S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: Such measures include physical protection of plants and radioactive material as well as adopting and executing global standards in the running of these plants. The latter includes incorporating design features to ensure safety of the plants during normal operations as well as to effectively tide over the ill-effects of possible natural events like floods, tsunamis among other disasters. These could include situating back-up generators at a greater height (especially pertinent in the aftermath of Fukushima) or increasing the height of protective walls or in-built design features to ensure ‘cool’ running of the plants among other efforts.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), established in 1983, is responsible for regulating the functioning of all nuclear power plants in India. To make functioning of the plants more independent, the government in 2011 has put into motion the required measures to establish the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), which will subsume the work of the AERB.

In recent times, the complementarities and mutually reinforcing nature of safety and security measures at nuclear power plants and of materials is being emphasised (two of ‘S’ trilogy, the other being safeguards). India appreciates this fact and is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, entered into force in 1987, as well as its 2005 Amendment which was ratified by India in 2007. India also supports the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: Nuclear Safety primarily refers to the measures taken to ensure the well-being of power reactors and other civilian uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear Security on the other hand refers to measures taken to prevent the misuse of nuclear/radiological materials/weapons including physical protection of sources, among others.

Both have the common purpose of ensuring that the negative effects of nuclear materials/technologies on society and environment are prevented. Both should have equal priority depending on the nature of the threat, technologies being used, among other pertinent factors.

Issues of nuclear safety came into prominence after the Chernobyl meltdown. Organisations like World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) were formed to help ensure uniform standards in civilian nuclear plant operations, improved safety procedures, among others. Issues of nuclear security came into prominence in the aftermath of 9/11. Events like the Nuclear Security Summit have sought to focus attention on these aspects. The IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is another prominent initiative, in which India is a significant partner.

Reshmi Kazi replies: In the given context, rule 24 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011, prescribes the time limit of 5 years to resort to the option of “right of recourse”. However, the contradiction appears when the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 mentions no such time limit. To that extent, the rule is ultra vires to the Act and thereby invalid.

Rule 24 stipulates limits in two ways:

• with regard to the amount for which suppliers can be held liable by way of recourse, and
• the number of years for which such liability can be imposed.

Rule 24 does this by imposing limits on the option of recourse to a position which is clearly permitted by Section 17(a) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. It thus seeks to bypass both Section 17(b) and any effect Section 46 (under which a victim of a nuclear accident could bring a liability claim against the operator under Tort Law and include the supplier also as co-defendant) may have on supplier liability, rather than directly limit these provisions. At the same time, a rule is a subsidiary legislation to the corresponding Act. Thus, it is imperative that the rule must be in tandem with the Act.