A series of 434 bomb blasts that rocked as many as 60 of 64 districts in Bangladesh on August 17 may have been 'mild' by way of the number killed – just two people – but the symbolism is very significant and perhaps inversely proportional to the damage caused.

Leaflets recovered from some of the blast sites demanded that the country become more Islamic and the needle of suspicion points to the banned Islamic group, the Jamaat-ul- Mujahedin. And while investigations are continuing, the implications of this incident are of potentially grave import.

All the blasts were synchronised to take place within 30 minutes of each other and the targets in most cases were symbols of the state – government buildings, local courts and revenue offices. The fact that such detailed co-ordination could be effected in a largely rural country with poor infrastructure and communication links may point to two inferences. One, that the mobile phone has empowered Bangladesh in an unintended manner and two, that there was a colossal failure of intelligence or – worse still – that there was some collusion from within the security apparatus of the state.

Either exigency is cause for deep concern since it was expected that there would be some disturbances in this period given the fact that the 30th anniversary of the assassination of the late Mujibur Rehman – the founder of Bangladesh – was being observed on August 15. The moot question is whether the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) government headed by Begum Khaleda Zia is unwilling or unable to deal with the scourge of religious radicalism and related extremism, or are some elements within the government tacitly allowing such organised violence?

The August 17 incident was preceded by a rash of attacks with religious right-wing overtones leavened by the deep chasm that permeates political discourse in Bangladesh with the two major parties-the BNP and the AL (Awami League)-being deeply divided over a host of issues.

It may be recalled that on August 21 last year, an AL rally was subjected to grenade attacks that killed 21 people, including senior political leader Ivy Rahman, and it was fortuitous that more members of the party were not among the casualties.

Liberal opinion in Bangladesh is anguished over these twin trends. The first is the inflexible mutual hostility that the two major parties have maintained, wherein every major issue is polarised along party lines; and the second is the growing nexus between religious right wing groups and the ruling party. The AL lost the 2001 election to the BNP which had aligned itself with the Jamaat and the Islamic Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Council).

The Islamic Oikya Joten (IOJ) established in 1990 comprises seven parties: Khelafat Majlis, Nezam-e-Islam, Faraizi Jamaat, Islami Morcha, Ulama Committee, a splinter group of National Awami Party (Bhasani), and Islami Shashantantra Andolo. Its main aim is reportedly to establish an Islamic polity based upon Islamic jurisprudence and the Khilafat. Over the years, the BNP partners have used the message of divisive and sectarian Islam to mobilise the rural populace in the villages of the country, thereby shrinking the vote bank of the more moderate AL. The Jamaat and the IOJ together obtained 20 seats out of 300 in the 2001 general elections and are now an assertive part of the BNP-led ruling coalition in Dhaka.

According to local reports, the Jamaat's rallying slogan is 'amra hawbo Bangladesh, Bangla hobay Afghan' - meaning 'we will become Taliban, Bangladesh will become Afghanistan'.

Many Islamic states have witnessed a gradual increase in the ascendancy of religious parties in their domestic polities and Bangladesh is no exception. Since the early 1990s, there has been a supra-national ideological motivation for right wing Islamic religiosity and the emergence of an international Islamic front espousing a rigid Wahabi strain of Islam and supported by funds from Saudi Arabia and other states has incrementally became part of the global canvas.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s with the al-Qaida at the core is the more visible manifestation of this trend. In South Asia, this pattern received further impetus from the military establishment in Pakistan and, given the deep linkages between the Pakistani ISI and the right wing groups in Bangladesh – particularly the Jammat-e- Islami (which incidentally supported Pakistan in 1971 during the war for the liberation of Bangladesh), these parties became more effective and spawned militant splinter groups.

The greater irony is that the government in Dhaka has been steadfastly refusing to acknowledge that such groups exist in Bangladesh and has preferred to do the ostrich act despite evidence to the contrary that has been presented by various intelligence agencies, including those from the US and UK among others. In a candid comment, Bangladesh's leading newspaper, the Daily Star, observed editorially (August 21) of the spate of terrorist attacks: "The one benefit to come out of the unspeakable tragedy was supposed to be that it rammed home the fact that there are dangerous extremists in our midst and that the government needed to take serious action to safeguard the nation."

Left unchecked, this trend of growing radicalism in Bangladesh leading to motivated violence can result in a very destabilising situation wherein the electoral process can be hijacked to suit the interests of the right-wing religious extremists.

This would be very undesirable for the region as a whole and enlightened moderation is urgently called for in the internal discourses of Bangladesh. The argumentative characteristic that noted economist Amartaya Sen has examined in some detail in the Indian context had its greatest exponents in Bengali tradition and now more than ever, the liberal spectrum in Bangladesh will have to determinedly debate over which fork in the post 9-11 road their country will take.

August 17 should serve as both wake-up call and a much needed inoculation.

New Delhi July 25 A Briefing Paper published by the independent British think tank, The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), has become an embarrassment for the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair even as Britain is trying to overcome the shock of the terrorist attacks on July 7 in London claiming the lives of more than fifty as well as the foiled attacks on July 21. The Briefing Paper for July 2005 titled “Security, Terrorism and the UK” says:

The UK is at particular risk because it is the closest ally of the United States, has deployed armed forces in the military campaigns to topple the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and has taken a leading role in international intelligence, police and judicial cooperation against Al-Qaeda and in efforts to suppress its finances.

The report clearly states that extremists have been recruited and deployed within British borders and that for an open society like the UK it is really difficult to prevent the sudden co-ordinated suicide bombings bearing the trademark of Al-Qaeda. However, what Tony Blair would have found even more embarrassing is the depiction by the authors of the report, Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson of the UK, as a pillion rider of a powerful ally and their conclusion that the ride in fact has proved costly in terms of British, US military personnel and Iraqi civilians killed as well as the damage to the counter-terrorism campaign.

Getting termed as a pillion rider would certainly not be gratifying for the British government, because the report questions the whole rationale of the War against Iraq. Observers may recall the tumultuous days of 2003 when in spite of the sad episode of suicide of the British weapons expert, David Kelly, resignations of ministers from the British cabinet and mass anti-War demonstrations in European cities did not prevent the “Coalition of the Willing” led by the UK in Europe to go ahead with the War against Iraq. As expected, the British government has not shared the assessment of Chatham House. The British government spokesman was rhetorical when he asserted that there have been attacks in twenty-six countries over the past twelve years and questioned whether the report (of Chatham House) was simply suggesting that the UK should have put her head down and hope not to be attacked?

Nevertheless, can it be denied that there have been not enough indications that a terrorist attack might take place in the UK? After 9/11 and especially after Britain went to War in Iraq, there have been regular warnings about possible terrorist attacks in the UK. The threat seemed to be more imminent given the considerable presence of Islamic dissidents from West Asia and rabid Islamic preachers in London. These radical Islamists have been continuing their activities in London though toned down but almost uncontrolled even after 9/11. In February 2004 Stephen Ulph of the Terrorism Monitor termed the British capital as Londonistan. Very recently the German security portal, Sicherheit-Heute (Security Today) depicted London as “Metropolis of Islamic International”. The Chatham House report is right in its observation:

By the mid-1990s the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police were well aware that London was increasingly being used as a base by individuals involved in promoting, funding and planning terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, these individuals were not viewed as a threat to the UK’s national security, and so they were left to continue their activities with relative impunity, a policy which caused much anger among the foreign governments concerned.

Moreover, recent experience are that British Jihadis have been found in Iraq and Israel ready to take part in terrorist attacks or for suicide bombings. Given these early warnings and disturbing incidents, it seemed that the British government had perhaps taken the situation a little bit casually. In contrast, for the masterminds of these terrorist attacks on July 7, the timing couldn’t have been more opportune to attack the British government when: the UK had taken over the rotating half-yearly European presidency just seven days earlier and London had snatched the Olympic bid from its traditional rival, Paris.

One would find the assessment of Chatham House rather justified if the whole internal security situation in Europe is taken into account. In fact, 2004 was a remarkable year in recent European history as far as its internal security is concerned. If the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 claiming 191 lives were an indication of the capability of Islamic sleeper cells in Europe to successfully orchestrate attacks on such a large scale, the brutal killing of the controversial Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 in broad daylight in Amsterdam emphasised the accomplishment of a lone terrorist to execute his plan unhindered. In the case of Theo van Gogh it must be mentioned that he had been under continuous threat by Islamists prior to his killing. The co-producer of Theo van Gogh’s last controversial film “Submission”, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somalia-born Dutch Member of Parliament, has for months been facing death threats and under state protection. However, in both the cases of Madrid and Amsterdam the findings are almost the same: the perpetrators are mostly young, belong to the immigrants’ community or have dual citizenships, do not have any terrorist antecedents or even if they were earlier apprehended or approached by the authorities, the reasons were petty crime.

At present it appears that the British government would not undertake a serious revision of its Iraq Policy. Simultaneously, given the unipolar moment it is also not possible for the UK to exchange the driver’s seat with pillion riding in the Coalition against Terror. Hence the likely British action to prevent further terrorist attacks would be three-pronged: (i) to legislate stringent anti-terrorism laws; (ii) to enhance intelligence and police cooperation internationally and specifically with European nations; (iii) to increase dialogue with the 1.6 million strong Muslim population in Britain.

Regarding the cooperation at European level, there is already a Solidarity Clause under Part I, Article I-43 with implementation in Article III-329 in the European Constitution (Article 42 with Article III-329 in the Draft Constitution of 2003). The Clause highlights the solidarity of member states in case of a terrorist attack in one of the member countries. Moreover, after the Madrid terrorist attacks a post of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was also created for effective counter-terrorism coordination. But the recent rejections of the European Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda and the subsequent one year period of reflection on the future as decided by the EU leadership, the most important issue of European integration in security affairs is likely to experience delays. Justice and Home Affairs, which constitute the third pillar of the EU, still remains the contentious issue amongst the member countries. Cooperation amongst the European intelligence agencies would also face hindrances because of traditional rivalries and distrust.

Therefore, at this point the primary onus of tackling indigenous threats and preventing further terrorist attacks would certainly lie with the British government. Undoubtedly London in recent times has become the safe sanctuary of all the West-Asia based radical Islamic organisations, global Islamic movements, individual hate preachers and Islamic indoctrinators. Given the liberal atmosphere of the British system, legal hurdles, lack of harmonisation in common EU counter-terrorism efforts it is very difficult to try or eventually extradite an individual charged for inciting hatred, communal disharmony or even Jihad. Recent instances like Abu Hamza in Britain and Metin Kaplan in Germany are clear instances of hardship faced by the government authorities to legally extradite a convicted individual outside Europe. The European Arrest Warrant, which could have been an effective tool to combat intra-EU crime and terrorist activities, is not yet accepted by all the EU member nations. On the contrary, the German Constitutional Court this week ruled the European Arrest warrant as null and void.

Consequently the primary task of the British government should be to not ignore the Chatham House report on principle, but rather to formulate time-bound, concrete measures to deal with these hate preachers and indoctrinators who otherwise have been under observation of European agencies. Except investigative stories on unearthing serious issues pertaining to British and European security, European mainstream media may also ponder over providing prominence to these publicity-mongering individuals.

On July 18, India and the United States released a joint statement delineating the multi- dimensional aspects of the bilateral relationship.

The joint statement underlines the evolving relationship of the two countries. There are a number of ritualistic phrases and statements besides some firsts and interesting provisions.

The understanding reached by the two countries on nuclear matters is definitely a very important feature of the joint statement. The US administration has agreed to “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realises its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security”.

The American promise intends to go beyond the Tarapur fuel supply issue. As there are a number of American legislations and regulations that may come in the way of the US President George Bush’s move to achieve fruition of the “full civil nuclear energy cooperation” with India, he made it clear in the statement that agreement would be sought “from Congress to adjust US laws and policies”.

The joint statement also mentions that the US would work with its allies to adjust international regimes, the Generation IV International Forum and projects such as ITER (the International Thermo-nuclear Experimental Reactor). The media and analysts are busy all over the world studying the implications. Questions have been raised: Can India get what it wants? If yes, when, if no, why?

A section of the US media and some analysts flashed the news that the US Congressmen were shocked when they learnt of the concessions that were made by the administration to India.

Most of them quoted Democratic Congressmen like Ed Markey to build the argument that the adjustment of the laws and policies in relation to India would be tough.

There should not be any doubt that the joint statement merely reflects the intentions and wishes of the US administration. The interplay of different interest groups and forces of the US policy-making bodies, especially in the Congress, is quite vital for the final delivery.

However, the US media and other serious analysts are recognising, in a big way, the fact that geo-political considerations will ultimately determine the outcome.

Most American analysts are of the opinion that the non-proliferation lobby is not so much against India as it is against North Korea and Iran.

India has demonstrated, by and large, an impeccable non-proliferation record. This has helped in building a positive constituency for itself inside the US and elsewhere.

Neo-conservatives, the most vocal section of non-proliferation activism and always ready to recommend a pre-emptive strike against the ‘proliferating’ countries, have responded positively to the statement.

A scholar at the prominent neo-conservative think-tank, American Enterprise Institute, captures the gist of the dilemma of the American non-proliferation lobby in the statement in an American newspaper. He finds that “there is a lot of hand-wringing from the non-proliferation community. But this is the price of admission to a deeper partnership with India. There is risk associated with this. But it tells you how seriously the Bush administration is taking this as a strategic relationship.”

In the US Congress, both the chambers have got a majority in the Republican party. Although there is no guarantee that these Congressmen will vote on partisan lines, there is a still greater probability of their doing so.

Moreover, the opposition to the agreement by some Democrat Congressmen should not mean that the whole party will vote en masse against the concessions to India.

We must remember that in the wake of the post-Pokhran crisis, the breakthrough in the relationship was brought about by a Democrat President, Bill Clinton. There are people in the party who are well disposed to India.

At a time when India may be looking at the international market for cost-effective nuclear shopping, the positive assurance by the US can be extremely useful.

In India we may love, wish and argue for a multi-polar world, but the reality is that the international system is US-centric.

In multilateral regimes, it’s been found that the US puts up one barrier after another. France and Russia have generally been constructive. There can be a supply of the required goods from these countries too. Besides, the development may lead to India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. India has fulfilled all the criteria except one – membership of the group.

This criterion has safeguards. The Indian conditional acceptance of voluntary safeguards for segregated civilian nuclear facilities and the additional protocol may help to circumvent this clause.

For all practical purposes, the joint statement establishes India as a nuclear weapon country even though the phrase advanced nuclear technology state is used by way of a description. India may get all the advantages of a nuclear weapon state that is otherwise denied to it because of the crisis-ridden Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Finally, it is difficult to predict the date of delivery of the denied items, but the potential of the delivery in the future is possible.

Simultaneously, the Indian establishment must not forget to calculate its cost, including what is incurred in last-minute bargaining. If the deal is costly, we should renegotiate it afresh. There is a lot of scope for this in the statement.

With its repeated admissions of an ongoing nuclear weapons development programme utilising highly enriched uranium, and with an alarmingly advanced missile launching capability, North Korea is at the fulcrum of a crisis that while raising the spectre of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula also impacts the very foundations of security in northeast Asia. Despite this brinkmanship, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman assured on May 8, 2005, "our will to denuclearise the Korean peninsula and seek a negotiated solution to it still remains unchanged."

Background to the Crisis

The current crisis owes its origin to the unilateral withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by North Korea on January 10, 2003. Earlier, in 1993, Pyongyang had withdrawn from the NPT, setting the stage for the Agreed Framework of 1994. If the past is any indicator, the current impasse should give way to a new agreement that for all purposes is being held up by the inconsistent approach on the part of North Korean negotiators. By reneging on its multilateral commitments and increasing the stakes, North Korea has brought to the fore its core concerns vis-à-vis the United States, namely, recognition of North Korea's sovereignty by the U.S., a non-aggression pact, and no obstacles in its path of economic development.

The DPRK’s formal decision to withdraw from the NPT triggered intensive diplomatic manoeuvres and actions by the US, China, Japan and South Korea to diffuse a nuclear crisis and head off an international disaster. Following the North Korean announcement (which came three days before the Chinese president was scheduled to meet with President Bush in Texas in 2003) China, in its first reaction, offered to work closely with the US to create a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Beijing, then, publicly stated its position as follows:

1. maintaining stability and peace in the Korean peninsula;
2. Keeping the peninsula free from nuclear weapons;
3. Using diplomatic channels to resolve the conflict and issues; and
4. calling upon both North Korea and the US, to normalise their relations through constructive and fair dialogue among equals.

China offered to provide a venue for both states to hold talks. The major Chinese concern focused on the possibility that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would follow suit and acquire nuclear weapons, causing the nuclearisation of North-East Asia and the consequences that would follow.

Despite the all-too-visible indications of public diplomacy involving, on the one hand, South Korea, Japan and the U.S., and, on the other, the subtle and not so subtle influence of Russia and China, the significant aspect that needs to be highlighted is the special equation China has with North Korea, and why any mechanism or framework to settle the crisis will have a dominant Chinese perspective.

“Lips and Teeth”

A relationship that in the 1960s and 1970s was described as “as close as lips and teeth” is going through a very severe test, with the strain most revelatory in China's official statements since the crisis unfolded in October 2002. To recall Beijing’s pique, a clear indication of China's official position on North Korea's nuclear programme was articulated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman during the summit of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Los Cabos, Mexico in late October 2002 that said "(We) emphasise that the Korean peninsula should be nuclear-free, and we hope peace and stability can be maintained on the Korean peninsula. We will use various means to express our position. This includes exchanges with North Korea where we will make clear our position," the spokesman, Kong Quan, said. Mr. Kong had made these remarks after the then Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, met his South Korean counterpart, Kim Dae-Jung, for talks where Pyongyang's secret nuclear programme topped the agenda. As far as China is concerned, the statement was unusual, as Beijing usually prefers not to criticise North Korea by name in order not to anger the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang. Mr. Kong added: "(As) a neighbour of the Korean peninsula, our view is that the problem should be solved through peaceful means and dialogue in order to protect the peace and stability of the area."

The China – North Korea Relationship

There is probably no aspect of China's external relations where the actual policy diverges from the declaratory policy as in the case of North Korea. The difference in large measure is due to the difficult character of the North Korean leadership and the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula. Conservative sections make out a case that in the event of the Sino-Soviet relationship becoming tense again, it would be very important for Beijing that Pyongyang does not "tilt" towards Moscow. The actual Chinese policy, clearly perceived as such by the North Korean leadership, is that Pyongyang should neither move militarily against Seoul, nor politically gravitate towards Moscow. Ironically, for the maintenance of these conditions, Beijing relies on the U.S. commitment to, and military presence in, South Korea. Also, in a doomsday scenario, were North Korea to attack South Korea, a contingency the Chinese regard as unlikely, Beijing would "oppose" such a move: whatever that means, it clearly does not mean support.

On the other hand, Beijing plays an important role in "sustaining" North Korea economically with regular supplies of fuel, grain and other goods that in part redress the chronic shortages. Recent reports indicate the introduction of limited economic reforms in North Korea that have seen a dramatic rise in wages and in the price of essentials. Politically, China endorses Pyongyang's demand for an American withdrawal from South Korea and for a tripartite conference between the two Koreas and the U.S., on the question of unification of the peninsula.

China's policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has been torn between its desire to support an ally and its desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As one of its few allies during the Cold War, China traditionally supported North Korea in its ongoing confrontation with South Korea and the U.S. However, with the changed realities after the Cold War, China has shown a reluctance to come to North Korea's aid especially when it challenges international norms, particularly on nuclear proliferation. Some analysts believe this reluctance is based not only on China's desire to be perceived as a responsible international power, but also on the greater importance it now attaches to good relations with the U.S. and South Korea. Yet another reason is China's concern over the instability on the Korean peninsula, which might threaten its security interests.

While the U.S. has continued to push China on North Korea, China has publicly stated that it is "genuinely committed to denuclearisation" on the Korean peninsula, and appears to be pursuing a policy of preventing North Korea from testing a nuclear weapon, while at the same time allowing North Korea to keep this threat active. This ensures that as long as ambiguity over its nuclear weapon program exists, outside states (read: U.S.) will be less willing to take military action against Pyongyang due to concern over its possible nuclear weapon capability. When asked by Washington to apply pressure on Pyongyang by cutting off energy and food supplies, China rejected the request, stating on May 10, 2005 that: "[T]he normal trade flow should not be linked up with the nuclear issue. We oppose trying to address the problem through strong-arm tactics." Washington was also told not to bring the issue before the U.N. Security Council, with the statement by Liu Zhaoxing that "[T]he six-party talks, and not the United Nations Security Council, are the right channel for addressing this issue." Liu also argued at one point that no country involved in the six-party talks should "say or do anything that is not in favour of continuing the six-party talks."

China's dilemma on the current crisis is further revealed by its starkly divergent views on Iraq and North Korea. On Iraq, China has laid stress on the importance of the U.N. Security Council, while in the case of North Korea it has repeatedly called for direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. While China and North Korea have engaged in some nuclear cooperation, its nature and comprehensiveness remain shrouded in secrecy. Even as early as the 1960s, China had refused to assist North Korea in developing a nuclear weapon. In 1987, it pulled out its nuclear technicians from North Korea when it discovered that Pyongyang was aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. In 1989, both China and the Soviet Union refused to assist the North Koreans in developing a nuclear reprocessing facility. During the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, in which North Korea refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its reactors and moved to withdraw from the NPT, China initially opposed the use of sanctions or other coercive measures to bring Pyongyang back in line with its NPT obligations However, Beijing soon changed its position from stating that it "would oppose" sanctions to saying it "would not support" sanctions — meaning that it would abstain rather than veto a U.N. Security Council resolution against North Korea.

This shift is widely believed to have been instrumental in bringing North Korea around to accept the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang agreed to suspend its nuclear programme, shut down its graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, allow IAEA inspections, and abide by the NPT in exchange for light water reactors and heavy fuel oil from the U.S., Japan and South Korea. Of interest is the detail that China was not directly involved in the Agreed Framework, nor was it a member of the Korean Energy Development Organisation, the multilateral body created to implement the Agreed Framework.

Beijing is also concerned that if the US-North Korea hard line policies escalate, a military showdown would become a possibility. Such a conflict would cause a massive flight of North Korean refugees into China, thus causing great economic burdens and disruption, especially at a time when China emphasises the need for a stable international environment to expand its trade, develop its technology and attract foreign investment. Furthermore, a post-war unified Korea under US military power would create a threat to China’s security itself, especially if the new Korea would inherit the North Korean nuclear facilities and weapons and become a nuclear power. This, coupled with rising Korean nationalism, could also threaten Chinese control over the Korean ethnic minority in Jilin Province of northeast China that borders North Korea.

Although Beijing has many interests in diffusing the current nuclear crisis, it has yet to take a leading role instead of limiting itself to calling for dialogue and peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Chinese posses great economic leverage over North Korea and could help convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear military programme. Privately, however, the Chinese blame, in great part, the US for designating North Korea as a member of the ‘axis of evil’, consequently turning it into a potential target for US and international sanctions and possibly military action. Beijing also considers that Pyongyang aims at getting the US’s attention and to obtain security guarantees from Washington. China calls upon both, the US and North Korea, to return to the 1994 Agreed Framework and sit on the negotiating table to mutually save face. In addition, China hinted that if the North Korean nuclear issue was brought before the UN it could foresee serious dilemmas. It cannot remain indifferent, and not use its veto, nor comply with the imposed economic sanctions, even if North Korea remains intransigent and defiant. As a result, it is unlikely that China would, under these circumstances, apply any strong pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear policy.

While China has reason to be concerned at the current tensions on the Korean peninsula, its position on the issue can be inferred from a comment made by its ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Sha Zukang, in 1999: "Dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on problem matters. In the case of North Korea, which is a very proud country, sanctions can only prove counterproductive. We should recognise that North Korea has legitimate security concerns. We need to continue the dialogue and practice more patience... But as for initiatives on the part of China, we can't go into the kitchen and do the cooking when we don't know how to cook."