India-Pakistan Relations

As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India’s response to terror will have to be well thought out.

In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.

To make the transition from the prevalent Nash Equilibrium with its lower payoffs to Pareto-optimal which will yield higher pay offs, India and Pakistan must break away from their traditional thinking of making no concessions.

Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.

China’s intensified engagement in the region, encompassing reconstruction and development, suggests a subtle move to alter the security situation.

Military diplomacy has not figured significantly in India-Pakistan relations with ample reasons. Military to military engagement between the two states is confined to CBMs of varying significance. Even as both militaries have several regional and extra-regional engagements falling under the rubric of military diplomacy, the ones between the two are restricted to the routine exchanges of military advisors in respective missions in national capitals. However, there is a case for expansion in military diplomacy between the two.

The absence of a credible interlocutor in Pakistan who can exercise effective control over the Pakistan army leaves India with little choice except to open a parallel dialogue with the military establishment in Pakistan.

As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region.

The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand.

The ISI threat assessment may be received with great enthusiasm in Western capitals and policy circles, but for observers from the subcontinent it is neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘shift’.