Problems of Cohesion Plaguing ASEAN and PIF

Introduction

In recent years, both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) have seen significant functional turbulence. ASEAN, which long prided itself on preventing conflict among regional members, failed to forestall the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2025, ultimately requiring China and the United States of America to broker a ceasefire.^[i] Meanwhile, the US has increasingly tested its cohesion through economic and strategic pressure, joining the already significant pressure imposed by the other major power, China.

Meanwhile, the PIF, a regional body comprising Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island Countries, has also begun to show increasing signs of dissension. At the most recent PIF summit in September 2026, leaders from the Solomon Islands and other PICs declined to attend, leading New Zealand authorities to allege foreign interference.^[ii] Meanwhile, both China and the US have increasingly sought to ensure greater conformity through a variety of tools, with varying success—amid increasing consternation in Canberra and Wellington.

Both bodies, and some members thereof, have often been alleged to be acting under the influence of external powers. However, many of the problems plaguing them are equally attributable to internal characteristics. It is therefore important to identify these characteristics for what they are, not to prescribe solutions from the outside, but rather to account for them while engaging these important pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific outreach.

ASEAN in Crisis

ASEAN, formed in 1967 from a core comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, eventually expanded to cover the entire Southeast Asian region in 2025, with Timor-Leste formally acceding to full membership as the eleventh member. Though largely successful in achieving economic integration and cultural understanding, ASEAN after the end of the Cold War continued to be plagued by questions about its efficacy in navigating an increasingly complicated geopolitical landscape.

Analysts have identified several interrelated factors behind ASEAN’s predicament. They have correctly identified the influence of major powers as a key factor.^[iii] Another key factor is regime difference: Malaysia and Indonesia are democracies, whereas Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos fall into varying positions on the ladder towards one-party rule.^[iv] A related factor is variation in developmental stages, given the wide divergence between Timor-Leste’s 2026 nominal per capita GDP of US$ 1,520 and Singapore’s US$ 109,117.^[v] However, these factors are exacerbated by problems with the grouping’s functioning, particularly its fundamental approaches.

ASEAN works by a process commonly known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, which has been defined as a

working process or style that is informal and personal…[requiring the] use [of] compromise, consensus, and consultation in the informal decision-making process…it above all prioritises a consensus-based, non-conflictual way of addressing problems.^[vi]

Externally, ASEAN requires that its external dialogue partners respect the body’s centrality and unity. The first seeks to project the body as the central platform for engagement on issues affecting the region. In contrast, the second enjoins members to adhere to the body’s decisions without seeking individual benefits. Although consensus-based decision-making has often been cited as a reason for its fluctuating effectiveness, recent events point to deeper problems with other elements.

As several notable scholars have identified, ASEAN centrality holds only as long as external partners ascribe to it the legitimacy and authority needed to solve regional problems.^[vii] As such, it is deeply intertwined with maintaining unity and continued success in enforcing conformity. However, repeated crises, from the long-drawn friction with China in the South China Sea (SCS) to the catastrophic breakdown of dialogue between Cambodia and Thailand, not to mention continued paralysis on Myanmar, make it clear that not all of the pillars of the foregoing premises are in order.^[viii]

In effect, ASEAN finds itself on the horns of a variation of the classical openness/effectiveness/autonomy trilemma.^[ix] It is increasingly being led into a situation where it cannot simultaneously balance its centrality/openness (given demands and challenges from external powers), its unity/effectiveness (given the almost-hopelessly complex divergences on issues such as China’s SCS expansion) and national preferences/autonomy (given increasing rancour among members in the form of Cambodia and Thailand as well as within members in the case of Myanmar). As a result, centripetal forces are steadily building up within the body, embrittling its ability to speak with one voice in the face of challenges.

PIF at Crossroads

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), formed in 1974 as the South Pacific Forum, is the primary vehicle for regional integration in Oceania. From its inception, it has faced a crisis of weightage, as the sixteen Pacific Island Countries (PICs) find themselves in the same room as Australia and New Zealand, countries with vastly incommensurate economic and military wherewithal.^[x] Calls for Pacific unity within the body have therefore been measured historically against Canberra and Wellington’s willingness to accommodate smaller Pacific partners’ interests.

Perpetually wary of the two large members, PICs have traditionally been sensitive to any perceived imposition of their security interests on themselves and keen to diversify their relations with external powers, especially major powers such as the US, China, Japan and India.^[xi] The Solomon Islands’ quest to deepen security cooperation with China since 2019 reflects this challenge.^[xii]

The PIF faces a trilemma too, one that fits neatly into the classical paradigm. Its call for a unified response against external challenges remains fundamentally at odds with its smaller members’ right to preserve their sovereign autonomy while also constraining its effectiveness. The strong pull of Australia and New Zealand constrains the PICs’ autonomy and affects the body’s openness.

Internal frictions among the PICs further complicate the picture, as shown by the extended crisis triggered by Micronesian states’ 2022 declaration that they would withdraw from the body if representative parity with their Melanesian and Polynesian counterparts were not maintained.^[xiii] The fireworks surrounding the 2026 PIF Summit further show that smaller states’ desire to exercise autonomy and pursue openness, if the two big countries deem it unacceptable, is perceived by the latter as hampering the body’s effectiveness.

Conclusion

The problem of cohesion in these two important regional organisations may convincingly be attributed to interference by external parties, but such attribution is simplistic and confuses causes and effects. Major powers such as China and the US cannot but exploit the opportunity to place their thumb on the scales if ASEAN and PIF give them the opportunity. After all, as the Chinese proverb has it, 木先腐而后虫生 (Mù xiān fǔ ér hòu chóng shēng, Wood must first rot before worms can grow in it).

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

^[i]  Wasamon Audjarint and Sopheng Cheang, “Thailand and Cambodia Sign a New Ceasefire Agreement to End Border Fighting”, Associated Press, 28 December 2025.

^[ii] Michael O’Keefe, “Leaders Missing and China ‘Furious’: The Pacific Islands Forum Off to a Decidedly Shaky Start”, The Conversation, 1 September 2026.

^[iii] Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community”, Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper No. 441, October 2013, pp. 4–5.

^[iv] Aris Sarjito and Susanto Susanto, “The Role of ASEAN in Maintaining Political Stability in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities”, Journal of Election and Leadership, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2026, pp. 1–17.

^[v] “Timor-Leste GDP (2026)”, Worldometer; “Singapore GDP (2026)”, Worldometer.

^[vi] Logan Masilamani and Jimmy Peterson, “The ‘ASEAN Way’: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement”, Commentary, Foreign Policy Journal, 15 October 2014.

^[vii] Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 39, No. 2, August 2017, pp. 273–279.

^[viii] Justin Bassi and Euan Graham, “ASEAN’s Centrality Will Not Hold”, Commentary, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategist, 27 October 2025. To be sure, there is a growing willingness within ASEAN that this is the case, see Geo Dzаkwаn Arshаli, Vu Phuong Linh and André Paulo do Carmo Barret, “ASEAN Centrality: A View from Within”, Analysis, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 10 June 2026.

^[ix] Olivier Lewis, “Trilemma Tradeoffs in International Relations: An Analytical Framework”, Global Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2024, pp. 1–16.

^[x] Diana Thorburn, “The ‘Patch’ and the ‘Backyard’: Caribbean and Pacific Small Islands and Their Regional Hegemons”, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 56, Nos 1 and 2, 2007, pp. 240–260; Matthew Hill, “Chessboard or ‘Political Bazaar’? Revisiting Beijing, Canberra and Wellington’s Engagement with the South Pacific”, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 2010, pp. 41–58.

^[xi] Mihai Sora, “Geopolitical Competition Among the Larger Powers in the Pacific”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2022, pp. 111–126.

^[xii] Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, “China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement and Competition for Influence in Oceania”, Commentary, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2 December 2022.

^[xiii] Bernadette Carreon and Ben Doherty, “Pacific Islands Forum in Crisis as One-third of Member Nations Quit”, The Guardian, 8 February 2021; “Pacific Islands Forum Saved from Collapse at last minute as Micronesian States ‘Temporarily’ Rescind Withdrawal”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 12 February 2022.