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  • Narasimha Rao and the Bomb

    In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.

    October 2004

    Iranian Nuclear Programme and Pakistan: Implications of the Linkages

    Against all odds, Iran is pressing hard to prove its nuclear innocence and keeping its promises under the provisions of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is refusing to go along with Iran’s denials on violation of the NPT commitments. At the same time, the Bush Administration seems determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond Pakistan to other Muslim states. However, the facts emerging out of the probe into the A.Q. Khan episode and the international grey nuclear market indicate significant patterns of concealment and duplicity even by the NPT signatory states.

    July 2004

    Proliferation Security Initiative: An Assessment

    Proliferation of WMDs is a grave threat to mankind, be it their flow to ‘irresponsible states’ or to terrorists. Charged by its perception of vulnerability, the US has initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative; seeking involvement of ‘key’ states for interdiction of ‘suspect ships’ at sea. In its present form, PSI is contrary to the principle of ‘Freedom of the Seas’. Further, its operational efficacy is doubtful and it has an escalatory potential. However, bilateral arrangements as an extension of PSI may lawfully supplement global non-proliferation efforts.

    April 2004

    Reducing Nuclear Dangers after the AQ Khanspiracy

    The essay defines Pakistan’s brazen retailing of sensitive nuclear technologies as Bomb Process Outsourcing (BPO) and places it in a larger perspective. It offers a short retrospective of the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons by the P-5 in which significant manpower and materials were ‘foreign’. This is true of the programmes of Israel, Iraq, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil as well. Pakistan, has now, contributed to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

    January 2004

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