At the outset, I should like to clarify that I am not going to theorize or build models on global or regional international relations. I am also not going to speak on India and China as such as I have already spoken on it at some length some months ago at the Indian Council of World Affairs. If anyone would like to look through the text of that speech, she or he could get it from the ICWA or from me. This lecture is, in the nature of things, more China focussed.
The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.
The US Nuclear Posture Review The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)1 is a policy document of the US Department of Defense that underlines the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s… Continue reading De-linking CBW from Nuclear Deterrence
Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve, an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant.
The Indian armed forces appear to be driving defence budgets rather than a cold calculation of the country’s desire for ‘adequate’ military capability.
