With the melting of snow and improvement in weather conditions, the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) that separates India and Pakistan has traditionally been a ‘hot’ place in summers, with multiple ceasefire violations by Pakistan culminating in frequent artillery duels. Over time, and well before the era of instant news, this perception of the LoC had embedded itself in the collective consciousness of the Indian public.
The Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was one of the major structures raised after the Kargil conflict of 1999, representing, for the first time since independence, a step towards integration of the three armed forces with other relevant elements of power. This article situates and examines the functions of HQ IDS in the broader context of India’s national security architecture. It begins by giving a historical overview of the higher defence organisation in India, the issues pertaining to its security architecture, and the far-reaching impact of Kargil on these.
The Indian Army is in the process of a transformative effort, envisaging changes not only at the apex level, within the Army Headquarters, but also in the field, with the concept of Integrated Battle Groups likely to be implemented soon. The past record of major changes within the army suggests an incremental approach, and also disconnect between doctrinal thought and restructuring. The only exception were the changes post the 1975 military reforms.
Kargil was an early milestone in India’s journey towards becoming a nuclear weapons power. Two decades later, India has shed the image of a reluctant nuclear power and morphed into being a responsible one. The credit for this achievement can be traced to the wisdom that is embedded in India’s nuclear doctrine that has guided the development, growth and deployment of its nuclear wherewithal. The hallmarks of the doctrine like Civilian control, No First Use, and Credible Minimum Deterrence have endured despite internal and external pressures.
The Kargil War of 1999 focussed the nation’s attention on shortcomings in India’s national security management system, which was largely inherited from the British in 1947. A comprehensive review resulted in a major overhaul, ensuring tighter coordination between the various security structures, reforming the higher defence organisation, and bringing in a holistic approach, recognising the political, economic, technological, ecological and sociological factors impacting on national security.
Using the Kargil conflict as a backdrop, the article explains why the leverage and influence of sea power matters. During Kargil, situated in a small area of Jammu and Kashmir, and far away from the sea, the robust deployment of the Indian Navy created politico-diplomatic pressure that contributed indirectly to the outcome. Two decades hence, the navy’s multiple strategies as doctrinally enunciated, when complemented by the broader initiatives of SAGAR and SAGARMALA, assist in India becoming a pivot for economic progress and for mutual security in the Indian Ocean Region.
The Kargil conflict presented an opportunity for a relook at India’s national security environment in terms of defence preparedness. The Kargil Review Committee report pointed to the deficiencies in India’s security management system and gave a call for course correction especially in terms of integration of the armed forces, defence modernisation, and optimum defence budgeting and expenditure.
