Pranamita Baruah replies: After the latest round of nuclear tests by North Korea in February 2013, many seemed to argue that the political realities in the Korean Peninsula dictate that an overt military strike-even one limited to cruise missiles-should be on the cards. However, that cannot be the case as even the most restrained attack could have devastating implications for the East Asian security.

Most of the US military planners too seem to be of the view that even the notion of limited strikes against the hermit kingdom is fraught with potential escalations. It could destabilise the country and further aggravate the tension in the whole of East Asian region. Moreover, Pyongyang might treat such an attack as a part of Washington’s attempt to bring about a regime change in North Korea. This cannot be acceptable to the current regime as the Kim family, since the time of Kim Jong-il, has used the perceived threat from the US and its allies in the region to legitimise its dynastic rule over North Korea. So, in the interest of keeping the current regime intact, Kim Jong-un and his advisors in such circumstances could retaliate by a military action of their own.

Though North Korea’s claim of having missiles capable of striking at the US mainland is still doubtful, one cannot really deny that the North, with reportedly 10,000 fortified artillery pieces trained on Seoul, could easily target South Korea. Most importantly, North Korea has more than 100 No-Dong missiles that can reach deep into South Korea as well as Japan. Under such circumstances, both South Korea and Japan will not support any military action against the North. In fact, North Korea’s erstwhile ally Russia and current benefactor China too will oppose such an action. Though after the latest provocation both Moscow and Beijing had strongly criticised Pyongyang, they will, for the time being, continue to insist on diplomatically engaging with North Korea. Beijing’s recent effort towards resuming the Six Party Talks (SPT) clearly demonstrates its support for continued diplomatic engagement.

If the UN is to take a military action against North Korea, then it will require full support from its Security Council. However, this may not be possible if two of the permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China, decide to veto it.

Reply: Please refer to the following IDSA publications on the subject:

A. Vinod Kumar, “15-Years after Pokhran II: Deterrence Churning Continues”, June 10, 2013, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/15YearsafterPokhranII_avkumar_100613

Ali Ahmed, “India's Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor”, IDSA Monograph Series No. 10, December 2012, at http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf

Ali Ahmed, “Reopening the Debate on Limited War”, February 29, 2012, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ReopeningtheDebateonLimitedWar_aahmed_290212

Ali Ahmed, “What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?”, August 17, 2011, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatDoesPakistanHopetoAchievewithNasr_aahmed_170811

Ali Ahmed, “Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective”, May 12, 2011, at http://idsa.in/node/7464/3087#comment-3087

Ali Ahmed, “Towards a Proactive Military Strategy: 'Cold Start and Stop'”, Strategic Analysis, 35 (3), May 2011, at http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/35_3/ProactiveMilitaryStrategy_aahmed

Ali Ahmed, “Making Sense of ‘Nasr’”, April 24, 2011, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/MakingSenseofNasr_aahmed_240411

Ali Ahmed, “The advantages of ‘Cold Start Minor’”, December 13, 2010, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheadvantagesofColdStartMinor_aahmed_131210

Sushant Sareen, “Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War”, November 22, 2010, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ColdStartasDeterrenceagainstProxyWar_ssareen_221110

Ali Ahmed, “Cold Start and ‘The Sehjra Option’”, Journal of Defence Studies, 4 (4), October 2010, at http://idsa.in/jds/4_4_2010_ColdStartandTheSehjraOption_aahmed

Ali Ahmed, “The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy”, September 28, 2010, at
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheColdStartandStopstrategy_aahmed_280910

Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Reply: Refer to an earlier reply by S. Samuel C. Rajiv on a similar query, at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/safetyofnuclearpowerplantsinIndia