should the political class step down and military commanders take over? Or, since, as the Clausewitzian dictum of war being a continuation of politics suggests, can war ever be considered a purely military enterprise?

In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.

Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.

The US pursuit of missile defence in order to counter and/or hedge against Iran's ballistic missile capabilities coupled with concerns generated by its nuclear programme has had significant strategic consequences. Iran on its part has pursued these capabilities as part of its asymmetric strategy to overcome its strategic vulnerabilities flowing from US encirclement, short-comings in force levels vis-a-vis neighbours and resource constraints in building effective conventional forces.

Japan’s amendment of its atomic energy law with the inclusion of a “national security” clause is being viewed within the country as a ploy to pave the way for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The primary role of Israel’s current fleet of ‘Dolphins’ is likely to be limited to serve as instruments of ‘signalling’ strategic intent to potential enemies rather than as effective pre-emptive strike or competent second-strike platforms.

Israel is likely to calculate that it would better to wait and use diplomacy to push the major global and regional powers towards some kind of a joint venture against the much feared nuclear designs of Iran.