Publication - MP-IDSA

Foreign Policy Planning Efforts in India

Acertain element of planning is inherent in every human activity. Any decision or action that one takes anticipates consequences, sometimes immediate and sometimes distant. That is why St. Augustine has described the future as a present expectation. Viewed in this perspective, planning of some kind is a hallmark of human activity and in recent decades considerable attention has been given to organise and systematise it with a view to grappling with the ever-growing complexities of life.

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur

War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of Nehru Years by Srinath Raghavan

When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World by Martin Jacques

Japan’s Remilitarization by Christopher W. Hughes

Realism Drives India’s Foreign Policy India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension by S.D. Muni

Enduring Rivalry China and India: Prospects for Peace by Jonathan Holslag

Improving Policy Responses to Piracy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Region: What Role for India?

The participation of the Indian navy in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast is perceived by many as a manifestation of India's apparent willingness to take on a larger role on the global stage. This article explores the possibility for India to play a more important role in solving the Somali piracy crisis.

India’s Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement with the US

The debate around strategic autonomy offers a conceptual framework to understand how India, as an emerging power, tries to negotiate autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. In the context of Indo-US rapprochement, the dynamics of power relations are not commensurate with India's will to keep an acceptable degree of autonomy.

Signals and Orchestration: India’s Use of Compellence in the 2001–02 Crisis

How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.