Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.

The Arms Trade Treaty is flawed and requires strengthening. Ratified States need to take the lead in fortifying the Treaty before more member States are asked to join.

Time and again, civilian masses the world over have been at the receiving end of legions of conventional weapons systems leaving destructive direct and indirect consequences in their wake. The copious arms -and their ammunition- currently in circulation range from assault rifles, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons to pistols, machine guns as well as missiles, grenades and other explosive ordnances.

By abstaining from voting on the global arms trade treaty, India has exposed the treaty’s loopholes in not addressing concerns about illegal transfer of arms to terrorist organisations, insurgents groups and other non-state actors.

The shortcomings of the UN Register of Conventional Arms have led to the failure of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). For the Treaty to be robust and meaningful, the weapon systems which will matter in the future must be reflected in the very design of the instrument. Moreover, the Treaty should remain free from biases and prejudices of the past.

The proliferation of small arms and ammunition is a major issue that threatens the security of India. Aspects related to illicit manufacture of local country made guns, smuggling, pilferage from government stocks and a weak monitoring or surveillance mechanisms further complicate the issue.

The treaty needs to be capable of addressing existing and perceived threat of the world; at the same time, it should be flexible enough to meet emerging security challenges.

While the Arms Trade Treaty initiative remains the most important initiative relating to conventional arms regulation within the United Nations, the lack of consensus on issues of scope, parameters and criteria and implementation and international assistance makes it likely that we could end up with a weak treaty.

Since the idea of export controls may be new for a large number of countries, and most of the proposed provisions are borrowed from existing systems in developed countries, the treaty should be flexible enough to remove redundant provisions and adopt new provisions suitable for changed circumstances.

Among other intertwining issues, what continues to disturb the Indian establishment is the non-inclusion of non-state actors as likely recipients of illicit arms which, in the Indian experience, is crucial and on which the Chairman’s paper remains silent.