As a fresh attempt to kick start the Sri Lankan peace process takes shape, the future of this strife-torn island swings uncertainly between no war and new war. Formal talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been stalled since 2003. After much dispute over a mutually acceptable venue, the two sides finally agreed on Geneva, and talks are set to take place on February 22-23, 2006. But both sides are looking at only a limited mandate for the upcoming talks. On the governmental side stands the clear agenda of reviewing the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and making it less prone to violations. The LTTE, on the other hand, has made it clear that it seeks a more complete implementation of the CFA and not its revision. Beyond this lie deeper issues such as the LTTE's demand for de-escalating the Sri Lankan's military presence in northern Jaffna peninsula. The Army's presence in the area undermines the Tigers' claim to the northeast as part of the larger aspiration for a Tamil homeland. This demand is also intrinsically related to the actual territorial control the LTTE wields in the northeast. Another issue pertains to disarming the "paramilitaries" in the eastern district. These 'paramilitaries' refer to the Karuna faction's shadow war against the Tigers. This stands as an unprecedented challenge to the LTTE leadership and has weakened its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamils.

Given these entrenched and asymmetric positions, there is not much scope for optimism. But the exercise of going back to the negotiating table does point to a greater willingness on the part of the new government in Colombo to engage in dialogue, and reflects the changing dynamics on the ground for the rebels.

A great deal of diplomatic activity has preceded the decision to meet at Geneva. The internationalization of the Sri Lankan conflict has witnessed the involvement of several interested parties and actors in the fate of the ethnic struggle. The international community has become a key player in the peace process, and it has sought to use aid as a tool for peace-building. While much disagreement raged over the disbursement of Tsunami aid followed by the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) fiasco, the fact remains that both the government and the LTTE have a stake in laying their hands on international aid which remains locked up. Besides, given the growing international isolation of the LTTE, it has found it difficult to avoid negotiations in the face of international pressure.

Domestically too, this fresh bid at peace is in keeping with President Rajapaksa's electoral promise to start a new peace initiative that is both transparent and inclusive. In keeping with his Mahinda Chintana or Vision, the new President has gone about forging a national consensus in favour of talks by convening an All Parties Conference meeting recently.

As far as India is concerned, despite Rajapaksa's open efforts urging a more direct Indian role as a Tokyo Conference Co-Chair during his December 2005 state visit to New Delhi, India has made clear its inability to be more active. Although the Sri Lankan peace process is of much significance, it is mainly through tools like military cooperation, economic aid, and negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that the Indian government has maintained a policy of supporting the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE.

Another dimension that requires attention is that the US role has visibly increased in the peace process. In early January, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera visited Washington and met Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice as well as the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Richard Lugar. Foreign Minister Samaraweera reportedly requested the US to ban the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), which is the LTTE's main aid arm and is reputed to be a front organisation for fundraising from the Tamil Diaspora. Samaraweera also reiterated President Mahinda Rajapaksa's resolve to pursue a negotiated settlement, curb escalating tensions with the LTTE and forge a 'southern consensus' in the country. Later, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns visited Colombo. In what can be described as an unmistakable signal to the rebels to abandon violence, Burns described the LTTE as a "reprehensive terrorist group" which was responsible for keeping Sri Lanka on the edge of war. In an interesting statement that echoes New Delhi's long held view, Burns also drew a distinction between the grievances of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and that of the LTTE. He made explicit US support for ending violence, a return to negotiations and the maintenance and strengthening of the ceasefire agreement. Besides, Burns made it clear that the LTTE would not gain any support if it continued to follow the path of violence. The US has also taken steps to send a top-level team to Sri Lanka comprising agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to carry out a close study of the prevailing situation in the country and the activities of the Tigers.

On his part the LTTE supremo Prabhakaran, in his Heroes Day speech on November 27, 2005, made it clear that the Tigers would intensify their struggle for liberation unless the new government comes forward with a reasonable political framework within a year's time. This seems to be a reiteration of the LTTE's Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) demand, which was earlier rejected by the Chandrika Kumaratunga government.

The recent escalation in violence, as witnessed in the suspected Black Sea Tiger claymore attack on a convoy killing eight sailors of the Sri Lankan navy and the recent assault on a Fast Attack Craft (FAC) near Trincomalee harbour, has tested the government's resolve. According to Sri Lankan Army statistics, since December 2005 over 130 persons have been killed, including 77 from the security forces, 42 civilians and 15 LTTE cadres.

But it is clear that the government is not willing to be drawn into a military confrontation. It seeks instead a political solution that can be facilitated and made acceptable with the help of external agencies and actors. In this context, perhaps a federal solution could be adopted. The international community including India is actively encouraging an exploration of a federal solution. USAID recently held a Workshop in Colombo to popularise the federal idea. If a domestic political consensus can be reached, it will then be a matter of making the LTTE accept the same. This is something that everyone understands will be the long-term challenge.

The last round of talks at Hakone, Japan (March 2003) was a tame affair. The ppeace talks were dominated by the issue of the sinking of a LTTE ship by the Sri Lankan Navy in international waters. The issue of high security zones (HSZs) also figured in that round, with both sides arguing for and against the removal of HSZs. For the Tigers, the HSZs have posed a major hindrance to the resettlement of the displaced population; but the Government negotiators wanted to link demilitarization with a final political solution. Today, the issue of HSZs has been overshadowed by the Karuna factor, which seems to be not only a major irritant for the Tigers but also an unprecedented challenge.

At Geneva, the LTTE are to be represented by their chief ideologue Anton Balasingham, political wing leader S P Thamil Chelvam, `Police Chief` Nadesan, Ilanperiyan and Jeyam from Jaffna, with Adele Balasingham as secretary to the delegation. The government's negotiating team led by the Health Minister Nirmal Siripala de Silva is relatively inexperienced. A series of workshops have been launched to better equip the negotiators. Even the former negotiator of the Sinn Fein, Martin McGuiness met with President Rajapaksa to discuss whether the negotiation techniques employed in the Irish peace process could be employed in the Sri Lankan case. The new government, despite its hardline Sinhala nationalist allies, wants to project itself as a supporter of the fragile ceasefire. It reportedly seeks to tow a softer line, and be more accommodating. Despite its determination to revise the agreement, a concerted effort to return to talks implies a decision to stave off war and keep the negative peace of 'no war' alive.

While it's off to Geneva for now, the room for optimism is low. Consistent pressure from the international community has been a prime reason for resumption of talks. However, unless both sides agree to significantly shift their stands, the talks would essentially prove to be a time buying tactic for the Tigers.

Russia's concern over Iran's nuclear programme is increasing with every passing day. Iranian authorities are showing un-willingness to accept Russia's proposal to enrich uranium in Russian territory. Russia is trying to resolve an international crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons programme, though its position on Iran has rhetorically moved closer to the European "Troika" (France, Germany, UK). Russia agreed to Iran's referral to the UN Security Council on the condition that the council would take action only after the March 6 IAEA meeting. Iranian authorities are showing defiance and are not willing to listen to the rest of the world either. Russia is continuing its diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to accept its proposal to come out of the present crisis.

Russia does not want Iran to become a new member of the nuclear weapons club. At the same time, it feels that sanctions will not help to persuade Iran to take note of international concerns, given that sanctions have not normally served the purpose and particularly in the case of Iran it is feared that imposition of sanctions is likely to harm the global oil prices. It is also feared that any such move is likely to result in creating even greater hatred toward the countries behind this decision and will strengthen the hardliners' grip on Iran. This will also hinder the effort of Iranian reformists to achieve their goals. At the same time, Tehran could also initiate or accelerate efforts to acquire the ultimate weapon as a deterrent, if not to use in retaliation at an opportune time. Further, with its vast petroleum assets and great authority, the Iranian regime may start doing what it is already accused of doing. In view of these repercussions, at present Russia's proposal looks to be the best option for both Iran and the rest of the world. Generally it is perceived that in case of failure of this Russian diplomatic effort, sanctions could emerge as the most viable decision for the global community, which is slated to meet on March 6 to further discuss the Iran nuclear issue.

There are economic and geopolitical interests behind Russia's soft stance on Iran. Geopolitically, Iran is Russia's biggest neighbour in the Caspian region, where Moscow is trying to restore its influence. Iran being Russia's neighbour, Russia would prefer to maintain friendly relations with it, particularly in view of Tehran's influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasus. Iran could resort to supporting terrorist activities within the Commonwealth of Independent States by providing Muslim insurgents with weapons, money and volunteers mainly in Chechnya and Tajikistan. It will therefore not be beneficial for Russia to antagonise Iran at present. Besides, Russia's other neighbours like Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are also Iran's immediate neighbours, will also face difficulty if sanctions are imposed on Iran. Further, Russia could also resist the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and US influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asian region through a possible alliance with Iran. Therefore, from the strategic point of view, it is important for Russia to maintain friendly relations with Iran. It is because of Iran's importance that Teheran was given observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia will adopt a policy to support Iran rather than to go against it. Given that NATO's eastward expansion is already creating tension for Russia, the anti-Western regime in Iran would be natural ally for Russia. Thus the combination of economic incentives, strategic interests and Russia's desire to play an important role in the global decision making process might induce Kremlin to work towards finding a diplomatic way out of the crisis.

Russia is very clear in taking Iran's side, with which it has close economic and military partnerships. Russia-Iran relations have been strengthened by arms sale and the sale of nuclear power reactors to Iran in addition to the US$840 million reactor at Bushehr. Russia expects to achieve up to $10 billion from its Bushehr deal, though it is currently building the reactor on credit to be paid by Iran only after the completion of the project. Russia will also sell Iran an air-defence system known as the Tor-M1. The Tor-M1 uses a mobile launcher to track and destroy multiple targets. It is the largest weapons deal between Moscow and Tehran within the past five years. There are also energy ties between Iran and Russia. Russia's state-controlled Gazprom has invested up to $750 million in a number of energy projects in Iran. Russia also exports metals and machine manufacturing supplies to Iran worth about $2 billion a year. Russia has also launched a booster rocket carrying an Iranian satellite in October 2005 and there are further plans to launch a second Iranian satellite in the year 2007. Thus, any setback in Russia-Iran relations would impact on these commercial contracts and affect Russia's nuclear enterprises as well as its military-industrial complex.

Russia would like to see Iran as an important strategic and economic partner. Regarding Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, it focuses exclusively on economic issues. Sanctions and admonitions will not change Russia's relation with Iran. Russia's present move also focused on its current policy towards Iran. Though at present Iran has not shown clear acceptance of the Russian proposal, Russia however feels that it has its own ways to persuade Iran, mainly through the supply of defensive weapons. As there are indications that Iran might need to protect its territory in the near future, particularly in the context of recent US pronouncements not ruling out the military option. Moreover, there are reports that Israel has drawn up plans for surgical strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities with bunker busting bombs supplied by the US. There are also reports that the Bush administration is preparing its NATO allies for a possible military strike against suspected nuclear sites in Iran. Nevertheless, in the backdrop of these realities Russia's intention will be to defend its own interest while helping Iran to solve the present crisis. Moscow is hoping to come out with an agreement with Iran on the uranium enrichment issue in Russian territory during the February 16 talks with Iran, which would cover a whole range of issues concerning the two countries.

Russia is now in a difficult position. On the one hand it is absolutely clear that a nuclear Iran is against its interests. In this respect, Russia's position is fully compatible with that of Western nations. On the other hand, if Moscow completely alienates Iran by siding with the West, the regime in Tehran could cause concern for Russia. One thing is clear to Russia: an isolated and nuclear Iran is certainly more dangerous than an Iran that is being engaged by the West and the international community. This consideration alone dictates that Russia keeps all lines of communication open and continues to maintain ties with its southern neighbour. While agreeing with the Western nations on nuclear non-proliferation, Russia would not like to lose its special geopolitical and economic ties with Iran. It is a difficult, but necessary, policy line for Russia, for it needs to take into account the short- and long-term consequences of any steps it takes on this issue.

Two very important elections are set to take place in Israel and in the Palestinian territories - the Israeli Legislative Elections on March 28 and the Palestinian Parliamentary elections for the Legislative Council on January 25. Both events are beset with equal amounts of tension, confusion and turmoil, resulting in extremely strained run up to the elections.

Israel is bracing itself for an election in which the main contender, Ariel Sharon, will be unable to participate due to a sudden stroke, which has hurled Israeli politics in a pit of lingering uncertainty. Though Israelis are known for their resilience and are used to such uncertainties, the present situation is proving to be extremely arduous for them. Sharon, who had become a colossus in Israeli politics in the past few years, has been in the limelight ever since he decided to disengage from the Gaza Strip in mid-August 2004. The Disengagement Plan, which eventually resulted in rifts in the ruling Likud party, led to his resignation in December 2005 and pushed him to form a new centrist party called Kadima (Forward). His stroke and failing health have not only left Sharon but also the entire nation paralysed, presaging his departure from Israel's political scenario.

Who will succeed Sharon? What direction would Israel-Palestine relations take under a new leader? Will Sharon's exit from Israeli politics usher in an era of more hostility, more uncertainty or a combination of the two? Amongst these obscurities, one aspect is clear: Sharon's successor will not only have external problems to deal with but will primarily have to fill the vacuum created by his departure. The first on the list among Sharon's successors is the former Deputy Prime Minister and now acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who while temporarily replacing Sharon simultaneously faces the near-impossible demanding task of stepping into his shoes. Lacking the personal and political charisma that Sharon exuded, Olmert's main concern is about losing out to the hawkish Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu.

But recent polls conducted by Israeli newspapers Haaretz and Maariv found that Kadima, led by Olmert, could take 44 to 45 seats in Israel's 120-member parliament, its strongest showing so far. The polls also predicted that the centre-left Labour Party under Amir Peretz would get 16 to18, seats while the Likud led by Netanyahu would fall to third place with 13 to15 seats.

However, Israeli public opinion tends to undulate and the results of these polls can be attributed to the Israeli public's sympathy for Sharon and hence could subsequently change in course of time. As a majority of Israelis believed strongly in Sharon and saw him as the only leader who could take action suited to Israeli interests while at the same time placating the international community as well, it will take some time for them to accept a change in Israel's political leadership.
Thus, there are three political scenarios that can unfold after the coming elections. The first, as suggested by the polls, is the Kadima winning and Olmert becoming the Prime Minister. It is clear from Olmert's previous and present political actions that he will simply continue Sharon's political agenda. The second scenario could be Netanyahu taking over the leadership and subsequently implementing his hawkish policies. The third and most unlikely probability is the Labour leader Amir Peretz coming to power and reformulating the current political agenda, i.e. shifting the emphasis from security to socio-economic issues.

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Palestinians, on the other hand, are not without their share of turmoil, tension and challenges as they head towards elections this week. Even though the reasons for their predicament might differ from those of the Israelis, the rampant and raging sentiments felt by both have quite an uncanny resemblance. The main cause of concern here is the fear of outbreak of a civil war between the ruling Fatah party and the Islamic group Hamas. Hamas, which is participating for the first time in elections in the Occupied Territories, thrives not only on widespread grassroots support but has also benefited substantially from Fatah's incompetence and failure in governing and administering the territories efficiently. Fatah, which is ridden with corruption, nepotism and internal strife has lost considerable support amongst the Palestinians and is thus walking a tight rope in sustaining its credibility as the sole political force. It has to work extremely hard to revamp the party and vindicate itself as much as it can from corruption and internal problems. In addition, it faces internal divisions as the younger guard (who are also more radical) within the party registered their own list of candidates for the elections. Marwan Barghouti, who led the second Intifadaa and is currently serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison, heads the younger guard.

Hamas's popularity was clearly exhibited when it won a sweeping victory in the municipal elections in the West Bank in December 2005. The Palestinian electoral commission said that Hamas took 73 per cent of the vote in Nablus (the biggest city in the Occupied Territories), while the mainstream Fatah organisation obtained only 13 per cent. This clearly shows that Hamas has its roots strongly and deeply embedded in the West Bank as well as in the Gaza Strip and is all set to enter the Palestinian political establishment.

Fatah is not the only party that is deeply concerned about Hamas's popularity and decision to contest elections. Israel too shares the same sentiments and is highly skeptical of a terrorist group becoming part of the government. Hamas, which is on the list of terrorist organizations of many countries including that of the US, is being compelled by them to disarm and give up violence if it wants to become a legitimate political player. Hamas's decision to take part in the elections (it had refused to participate in the 1996 elections because of its opposition to the Oslo Accords) clearly represents a strategic rather than a mere tactical shift. Also, its recent decision to drop its call for Israel's destruction from its manifesto clearly indicates that it is serious about its future as a political player in Palestinian politics.

And by coupling their electoral participation with armed struggle, which it vows to continue against Israel, Hamas will create a major shift in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Thus, it is quite likely that a political infrastructure with Hamas, Fatah and smaller parties might be formed.

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However, an Israel without Sharon and a Palestine with Hamas could cause major changes not just in Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics but at the regional level as well. If Ehud Olmert wins and the Kadima comes to power then one would see the continuation of Sharon's unfinished political agenda. But if the hawkish Netanyahu - who strongly opposed Sharon's Disengagement and believes that Land can only be given to the Palestinians in exchange for Peace, which according to him the Israelis are not getting - comes to power than one is likely to witness stronger and more stringent measures imposed upon the Palestinians. Although the participation of Hamas has been troubling to some governments, most believe that their inclusion in the political process could lead to a softening of their hard line stance. Thus a Hamas versus Netanyahu scenario would be something neither the Israelis and Palestinians nor the Americans the international community would prefer. But it seems that such a scenario could become a reality soon, a reality for which Israel and the United States must get prepared for very soon.

Balochistan has once again flared up, as troops moved in on December 18, 2005 to discipline the recalcitrant Marri tribes in Kohlu district. By commencing its much-awaited operations in Balochistan, the Pakistan military broke a tenuous peace that had lasted for nine months since clashes in Dera Bugti had claimed over 60 lives. The present operations in Balochistan ostensibly started in response to the December 14 rocket attacks on Kohlu town during President Pervez Musharraf's visit to lay the foundation stone of one of the three new cantonments to be set up in the province. Baloch nationalists fiercely oppose the cantonments. The very next day an Army helicopter that was carrying the Inspector-General, Frontier Corps (IGFC), Maj-Gen Shujaat Zamir Dar and his deputy Brig Saleem Nawaz was shot at by machine-gun fire. Though the pilot succeeded in safely landing the helicopter, both officers sustained bullet injuries.

Islamabad's sharp reaction to innocuous Indian remarks asking it to exercise restraint while dealing with its own population in Balochistan has clearly exhibited Pakistan's sensitivity in Balochistan, which has been its Achilles heel. Spread over an area of 147,000 square miles, Balochistan comprises 43 per cent of Pakistan's land mass but has only five per cent of its population. It also has immense natural resources and most of Pakistan's energy resources. Its location astride the oil lanes of the Persian Gulf, as well as at the trijunction where Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan meet makes it geopolitically and strategically the most important part of Pakistan. It nearly commands the country's entire coast - 470 miles of the Arabian Sea. It is a land that is ruled autocratically by feudal lords. Historically, it has been a loose tribal confederacy, which owed allegiance to the Persian emperor and the Afghan kings at different times in history. The ethnic origins of the Baloch set them distinctly apart from the peoples of the Indo-Gangetic plains.

Four times since Pakistan's creation, the Baloch (who like many Sindhis and Pakhtoons never wanted to be part of Pakistan) have rebelled demanding greater autonomy or even an independent state, which would reunite the five million Baloch in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan under one flag. The Khan of Kalat, the acknowledged liege lord of all Baloch tribes, had sought a status similar to that of Nepal during the British Raj. After independence both houses of parliament in Kalat had unanimously rejected the proposal to merge with Pakistan. Yet, British Balochistan was merged with Pakistan and the municipality of Quetta, a body overwhelmingly dominated by non-Baloch settlers, ratified the proposal. Subsequently, the Khan of Kalat was forced to sign the merger document and Kalat was annexed. This led to the first armed insurgency in 1948 led by Prince Karim, the brother of the Khan.

Between then and now, the Baloch have risen in revolt thrice and have faced the Pakistani security forces in 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77. Each of these uprisings were crushed with brute force and left psychological scars that are yet to heal. The organizational capabilities of the insurgents and popular support for them have increased with every insurgency. At the peak of its intensity in 1973, 55000 insurgents faced 80000 Pakistani troops; the latter were supported not only by the Pakistani Air Force but by the Iranian Air force as well. More than 5000 insurgents and over 3300 soldiers are believed to have been killed in the conflict that lasted till 1977. Pakistani Armed Forces, which had lost Bangladesh a few years earlier, used a heavy hand to crush the Baloch insurgency to redeem their honour.

Though the current operations have ostensibly been launched against Marri tribesmen in Kohlu district for their suspected involvement in rocket attacks and bomb explosions, a careful analysis of events would indicate that the operation had been planned much before any of these incidents took place. In fact, the operation had been planned for in October 2005 but was delayed because of the earthquake that hit Pakistan on October 8, 2005.

After originating in Kohlu district, the conflict has engulfed the neighbouring Dera Bugti district as well. Security forces supported by helicopter gunships and artillery have been targeting Baloch strongholds. The current operation is a full-fledged military offensive against Baloch nationalists. Bugti and Marri, two large, influential, but rival tribes in Balochistan, are now pitted against the government and are demanding more autonomy for the province, a bigger share in national resources and a special quota in federal jobs, besides enhanced royalty for natural gas, which is supplied to the whole country from the Sui region of Balochistan.

The insurgents appear to be well versed in military craft and realize that they are in no position to take on the security forces in direct combat. They are therefore targeting communication links to delink Balochistan from the rest of Pakistan. Their targets include railway lines, gas pipelines, and electricity and communication towers. They have even gone out of the state and targeted pipelines and bridges. They also seem to be familiar with the art of psychological operations and their representatives have also been quick to take credit for various acts of sabotage.

The situation is reported to be worsening, with large-scale collateral damage. Baloch nationalists have claimed that indiscriminate firing by the security forces has led to large-scale death and destruction. A number of women and children have been killed. Opposition parties in parliament have accused the government of carrying out genocide by employing helicopters in bombing sorties and using poisonous phosphorus gas against the population. Human rights activists have been prevented from visiting the affected districts. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has urged the government to stop killing Balochis in Kohlu and to cease fire immediately. It has recommended that the issue be resolved politically.

The current insurgency in Balochistan underlines the fragility of the Pakistani State more than 58 years after its creation. The regional aspirations of various ethnic groups and their efforts to assert their sub-national identities poses a potent threat to the Pakistani State. With the exception of Punjabis, other groups perceive themselves as Pakhtoons, Balochs, Sindhis or Mohajirs first and Pakistanis later. These other groups also suffer from a persecution complex and feel that they are being discriminated against by the Punjabi elite. In nearly six decades of Pakistan's existence, the Baloch have always been out of the mainstream. This is the why, whilst Pakhtoons assimilated in Pakistani society with the passage of time, the Balochs have moved away.

At Partition, the tribal areas of Balochistan were amongst the most backward parts of the subcontinent. Almost six decades later, they are still in the same condition. The tribesmen may be carrying automatic Kalashnikov assault rifles instead of ancient Lee Enfield 303s; that apart, there has hardly been any progress or development. The only law is the one laid down by the tribal chief. Clearly, the existence of such pockets of lawless lands has helped in the spread of anarchy in Pakistan. Since the Afghan war, guns and drugs have flooded Pakistan and the use of missiles, anti-aircraft weapons and an array of modern and very lethal arms by the Baloch in the current conflict is indicative of this. The army has suffered serious casualties in its operations, and has been forced to use helicopter gunships to quell the rebellion.

The record of the Pakistan Army in dealing with internal disorders has actually been dismal. Its operations in the East led to the creation of Bangladesh. Its operations in Sindh and Balochistan have failed to integrate the restive population despite the use of brute force. Recent operations in FATA have also tied down almost an entire division supported liberally by artillery and helicopter gunships. But militants still roam the region with impunity. In fact, the alienation of the population has only grown with the passage of time. The security forces have also managed to create a perpetual problem in the tranquil heights of the Northern Areas. The security apparatus in Pakistan at this point of time is really overstretched and if violence in Balochistan intensifies, the Pakistan army will definitely be sucked into a quagmire from which it will find it extremely difficult to extricate. The sands of Balochistan have the potential to fester and bleed Pakistan.