S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The initial diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear issue were spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3). Some of the few instances of successful engagement were the Tehran Agreed Statement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 that Iran entered into with the E3. The E3 engagement process, however, hit a roadblock in the light of Iran’s decision of August 01, 2005 to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan.

The P5+1/E3+3 (made up of five permanent members of the UNSC along with Germany) took forward the process of engagement spearheaded by E3 countries after the Iranian nuclear issue was referred to the UNSC by the IAEA in February 2006. Germany’s involvement therefore began as part of the E3 as early as in 2003 and continued when the negotiation process was expanded to include the other three permanent members of the UNSC in 2006. 

Brazil meanwhile was involved in such efforts as the May 2010 Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear swap deal under the terms of which (similar to the October 2009 deal involving Russia and France) Iran was to have transferred 1200 kgs of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in return for 120 kgs of uranium fuel rods from the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France, and the IAEA) within a year of depositing the LEU. The US and France, however, rejected the deal given that Iran’s stockpile of LEU had doubled since October 2009. Such efforts also raised the stakes in the US–Turkey/Brazil bilateral ties, with these countries’ foreign policy efforts seemingly at odds with the US interests and preferences.

For an examination of the various diplomatic-political efforts undertaken to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, please refer to the article, “In Pursuit of a Chimera: Nuclear Imbroglio between Sanctions and Engagement,” Strategic Analysis, Routledge, 36 (6), November 2012.

Reshmi Kazi replies:, Pakistan’s aim is to signal to India that any contemplation of a conventional punitive retaliation to its sub-conventional but “highly destructive and disruptive” cross-border terrorist strikes, such as the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, would bear disastrous consequences including probable use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s objective thus is to dissuade India from considering the option of retaliation by lowering the threshold of nuclear option.

Pakistan’s resort to the nuclear option, however, would break down the deterrence stability. In that case, it will be highly irrelevant whether a target has been hit by a strategic or tactical weapon. A nuclear attack is a nuclear attack. To quote Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik, “Tactical or strategic, it (NASR) is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy. So, it's not a game-changer.” What this essentially means is that in the event India faces a nuclear attack, New Delhi will be left with no other choice but to use nuclear weapons in the form of a massive retaliation. In that case, it makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon or a long range or short range weapon is used, since the general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

Also, see Reshmi Kazi, “NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan,” IDSA Comment, August 19, 2011.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom (P5) and Germany (the P5+1) are currently giving push to the 'engagement' track with the latest round of talks which began on October 15, 2013 at Geneva. While existing unilateral and multi-lateral (UNSC and EU) sanctions are in place, no additional sanctions are as yet being contemplated as a part of the 'sanctions' track.

The 'dual-track' policy of sanctions and engagement has till date not shown much progress in modulating Iranian behaviour. It is pertinent to note that in the past, as the nature and volume of sanctions increased, Iranian intransigence correspondingly increased. Iran for instance suspended its voluntary implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) after its referral to the UNSC in February 2006.

However, various reports as well as Iranian officials have acknowledged the vulnerable state of the Iranian economy and its currency as a result of trade and oil-related sanctions. President Hassan Rouhani's overwhelming victory defeating candidates like Saeed Jalili (who was the chief nuclear negotiator) has given rise to the strong perception that the Iranian public have rejected the confrontationist approach of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has also supported the path of dialogue, crucially in a speech to the IRGC commanders in September 2013. With the Obama Administration showing its commitment to the dialogue process, the hopes for progress at the current round of negotiations are huge.

Possible outcomes could range from Iran signing the IAEA AP, temporarily suspending its enrichment activities, the shipping out of excess quantities of enriched uranium (a possibility alluded to by the Iranian Parliament Speaker) in exchange for graduated sanctions relief, provision of spare parts for its civilian aircrafts, among others in a 'grand bargain'.

These elements are in the realm of the 'possible' given the unique circumstances surrounding the current negotiations, including Rouhani 'the pragmatist' being in power, Khamenei's support for negotiations, weak state of the Iranian economy, and the positive vibes generated by the renewed interactions between the US and Iran topped by the first telephonic conversation between presidents of the two countries in more than three decades.