While countries need to adopt each other’s best practices to deal with the hydra-headed monster called terrorism, there cannot be a magic bullet or a single successful counter-terror strategy.
As the new government headed by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu takes charge in Jerusalem, it seems that there are no easy solutions to what Israel perceives to be its central strategic question – how to effectively stop the Iranian nuclear quest. Israel’s leaders across the political spectrum have long maintained that a nuclear capable Iran, coupled with the rhetoric against Israel emanating from Tehran and its help to groups like the Hezbollah and the Hamas, constitutes an existential threat.
Notwithstanding calls for the establishment of an independent and international commission of inquiry to investigate war crimes committed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups during the Operation Cast Lead, a legal issue is whether the use of certain weapons by the Israeli forces is in contravention of international law.1
A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The factional fighting between the Islamist Hamas, represented by the recently dismissed Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip, and the 'moderate' Fatah, headed by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas, took a turn for the worse on June 14 when Hamas cadres ransacked the Preventive Security Service building, the headquarters of the PA in Gaza City. The renewed fighting between the two factions, which accounted for more than 100 deaths during the week gone by, has already claimed over 600 lives since January 2006.
As the dust slowly settles down over the battlefields of South Lebanon and North Israel, the major actors in this tragic drama are now debating ways and means to salvage the long stalled Arab-Israel peace process from the wreckage of war and violence in the region. Israel's 34-day military campaign against Lebanon ended in mid-August with no clear victory to either party.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second Israel-Lebanon War, most observers have concluded that Israel lost its war against Hezbollah. Although at the end of 34 days of violent engagement there is no clear victor or loser, this article, on the contrary, argues that Israel succeeded in achieving the most important among its political and strategic objectives.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's seemingly 'inadvertent' admission of his country's nuclear status in an interview broadcast on German television on December 11 at the start of his trip to Berlin once again focussed world attention on the country's nuclear status. It is widely known that Israel has a nuclear arsenal consisting of about 150-200 weapons from the plutonium produced at the Dimona nuclear reactor, situated in the Negev desert near Beer Sheva.
Since the middle of the 20th century, the Arab-Israeli wars have thrown up a number of military lessons. The most spectacular was a textbook pre-emptive counter air strike in 1967 by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which destroyed or made non-operational the entire Egyptian Air Force. This demonstrated the need for gaining mastery of the air as a prelude to spectacular ground operations. At sea, a Styx missile fired by an Egyptian missile boat on the Israeli destroyer Eliat validated the idea of anti-ship missiles.
