On December 5, 2005, the National Convention reconvened to resume the process of drafting a new Constitution. Without doubt the process of framing a new Constitution for Myanmar has been a long drawn out one. The National Convention, with over 1,000 delegates from various national races and groups, and comparable to a constituent assembly, first began its task in 1993. It last held its meetings between February 17 and March 31, 2005.

The National Convention, which the military junta reconvened, faces opposition - both domestic and international. At the international level, the opposition was in the form of the Tutu-Havel Report and in the American proposal to the UN Security Council to discuss the problem of political transition in Myanmar. The latter proposal was accepted by the UN Security Council members who agreed to discuss the problem and have the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan brief them. This brings Myanmar once again on to the centre stage.

At the domestic level, there was opposition from ethnic groups when some of its leaders were put under arrest. Eleven political parties issued a statement expressing distrust in the National Convention and sought the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. They reiterated their aspiration or:

• The establishment of a federal union.
• Equality among various ethnic groups.
• The right to self-determination of all ethnic groups.

Second was the public reaction when the SPDC undertook the relocation of its capital 400 kms north of Yangon to Pyinmana on November 6, almost exactly one month prior to the reconvening of the National Convention. It appears that the government's intention behind this move was to strengthen the military's hold. Meanwhile, the SPDC has declared that the government sponsored social organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) set up in 1993, may soon overtly transform itself into a political party. It claims a membership of 22 million (whereas Myanmar's total population itself is only a little over 50 million). Thus it would be logical to expect this group, modelled on Indonesia's Golkar party, to be a serious contender in any elections in the future.

The National Convention had held its deliberations between May and July 2004 after a long gap since its suspension in March 1996. Its initial meetings were convened between 1993 and 1996. The National League for Democracy, whose leader Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest was extended on November 27, continues to boycott the Convention.

After the National Convention adjourned in July 2004, differences relating to a seven-point proposal presented by the 13 cease-fire groups participating in the Convention on June 9, 2004, surfaced. The proposal had suggested greater power to the states, including control over foreign policy for states sharing international boundaries with other countries, and the right to have separate armed forces. The National Convention Convening Commission rejected these suggestions, as they were not found to be in conformity with the six National Convention objectives and the 104 basic principles. A modus vivendi nonetheless appears to have been worked out under which the authorities agreed to put the proposal on record and the cease-fire groups agreed not to read the proposal at the plenary meeting.

It may be recalled that Myanmar has had two Constitutions: one promulgated in 1947 and the other in 1974. The Constitution of the "Union of Burma" formulated by the Constituent Assembly in 1947 delineated a quasi-federal union with a centralized Union Government and constituent (ethnic based) States supervised by State Councils. Some States (Shan and Kayah) enjoyed the right to secede after ten years. When General Ne Win captured power in 1962, he demolished the parliamentary democratic structure, suspended the Constitution and installed in its place the Revolutionary Council. The 1974 Constitution, which he put in place, stipulated a unitary State (vide Article 11). Importantly, while Article 22 guarantees the basic rights of all citizens before the law, Article 153b takes away this right by stating that the exercise of such rights must not be "to the detriment of national solidarity and the socialist social order." Needless to add, these provisions are contrary to the provisions of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides for the right of freedom of opinion and expression. Following the 1988 uprising, the military reasserted itself, the Constitution was abrogated and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was established [subsequently replaced in 1997 by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)].

The latest attempt to frame a new Constitution dates back to 1993 when the National Convention was first convened by SLORC. The National Convention's composition ensured that the military's voice would dominate its deliberations and the Constitution that would finally emerge would consequently ensure a significant place for it in the governance of the country. The NLD participated in the National Convention initially but walked out of it in December 1995. It did not wish to fritter away the legitimacy it had secured in 1990 by participating in a National Convention in which it was only a small constituent. The SLORC had annulled these election results - its contention being that these elections were meant to select representatives for a constitution-drafting body rather than a national assembly. Discussions in the National Convention led to specific chapter headings for the Constitution and the basic principles for each of the chapters. These principles were then approved by the National Convention Convening Commission. Now, based on this consensus, the elected representatives have to draft a new Constitution (with assistance and suggestions from the SPDC). The draft would then be put to a national referendum. In the meantime sovereign power would reside with the SPDC.

The SPDC is under renewed pressure from the West and ASEAN. It will have to convince the world community about the seriousness with which it is implementing political reforms. It appears intent on going ahead with the seven-point road to democracy. The systematic manner in which the SPDC is proceeding with the National Convention would indicate that it has a set plan in mind. Is it willing to make fundamental changes to that plan to accommodate international pressures for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi? Would the international community and the neighbours especially be prepared to accept the consequences of any disturbance that may follow? Is the neighbourhood ready to accept an influx of refugees if a prolonged civil war ensues? Are there credible and capable institutions within the country which could ensure stability in a post-conflict Myanmar? Answers to these questions would indicate the likely manner in which the political transition might unfold. Be that as it may, the long years of rule by the military has drained other institutions within the country of their strength. To ensure a smooth process of regime transition, a step-by-step approach to democracy, rather than an externally imposed solution, would be a preferred alternative.

In 2001, Uzbekistan opted to become the linchpin of US policy goals in Central Asia. It was then argued that Washington would guarantee the nurturing of geo-political pluralism in the region. This was viewed against the backdrop of the historical ascendancy of China and the imperial decline of Russia. Much has happened since then. Today the US is facing a deadline to quit its airbase in Karshi-Khanabad (K-2), set up in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, because of Tashkent’s suspicion that Washington had plotted the revolt in Andijan on May 13, which led to a bloody massacre. Following protracted information warfare, the US helped airlift 439 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania on 29 July in the garb of a UN operation. Hours later, an infuriated Karimov gave the US 180 days to quit. Karimov finally discovered America’s opportunistic aspect and feared that a plot was aimed at regime change a la Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

In Central Asia, things are likely to get worse before they get better. In a recent conference at Tashkent, Russian strategic pundits displayed utmost self-confidence in predicting a triumphant Russian re-entry into the region. The Andijan crisis may have triggered the current Uzbek-US rift, but political pressure from Moscow has probably played a part in exacerbating it further. Moscow, it seems, has taken full advantage of US entanglement in Iraq to re-claim Central Asia within its sphere of influence. Signs of an Uzbek rapprochement with Russia were visible from last year when Karimov favoured Russia’s Gazprom and LUKoil rather than US firms for long-term investments in Uzbekistan’s gas fields. Gossip doing the rounds is that Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara, who is facing an arrest warrant for contempt of court over a divorce case, managed to cut a major business deal with a Russian oligarch. This was a vital factor for the change in Uzbek foreign policy orientation.

In the current balance of advantage, Islam Karimov has hopped off the fence to embrace Russia and is using the China-driven SCO to contain American presence in the region. The Tashkent conference was sponsored by the Moscow based think tank Fund Politika led by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who inter alia was in Tashkent in June to spin-doctor the Uzbek counterattack against Western media.

The Uzbeks appear to have run out of options in their initial approach of playing a ‘multi-strategic’ game, which they thought would serve several objectives ranging from curbing terrorism, WMD, fundamentalism and drug trafficking. They perceive the US as not reciprocating their support for the war against terror, and instead, see it playing the old game. Tashkent’s accusation that a joint US, NATO, and EU resolution seeking investigation into the Andijan killings was prepared prior to the unrest, cannot be verified. By giving 180 days deadline for the US to leave, Tashkent seems to have left no room for a diplomatic settlement of the imbroglio. The US says it is prepared to vacate K-2. Some Uzbeks probably still feel that moderation is required if there is to be any hope of bridging the rift.

The turning point for Washington was the July 5 SCO summit in Astana, when Central Asian states, guided by China and Russia, set a deadline for ending US military presence in the region. The Chinese perceive the US motivation for seeking regime change in Central Asia as a stepping-stone for pursuing its policy goals in Xinjiang, where a movement for independent Uighuristan is gaining momentum. Uzbekistan might have given the US six months to leave, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, following Rumsfeld’s visit on July 25, continue to favour the US presence until stability returns to Afghanistan. Bishkek is seeking amendments in the air base agreement to allow for more payments by US. Perhaps, more alarming to Washington was Peace Mission 2005 – the first ever Sino-Russian military manoeuvres in August, which made Rumsfeld rush to East Asia to ascertain the seriousness of the situation firsthand.

Unable to match Russian and Chinese localized strengths, the US is relying on its strategy of promoting democracy and human rights to bring about democratic change in Central Asia. Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice toured the region last month to boost the morale of opposition and democratic forces and did not hide their support for pro-democracy and civil society groups. Last month, Congressman Christopher Smith (Republican) announced legislation to halt both military and humanitarian aid to Central Asian governments that fail to democratise or respect human rights.

Meanwhile, rumours about the US seeking alternative bases elsewhere and a new air base in Turkmenistan have been immediately addressed by Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dashed to Ashghabat on October 21, where he was assured by Turkmanbashi that such a move was not on the cards. This fear arose when Turkmenistan recently renounced its membership of the CIS.

The overwhelming impression one is left with is that Andijan has led to paranoia among Uzbeks. They admit committing certain mistakes but are willing to seek support and ideas to overcome the tragedy. The Taliban’s resurgence, neighbours armed with nuclear weapons and the infiltration of terrorists belonging to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Akramiya trained in Pakistan, remain Uzbekistan’s real concerns. Tashkent perceives contrasting policies being pursued by Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan; while the former is trying to distance itself from the region, the latter has become a member of the WTO and is actively engaged in opening itself up to the world. In Tashkent’s view, these contrasting policies create more problems rather than addressing issues concerning regional integration.

Moscow sees Central Asia as its natural domain and as such cautions the US against over-stretching itself. Russians fear US involvement might end up orienting Central Asia towards the Middle Eastern political culture and envisage the Iraq situation sparking up sectarian conflict across the region from Pakistan to Uzbekistan. Russian thinkers prefer the region orienting itself to the North East Asian dynamic as part of its second phase integration programme for Central Asia. Moreover, Russians pin much hope on the time-tested long history of a harmonious relationship between Central Asian Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The fact that for over a hundred years, Muslims of Central Asia were closer to Russia than even many Russians living in Russia brings optimism for the new Russian plan to be successful. However, for Uzbeks, reintegration with Russia could be possible only if Moscow realizes and overcomes past Soviet mistakes in dealing with the region. A Russia-centric economic plan for Central Asia is certainly not something the Uzbeks want. Uzbek preconditions are many including their desire to develop transportation links to the Indian Ocean and also Russia’s ability to resolve difficult Uzbek-Kazakh relations.

The key question remains whether Moscow, before going ahead, would trust Karimov since he proved quite deceitful in the past. Karimov severed all ties with Russia, opted out of the Collective Security Treaty and played on anti-Russian rhetoric that led to over 2 million ethnic Russians being forced to leave Uzbekistan. What kind of prize would Tashkent be willing to pay for Russian and Chinese support? The Russian Foreign Minister was in Tashkent on 21 October to chart a future roadmap. Moscow would prefer to first let US forces leave K-2 before talking about Tashkent’s re-entry into CSTO. It is only then that Moscow will seek to install in Tashkent a leader of its choice.

For the time being, both the US and Uzbekistan are hoping to gain something by demonising the Andijan event. It is quite possible that the adept Karimov finds it necessary to balance off big-country interests at this point of time. I carried home the impression that Uzbeks themselves are somewhat unsure about the implications of fully going along with Russia once again. Prominent Uzbek experts like Farkhad Tolipov, who criticised Karimov’s miscalculation in denouncing the US, seemed to have been purged, as he was conspicuously absent in the conference.

There appears to be a near-unanimity about India’s potential role of playing the role of a balancer in the regional power game in Central Asia. Analysts (within and outside the region) wonder about India’s reluctance to play the great game on the Central Asian chessboard, considering the undeniable geo-political significance of the region with its huge energy resources. India enjoys a ready psychological acceptance in the region, as compared to the utter distrust felt towards China and Pakistan. Most outside experts noted India’s potential ability to contribute to the stability of Central Asia, in contrast to what it is doing now. It must be underlined that in Central Asia the Soviet legacy of thinking and operating through a structured framework continues to dominate people’s mindset. India, as an emerging power, ought to be interested in defining its own geopolitical goal in Central Asia, instead of moving in a piecemeal ‘bilateral’ fashion. India’s bidding for PetroKazakhstan Company is being seen as symptomatic of its inclination to play the Central Asian game.

In this reconfiguration and regional power game, which is as yet, at a nascent stage, a point that worries everyone, including the US, Russia and Central Asians themselves, is the new factor of China’s growing influence. China is clearly seeking interests beyond Central Asia.

There are embryonic signs that Washington is all set to turn the heat on Myanmar next. The UN Security Council finally agreed unanimously on December 2 to a US request for a “one-off briefing” by the Secretary-General on “the deteriorating situation” in Myanmar. The US request followed the Tatmadow’s extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest and a UN Committee resolution condemning Myanmar’s human rights abuse.

Washington raised Myanmar’s growing threat to international peace and security, citing problems caused by illicit narcotics, human rights abuses, internal repression – destroying villages, targeting minorities, and forcing people to flee the country. The US also cited the junta seeking nuclear capabilities.

At the recent APEC meeting in Busan, President Bush pledged to help restore democracy in Myanmar, while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the junta as “one of the worst regimes in the world.” In July 2003, Bush had signed the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act that banned imports from Myanmar.

What came on the heels of the recent US assertion was a 124-page report by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) revealing shocking details of the junta’s ‘brutal and systematic’ abuse of political prisoners (1,100 prisoners are still under detention). President Bush’s recent 50-minute meeting with a Shan human rights campaigner, Charm Tong, indicates the gravity with which the United States views the situation in that country. The junta’s move to a new capital, Pyinmana, triggered by its fear of a possible US attack – reinforced by the invasion of Iraq – has led to the displacement of thousands of people.

The campaign to introduce the Myanmar issue into the agenda of the UNSC has been underway for some time. A report by Nobel laureates Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu – Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma – has had considerable impact on the world body. Their success in blocking Myanmar from taking over the chairmanship of ASEAN for 2006 seems to have also encouraged the West to push for change. The UN remains critical of Suu Kyi’s detention. But China, Russia and other Council members reject the notion that Myanmar’s situation poses a threat to international peace and security. Despite the ouster of Beijing favourite Khin Nuynt, China supports the junta, with Wen Jiabao asserting in July that China will not change its Myanmar policy “no matter how the international situation fluctuates.”

The Bush administration’s ringing of the alarm bell about Myanmar acquiring WMD capabilities is significant. Yangon acquiring ballistic missiles and its announcement on developing a nuclear facility with Russian Minatom’s assistance since 2002 have raised many eyebrows. The project, stalled earlier due to financial reasons, seems to have been revived now. Minatom is to construct a 10 mega-watt pool-type reactor in Kyaukse near Mandalay. But an IAEA team, which visited Myanmar in 2001, expressed doubts about the country’s preparedness to maintain safety standards. There were reports suggesting that North Korea may take over the project from Russia. Moreover, Pakistani nuclear experts too have been visiting Myanmar since 2001, including a recent delegation led by Zaifullah to Pyinmana. These developments, along with the junta’s plans to acquire an additional squadron of Russian MIG-25s, have led to growing suspicions about Myanmar becoming the next problem state for America.

The junta’s reconvening on December 5 of the National Convention (NC) to draft a new constitution as part of its 7-step Roadmap to form a “genuine and disciplined democratic system” lacks a specific time frame or itinerary; and is also vague on important details of the “transition process”. The chart (a better word than map) shows the junta effectively controlling all the procedures and processes of “democratization”. The Tatmadow wants to exercise complete control over both the road and the map. Its new law No. 5/96 severely restricts open debate, which could be enforced against those opposing the new format. The opposition remains equally steadfast on restricting the Tatmadow’s future role in politics. The ceasefire with insurgents appears fragile; more so with those still outside the legal fold and therefore seek greater protection for their rights. These factors, along with the power struggle within the junta which became intense after Khin Nyunt’s departure, could derail the NC process. The NC’s lack of credibility is another issue, as Western powers threw their weight behind the opposition. But the junta considers the recovening of the NC as a delicate juncture in the democratisation process and as such, the release of SUU KYI and Tin Oo could disrupt the process. Their release is therefore unlikely to come about until the main principles of the Constitution are ready and the way is clear for a referendum. SUU KYI’s popularity undoubtedly remains intact but some of the pro-democracy groups and ranks within NLD are not happy with her leadership style.

The blocking of Yangon’s chairmanship has exposed ASEAN’s own credibility, and so far, neither the ASEAN engagement strategy nor the punitive sanction policy used by USA and EU has produced any positive results. A section in the US thinks that sanctions would not work against Myanmar because it is a pre-industrial state and can limp along on its own, even if placed under sanctions. There is merit in this argument because the limits and effectiveness of sanctions have been explored, both theoretically and empirically.

Tatmadow cannot be wished away easily. But the junta’s rationalization that it exercises power to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity appears to be both an exaggeration and an illusion. Given the failure of the West and ASEAN to break the impasse, there is an increasing need for the UN along with China, India and Thailand to start a trilateral process under the “1+3 framework” to map out an Action Plan as a starting point for an agreed, workable (not theoretical or dogmatic) approach to breaking the vicious cycle of exaggerated expectations and ground realities. After securing the confidence of all concerned parties, the group could work out phased procedures and mechanisms to assist the reconciliation process. The group should guarantee Myanmar’s security interests. A coordinated EU, US, Japan and ASEAN approaches by way of economic measures in support of the 1+3 is necessary. Once the Action Plan is accepted, the West could lift sanctions. Meanwhile, the UN should consider mollifying Tatmadow by engaging its professional military in international peace keeping and peace building missions.

India being Myanmar’s neighbour cannot ignore China’s changing Myanmar policy. Beijing could be making conciliatory gestures towards the opposition leader without antagonizing the junta in the belief that without the NLD’s participation the process could be long and difficult. India has quietly supported the democratic process in many neighbouring countries, including Myanmar. If we are not careful, the democratic agenda supported by India for many, many years could be usurped by China. India's interest also lies in preventing the US fomenting crisis in our strategic neighbourhood.

Last week witnessed a major development on the India-China energy front with the joint bidding plan for Petro-Canada's Syrian assets by India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). In September this year Petro-Canada expressed interest to sell off its 38 per cent stake in the Al Furat field, which produces about 70,000 barrels of oil daily accounting for 50 per cent of Syria's total output. This is the first time that Indian and Chinese firms have joined together to secure stakes in an overseas energy facility. In overseas bidding efforts since 2004, Indian firms have faced competition from Chinese firms and in three different instances India lost to China in the race to secure overseas hydrocarbon assets. Angola was the first instance, where India bid for 50 per cent stake of Shell in Angola's Block 18 field. In the $600 million offer, India had promised to include $200 million to support Angola's ongoing railway construction project. This was outbid by China with a $2 billion offer. The bidding competition again surfaced when India wanted to buy the stake of Petrokazakhstan — a Canadian oil firm operating in Kazakhstan. In this case as well, China won the deal by offering $4.2 billion to Petrokhazakhstan against India's offer of $3.9 billion. The third incident was in the case of India's energy interest in Ecuador, where India and China competed for Encana's stakes. China proved to be the winner in this race as well.

Different perceptions exist regarding India-China bilateral relations, but most analysts overwhelmingly reject any scope for cooperation between the two countries on the energy front. Many scholars see energy resources as a common interest of both the countries and contend that the search for energy would lead to competition and eventually to conflict. But these perceptions have to be studied in a broader framework to understand the possibility of any such unhealthy competition. First, most such conclusions are made on the basis of the historical experience of the 1962 conflict as well as China's military inclination towards Pakistan. These perceptions play a major role while defining and dealing with any major issue between the two countries. However, the bidding and outbidding instances have to be seen purely in a commercial sense and not as political competition between the two countries.

After the Angola incident itself both sides realized that there is a greater scope and necessity for cooperation in their future search for overseas energy. This thought has crystallized into bilateral meetings and exchanges of visits. In August 2005, a high level team led by Mr Talmiz Ahmed visited China, and another high-level visit is expected to happen in mid-January 2006 primarily to study the scope for cooperation. Cooperation between the two countries would have far reaching implications on the global energy market. First, by pooling financial and technological resources, such a joint venture would become one of the largest state-owned bilateral joint energy efforts to address the energy security issues of two major energy consumers of the world. Secondly, in the coming years, more joint ventures may emerge from other import dependent countries or an Asian regional effort may form under the leadership of India and China. Third, this might adversely affect energy producers who are waiting to encash on the competition between India and China. Many energy watchers have pointed out that Russia and Bangladesh have been trying to gain advantage from India-China competition. Both India and China have shown interest in buying a 20 per cent share in Yuganskneftgaz (a Yukos subsidiary expropriated by the Russian government). Bangladesh is also angling to benefit from the India-China competition for natural gas. Although India is geographically closer, Bangladesh has been showing interest in exporting natural gas to China, in an attempt to increase its bargaining value. These kinds of producer politics would be hard to play if India and China decide to go ahead with their joint search for energy. Fourth, joint efforts would also help to bring down the stake values, as it has been seen that in the name of competition China has paid considerably higher value for its overseas equity purchases.

Taking the relevance of energy security in the current global sense and the growing energy demand of India and China, it would be mutually beneficial for the two countries to cooperate and work together in their quest for energy. The primary areas of possible cooperation are:

• Most energy exploration and development projects around the world require large-scale investment and technology. Joint efforts by the two countries in pooling their investments and technology would yield better resource outputs.
• Hydrocarbon transportation route — oil and gas pipelines — is another area of possible cooperation, where they can bring energy through the shortest possible routes with minimum investment cost.
• As China gets most of its hydrocarbon supply through the Indian Ocean SLOCs, it would give considerable importance to cooperating with India to ensure the security of is supplies.
• India's Sakhalin gas production shares can be swapped with Chinese supplies from the Middle East, which would enable both countries to reduce the transportation distance and cost.
• India and China would be able to bring together other imported energy dependent Asia-Pacific countries, which can act as a peer group to harness the growing energy price, and demand the removal of Asian Premium charged on every barrel of oil exported to the Asia-Pacific.
• As suggested by India's Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, cooperation between India and China would be able to bring in a pipeline network to tap the Russian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy sources. In future this pipeline network can form a hub of energy supply to the other Asia-Pacific countries.
• As investments in renewable and nuclear energy in the region are expected to increase in the coming years, efforts to build up an 'Asia-Pacific cooperation' in this regard would help member countries address their growing energy demand.
• India and China can consider cooperating in the field of 'tar sand' exploration or gas hydrate exploration, as these would gain considerable importance as tomorrow’s major energy sources.

The scope for cooperation between India and China has to be explored further as there would be more mutually beneficial areas. The perceived competition between the two countries would not take off for many reasons. They have been working together for many decades to eliminate their past differences on political and territorial issues. Hence, neither side can afford to encourage the emergence of further differences or the persistence of extant irritants in the coming years. Moreover there are other challenges like the threat of US sanctions — regarding investments in Iran, where it is essential for both countries to cooperate politically and economically to ensure energy supply. The benefits that would accrue as a result of cooperation on the energy front between the two Asian giants are much larger than that of competition.