Europe’s Sharpened Focus on Continental Defence

Introduction

The Coalition of the Willing, made up of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, at their Summit in Paris on 13 July 2026, in a joint declaration established an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Coalition for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) of Europe. They committed to build this capability under a shared architecture that complements and builds on existing national and broader ABM solutions.[1]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statements limit the coalition goals to accelerated support for the Freyja ABM project, comprising a homegrown Ukrainian interceptor supported by German radars and Norwegian Command and Control (C2) systems among its primary components. These two overlapping narratives indicate that Freyja would be the first operational deliverable of a broader effort for a futuristic ABM capability exclusive to Europe.[2] The establishment of the Bliksem EXO Consortium on 14 July 2026, an industrial collaboration for future exo-atmospheric interceptors, also reinforces this likely trajectory.[3]

Key Drivers

The key imperative for the ABM coalition remains Russia’s Ballistic Missile (BM) campaign in Ukraine. President Zelensky’s request at Paris for 300 Patriot missiles to tackle the envisaged 2026 Russian winter offensive points to a capacity and capability (technology) gap in its arsenal of Air Defence (AD)/BMD systems.[4] Ukraine counters the variety of missiles launched at its territory with an inventory which is mostly US/Europe loaned.

These include American MIM-104 Patriot (six batteries),[5] the joint Franco-Italian SAMP/T AD System, IRIS-T SLM (Germany), and some units of the Kongsberg-Raytheon National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS).[6] Amongst these, the Patriot and SAMP/T are designed to counter BMs and are reportedly deployed for high-value asset defence. While it is difficult to assess the efficacy of BMD systems in general, given the complexities involved, datasets of interceptions in Patriot-defended areas reveal a decline in interception rates of Iskander-M missiles since around 2024.[7]

The scarcity of interceptors compounds the problem. On 2 July 2026, the Ukrainian Air Force reported countering a higher number of BMs (74 missiles) fired at them in an overnight offensive, with low interception rates.[8] A similar pattern was reported in the period 12–15 May 2026.[9] Analysts ascribe the degraded performance of Ukrainian air defences to a surge in Russian offensive amid shortfalls of Patriot interceptors given the protracted US–Iran conflict.[10] The Ukrainian President’s hopes of Freyja’s operationalisation in the next 12 months come against this backdrop, enabling cheaper domestically produced interceptors that can be developed at scale.[11]

The secondary drivers for the coalition can also be understood when contextualised to the unique situation of a combined or collective approach to AD, typical of Europe and NATO-allied partners.[12] Despite complexities in concept and implementation, the guiding adage for any AD or Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture is rather basic: threat perception and threat assessment. This presents a dichotomy in the case of Europe. Unlike sovereign States that calibrate their defences based on individual threat perceptions, all signatories of the declaration (except Ukraine) are NATO members who primarily depend on the alliance IAMD framework to address threats to their skies and protect their expeditionary forces on foreign soils. This arrangement has been in place since the Cold War.

The NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) was set up in 1961, largely to tackle a manned Soviet air offensive. Its designation as NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) was formalised in 2010.[13] This was due to geopolitical changes in the late 1980s and 1990s, including the dissolution of the USSR, and newer threats of Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) perceived from states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea.[14] Notwithstanding the re-designation and its triggers, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 saw the massed aerial threats to Europe decline sharply. Concerns of BM threats from North Korea and China were not shared by many European countries, including Britain, which preferred diplomatic and deterrence postures rather than investments in BMD capability.[15]

Though the debate on building an exclusive BMD for Europe had surfaced when the US withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2003, it gained topicality in the 2010s with newer threats amidst proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and geopolitical events such as annexation of Crimea.[16] However, this relatively benign period, free of an immediate massive BM threat to Europe, resulted in a gap in related defences, philosophies and technologies, affecting national sovereign capabilities.

Hence, when the Russia–Ukraine conflict began in 2022, all nine countries were short of indigenous capabilities and numbers and depended mostly on US or imported systems. The conflict with Iran sharpened the shortages as the US shifted significant numbers to the Middle East.[17] While the need to enhance NATO and Europe’s IAMD capability has been consistently acknowledged since the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the 2025 NATO summit officially endorsed it.[18] In addition, President Donald Trump’s persistent pressure on NATO allies pointed to expectations of a greater financial and military commitment for regional defence.[19]

Efforts to enhance production of IAMD systems in Europe began soon after February 2022, aimed at arming Ukraine as well as building national capacity. These included additional procurements, production and assembly lines for the PAC-2 GEM-T interceptor of Patriots, accelerated production of Aster 30 interceptors of SAMP/T, enhanced range IRIS-T SLX (80 Km) and Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM) ER and MR variants.

The European collective AD concept also poses a problem as governments have often diverged on approaches to build capability, differing between off-the-shelf foreign systems and European-made systems. The German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), for example, relies primarily on foreign systems (US Patriots, Israeli Arrow-3), in divergence from French efforts to develop European-made capabilities and systems.[20] It is here that the tenth signatory nation, Ukraine, fits in, bringing in its European-developed Freyja system, alongside a battlefield that helps future maturation of additional systems.

It is also pertinent to note that the declaration defines the coalition as a purely defensive BMD. A possible interpretation is that, by separating AD from BMD, signatory nations retain their specific strategic military postures while allowing costly and complicated BMD systems to be built collectively. In other words, this arrangement allows alignment of offensive military postures with sovereign foreign policy while retaining enhanced, collective BMD capability.

It is also worth noting that the concept and terminology of IAMD are NATO designations. Against this context, each partner nation defines its posture and investment differently, based on geopolitical threats, deterrence value, national resilience and latitude for manoeuvre.[21] Hence, the European decision to create a sovereign BMD that complements existing NATO IAMD arrangements reflects a sharp strategy, balancing alliance management and strategic sovereignty.[22]

What Does the New Coalition Enable?

The Paris coalition declaration is a firm indicator that Europe seeks to pursue a framework that enhances its own BMD defence industry ecosystem.  Significantly, by pledging respective industrial partners to the effort, it treats defence technology and manufacturing co-operation as a prime mechanism, rather than a supplier-supporter activity.[23] The industrial dimension includes participation of major missile defence companies specialising in sensor, networking and shooter layers—Thales, Safran, MBDA, Airbus Defence &Space, MBDA Deutschland, etc. This also suggests that the declaration aims to establish the industrial landscape for future capability, targeted at Freyja, alongside an exo-atmospheric interceptor and associated sensors and C2 systems. However, this move should not be considered as a departure from NATINAMDS.

Once the systems are operational, it is expected that they may feed into the alliance operational framework, while reducing dependence on US-provided systems, beginning with interceptors. Given the sensor and tracking requirements for BMD systems, it may be suggested that this new programme feeds into or borrows from ongoing European projects [Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theatre Surveillance (TWISTER), ODIN’S EYE II and JEWEL] on combining space-based missile early warning, tracking and endo-atmospheric interceptor systems.[24]

Ukraine’s position in the coalition effort can be construed as a unique contribution to the war effort. The Freyja system, at its core, uses the Ukraine-developed FP-7x ballistic interceptor missile, produced at a cost of about US$ 700,000 per unit, compared to the much more expensive Patriots. By naming it after the Norse goddess of love, war and beauty, it acknowledges the collaborative efforts of European nations, symbolising a joint shield guarding European skies.[25] Significantly, Freyja’s most visible component is the interceptor, which allows Ukrainian technology to remain central to the European BMD framework.[26]

Conclusion

Preliminary and broad reporting refers to the European programme as a missile shield or a European BMD. Analysis reveals that the coalition of sovereign European states aims to fill a specific technological and capability gap in indigenous endo- and exo-atmospheric interceptors. The effort rides on multinational collaboration among established, albeit fragmented, defence industries and procurement systems. Though the programme mentions BMD, it appears to align capabilities into the operational framework of IAMD under NATO. It remains to be seen if the effort also includes development of sovereign European space-based layers for missile early warning and tracking.[27]

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] “Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition”, Elysee, 13 July 2026.

[2] “Freyja Enters Final Stage: Agreement Signed to Integrate German Hensoldt Radars into European Anti-ballistic Shield”, UNN, 16 June 2026.

[3] “European Defence Companies Sign Letter of Intent to Establish the Bliksem EXO Consortium”, Thales, 14 July 2026.

[4] Warren Murray with Guardian writers and agencies, “Ukraine War Briefing: Zelenskyy Seeks 300 Patriots to Get Through Winter”, The Guardian, 14 July 2026.

[5] Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “Iskander: An Improved Russian Missile Tests Ukraine’s Air Defence”, RUSI, 18 November 2025.

[6] Abbey Fenbert, “NASAMS Air Defense Systems Delivered to Ukraine, Canadian Defense Minister Says”,  The Kyiv Independent, 23 November 2024.

[7] Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “Iskander: An Improved Russian Missile Tests Ukraine’s Air Defence”, no. 5.

[8] Gleb Garanich and Olena Harmash, “Russia Bombards Kyiv”, Reuters, 2 July 2026.

[9] Yurii Kovalenko and Olena Harmash, “Zelenskiy Vows Retribution After Russian Strike on Housing Block Kills 24”, Reuters, 15 May 2026.

[10] Andrew Stuttaford, “Facing The Anti-Ballistic Missile Gap”, National Review, 10 July 2026.

[11] “Ukraine and Europe Launch FREYJA Anti-Ballistic Shield: ‘Ballistic Missiles Are Putin’s Final Bet’”, Kyiv Post, 14 July 2026.

[12] Andreas Noll, “EU Defense Remains Heavily Reliant on the United States”, DW, 12 July 2026; Rahul Wankhede, “A Global Scan of Integrated Air and Missile Defence Systems”, in Sujan Chinoy and Sukhbir Kaur Minhas (eds), Mission Sudarshan Chakra: Evolving a Futuristic Integrated Aerospace Command and Control System, 2026, pp. 15–17.

[13] “NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence”, NATO, 13 February 2025.

[14] “Strong Together”, Polska Zbrojna, 3 April 2023.

[15] Jeremy Stocker, “Britain’s Role in U.S. Missile Defense”, US Army War College Press, July 2004.

[16] Helle Dale, “With the ABM Treaty Gone, Europe Warms to Missile Defense”, European Affairs, Summer 2002; “Anti-missile Shield for Europe”, European Parliament, 12 March 2014.

[17] Emma Burrows, “As the US Shifts Missiles Towards Iran, Officials Raise Concerns of Gaps in European Air Defences”, AP News, 21 March 2026.

[18] “NATO Chief Urges 400% Increase in Alliance’s Air Defence”, RTE, 9 June 2025.

[19] “Trump Demands Europe Steps Up at NATO Summit”, Al Jazeera, 9 July 2026.

[20] “European Integrated Air and Missile Defence: Slow Progress”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Chapter 3, 2025, p. 38; IISS, Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence: An Assessment, Routledge, 2025; Sidharth Kaushal, “Integrating Allied Air and Missile Defence Systems”, European Security and Defence, 14 May 2025.

[21] Peter Roberts, “UK Ballistic-Missile Defence: Drivers and Options”, Occasional Paper, RUSI, 2015.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Maria Rugamer, “European Defence Groups Unveil Plan for Homegrown Missile Shield Interceptor”, Reuters, 14 July 2026; Jonathan Powell, “European Companies Unveil Missile Shield Plan”, Chinadaily.com.cn, 16 July 2026.

[24] Martin Rosenkranz, “Twister, Odin’s-Eye and Jewel – Europe’s Plans Against Missile Threats”, Militar Aktuell, 8 May 2026; “European Missile Defence – Unstructured Cooperation?”, IISS, 26 August 2022.

[25] Terekh, CEO/CTO Fire Point.

[26] “Norway Commits $306 Million to Help Shield Ukraine From Russian Ballistic Missiles”, United24, 8 July 2026.

[27] Nils Adler, “Russia-Ukraine War: What is Europe’s New Ballistic Missile Shield Plan?”, Al Jazeera, 14 July 2026.

Keywords : Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Defence, Europe