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  • Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Danger

    This article attempts to make a realistic assessment of the danger of nuclear terrorism. While acknowledging the catastrophic consequences of an act of terrorism employing either an improvised nuclear device or a violent attack against a nuclear installation causing spread of lethal radioactivity, it also highlights the complexity of the challenges likely to be confronted by any would-be nuclear terrorist.

    March 2014

    The Fissile Materials Working Group: A Case Study of How a Civil Society Group Can Impact Fissile Material Policy

    Security experts the world over agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international peace and security in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more than 20 confirmed cases of the illicit or unauthorised trafficking of fissile materials. Fissile material for more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons is spread across the globe.

    March 2014

    Nuclear Security, the Summit Process and India

    India has been dealing with terrorism for several decades, and is therefore constructively involved in all genuine exercises for countering the menace. As terror groups are expected to use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), India fully supports the legal and other operational measures and mechanisms adopted by multilateral and international organisations to mitigate the risk of WMD terrorism. A resolution has been steered in the United Nations General Assembly to gain international support for fighting WMD terrorism.

    March 2014

    The Technological Dimension of Nuclear Security

    The issue of nuclear security has several dimensions including security of nuclear materials and facilities, export controls, security of technologies and development of technologies that are proliferation-resistant. Each of these dimensions needs examination from an applicable perspective. India looks at nuclear technology and nuclear materials primarily as a resource for meeting a part of its requirements for electricity.

    March 2014

    Special Editors’ Introduction

    The 21st century is witnessing a renaissance of civil nuclear energy, particularly in Asia. At the same time, this century is also witnessing a rise in acts of terror, using newer and more lethal tools. The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and other terror incidents have forced the international community to pay more serious attention to the possibility of terror groups using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

    March 2014

    Politics, Security and Nuclear Abolition: Beyond the Idealist Rhetoric

    Disarmament and non-proliferation are rightfully viewed as two sides of the same coin: the two imperatives that need to be met if the prospect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to be realised. Although the existence of a link between the two concepts is obvious, the exact nature of this connection is perhaps not as clear. The central question here is whether it is politics or strategic realities that shape states’ nuclear options and by implication, the two-fold road to global zero.

    January 2014

    Nitin Khadse asked: How will the deal on Iran's nuclear programme affect America's relations with other powers in West Asia, and what is in Indian interest?

    Gulshan Dietl replies: The United States has nourished two “special relationships” in West Asia - that is, with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both of them are adversaries of Iran. The November 24, 2013 Interim Agreement between Iran and the P5+1 major powers (5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council + Germany) has resulted in a relegitimation of Iran in the global community and, more significantly, in an improvement in the US-Iran relations. Israel and Saudi Arabia, in the circumstances, are alarmed at the future prospects of this development. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has called the agreement a “historic mistake” and has kept up the threat of launching a unilateral attack against Iran if the Israeli security is threatened. Saudis have cautiously welcomed the agreement, though their concerns about an enhanced Iranian influence in the region and competition in the global energy market are serious.

    In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, the US Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, acknowledged the anxieties of the Gulf states regarding the American “intentions, strategy and commitment” to the region and sought to reassure them that the US would continue to improve its own presence and bolster the regional empowerment in security and defence. Secretary of State John Kerry, similarly, indulged into a highly demonstrative gesture during his visit to Israel when the missile defence organisations of the US and Israel jointly test-fired Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system. The Iran nuclear deal has impacted the US special relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia and there are sustained moves on all sides to mend the damage.

    The Iran deal is certainly in our interest and we have welcomed the same. The sanctions on oil, shipping and banking are not yet lifted. Therefore, there will not be an immediate expansion in the Indo-Iran trade ties. In the longer run, the Indian import of Iranian oil is slated to go up; exploration in the gas fields allotted to India will begin; and the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline may yet see the light of the day after an inordinate hibernation.

    Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Thinking and the Pakistani Connection

    Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

    January 07, 2014

    Pratyush Sinha asked: Why Germany is part of the P5+1 negotiation, whereas India or Brazil is not despite substantial economic and military clout?

    S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The initial diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear issue were spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3). Some of the few instances of successful engagement were the Tehran Agreed Statement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 that Iran entered into with the E3. The E3 engagement process, however, hit a roadblock in the light of Iran’s decision of August 01, 2005 to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan.

    The P5+1/E3+3 (made up of five permanent members of the UNSC along with Germany) took forward the process of engagement spearheaded by E3 countries after the Iranian nuclear issue was referred to the UNSC by the IAEA in February 2006. Germany’s involvement therefore began as part of the E3 as early as in 2003 and continued when the negotiation process was expanded to include the other three permanent members of the UNSC in 2006. 

    Brazil meanwhile was involved in such efforts as the May 2010 Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear swap deal under the terms of which (similar to the October 2009 deal involving Russia and France) Iran was to have transferred 1200 kgs of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in return for 120 kgs of uranium fuel rods from the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France, and the IAEA) within a year of depositing the LEU. The US and France, however, rejected the deal given that Iran’s stockpile of LEU had doubled since October 2009. Such efforts also raised the stakes in the US–Turkey/Brazil bilateral ties, with these countries’ foreign policy efforts seemingly at odds with the US interests and preferences.

    For an examination of the various diplomatic-political efforts undertaken to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, please refer to the article, “In Pursuit of a Chimera: Nuclear Imbroglio between Sanctions and Engagement,” Strategic Analysis, Routledge, 36 (6), November 2012.

    Shubhendra Mishra asked: Has development of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan limited the option of punitive action by India in a 26/11 like situation?

    Reshmi Kazi replies:, Pakistan’s aim is to signal to India that any contemplation of a conventional punitive retaliation to its sub-conventional but “highly destructive and disruptive” cross-border terrorist strikes, such as the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, would bear disastrous consequences including probable use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s objective thus is to dissuade India from considering the option of retaliation by lowering the threshold of nuclear option.

    Pakistan’s resort to the nuclear option, however, would break down the deterrence stability. In that case, it will be highly irrelevant whether a target has been hit by a strategic or tactical weapon. A nuclear attack is a nuclear attack. To quote Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik, “Tactical or strategic, it (NASR) is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy. So, it's not a game-changer.” What this essentially means is that in the event India faces a nuclear attack, New Delhi will be left with no other choice but to use nuclear weapons in the form of a massive retaliation. In that case, it makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon or a long range or short range weapon is used, since the general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

    Also, see Reshmi Kazi, “NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan,” IDSA Comment, August 19, 2011.

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