China has not issued any official statement on the recently concluded elections in Iraq. However, in a Press Conference on February1, 2005, to a question on the elections, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that:
China has not issued any official statement on the recently concluded elections in Iraq. However, in a Press Conference on February1, 2005, to a question on the elections, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that:
“We are pleased to see and welcome the election's being held as scheduled. Now the international community is looking forward to the results of the election. We deem the election an important step in the process of Iraq's reconstruction. We hope the election would be genuinely helpful to restore stability in Iraq, grant the wishes of the Iraqi people to master their own fate and promote the political and economic reconstruction in the country.”
Earlier in November 2004, at the special conference on Iraq hosted by Egypt, which brought together representatives of over 20 countries and regional and international organizations, including Iraq's neighbouring countries, the G-8, China, the United Nations and the European Union, the Permanent Representative of the PRC at the United Nations Wang Guangya stated that:
“The Chinese government hopes the upcoming elections in Iraq, which should be just, democratic and transparent, would lead to the formation of a transitional government which represents the majority of the Iraqi people and has its due authority.”
The official media as reflected by commentaries and opinions on Iraq do identify four challenges faced by the newly elected Iraqi government, namely: the challenge posed by anti-US insurgents; the arduous task of reconstruction; the increasing schisms amongst religious groupings (sects); and, the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq.
From the perspective of the Chinese media, anti-US insurgents target US-led coalition troops and Iraqi security forces, governmental officials, foreigners and even the common people who support the interim government. These armed insurgents representing various organizations have launched attacks, explosions and suicide bomb attacks against targets.
In reconstructing Iraq, the task gets complicated owing to the shortage of oil supply due to the severely damaged oil infrastructure in addition to the uninterrupted attacks and sabotage by anti-US insurgents. These economic losses are officially estimated at several billion US dollars. This goes a long way in disproving the US’ assumptions prior to the war that oil exports are sufficient to restore Iraq’s economy. China has been participating in the process of Iraq's reconstruction by training diplomats and professionals in the fields of economic management and energy development.
Referring to public opinion polls held in the US, Europe and even Iraq, the Chinese media highlights the point that most Iraqis are disgusted with the presence of US-led coalition troops in their country though many of them also oppose anti-US insurgents. A majority of Iraqis, the People’s Daily felt, hopes for the early withdrawal of foreign troops from their country.
The Chinese media emphasised the fact that the recently concluded elections were held under the continued presence of foreign troops. These elections, while determining Iraq's future state system, the nature of state power and the redistribution of political power, received universal attention from Iraq's neighbours, the Arab world and the international community. While China emphasizes the role and importance of the United Nations in any solution to the crisis, it repeatedly calls for the maintenance of Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Implicit in China’s calls for the establishment of a “broad representative authority” to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Iraqi people are the concerns it has for the security and stability of the entire region. It could well be argued from a Chinese perspective, that the Iraq crisis reflects the confusion and dilemma of the United Nations in preventing superpowers (read US) from acting alone.
In a commentary that appeared in the People’s Daily prior to the elections in Iraq, and one that perhaps reflected China’s concerns regarding the presence of US troops in Iraq, it was mentioned that the elections were “…[A}merica's utmost effort at retrieving its image and creating conditions for its troops withdrawal from Iraq as soon as possible.” The same commentary also added that Iraq’s general election “is part of the "Greater Mid-east Plan" for the United States to carry out its democratic reform in the Middle East.”
For many Chinese commentators and opinion makers, since the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001, the United States has restrained Arab countries and the Islamic world by the twin tactics of "counter-terrorism lineation" and "political reform". Over the past three years and more, through the two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and the three general elections in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, the United States has sounded the “winds of change” for it to begin transforming the political domains of the Middle East. This “democratization process,” it is felt strongly, will pave the way for Washington to strengthen its military presence in the Middle East and its strategy of political influence.
It can be inferred that for China, Iraq's future should be determined by the Iraqi people and that the independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of the country should not be issues that complicate the existing situation. While security concerns regarding Iraq demand a comprehensive political solution and efforts have to be made to improve the same, these should fall within the framework of the development of the political process in the country. On the role of the United Nations, China believes that the Iraq issue should be solved within the framework of the UN Charter and hopes the UN can have an important role in Iraq's reconstruction.
Elections, Iraq, China
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Left-Wing Extremism in 2004: An Assessment
Sanjay K Jha
February 03, 2005
While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and multiple insurgencies in the Northeast remain the focus of India’s internal security planning, left-wing extremism (LWE) is gradually becoming another major source of concern. An assessment of the developments during the current year reveals their continuously expanding sphere of violence — both in terms of scale and intensity.
While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and multiple insurgencies in the Northeast remain the focus of India’s internal security planning, left-wing extremism (LWE) is gradually becoming another major source of concern. An assessment of the developments during the current year reveals their continuously expanding sphere of violence — both in terms of scale and intensity. The widening network of violence through linkages with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), increasing lethality of Maoist groups due to easy availability of small arms, and the open India-Nepal border have far reaching implications for India’s internal security.
From 55 districts across nine States in the country in November 2003, Maoists have been able to expand into as many as 156 districts spreading across 13 States by September 2004.[1] Although Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh remained the worst affected States, the activities of LWE groups were also reported from Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In terms of fatalities also, the LWE violence registered an upsurge in 2004. Speaking in Parliament on December 14, 2004, Minister of State of Home Sriprakash Jaiswal said that Naxal violence claimed 518 lives, including 420 civilians and 98 security force personnel between January and November 30, 2004, compared to 513 deaths in the calendar year 2003.[2]
Though the intensity and scale of LWE activities vary from state to state, a closer examination of the developments in the calendar year 2004 reveals certain broad patterns and trends. These are as follows:
Despite the ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations in Andhra Pradesh, there are indications that the Maoists remain committed to expanding their area of activity and influence.
The merger of the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People’s War), CPI-ML (PW), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) — into a single party, the Communist Party of India (Maoist), CPI-M is likely to make the LWE movement more focused, widespread and lethal.
Indian Maoists continue to maintain deep linkages with the CPN-M to further expand, consolidate and unify Maoist movements in India and across South As
The growing relationship of Maoists with insurgent groups operating in eastern and northeastern parts of India has become an additional cause of concern with serious implications for internal security.
The border areas — both inter-state borders and India-Nepal border — remain more vulnerable. Taking advantage of the peace process in Andhra Pradesh, the lack of proper co-ordination among law enforcement agencies of the two Maoist-affected states and the difficulties in managing the open India-Nepal border, the Maoists have consolidated their presence in these areas.
Several front organizations such as the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), remained active during the year to provide greater coherence and focus to Maoist movements in South Asia.
Consolidation and Expansion
Apart from a host of internal factors such as poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, existence of traditional structures of exploitation, poor performance of civil administration in rural areas and an ill-equipped police force, the dramatic expansion in Maoist influence has been, to a considerable extent, facilitated by greater ideological coherence provided by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal and also due to the activities of several front organizations in the last few years. Prominent among such organizations which remained active during the year are: the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), the World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia (WPRM South Asia), the Krantikari Jansangarsh Ekjutta Samiti and outfits involved in the Mumbai Resistance 2004.[3]
This ideological synergy is evident in the unification move among Indian Naxalite groups, the most significant being the merger between the CPI-ML (PW) and the MCCI in September 2004. These were the two most powerful groups, responsible for more than 85 per cent of the LWE violence in the country. The merger is likely to result in the end of ‘turf wars’ between the two in Bihar and Jharkhand, thereby increasing their ‘fire power’ and ‘battle ability’. Outlining the agenda of the new party, one of its prominent leaders Ramakrishna said in Hyderabad on October 14, 2004 that the thrust of the new party would be to build up the ‘people’s army’ and base areas by intensifying the ongoing ‘agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war’ throughout the country.
The merger could well be the beginning of a new phase in the history of LWE movement in India. In fact, statements by senior leaders of these groups suggest that they have been making concerted efforts to consolidate all revolutionary splinter groups into a unified and formidable force. This has put a serious question mark on the Andhra Pradesh government’s move to find a negotiated settlement with CPI-M and the CPI-ML (Janasakthi), another Maoist group operating in parts of the State.
Peace Process in Andhra Pradesh
The peace process began with a number of reconciliation measures by the Chief Minister Y S Rajashekhar Reddy soon after he assumed office on May 14, 2004. This gesture of the Congress-led government did not come as a surprise, for during the campaigning for the State Legislative Assembly elections held in April 2004, the state Congress party had made it clear that, if voted to power, it would review the policy of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Government towards Naxalites. In fact, Naxalism was one of the important issues during the elections. After the October 1, 2003 attack on Chandrababu Naidu by the PW, the former recommended dissolution of the State Assembly and opted for early elections hoping to exploit the perceived ‘sympathy wave’ in his favour. He alleged that the Congress was hand in glove with the PW and is “conspiring to gain from the extremist issue and help them later.” The PW had also made its preference clear by selectively targeting the leaders and supporters of the TDP and its ally the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).
Expectedly, soon after assuming office, the Congress-led government announced a host of unilateral concessions to the PW. On June 16, 2004, the government declared a three-month long ceasefire. On July 21, the government allowed the ban on the PW to lapse, which had been first imposed in 1992 by then Congress party Chief Minister N Janardan Reddy on the PW and its seven front organizations.
Available evidence suggests that the Naxal group has exploited the ‘favourable context’ provided by the government. Reports of armed Naxalites roaming free in villages, holding public meetings, carrying out recruitment drives, extortions and training of new recruits and strengthening of organization appeared regularly in media. Moreover, the outfit has shown no indication of any attempt to revisit its core ideology of capturing political power through armed struggle even if all of its demands are met.
In the given context, it should not come as a surprise that the first ever direct talks between the Maoist groups and the Andhra Pradesh Government, which concluded on October 18, 2004, did not produce any significant breakthrough. Though the government extended the ceasefire till December 2004, both sides could not sign a formal ceasefire agreement due to Maoist insistence on carrying arms saying that weapons have a symbolic value for their ideology and struggle.
Though it would be premature at this juncture to comment on the prospects for a negotiated settlement, there are indications that the peace process has run into trouble and there are uncertainties over the second round of talks. Speaking to media persons in Hyderabad on December 6, 2004, State Home Minister K Jana Reddy said that the present atmosphere is not conducive for a second round of peace talks with Naxalites in view of the incidents of extremist violence in some parts of the State.[4] A number of reports since the conclusion of the first round of talks suggest that the Maoists have been roaming around freely with arms and indulging in such illegal activities as extortion and illegal occupation of lands.[5]
The trajectory of peace negotiations in Andhra Pradesh demonstrates that a peace process based on an unrealistic assessment of the motivation, capabilities and activities of insurgent groups can prove to be counter-productive. Moreover, the logic of negotiating with Maoist groups in one State while the group is active in other States is questionable. In the past also, the Maoists have used the peace process as a tactic and an opportunity for recovering, consolidating and expanding themselves. For example, during the failed peace process in 2002, the PW used the opportunity to regroup itself and enhance its operational capabilities. And earlier, during the regime of Chief Ministers N T Rama Rao[6] and M Chenna Reddy (1989-90) also the PW utilized the respite provided by State Governments to revitalize its organisation. This is evident when we examine the pattern of Maoist violence in other States during the current year.
Spread of LWE Violence in Other States
In affected States, the Maoist ambition is manifested in an escalation of violence and overt mobilization. For example, Jharkhand remained one of the worst affected States where Maoists are active in approximately 18 out of its 22 districts. During the current year also, the Maoists continued with their systematic attack on security force personnel, common public, government buildings, railway stations and private sector installations. Similarly in Bihar, where approximately 30 out of its 38 districts are under their control, Maoists continued with their violent campaign, both in their traditional strongholds and in areas bordering Nepal. Chhattisgarh also witnessed a similar intensification of Maoist violence. The impact of the ceasefire in Andhra Pradesh was visible all along the Andhra Pradesh-Chhattisgarh border. Speaking in Raipur on December 5, 2004, Chief Minister Raman Singh said, “After the peace talks, Naxalites are openly moving in Andhra Pradesh and because of that the activities of the ultras have increased in the areas of Chhattisgarh close to Andhra Pradesh border.”[7] The same has been the case with border areas in Orissa and Maharashtra.
However, what has caused considerable concern within the Indian security establishment is an escalation of Maoist activities beyond their traditional strongholds in Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, 17 security force personnel were killed in a landmine blast in Chandauli district on November 20, 2004. Similarly, a number of Maoist-related incidents were reported from Uttaranchal, which has five districts bordering or proximate to Nepal. On September 6, 2004, police recovered a huge cache of arms and ammunition at a Maoist training camp believed to have been set up by the MCCI in Champawat district. Earlier, on August 30, 2004, five suspected Nepalese Maoists were arrested from the Saufutia forests of the Udham Singh Nagar District.
West Bengal too has seen an upsurge in Maoist violence. On December 4, 2004, approximately 150 armed Maoists blew up two excavators and a forest guesthouse at Kakrajhore village in West Bengal, bordering Ghatsila in East Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. Earlier, on October 16, 2004, six personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) were killed in a landmine attack in the Ormara forest in West Midnapore district. In another major incident on February 25, 2004 eight security force personnel, including five from the EFR, were killed and four injured, when a powerful landmine exploded at Golabari in Midnapore district.
Activities of Maoists were also reported from Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. In September 2004, the Tamil Nadu Government banned the PWG and its affiliated outfits.
Beyond the above mentioned affected states, there is a much wider network of covert mobilization across the country including Haryana and Punjab in the north and Gujarat and Rajasthan in the west, far from the current areas of concentration in India’s east and south.
External Linkages
The Indian Maoists continued their linkage with Nepalese Maoists with increased coordinated activities in areas along the India-Nepal border particularly in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttaranchal. The expansion of Maoist activities in border areas has certainly facilitated the use of Indian territory by Nepalese Maoists. Many Maoist cadres and leaders hiding in India were arrested on a number of occasions and handed over to the Nepalese authorities, or detained in Indian prisons. Apart from this, a number of incidents in the recent past have suggested that Maoists injured during encounters with the security forces had been treated in Indian hospitals. Besides, the India-Nepal border is also being used for supplying logistics to the Maoists.
In this context, reported apprehensions about the CPN-M and Indian Naxalites forming what is known as the Revolutionary Corridor or the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) are not entirely misplaced. The purpose of the CRZ is to facilitate easy transportation of arms across their areas of influence and quick retreat to safe havens during times of intense security force operations in any part of the CRZ. The pattern of Maoist violence in the last few years suggests that the expansion of Naxal violence in the Indian hinterland and along the border areas is broadly in conformity with the concept of the CRZ. The creation of this ‘Red Corridor’ will have serious internal security implications, as this would not only result in an area of disorder from Nepal in the north to Tamil Nadu in the south, but would also have the potential to cause instability in other areas in the Indian hinterland.
Another dimension to the Maoist use of Indian territory is their attempt to establish a network in certain border areas and areas populated by Nepali population in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Himachal Pradesh. In these areas, the Maoists already enjoy the support of a section of people of Nepal origin through outfits such as the Akhil Bhartiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES).
As far as linkages with other terrorist groups to procure arms are concerned, the links with the LTTE was reported during the current year as well. Quoting Coast Guard sources, media reports on June 18, 2004 said that the LTTE regularly supply PWG cadres with gun and munitions. The landing happens on the coastline in Krishna and Guntur districts in Andhra Pradesh.[8] In the past also, the LTTE supplied arms and imparted training in using IEDs to the PWG.
As far as linkage for mutual benefits are concerned, reports of Maoist connection with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) have added new dimensions to the Indian internal security scenario. On March 24, 2004, a senior Nepalese Maoist leader, Mohan Kiran Vaidya, was arrested near Siliguri town in West Bengal. Subsequent interrogation confirmed linkages between the Nepalese Maoists and these groups. According to media reports, the relationship assumed significance after the Royal Bhutanese Army launched an offensive on December 15, 2003 to flush out the ULFA, KLO and the NDFB. After the crackdown, a number of senior Maoist leaders reportedly met top leaders of the ULFA in north-western Bhutan and extended an invitation to them to set up camps in Nepal. The ULFA, in turn, agreed to train the Maoist cadres and provide arms.
The situation is further complicated by the apprehension that the ISI and other Pakistan-backed entities might incorporate the Maoist and Naxalite groups in their larger strategy to destabilise India. On November 25, 2004, media reports said that police have unearthed Maoist links with "contacts" based in Karachi in Pakistan, from an encounter site at Kukkalagondi Thanda in Karimnagar district of Andhra Pradesh.[9] It assumes significance in the light of reports of increased ISI activities in Nepal, and use of the unprotected India-Nepal border to infiltrate terrorists, arms and fake currency into India in the past. If the security situation in Nepal continues to deteriorate and the government is unable to maintain effective control, then the possibility of an unstable Nepal being used as a sanctuary or a staging ground by anti-India terrorist groupings cannot be ruled out.
Conclusion
Given the trajectory of left-wing extremist movement in India in the year 2004, a further escalation in violence remains a reasonably high possibility.
Apart from the traditional strongholds of the movement in Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Chhattisgarh, further consolidation and expansion of Naxal activities in newer areas in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh are likely to pose additional challenges to security forces and the government.
In view of the merger of Naxalite groups and greater ideological coherence provided by the CCOMPOSA, RIM and other front organizations, any further consolidation of the idea of the CRZ would give a boost to LWE groups and could make the Naxalite movement in India more violent than what it currently is.
The networking of Maoist organisations presents a challenge for individual states to find a way to contain or eliminate such networks beyond the boundaries of specific theatres of conflict. Disruption of such links would be effective in countering insurgencies if there is a common understanding both within India and with Nepal on the nature and trajectory of this violence, the group dynamics, their support structure, and external linkages and initiation of a series of coordinated responses.
Such joint responses must come as part of a comprehensive strategy, which objectively addresses the underlying economic and socio-political issues that give rise to and sustain such movements.
The views expressed are personal.
See Ajai Sahni, “Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic,” South Asia Intelligence Review, vol. 3, no. 12, October 4, 2004, at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_12.htm. Also see, “About 45 percent of India under terror shadow,” The Times of India (New Delhi), December 8, 2004.
Mumbai Resistance 2004: Against Imperialist Globalization and War, was an event organized on January 17-20, 2004 in Mumbai by several front organizations of Maoist outfits. The event was a good illustration of the networks in place between the Maoist guerrilla outfits, as well as their fronts, in various countries for political mobilization and expansion of its support base. It was organized parallel to the World Social Forum, 2004, held in Mumbai during January 16- 21, 2004.
NT Rama Rao was Chief Minister from 1983 to 1989, except for a brief period between August 16, 1984 and September 16, 1984 when N Bhaskara Rao was Chief Minister. During his second tenure, from 1985 to 1989, he was forced to take a tough stand against the PWG in view of an escalation in Naxalite violence.
A permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council seems well within India’s grasp. India’s long held aspirations of playing a more active role in the global affairs by acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has received a significant boost by the report submitted by the Secretary general’s high-level panel on threats, challenges and change.
A permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council seems well within India’s grasp. India’s long held aspirations of playing a more active role in the global affairs by acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has received a significant boost by the report submitted by the Secretary general’s high-level panel on threats, challenges and change. The report has recommended that all the organs of the UN including its most powerful organ – the Security Council, are in need of change and need to be made more representative of the broader membership especially of the developing world. It is widely accepted that the current composition of the Security Council is indicative of post World War II order. A new world order was established by creation of the UN with a veto for the five nations who won the Great War- the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. This club of five sits in the Security Council today because it defines security as an extension of its interests. That is why these states consider their possession of nuclear arms as legitimate, and condemn any other nuclear power as ‘irresponsible’ or potentially ‘evil’. During the Cold War, their internal differences ensured a balance but by the early nineties one half of the post-1945 arrangements had collapsed. With the vanishing of the second world, unilateralism moved in to fill the strategic vacuum. Third world countries most of whom came into existence post 1945, have often felt left out in this global structure and have been insisting that the Security Council must reflect the geopolitical realities of the twenty first century. It was with the task of strengthening the UN to meet the new threats to international peace and security in the twenty first century that the panel of sixteen eminent personalities was set up by the Secretary General.
The panel has recommended the enlargement of the Security Council and has proposed two models for the enlargement. One of the two models termed ‘Model A’ in the report, has recommended addition of six new permanent members and three new non-permanent members, thereby increasing the number of permanent members to 11 and non-permanent members to 13. The other model termed as Model B recommends creation of eight four-year renewable term (semi permanent) members and one new two-year non renewable member thereby retaining the number of permanent members to 5, increasing the number of non permanent members to 11 and creating eight semi permanent (a new category of membership) members. The report also divides the world into four zones i.e. Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Americas. Out of the six new permanent members, it recommends two each from Africa (currently unrepresented) and Asia and Pacific (currently under represented – only China) and one each from the Europe and the Americas. Based on most parameters India and Japan are the most likely candidates from Asia and Pacific, Brazil from Americas and Germany from Europe. The two representatives from Africa are likely to be selected from amongst South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. The panel report has been acclaimed by the Secretary General, who would present a report of his own in March 2005. The decisions are likely to be taken by the world leaders in September 2005 when they meet for a special summit at UN Headquarters.
In keeping with its anti-India stance – recent peace proposals notwithstanding – the proposal to enlarge the Security Council has led to deep consternation in Pakistan, as the realisation has dawned that any expansion of the Security Council will invariably lead to India’s inclusion on account of its size, geo-strategic significance, military strength and economic might. Also the way the expansion is being mooted Pakistan stands no chance of making into the expanded Security Council. This has led to Pakistan drumming up support to stall any expansion by ganging up with the lot of disgruntled countries – who are unlikely to get a seat in the expanded Security Council like Argentina and Italy. It has also come up with proposals that the selection of members should be left to respective regions thereby hoping to block India’s entry into the Security Council. The issues regarding India’s poor human rights record and its poor relations with neighbours have been raised in Pakistani media on a number of occasions to try and mar India’s prospects of making it to the Security Council. They have also raised the issue of religion saying that the Islamic world should also get a place in the expanded Security Council, without probably realising that India has the second largest population of Muslims in the world.
The report by the Secretary general’s high-level panel does not recommend veto powers for the new permanent members of the Security Council. This has led to some dejection and the foreign minister, Natwar Singh, has gone to the extent of saying that India was not impressed by any second-class status offer. The loss of veto power may somewhat diminish the lure of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council but any strong reservations by India at this juncture may be counter productive as the other countries being offered the membership may tend to accept them. This may shut the door on India’s aspirations for a long time to come. The most effective step taken by India to attain the membership was its alliance with Japan, Germany and Brazil to collectively bid for the permanent membership and any unilateral action at this juncture might severely impede Indian chances. Some sort of belated realisation seems to have dawned and the joint press statement by Brazil, Germany, India and Japan has welcomed the report. The statement supports the expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council by inclusion of developing countries to reflect today’s realities. It also urges the international community to embrace the opportunity wholeheartedly to bring about the needed change.
India should first try to get the permanent membership of the Security Council and then bid for Veto Power in conjunction with all the new permanent members of the Security Council. It may be a good ploy to ask for the withdrawal of Veto Powers from existing members and then settle for some sort of parity with the existing members. There is definitely merit in the fact that proliferation of Veto Power will end up making the Security Council a debating club. An ideal compromise could be to convert the Veto into a Half Veto i.e. a resolution can only be blocked if two or more Veto holding members vote against it. In an enhanced Security Council of 11 permanent members, it would amount to only five and a half vetoes as against five at present. Another option may be to limit the number of resolutions that can be vetoed by a particular country during a fixed period of time. The via media can always be found the important thing is that India must grab the opportunity with both hands and get into the Security Council first, if need be without the Veto Power.
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), United Nations
IDSA COMMENT
Tsunami Reveals Indian Military’s Humanitarian Response Capability
C Uday Bhaskar
January 08, 2005
The tsunami tragedy that struck large parts of Southern Asia abutting the Bay of Bengal and the South Eastern Indian Ocean littoral has been a tragic start for the New Year. It is feared that the total death toll in the affected areas may well cross the 200,000 mark. In many ways this is a multi-national disaster with the affected countries including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar amongst others and stretching all the away across the ocean to the East coast of Africa.
The tsunami tragedy that struck large parts of Southern Asia abutting the Bay of Bengal and the South Eastern Indian Ocean littoral has been a tragic start for the New Year. It is feared that the total death toll in the affected areas may well cross the 200,000 mark. In many ways this is a multi-national disaster with the affected countries including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar amongst others and stretching all the away across the ocean to the East coast of Africa.
The initial estimates of the scale of the disaster were perhaps inaccurate and it was only with the passage of a few days that the actual contours of what had happened became clear to the region and the global community. The word tsunami itself was new to the lexicon and considering that the last such occurrence in this part of the world was in 1883, it was to be expected that the entire event had a macabre tinge of novelty to it and even the professionals such as meteorologists and disaster experts across the region were caught unawares.
However what merits note is the manner in which India was able to respond to this tragedy and the kind of assistance that was provided by the Indian military within the first 24 hours. Currently there is an intense debate about why India is not seeking help from foreign sources on one hand, and the response of the global community led by the USA on the other. Various views have been expressed about Indian prickliness at one level, and the parsimony of the major powers and the kind of duties and obligations that devolve upon the global community – states and civil society – in the event of such natural disasters that warrant huge amounts of humanitarian assistance.
To examine the facts about the first determinant – the Indian response. Parts of the Indian east coast and the Andaman and Nicobar islands were devastated and the first duty was to mount necessary relief and rescue operations. This was done with alacrity and the civil administration was supported by the military wherever they were located. It is the speed with which similar succour was made available to the neighbouring states that is noteworthy. Within 12 hours of the tsunami tragedy - by sunset of December 26 - the first Indian naval helicopters were in Sri Lanka with immediate relief material. And this of course has to do with the proximate nature of the island republic to the Indian peninsula. To complement this, by Tsunami Day 2 (Dec 27) two Indian Naval ships, INS Sharada and INS Sandhayak, dropped anchor in Galle and Trincomalee respectively. The relief support to Sri Lanka began in earnest with the third ship INS Sutlej also reaching Galle by Dec 28.
Simultaneously ships were diverted to Male in the island of Maldives in the southern Indian Ocean. INS Mysore, a destroyer, arrived at Male by first light on Dec 28 while two other ships INS Udaygiri and INS Aditya arrived the following day on T Day 3, Dec 29. Many of these ships had integral helicopter capability and were able to provide support from the air as well and this immediate response was invaluable in assuring the affected people that help was on the way. Their gratitude was expressed in abundant measure on the worldwide web, which played a vital role in the dissemination of information apart from the audio-visual media.
In addition to the assistance to Sri Lanka and Maldives, the Indian military was able to reach out to Indonesia as well. INS Nirupak was converted into a hospital ship and dispatched to the worst affected country on T Day 4, Dec 30, with 40 troops embarked. At the time of writing this comment, the Indian military – which includes the Coast Guard – has deployed at peak a total of 32 ships and 5,500 army troops have been pressed into tsunami related relief effort while the air effort has seen more than 10,000 tonnes of relief supplies being air lifted to locales in and around India including the A&N islands. There is no denying that the Indian assistance to these nations is modest given the scale of the relief that is required but the spontaneity with which it was extended and the alacrity with which the Indian military was able to arrive are indicative of the credibility of the Indian humanitarian response machinery that spans the political, diplomatic and military determinant and this has some pertinent pointers for the regional security grid that the professionals will be monitoring.
As regards why India refused assistance from foreign NGOs and countries – particularly in the A&N islands. The initial and later estimates about the tsunami death toll and destruction suggested that India was in a position to deal with the tragedy. It was also felt that the other countries in the region needed this help more than India. In addition, the response from Indians across the national spectrum was immediate and generous and the challenge was to disaggregate the tasks that had to be undertaken and assign their priority. The first tenet of responding to a humanitarian disaster of this scale – whether natural or manmade – is to disaggregate the tasks. Reconnaissance and rescue of the survivors and providing immediate medical/food relief is the primary task. Invariably damaged communication and transport links always make this task formidable. Then follows the later task of rehabilitation and re-construction of shattered lives and infrastructure – which is always a long term and lonely task. More often than not the collective consciousness has a short memory and who in India now remembers the earthquake that struck Gujarat in January 2001 on Republic Day – or similar disasters over the years – except those directly affected?
The Indian estimate from informed sources is that rescue and relief is a task that India is better equipped to undertake on its own – give its economic and technological profile – and that appropriate assistance would be welcomed from all quarters for the later phase – that is rehabilitation and re-construction. For instance it is possible that India may well need aid from the global and regional monetary agencies for this latter task in the years ahead.
The final aspect is about how much aid would be deemed appropriate in such circumstances. The USA and some other nations including Germany have been castigated for being tight-fisted in their first responses and commitments. However in recent days the global response has been generous and it is estimated that the total commitments will exceed US $ 2 billion – or about Rs. 9,000 crores. My own position on aid is that the needy and impoverished cannot demand aid as a right. Yes, it is an ethical responsibility that devolves upon those more fortunate not to be so blighted but then the long cycle of history that goes back by a few thousand years tells us that man is not naturally altruistic and generous. And this abiding rhythm of human nature, like the deep ocean currents, is not likely to undergo any radical change. So the lesson is – be better prepared for the next humanitarian disaster and be more cognizant about our collective ethical responsibility to each other – whether one is an affluent foreign tourist or an impoverished native citizen - in an increasingly inter-dependent world.
(Published in Dainik Jagran, New Delhi, on 06 January 2004. The views expressed are personal.)
Tsunami
Military Affairs
IDSA COMMENT
Safeguarding the Malacca Straits
Gurpreet S Khurana
January 05, 2005
The Southeast Asian states are critically dependent on regional sea-lanes for trade since most of them have embarked on the philosophy of export-led development. These are also the energy lifelines of the East Asian states and are equally vital for global trade. The Malacca Straits and Singapore Straits enclose the busiest of these sea-lanes, through which about a quarter of the world trade passes each year aboard 50,000 vessels.
The Southeast Asian states are critically dependent on regional sea-lanes for trade since most of them have embarked on the philosophy of export-led development. These are also the energy lifelines of the East Asian states and are equally vital for global trade. The Malacca Straits and Singapore Straits enclose the busiest of these sea-lanes, through which about a quarter of the world trade passes each year aboard 50,000 vessels. These vessels also carry about half of the world's oil and two-thirds of its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to the energy-dependent economies of China, Japan and South Korea. The oil flow through the Straits is three times greater than that through the Suez Canal and fifteen times more than that through the Panama Canal.
Of late there have been periodic threats to the safety of the traffic moving through these straits from the Al Qaeda-linked regional terror network, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which continues to thrive in Southeast Asia. It was recently reported that the Al-Qaeda was in the possession of video footage of Malaysian police patrols in the Malacca Straits, indicating their potential interest in attacking the waterway. With the 805-km-long navigable channel being only 22 metres deep at its shallowest, only 1.2 nautical miles wide at its narrowest and lined with shipwrecks and shoal patches, an attack on oil tankers or vessels carrying potentially dangerous goods would be easy and rewarding for terrorists seeking to choke the straits, besides causing environmental pollution and severely affecting the littorals.
The Australian government even claims that terrorists could be planning an attack on one of these sea-lanes with a dirty bomb. Besides, other non-conventional threats like piracy and drug trafficking are also rapidly proliferating in these straits.
It is against this background that some extra-regional initiatives have been proposed with the aim of securing the Malacca Straits. India was requested by the littorals to provide security to the Straits during the 11t ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meet held earlier this year. Though reports are unconfirmed and the exact nature of the assistance sought is unclear, a senior Indian Navy Officer Cmde C Uday Bhaskar says: “Our role is being perceived as that of a responsible nation, which can create a balance in the region. Also, everyone realises that India has no ambitions of hegemony. The request also acknowledges India’s overall strategic capability.”
In case the littorals had explored the possibility of asking for patrolling assistance informally, to which the Indian External Affairs Minister had given his nod ‘in principle’, it could have been seen as an extension of several such policing requests made to India lately (there have been such requests from Mozambique and Mauritius). The new Indian maritime doctrine also lays down multilateral naval cooperation as one of the guiding principles for naval forces to address common security concerns like protection of sea- lanes, terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and transportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by sea. Besides being an endeavour to ‘build bridges of friendship’, providing security to the Malacca Straits is also vital for India due to the economic importance of energy and trade flow. It has expanding vital trading interests in the east with ASEAN and East Asia. With ASEAN, India’s trade grew by 30 per cent from US $7.6 b in 1999 to US $12.5 b in 2002 and it is projected to reach US $30 b by 2010. With China, it increased from US $3.6 b in 2001 to US $7.59 b in 2003. Though trade with Japan has been fluctuating it still remains one of India’s smajor trading partners. Trade with South Korea stood at just US $2 b, but it went up by 42 per cent till May 2004 (as compared to the corresponding period in the previous year). India’s energy demands are also heavy and growing and are projected to more than double by 2020. Insecure due to its heavy dependence on the Middle East, it intends to diversify its sources of energy in the East. Hence, security of its eastern sea-lines is an imperative that would only strengthen with time.
In addition, the mercantile traffic transiting through the Malacca Straits passes through India’s maritime zone and any contingency in the straits has security and environmental implications for India. Piracy and armed robberies of vessels are steadily spilling over to the Bay of Bengal. On the basis of 2003 statistics, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has termed Bangladesh and India as the second and third most prone countries, respectively, to such attacks, with Indonesia leading the pack. Little wonder then that India has been actively participating in curbing the threat. It also recently mooted a satellite communication network of littoral states for effective monitoring of ships’ passage across its maritime zone to forestall hijacking, piracy and transportation of WMD, wherein, a toll-free number enables ships to report their movement voluntarily.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie in the waters most frequented by drug-traffickers to fuel secessionist movements and associated terrorism. Besides joint-patrolling with Indonesia in the Andaman Sea since 2002, India has also planned a joint naval exercise with Thailand to boost cooperation in curbing arms smuggling.
Indira Point, the southern tip of Andaman and Nicobar Islands is located barely 80 nm from Indonesia's Banda Aceh and is a 3-4 hours sailing distance from the western entrance of the Malacca Straits. All ships must approach the Straits either through the 10-Degree Channel that bisects these islands or through the 6-Degree Channel south of Indira Point. Using these islands as a base, India can play a significant role in protection of the Straits. Joint patrolling with the littorals would also provide the Indian Navy with greater operational experience in dealing with non-conventional threats that abound in India’s eastern seaboard, besides facilitating greater confidence building and cohesion with regional navies. India’s security assistance in the straits could even include a 'convoy protection scheme' that is being contemplated by the littorals and for which the Indian Navy has acquired the experience through its successful 2002 mission of escorting US high-value ships through the Malacca Straits. Even the US would be amenable to India’s operational role in the straits since it is aware that by acting ‘solo’, its counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia would be futile.
(Published in the Sahara Times, New Delhi, Page 10 on 01 January 2005. The views expressed are personal.)
Al Qaeda, Coastal Security, Jamaat-e-Islami
Non-Traditional Security
IDSA COMMENT
Indo-Pak Ties and Visit of Pak PM Shaukat Aziz
C Uday Bhaskar
January 05, 2005
The intense media interest and the more modest outcome of what ultimately transpired after the just concluded visit of the Pakistani PM Mr. Shaukat Aziz to New Delhi is in many ways indicative of the tone and texture of Indo-Pak relations at the present moment. While the two nations have had a relationship of varying degrees of hostility and bitterness since October 1947, the agreement reached in January 2004 over the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) is the framework in which bi-lateral ties are now being pursued.
The intense media interest and the more modest outcome of what ultimately transpired after the just concluded visit of the Pakistani PM Mr. Shaukat Aziz to New Delhi is in many ways indicative of the tone and texture of Indo-Pak relations at the present moment. While the two nations have had a relationship of varying degrees of hostility and bitterness since October 1947, the agreement reached in January 2004 over the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) is the framework in which bi-lateral ties are now being pursued. The essence of this agreement is that Pakistan has sincerely committed that it will not support any form of terrorism or related activity against India and that New Delhi in turn will address all issues between the two countries including J&K.
As per the CDP, a series of meetings have been scheduled between officials and political leaders up to the level of the respective Foreign Ministers – and a number of areas have already been identified varying from nuclear and military CBMs to trade, commerce and people-to-people contact. However two events of recent vintage have generated considerable interest in the on-going CDP. The first is the suggestion made by Pakistani President General Musharraf at an Iftar party that the composite state of J&K could be divided into separate enclaves based on religion or ethnicity and that these could have some form of joint or UN control. This was a radical proposal to say the least and aroused considerable interest in India and those in the global community who track the sub-continent and its affairs.
The second event was the visit to Srinagar by Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh and his initiative to address the complex problem of J&K. On the eve of this first visit to J&K as PM, Dr. Singh also announced that India was willing to take the calculated risk of reducing the number of troops currently deployed in the state – and that this decision was based on a review of the current pattern of infiltration and terrorism. During his visit to Srinagar, Dr. Singh reached out to the people of the troubled state and offered both an economic package and a promise that if the path of violence was shunned, he would meet all shades of political opinion in the state. He also reiterated a consistent Indian position that whatever be the accommodation that Pakistan was seeking over Kashmir, India would not accept any form of re-drawing of boundaries or surrender of territory. Reading between the lines, it was also suggested that the autonomy and identity of the state could be restored at an appropriate time if the internal security situation and the political climate changed for the better.
This provided the backdrop for the Aziz visit to Delhi and there was much speculation about what would be achieved. The irony is that Mr. Aziz was coming to India in his SAARC capacity and his interaction with the Indian PM and other ministers were actually an add-on and not part of the CDP. However since the ball was set rolling by the Pak President about new proposals over Kashmir, this issue was upper-most in the public perception. It can now be surmised that the Aziz visit, while not being part of the CDP, has had a salutary effect in restoring the dialogue to its rightful place – the matrix of the CDP between officials and political leaders. It may be recalled that when Dr. Singh was asked to respond to the Musharraf proposal, he replied that these were stray comments at a social event and that if Pakistan were serious about this idea, it ought to be routed through the official channels.
It is relevant that during his visit to Delhi, Mr. Aziz clarified that the Musharraf proposals were made for generating some thought and debate within Pakistan and that it has served that purpose. This is welcome and it must be added that given the manner in which the Pak establishment, particularly the military and the anti-India constituency, have packaged the Kashmir issue since 1989, there is a need to inform the Pakistani people about the reality and relevance of the Kashmir ‘masla’ – as the issue is often called. In short there is a need to alter the contours of the dominant discourse within Pakistan about Kashmir and the Musharraf proposals may have had that objective in mind.
But it must also be conceded that Islamabad, which till recently was inflexible about the UN plebiscite, has now not made that the central issue and this is the sub-text of the Musharraf stance in recent months. It is also pertinent that Mr. Aziz reiterated the familiar Pakistani position that Kashmir is ‘central’ and that it must be addressed before there can be any progress on other issues including trade and people-to-people contact. So one can infer that while the Aziz visit served to restore the dialogue to the CDP, there is no major shift in the position of both sides. This is to be expected given the complexity of the K issue on one hand and the deficit of trust that now obtains between India and Pakistan at the official level.
The way ahead is to sustain the CDP – and note that this will be a long ‘process’ and not a 100 meters race as the Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh wryly observed when in Islamabad. This dialogue may be an instance where the ‘means’ is more important that the ‘ends’ – and the challenge will be to reconcile the seemingly intractable positions of the two sides. But as an analyst I would argue that if the Pakistani establishment is true to its word and desists totally from supporting any form of terrorism or religious extremism against India, then the stage will be set to improve the lives of the ordinary people on both sides – and then the political process coupled with socio-economic development can be encouraged on both sides of the divide. The Indian side is reasonably familiar with the participatory political process and notwithstanding the criticism from some quarters, it is agreed that the 2002 elections in J&K have been fair and today we have an elected government in Srinagar, a credible opposition – and the Hurriyat representing other views.
If a similar dispensation can emerge in the POK area and the COK area (China Occupied Kashmir), then the stage will be set for a meaningful inter-J&K political dialogue. This level of trust and dialogue across the divide may lead to a situation between India and Pakistan where other options present themselves by way of dealing with the J&K issue – and the aspirations and anxieties of its people. For this it may be necessary to identify those areas that can be dealt with first – the ‘low hanging fruit’ syndrome and proceed with those that are ‘doable’ in the first instance. Here the bus between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad is one possibility for it will facilitate greater people-to-people contact across the divide and if this works, it could be extended to other parts of the border, perhaps even to Sind and Rajasthan.
The real conceptual challenge is to ensure that Pakistan’s expectation that progress on Kashmir will be ‘in tandem’ with progress on other issues – a point made by Mr. Aziz during his interaction with the media – will be realized. Here it will be necessary to examine the relationship that now prevails between territoriality and sovereignty. More recent history tells us that in the evolution of a state, a point is reached when an inflexible attachment to notions of territoriality can be differently approached without making any substantive change to the formal positions that states have on contested territory. It is to be hoped that South Asia is now reaching that point and that the national interest will be accordingly defined and pursued.
Mr Shaukat Aziz is an eminent economist and perhaps he knows this logic very well. What is more important is that his boss - Gen. Musharraf - be similarly persuaded. The related responsibility for India is to ensure that the hope generated in the people of J&K is taken to its logical conclusion and that the region returns to its former rhythms and the ethos of a distinctive ‘kashmiriyat’. This intangible quality symbolizes the ethno-religious diversity within the composite state of J&K as it existed till October 1947 and this must be nurtured with consensual participation from all quarters. If this vision is realized, then the deaths of thousands in the last 15 years will not have been in vain – and the trauma of terror that has descended on the region will slowly lift.
In the interim the Aziz visit is best summed up in a sound-byte, ‘no break-through but no breakdown either!’ Inshallah, the next meeting between the Foreign Secretaries on December 7-8 will lead to more substantive results. But on balance, the Aziz visit has been satisfactory.
(Published in Dainik Jagran, New Delhi, on 27 November 2004. The views expressed are personal.)
China has not issued any official statement on the recently concluded elections in Iraq. However, in a Press Conference on February1, 2005, to a question on the elections, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that:
China has not issued any official statement on the recently concluded elections in Iraq. However, in a Press Conference on February1, 2005, to a question on the elections, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that:
Earlier in November 2004, at the special conference on Iraq hosted by Egypt, which brought together representatives of over 20 countries and regional and international organizations, including Iraq's neighbouring countries, the G-8, China, the United Nations and the European Union, the Permanent Representative of the PRC at the United Nations Wang Guangya stated that:
The official media as reflected by commentaries and opinions on Iraq do identify four challenges faced by the newly elected Iraqi government, namely: the challenge posed by anti-US insurgents; the arduous task of reconstruction; the increasing schisms amongst religious groupings (sects); and, the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq.
From the perspective of the Chinese media, anti-US insurgents target US-led coalition troops and Iraqi security forces, governmental officials, foreigners and even the common people who support the interim government. These armed insurgents representing various organizations have launched attacks, explosions and suicide bomb attacks against targets.
In reconstructing Iraq, the task gets complicated owing to the shortage of oil supply due to the severely damaged oil infrastructure in addition to the uninterrupted attacks and sabotage by anti-US insurgents. These economic losses are officially estimated at several billion US dollars. This goes a long way in disproving the US’ assumptions prior to the war that oil exports are sufficient to restore Iraq’s economy. China has been participating in the process of Iraq's reconstruction by training diplomats and professionals in the fields of economic management and energy development.
Referring to public opinion polls held in the US, Europe and even Iraq, the Chinese media highlights the point that most Iraqis are disgusted with the presence of US-led coalition troops in their country though many of them also oppose anti-US insurgents. A majority of Iraqis, the People’s Daily felt, hopes for the early withdrawal of foreign troops from their country.
The Chinese media emphasised the fact that the recently concluded elections were held under the continued presence of foreign troops. These elections, while determining Iraq's future state system, the nature of state power and the redistribution of political power, received universal attention from Iraq's neighbours, the Arab world and the international community. While China emphasizes the role and importance of the United Nations in any solution to the crisis, it repeatedly calls for the maintenance of Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Implicit in China’s calls for the establishment of a “broad representative authority” to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Iraqi people are the concerns it has for the security and stability of the entire region. It could well be argued from a Chinese perspective, that the Iraq crisis reflects the confusion and dilemma of the United Nations in preventing superpowers (read US) from acting alone.
In a commentary that appeared in the People’s Daily prior to the elections in Iraq, and one that perhaps reflected China’s concerns regarding the presence of US troops in Iraq, it was mentioned that the elections were “…[A}merica's utmost effort at retrieving its image and creating conditions for its troops withdrawal from Iraq as soon as possible.” The same commentary also added that Iraq’s general election “is part of the "Greater Mid-east Plan" for the United States to carry out its democratic reform in the Middle East.”
For many Chinese commentators and opinion makers, since the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001, the United States has restrained Arab countries and the Islamic world by the twin tactics of "counter-terrorism lineation" and "political reform". Over the past three years and more, through the two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and the three general elections in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, the United States has sounded the “winds of change” for it to begin transforming the political domains of the Middle East. This “democratization process,” it is felt strongly, will pave the way for Washington to strengthen its military presence in the Middle East and its strategy of political influence.
It can be inferred that for China, Iraq's future should be determined by the Iraqi people and that the independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of the country should not be issues that complicate the existing situation. While security concerns regarding Iraq demand a comprehensive political solution and efforts have to be made to improve the same, these should fall within the framework of the development of the political process in the country. On the role of the United Nations, China believes that the Iraq issue should be solved within the framework of the UN Charter and hopes the UN can have an important role in Iraq's reconstruction.
While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and multiple insurgencies in the Northeast remain the focus of India’s internal security planning, left-wing extremism (LWE) is gradually becoming another major source of concern. An assessment of the developments during the current year reveals their continuously expanding sphere of violence — both in terms of scale and intensity.
While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and multiple insurgencies in the Northeast remain the focus of India’s internal security planning, left-wing extremism (LWE) is gradually becoming another major source of concern. An assessment of the developments during the current year reveals their continuously expanding sphere of violence — both in terms of scale and intensity. The widening network of violence through linkages with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), increasing lethality of Maoist groups due to easy availability of small arms, and the open India-Nepal border have far reaching implications for India’s internal security.
From 55 districts across nine States in the country in November 2003, Maoists have been able to expand into as many as 156 districts spreading across 13 States by September 2004.[1] Although Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh remained the worst affected States, the activities of LWE groups were also reported from Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In terms of fatalities also, the LWE violence registered an upsurge in 2004. Speaking in Parliament on December 14, 2004, Minister of State of Home Sriprakash Jaiswal said that Naxal violence claimed 518 lives, including 420 civilians and 98 security force personnel between January and November 30, 2004, compared to 513 deaths in the calendar year 2003.[2]
Though the intensity and scale of LWE activities vary from state to state, a closer examination of the developments in the calendar year 2004 reveals certain broad patterns and trends. These are as follows:
Consolidation and Expansion
Apart from a host of internal factors such as poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, existence of traditional structures of exploitation, poor performance of civil administration in rural areas and an ill-equipped police force, the dramatic expansion in Maoist influence has been, to a considerable extent, facilitated by greater ideological coherence provided by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal and also due to the activities of several front organizations in the last few years. Prominent among such organizations which remained active during the year are: the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), the World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia (WPRM South Asia), the Krantikari Jansangarsh Ekjutta Samiti and outfits involved in the Mumbai Resistance 2004.[3]
This ideological synergy is evident in the unification move among Indian Naxalite groups, the most significant being the merger between the CPI-ML (PW) and the MCCI in September 2004. These were the two most powerful groups, responsible for more than 85 per cent of the LWE violence in the country. The merger is likely to result in the end of ‘turf wars’ between the two in Bihar and Jharkhand, thereby increasing their ‘fire power’ and ‘battle ability’. Outlining the agenda of the new party, one of its prominent leaders Ramakrishna said in Hyderabad on October 14, 2004 that the thrust of the new party would be to build up the ‘people’s army’ and base areas by intensifying the ongoing ‘agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war’ throughout the country.
The merger could well be the beginning of a new phase in the history of LWE movement in India. In fact, statements by senior leaders of these groups suggest that they have been making concerted efforts to consolidate all revolutionary splinter groups into a unified and formidable force. This has put a serious question mark on the Andhra Pradesh government’s move to find a negotiated settlement with CPI-M and the CPI-ML (Janasakthi), another Maoist group operating in parts of the State.
Peace Process in Andhra Pradesh
The peace process began with a number of reconciliation measures by the Chief Minister Y S Rajashekhar Reddy soon after he assumed office on May 14, 2004. This gesture of the Congress-led government did not come as a surprise, for during the campaigning for the State Legislative Assembly elections held in April 2004, the state Congress party had made it clear that, if voted to power, it would review the policy of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Government towards Naxalites. In fact, Naxalism was one of the important issues during the elections. After the October 1, 2003 attack on Chandrababu Naidu by the PW, the former recommended dissolution of the State Assembly and opted for early elections hoping to exploit the perceived ‘sympathy wave’ in his favour. He alleged that the Congress was hand in glove with the PW and is “conspiring to gain from the extremist issue and help them later.” The PW had also made its preference clear by selectively targeting the leaders and supporters of the TDP and its ally the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).
Expectedly, soon after assuming office, the Congress-led government announced a host of unilateral concessions to the PW. On June 16, 2004, the government declared a three-month long ceasefire. On July 21, the government allowed the ban on the PW to lapse, which had been first imposed in 1992 by then Congress party Chief Minister N Janardan Reddy on the PW and its seven front organizations.
Available evidence suggests that the Naxal group has exploited the ‘favourable context’ provided by the government. Reports of armed Naxalites roaming free in villages, holding public meetings, carrying out recruitment drives, extortions and training of new recruits and strengthening of organization appeared regularly in media. Moreover, the outfit has shown no indication of any attempt to revisit its core ideology of capturing political power through armed struggle even if all of its demands are met.
In the given context, it should not come as a surprise that the first ever direct talks between the Maoist groups and the Andhra Pradesh Government, which concluded on October 18, 2004, did not produce any significant breakthrough. Though the government extended the ceasefire till December 2004, both sides could not sign a formal ceasefire agreement due to Maoist insistence on carrying arms saying that weapons have a symbolic value for their ideology and struggle.
Though it would be premature at this juncture to comment on the prospects for a negotiated settlement, there are indications that the peace process has run into trouble and there are uncertainties over the second round of talks. Speaking to media persons in Hyderabad on December 6, 2004, State Home Minister K Jana Reddy said that the present atmosphere is not conducive for a second round of peace talks with Naxalites in view of the incidents of extremist violence in some parts of the State.[4] A number of reports since the conclusion of the first round of talks suggest that the Maoists have been roaming around freely with arms and indulging in such illegal activities as extortion and illegal occupation of lands.[5]
The trajectory of peace negotiations in Andhra Pradesh demonstrates that a peace process based on an unrealistic assessment of the motivation, capabilities and activities of insurgent groups can prove to be counter-productive. Moreover, the logic of negotiating with Maoist groups in one State while the group is active in other States is questionable. In the past also, the Maoists have used the peace process as a tactic and an opportunity for recovering, consolidating and expanding themselves. For example, during the failed peace process in 2002, the PW used the opportunity to regroup itself and enhance its operational capabilities. And earlier, during the regime of Chief Ministers N T Rama Rao[6] and M Chenna Reddy (1989-90) also the PW utilized the respite provided by State Governments to revitalize its organisation. This is evident when we examine the pattern of Maoist violence in other States during the current year.
Spread of LWE Violence in Other States
In affected States, the Maoist ambition is manifested in an escalation of violence and overt mobilization. For example, Jharkhand remained one of the worst affected States where Maoists are active in approximately 18 out of its 22 districts. During the current year also, the Maoists continued with their systematic attack on security force personnel, common public, government buildings, railway stations and private sector installations. Similarly in Bihar, where approximately 30 out of its 38 districts are under their control, Maoists continued with their violent campaign, both in their traditional strongholds and in areas bordering Nepal. Chhattisgarh also witnessed a similar intensification of Maoist violence. The impact of the ceasefire in Andhra Pradesh was visible all along the Andhra Pradesh-Chhattisgarh border. Speaking in Raipur on December 5, 2004, Chief Minister Raman Singh said, “After the peace talks, Naxalites are openly moving in Andhra Pradesh and because of that the activities of the ultras have increased in the areas of Chhattisgarh close to Andhra Pradesh border.”[7] The same has been the case with border areas in Orissa and Maharashtra.
However, what has caused considerable concern within the Indian security establishment is an escalation of Maoist activities beyond their traditional strongholds in Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, 17 security force personnel were killed in a landmine blast in Chandauli district on November 20, 2004. Similarly, a number of Maoist-related incidents were reported from Uttaranchal, which has five districts bordering or proximate to Nepal. On September 6, 2004, police recovered a huge cache of arms and ammunition at a Maoist training camp believed to have been set up by the MCCI in Champawat district. Earlier, on August 30, 2004, five suspected Nepalese Maoists were arrested from the Saufutia forests of the Udham Singh Nagar District.
West Bengal too has seen an upsurge in Maoist violence. On December 4, 2004, approximately 150 armed Maoists blew up two excavators and a forest guesthouse at Kakrajhore village in West Bengal, bordering Ghatsila in East Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. Earlier, on October 16, 2004, six personnel of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) were killed in a landmine attack in the Ormara forest in West Midnapore district. In another major incident on February 25, 2004 eight security force personnel, including five from the EFR, were killed and four injured, when a powerful landmine exploded at Golabari in Midnapore district.
Activities of Maoists were also reported from Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. In September 2004, the Tamil Nadu Government banned the PWG and its affiliated outfits.
Beyond the above mentioned affected states, there is a much wider network of covert mobilization across the country including Haryana and Punjab in the north and Gujarat and Rajasthan in the west, far from the current areas of concentration in India’s east and south.
External Linkages
The Indian Maoists continued their linkage with Nepalese Maoists with increased coordinated activities in areas along the India-Nepal border particularly in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttaranchal. The expansion of Maoist activities in border areas has certainly facilitated the use of Indian territory by Nepalese Maoists. Many Maoist cadres and leaders hiding in India were arrested on a number of occasions and handed over to the Nepalese authorities, or detained in Indian prisons. Apart from this, a number of incidents in the recent past have suggested that Maoists injured during encounters with the security forces had been treated in Indian hospitals. Besides, the India-Nepal border is also being used for supplying logistics to the Maoists.
In this context, reported apprehensions about the CPN-M and Indian Naxalites forming what is known as the Revolutionary Corridor or the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) are not entirely misplaced. The purpose of the CRZ is to facilitate easy transportation of arms across their areas of influence and quick retreat to safe havens during times of intense security force operations in any part of the CRZ. The pattern of Maoist violence in the last few years suggests that the expansion of Naxal violence in the Indian hinterland and along the border areas is broadly in conformity with the concept of the CRZ. The creation of this ‘Red Corridor’ will have serious internal security implications, as this would not only result in an area of disorder from Nepal in the north to Tamil Nadu in the south, but would also have the potential to cause instability in other areas in the Indian hinterland.
Another dimension to the Maoist use of Indian territory is their attempt to establish a network in certain border areas and areas populated by Nepali population in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Himachal Pradesh. In these areas, the Maoists already enjoy the support of a section of people of Nepal origin through outfits such as the Akhil Bhartiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES).
As far as linkages with other terrorist groups to procure arms are concerned, the links with the LTTE was reported during the current year as well. Quoting Coast Guard sources, media reports on June 18, 2004 said that the LTTE regularly supply PWG cadres with gun and munitions. The landing happens on the coastline in Krishna and Guntur districts in Andhra Pradesh.[8] In the past also, the LTTE supplied arms and imparted training in using IEDs to the PWG.
As far as linkage for mutual benefits are concerned, reports of Maoist connection with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) have added new dimensions to the Indian internal security scenario. On March 24, 2004, a senior Nepalese Maoist leader, Mohan Kiran Vaidya, was arrested near Siliguri town in West Bengal. Subsequent interrogation confirmed linkages between the Nepalese Maoists and these groups. According to media reports, the relationship assumed significance after the Royal Bhutanese Army launched an offensive on December 15, 2003 to flush out the ULFA, KLO and the NDFB. After the crackdown, a number of senior Maoist leaders reportedly met top leaders of the ULFA in north-western Bhutan and extended an invitation to them to set up camps in Nepal. The ULFA, in turn, agreed to train the Maoist cadres and provide arms.
The situation is further complicated by the apprehension that the ISI and other Pakistan-backed entities might incorporate the Maoist and Naxalite groups in their larger strategy to destabilise India. On November 25, 2004, media reports said that police have unearthed Maoist links with "contacts" based in Karachi in Pakistan, from an encounter site at Kukkalagondi Thanda in Karimnagar district of Andhra Pradesh.[9] It assumes significance in the light of reports of increased ISI activities in Nepal, and use of the unprotected India-Nepal border to infiltrate terrorists, arms and fake currency into India in the past. If the security situation in Nepal continues to deteriorate and the government is unable to maintain effective control, then the possibility of an unstable Nepal being used as a sanctuary or a staging ground by anti-India terrorist groupings cannot be ruled out.
Conclusion
The views expressed are personal.
A permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council seems well within India’s grasp. India’s long held aspirations of playing a more active role in the global affairs by acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has received a significant boost by the report submitted by the Secretary general’s high-level panel on threats, challenges and change.
A permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council seems well within India’s grasp. India’s long held aspirations of playing a more active role in the global affairs by acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has received a significant boost by the report submitted by the Secretary general’s high-level panel on threats, challenges and change. The report has recommended that all the organs of the UN including its most powerful organ – the Security Council, are in need of change and need to be made more representative of the broader membership especially of the developing world. It is widely accepted that the current composition of the Security Council is indicative of post World War II order. A new world order was established by creation of the UN with a veto for the five nations who won the Great War- the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. This club of five sits in the Security Council today because it defines security as an extension of its interests. That is why these states consider their possession of nuclear arms as legitimate, and condemn any other nuclear power as ‘irresponsible’ or potentially ‘evil’. During the Cold War, their internal differences ensured a balance but by the early nineties one half of the post-1945 arrangements had collapsed. With the vanishing of the second world, unilateralism moved in to fill the strategic vacuum. Third world countries most of whom came into existence post 1945, have often felt left out in this global structure and have been insisting that the Security Council must reflect the geopolitical realities of the twenty first century. It was with the task of strengthening the UN to meet the new threats to international peace and security in the twenty first century that the panel of sixteen eminent personalities was set up by the Secretary General.
The panel has recommended the enlargement of the Security Council and has proposed two models for the enlargement. One of the two models termed ‘Model A’ in the report, has recommended addition of six new permanent members and three new non-permanent members, thereby increasing the number of permanent members to 11 and non-permanent members to 13. The other model termed as Model B recommends creation of eight four-year renewable term (semi permanent) members and one new two-year non renewable member thereby retaining the number of permanent members to 5, increasing the number of non permanent members to 11 and creating eight semi permanent (a new category of membership) members. The report also divides the world into four zones i.e. Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Americas. Out of the six new permanent members, it recommends two each from Africa (currently unrepresented) and Asia and Pacific (currently under represented – only China) and one each from the Europe and the Americas. Based on most parameters India and Japan are the most likely candidates from Asia and Pacific, Brazil from Americas and Germany from Europe. The two representatives from Africa are likely to be selected from amongst South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. The panel report has been acclaimed by the Secretary General, who would present a report of his own in March 2005. The decisions are likely to be taken by the world leaders in September 2005 when they meet for a special summit at UN Headquarters.
In keeping with its anti-India stance – recent peace proposals notwithstanding – the proposal to enlarge the Security Council has led to deep consternation in Pakistan, as the realisation has dawned that any expansion of the Security Council will invariably lead to India’s inclusion on account of its size, geo-strategic significance, military strength and economic might. Also the way the expansion is being mooted Pakistan stands no chance of making into the expanded Security Council. This has led to Pakistan drumming up support to stall any expansion by ganging up with the lot of disgruntled countries – who are unlikely to get a seat in the expanded Security Council like Argentina and Italy. It has also come up with proposals that the selection of members should be left to respective regions thereby hoping to block India’s entry into the Security Council. The issues regarding India’s poor human rights record and its poor relations with neighbours have been raised in Pakistani media on a number of occasions to try and mar India’s prospects of making it to the Security Council. They have also raised the issue of religion saying that the Islamic world should also get a place in the expanded Security Council, without probably realising that India has the second largest population of Muslims in the world.
The report by the Secretary general’s high-level panel does not recommend veto powers for the new permanent members of the Security Council. This has led to some dejection and the foreign minister, Natwar Singh, has gone to the extent of saying that India was not impressed by any second-class status offer. The loss of veto power may somewhat diminish the lure of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council but any strong reservations by India at this juncture may be counter productive as the other countries being offered the membership may tend to accept them. This may shut the door on India’s aspirations for a long time to come. The most effective step taken by India to attain the membership was its alliance with Japan, Germany and Brazil to collectively bid for the permanent membership and any unilateral action at this juncture might severely impede Indian chances. Some sort of belated realisation seems to have dawned and the joint press statement by Brazil, Germany, India and Japan has welcomed the report. The statement supports the expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council by inclusion of developing countries to reflect today’s realities. It also urges the international community to embrace the opportunity wholeheartedly to bring about the needed change.
India should first try to get the permanent membership of the Security Council and then bid for Veto Power in conjunction with all the new permanent members of the Security Council. It may be a good ploy to ask for the withdrawal of Veto Powers from existing members and then settle for some sort of parity with the existing members. There is definitely merit in the fact that proliferation of Veto Power will end up making the Security Council a debating club. An ideal compromise could be to convert the Veto into a Half Veto i.e. a resolution can only be blocked if two or more Veto holding members vote against it. In an enhanced Security Council of 11 permanent members, it would amount to only five and a half vetoes as against five at present. Another option may be to limit the number of resolutions that can be vetoed by a particular country during a fixed period of time. The via media can always be found the important thing is that India must grab the opportunity with both hands and get into the Security Council first, if need be without the Veto Power.
The tsunami tragedy that struck large parts of Southern Asia abutting the Bay of Bengal and the South Eastern Indian Ocean littoral has been a tragic start for the New Year. It is feared that the total death toll in the affected areas may well cross the 200,000 mark. In many ways this is a multi-national disaster with the affected countries including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar amongst others and stretching all the away across the ocean to the East coast of Africa.
The tsunami tragedy that struck large parts of Southern Asia abutting the Bay of Bengal and the South Eastern Indian Ocean littoral has been a tragic start for the New Year. It is feared that the total death toll in the affected areas may well cross the 200,000 mark. In many ways this is a multi-national disaster with the affected countries including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar amongst others and stretching all the away across the ocean to the East coast of Africa.
The initial estimates of the scale of the disaster were perhaps inaccurate and it was only with the passage of a few days that the actual contours of what had happened became clear to the region and the global community. The word tsunami itself was new to the lexicon and considering that the last such occurrence in this part of the world was in 1883, it was to be expected that the entire event had a macabre tinge of novelty to it and even the professionals such as meteorologists and disaster experts across the region were caught unawares.
However what merits note is the manner in which India was able to respond to this tragedy and the kind of assistance that was provided by the Indian military within the first 24 hours. Currently there is an intense debate about why India is not seeking help from foreign sources on one hand, and the response of the global community led by the USA on the other. Various views have been expressed about Indian prickliness at one level, and the parsimony of the major powers and the kind of duties and obligations that devolve upon the global community – states and civil society – in the event of such natural disasters that warrant huge amounts of humanitarian assistance.
To examine the facts about the first determinant – the Indian response. Parts of the Indian east coast and the Andaman and Nicobar islands were devastated and the first duty was to mount necessary relief and rescue operations. This was done with alacrity and the civil administration was supported by the military wherever they were located. It is the speed with which similar succour was made available to the neighbouring states that is noteworthy. Within 12 hours of the tsunami tragedy - by sunset of December 26 - the first Indian naval helicopters were in Sri Lanka with immediate relief material. And this of course has to do with the proximate nature of the island republic to the Indian peninsula. To complement this, by Tsunami Day 2 (Dec 27) two Indian Naval ships, INS Sharada and INS Sandhayak, dropped anchor in Galle and Trincomalee respectively. The relief support to Sri Lanka began in earnest with the third ship INS Sutlej also reaching Galle by Dec 28.
Simultaneously ships were diverted to Male in the island of Maldives in the southern Indian Ocean. INS Mysore, a destroyer, arrived at Male by first light on Dec 28 while two other ships INS Udaygiri and INS Aditya arrived the following day on T Day 3, Dec 29. Many of these ships had integral helicopter capability and were able to provide support from the air as well and this immediate response was invaluable in assuring the affected people that help was on the way. Their gratitude was expressed in abundant measure on the worldwide web, which played a vital role in the dissemination of information apart from the audio-visual media.
In addition to the assistance to Sri Lanka and Maldives, the Indian military was able to reach out to Indonesia as well. INS Nirupak was converted into a hospital ship and dispatched to the worst affected country on T Day 4, Dec 30, with 40 troops embarked. At the time of writing this comment, the Indian military – which includes the Coast Guard – has deployed at peak a total of 32 ships and 5,500 army troops have been pressed into tsunami related relief effort while the air effort has seen more than 10,000 tonnes of relief supplies being air lifted to locales in and around India including the A&N islands. There is no denying that the Indian assistance to these nations is modest given the scale of the relief that is required but the spontaneity with which it was extended and the alacrity with which the Indian military was able to arrive are indicative of the credibility of the Indian humanitarian response machinery that spans the political, diplomatic and military determinant and this has some pertinent pointers for the regional security grid that the professionals will be monitoring.
As regards why India refused assistance from foreign NGOs and countries – particularly in the A&N islands. The initial and later estimates about the tsunami death toll and destruction suggested that India was in a position to deal with the tragedy. It was also felt that the other countries in the region needed this help more than India. In addition, the response from Indians across the national spectrum was immediate and generous and the challenge was to disaggregate the tasks that had to be undertaken and assign their priority. The first tenet of responding to a humanitarian disaster of this scale – whether natural or manmade – is to disaggregate the tasks. Reconnaissance and rescue of the survivors and providing immediate medical/food relief is the primary task. Invariably damaged communication and transport links always make this task formidable. Then follows the later task of rehabilitation and re-construction of shattered lives and infrastructure – which is always a long term and lonely task. More often than not the collective consciousness has a short memory and who in India now remembers the earthquake that struck Gujarat in January 2001 on Republic Day – or similar disasters over the years – except those directly affected?
The Indian estimate from informed sources is that rescue and relief is a task that India is better equipped to undertake on its own – give its economic and technological profile – and that appropriate assistance would be welcomed from all quarters for the later phase – that is rehabilitation and re-construction. For instance it is possible that India may well need aid from the global and regional monetary agencies for this latter task in the years ahead.
The final aspect is about how much aid would be deemed appropriate in such circumstances. The USA and some other nations including Germany have been castigated for being tight-fisted in their first responses and commitments. However in recent days the global response has been generous and it is estimated that the total commitments will exceed US $ 2 billion – or about Rs. 9,000 crores. My own position on aid is that the needy and impoverished cannot demand aid as a right. Yes, it is an ethical responsibility that devolves upon those more fortunate not to be so blighted but then the long cycle of history that goes back by a few thousand years tells us that man is not naturally altruistic and generous. And this abiding rhythm of human nature, like the deep ocean currents, is not likely to undergo any radical change. So the lesson is – be better prepared for the next humanitarian disaster and be more cognizant about our collective ethical responsibility to each other – whether one is an affluent foreign tourist or an impoverished native citizen - in an increasingly inter-dependent world.
(Published in Dainik Jagran, New Delhi, on 06 January 2004. The views expressed are personal.)
The Southeast Asian states are critically dependent on regional sea-lanes for trade since most of them have embarked on the philosophy of export-led development. These are also the energy lifelines of the East Asian states and are equally vital for global trade. The Malacca Straits and Singapore Straits enclose the busiest of these sea-lanes, through which about a quarter of the world trade passes each year aboard 50,000 vessels.
The Southeast Asian states are critically dependent on regional sea-lanes for trade since most of them have embarked on the philosophy of export-led development. These are also the energy lifelines of the East Asian states and are equally vital for global trade. The Malacca Straits and Singapore Straits enclose the busiest of these sea-lanes, through which about a quarter of the world trade passes each year aboard 50,000 vessels. These vessels also carry about half of the world's oil and two-thirds of its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to the energy-dependent economies of China, Japan and South Korea. The oil flow through the Straits is three times greater than that through the Suez Canal and fifteen times more than that through the Panama Canal.
Of late there have been periodic threats to the safety of the traffic moving through these straits from the Al Qaeda-linked regional terror network, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which continues to thrive in Southeast Asia. It was recently reported that the Al-Qaeda was in the possession of video footage of Malaysian police patrols in the Malacca Straits, indicating their potential interest in attacking the waterway. With the 805-km-long navigable channel being only 22 metres deep at its shallowest, only 1.2 nautical miles wide at its narrowest and lined with shipwrecks and shoal patches, an attack on oil tankers or vessels carrying potentially dangerous goods would be easy and rewarding for terrorists seeking to choke the straits, besides causing environmental pollution and severely affecting the littorals.
The Australian government even claims that terrorists could be planning an attack on one of these sea-lanes with a dirty bomb. Besides, other non-conventional threats like piracy and drug trafficking are also rapidly proliferating in these straits.
It is against this background that some extra-regional initiatives have been proposed with the aim of securing the Malacca Straits. India was requested by the littorals to provide security to the Straits during the 11t ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meet held earlier this year. Though reports are unconfirmed and the exact nature of the assistance sought is unclear, a senior Indian Navy Officer Cmde C Uday Bhaskar says: “Our role is being perceived as that of a responsible nation, which can create a balance in the region. Also, everyone realises that India has no ambitions of hegemony. The request also acknowledges India’s overall strategic capability.”
In case the littorals had explored the possibility of asking for patrolling assistance informally, to which the Indian External Affairs Minister had given his nod ‘in principle’, it could have been seen as an extension of several such policing requests made to India lately (there have been such requests from Mozambique and Mauritius). The new Indian maritime doctrine also lays down multilateral naval cooperation as one of the guiding principles for naval forces to address common security concerns like protection of sea- lanes, terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and transportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by sea. Besides being an endeavour to ‘build bridges of friendship’, providing security to the Malacca Straits is also vital for India due to the economic importance of energy and trade flow. It has expanding vital trading interests in the east with ASEAN and East Asia. With ASEAN, India’s trade grew by 30 per cent from US $7.6 b in 1999 to US $12.5 b in 2002 and it is projected to reach US $30 b by 2010. With China, it increased from US $3.6 b in 2001 to US $7.59 b in 2003. Though trade with Japan has been fluctuating it still remains one of India’s smajor trading partners. Trade with South Korea stood at just US $2 b, but it went up by 42 per cent till May 2004 (as compared to the corresponding period in the previous year). India’s energy demands are also heavy and growing and are projected to more than double by 2020. Insecure due to its heavy dependence on the Middle East, it intends to diversify its sources of energy in the East. Hence, security of its eastern sea-lines is an imperative that would only strengthen with time.
In addition, the mercantile traffic transiting through the Malacca Straits passes through India’s maritime zone and any contingency in the straits has security and environmental implications for India. Piracy and armed robberies of vessels are steadily spilling over to the Bay of Bengal. On the basis of 2003 statistics, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has termed Bangladesh and India as the second and third most prone countries, respectively, to such attacks, with Indonesia leading the pack. Little wonder then that India has been actively participating in curbing the threat. It also recently mooted a satellite communication network of littoral states for effective monitoring of ships’ passage across its maritime zone to forestall hijacking, piracy and transportation of WMD, wherein, a toll-free number enables ships to report their movement voluntarily.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie in the waters most frequented by drug-traffickers to fuel secessionist movements and associated terrorism. Besides joint-patrolling with Indonesia in the Andaman Sea since 2002, India has also planned a joint naval exercise with Thailand to boost cooperation in curbing arms smuggling.
Indira Point, the southern tip of Andaman and Nicobar Islands is located barely 80 nm from Indonesia's Banda Aceh and is a 3-4 hours sailing distance from the western entrance of the Malacca Straits. All ships must approach the Straits either through the 10-Degree Channel that bisects these islands or through the 6-Degree Channel south of Indira Point. Using these islands as a base, India can play a significant role in protection of the Straits. Joint patrolling with the littorals would also provide the Indian Navy with greater operational experience in dealing with non-conventional threats that abound in India’s eastern seaboard, besides facilitating greater confidence building and cohesion with regional navies. India’s security assistance in the straits could even include a 'convoy protection scheme' that is being contemplated by the littorals and for which the Indian Navy has acquired the experience through its successful 2002 mission of escorting US high-value ships through the Malacca Straits. Even the US would be amenable to India’s operational role in the straits since it is aware that by acting ‘solo’, its counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia would be futile.
(Published in the Sahara Times, New Delhi, Page 10 on 01 January 2005. The views expressed are personal.)
The intense media interest and the more modest outcome of what ultimately transpired after the just concluded visit of the Pakistani PM Mr. Shaukat Aziz to New Delhi is in many ways indicative of the tone and texture of Indo-Pak relations at the present moment. While the two nations have had a relationship of varying degrees of hostility and bitterness since October 1947, the agreement reached in January 2004 over the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) is the framework in which bi-lateral ties are now being pursued.
The intense media interest and the more modest outcome of what ultimately transpired after the just concluded visit of the Pakistani PM Mr. Shaukat Aziz to New Delhi is in many ways indicative of the tone and texture of Indo-Pak relations at the present moment. While the two nations have had a relationship of varying degrees of hostility and bitterness since October 1947, the agreement reached in January 2004 over the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) is the framework in which bi-lateral ties are now being pursued. The essence of this agreement is that Pakistan has sincerely committed that it will not support any form of terrorism or related activity against India and that New Delhi in turn will address all issues between the two countries including J&K.
As per the CDP, a series of meetings have been scheduled between officials and political leaders up to the level of the respective Foreign Ministers – and a number of areas have already been identified varying from nuclear and military CBMs to trade, commerce and people-to-people contact. However two events of recent vintage have generated considerable interest in the on-going CDP. The first is the suggestion made by Pakistani President General Musharraf at an Iftar party that the composite state of J&K could be divided into separate enclaves based on religion or ethnicity and that these could have some form of joint or UN control. This was a radical proposal to say the least and aroused considerable interest in India and those in the global community who track the sub-continent and its affairs.
The second event was the visit to Srinagar by Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh and his initiative to address the complex problem of J&K. On the eve of this first visit to J&K as PM, Dr. Singh also announced that India was willing to take the calculated risk of reducing the number of troops currently deployed in the state – and that this decision was based on a review of the current pattern of infiltration and terrorism. During his visit to Srinagar, Dr. Singh reached out to the people of the troubled state and offered both an economic package and a promise that if the path of violence was shunned, he would meet all shades of political opinion in the state. He also reiterated a consistent Indian position that whatever be the accommodation that Pakistan was seeking over Kashmir, India would not accept any form of re-drawing of boundaries or surrender of territory. Reading between the lines, it was also suggested that the autonomy and identity of the state could be restored at an appropriate time if the internal security situation and the political climate changed for the better.
This provided the backdrop for the Aziz visit to Delhi and there was much speculation about what would be achieved. The irony is that Mr. Aziz was coming to India in his SAARC capacity and his interaction with the Indian PM and other ministers were actually an add-on and not part of the CDP. However since the ball was set rolling by the Pak President about new proposals over Kashmir, this issue was upper-most in the public perception. It can now be surmised that the Aziz visit, while not being part of the CDP, has had a salutary effect in restoring the dialogue to its rightful place – the matrix of the CDP between officials and political leaders. It may be recalled that when Dr. Singh was asked to respond to the Musharraf proposal, he replied that these were stray comments at a social event and that if Pakistan were serious about this idea, it ought to be routed through the official channels.
It is relevant that during his visit to Delhi, Mr. Aziz clarified that the Musharraf proposals were made for generating some thought and debate within Pakistan and that it has served that purpose. This is welcome and it must be added that given the manner in which the Pak establishment, particularly the military and the anti-India constituency, have packaged the Kashmir issue since 1989, there is a need to inform the Pakistani people about the reality and relevance of the Kashmir ‘masla’ – as the issue is often called. In short there is a need to alter the contours of the dominant discourse within Pakistan about Kashmir and the Musharraf proposals may have had that objective in mind.
But it must also be conceded that Islamabad, which till recently was inflexible about the UN plebiscite, has now not made that the central issue and this is the sub-text of the Musharraf stance in recent months. It is also pertinent that Mr. Aziz reiterated the familiar Pakistani position that Kashmir is ‘central’ and that it must be addressed before there can be any progress on other issues including trade and people-to-people contact. So one can infer that while the Aziz visit served to restore the dialogue to the CDP, there is no major shift in the position of both sides. This is to be expected given the complexity of the K issue on one hand and the deficit of trust that now obtains between India and Pakistan at the official level.
The way ahead is to sustain the CDP – and note that this will be a long ‘process’ and not a 100 meters race as the Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh wryly observed when in Islamabad. This dialogue may be an instance where the ‘means’ is more important that the ‘ends’ – and the challenge will be to reconcile the seemingly intractable positions of the two sides. But as an analyst I would argue that if the Pakistani establishment is true to its word and desists totally from supporting any form of terrorism or religious extremism against India, then the stage will be set to improve the lives of the ordinary people on both sides – and then the political process coupled with socio-economic development can be encouraged on both sides of the divide. The Indian side is reasonably familiar with the participatory political process and notwithstanding the criticism from some quarters, it is agreed that the 2002 elections in J&K have been fair and today we have an elected government in Srinagar, a credible opposition – and the Hurriyat representing other views.
If a similar dispensation can emerge in the POK area and the COK area (China Occupied Kashmir), then the stage will be set for a meaningful inter-J&K political dialogue. This level of trust and dialogue across the divide may lead to a situation between India and Pakistan where other options present themselves by way of dealing with the J&K issue – and the aspirations and anxieties of its people. For this it may be necessary to identify those areas that can be dealt with first – the ‘low hanging fruit’ syndrome and proceed with those that are ‘doable’ in the first instance. Here the bus between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad is one possibility for it will facilitate greater people-to-people contact across the divide and if this works, it could be extended to other parts of the border, perhaps even to Sind and Rajasthan.
The real conceptual challenge is to ensure that Pakistan’s expectation that progress on Kashmir will be ‘in tandem’ with progress on other issues – a point made by Mr. Aziz during his interaction with the media – will be realized. Here it will be necessary to examine the relationship that now prevails between territoriality and sovereignty. More recent history tells us that in the evolution of a state, a point is reached when an inflexible attachment to notions of territoriality can be differently approached without making any substantive change to the formal positions that states have on contested territory. It is to be hoped that South Asia is now reaching that point and that the national interest will be accordingly defined and pursued.
Mr Shaukat Aziz is an eminent economist and perhaps he knows this logic very well. What is more important is that his boss - Gen. Musharraf - be similarly persuaded. The related responsibility for India is to ensure that the hope generated in the people of J&K is taken to its logical conclusion and that the region returns to its former rhythms and the ethos of a distinctive ‘kashmiriyat’. This intangible quality symbolizes the ethno-religious diversity within the composite state of J&K as it existed till October 1947 and this must be nurtured with consensual participation from all quarters. If this vision is realized, then the deaths of thousands in the last 15 years will not have been in vain – and the trauma of terror that has descended on the region will slowly lift.
In the interim the Aziz visit is best summed up in a sound-byte, ‘no break-through but no breakdown either!’ Inshallah, the next meeting between the Foreign Secretaries on December 7-8 will lead to more substantive results. But on balance, the Aziz visit has been satisfactory.
(Published in Dainik Jagran, New Delhi, on 27 November 2004. The views expressed are personal.)
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