It makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon is used by Pakistan, since India’s general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.
Game theory can be helpful in understanding how India and Pakistan can get out of the low paying unhelpful situations, throw light on crisis escalation and crisis stability, and to understand their nuclear thresholds.
There is a need to conclusively revisit the issue of India’s response, and other pro-active measures, to deter and forestall terrorist attacks in future.
Pakistan’s conciliatory approach towards India is tactical and could change rapidly if the army decides that its interests are better served through a more offensive posture.
Ever since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Western media reports have constantly highlighted the dramatic increase in Pakistan's production of nuclear fissile materials and nuclear warheads. Reports published at end of January in the New York Times and the Washington Post are a case in point. These reports, quoting serving and retired US administration officials, mentioned that the latest US intelligence assessments have concluded that Pakistan has been steadily expanding its nuclear arsenal – particularly since President Obama took office in 2009.
The success of high-level talks between India and Pakistan would depend on how the media shape popular opinion in the two countries and popular support to take the relationship forward.
The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.
The article reviews the Cold Start doctrine in light of the limited war doctrine. It argues that the launch of strike corps entails a risk prone war expansion. War termination should therefore be short of the launch of strike corps offensives. It suggests a 'Cold Start and Stop' strategy with limited offensives by integrated battle groups being used to coerce Pakistan. Pakistani amenability to Indian war aims would be dependent on India offering incentives diplomatically alongside. India's limited war doctrine, currently not articulated, must be informed by such a war waging strategy.
The aversion in India to dealing directly with Pakistan's military establishment is entirely understandable, but is also unreal given the power dynamics of Pakistani politics.
