India will have to make a judicious political decision on accepting any additional criteria that the NSG might come up with as a precondition for accepting its membership application.
Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.
Membership in the NSG is essential to safeguard future Indian interests in nuclear commerce, even if it is not a necessary condition for India to engage in nuclear exports.
Until the next plenary in Switzerland in 2017 or the interim meeting before the end of 2016, India should actively engage with all members and particularly with those who have expressed doubts or raised queries, including China.
The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.
There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the Pakistani claim that Pakistan had entered into any voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in respect of KANUPP.
Has South Africa buckled under Chinese pressure to oppose India’s membership in the NSG? While this cannot yet be confirmed, there are strong indicators that it could be a possibility.
The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.
Some of the members are expressing unnecessary apprehensions regarding India’s membership. Unlike China, India has a track record of complying with obligations of any treaty or agreement it signs.