Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective
The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.
- Ali Ahmed
- May 12, 2011
The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.
The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.
The article reviews the Cold Start doctrine in light of the limited war doctrine. It argues that the launch of strike corps entails a risk prone war expansion. War termination should therefore be short of the launch of strike corps offensives. It suggests a 'Cold Start and Stop' strategy with limited offensives by integrated battle groups being used to coerce Pakistan. Pakistani amenability to Indian war aims would be dependent on India offering incentives diplomatically alongside. India's limited war doctrine, currently not articulated, must be informed by such a war waging strategy.
As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India’s response to terror will have to be well thought out.
The aversion in India to dealing directly with Pakistan's military establishment is entirely understandable, but is also unreal given the power dynamics of Pakistani politics.
In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.
To make the transition from the prevalent Nash Equilibrium with its lower payoffs to Pareto-optimal which will yield higher pay offs, India and Pakistan must break away from their traditional thinking of making no concessions.
Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.
China’s intensified engagement in the region, encompassing reconstruction and development, suggests a subtle move to alter the security situation.
Military diplomacy has not figured significantly in India-Pakistan relations with ample reasons. Military to military engagement between the two states is confined to CBMs of varying significance. Even as both militaries have several regional and extra-regional engagements falling under the rubric of military diplomacy, the ones between the two are restricted to the routine exchanges of military advisors in respective missions in national capitals. However, there is a case for expansion in military diplomacy between the two.