Exactly fifty years back in 1955 leaders from 29 countries spanning Asia and Africa met in the town of Bandung on West Java in Indonesia from April 18 to 25 to deliberate on a new strategy they should adopt vis-à-vis the rest of the world to make their voice heard and to make their presence felt at a time when the world was in grips of the most intensive ideological warfare between those who ardently advocated communism and those opposed it as fervently led respectively by the former Soviet Union and the United States.
Exactly fifty years back in 1955 leaders from 29 countries spanning Asia and Africa met in the town of Bandung on West Java in Indonesia from April 18 to 25 to deliberate on a new strategy they should adopt vis-à-vis the rest of the world to make their voice heard and to make their presence felt at a time when the world was in grips of the most intensive ideological warfare between those who ardently advocated communism and those opposed it as fervently led respectively by the former Soviet Union and the United States. That these ideological fights would end up as proxy wars in the newly liberated and yet to be liberated of countries of the South became crystal clear with the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The American direct military intervention in Vietnam in 1954 after the French failed to subdue the spirited nationalist movement of that country further reinforced what had been suspected by some enlightened leaders such as India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. Simultaneously, vast majority of the in Africa were still reeling under the colonial rule where many were waging armed struggles.
Much of the economic power and military muscle was heavily concentrated in the West and, despite partial decolonization, their stranglehold on their former colonies was still very strong. Most of the countries in the South had very little option other than chose one of the pillars that dominated world politics.
This was the backdrop against which the Bandung Conference was held. Given the circumstances prevalent then, the primary focus of this Conference was anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. All the prominent and well-known leaders of that time attended the Conference such as, aside from Nehru and Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister of the Gold Coast (later Ghana), Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, Chou En Lai, premier of China, Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of Vietnam. Many other Asian and African nations, including Japan, sent representatives.
It was an attempt to carve a niche for the countries of the South and towards that end the Bandung Conference was instrumental in creating and advancing the concept of positive neutralism. While it was known that many newly independent countries like India had advocated to maintain neutrality by refusing to take sides with either of the ideological groupings of the West, positive neutralism was supposed to be different from being merely neutral. It meant to take active part in global politics for the promotion of decolonization and to get a better deal for the countries of the South. It was envisaged that the primary location to play that role would be the United Nations.
A major upshot of the movement that started at Bandung gradually encompassed other developing countries was the emergence in 1961 a new global movement called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the third alternative. Thus, the Bandung was instrumental in laying the foundation for NAM which became a significant force in the sixties and the seventies. NAM forced the adoption of resolutions at the United Nation for New International Economic Order and New International Information Order that led to the earmarking of considerable sums as aid by the developed to the developing nations. It is not as though NAM had such a smooth sailing forging the Third World solidarity. If the pro-U.S. 1965 military coup in Indonesia was the first blow, there were other developments that dented the credibility of NAM, for instance the a signing of a peace and friendship agreement between India and the Soviet Union in 1971, the emergence of dictatorship in Egypt, etc. Military coups and authoritarian regimes gaining access to power in many countries in Africa and Latin America further weakened the movement.
By the time the second round of the Cold War got underway starting from the emergence of the Indochina countries as communist defeating the U.S. in the mid-1970s, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1978, and a series of other developments in Africa and Southeast Asia, NAM, although had more than 100 nations as members, had become too amorphous and the principles for which it had been fighting for had become too vague and impractical.
The emergence of economic tigers in Asia, called the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), and many others abandoning the socialist path that the leading countries had been advocating created a serious ideological crisis for NAM. Successful economic policies these countries pursued underscored the significance of attracting direct investments from and opening up of the markets of the developed countries rather than harping on doles in the form of aid. The non-aligned movement included such diverse countries- rabidly anti-communist and pro-American like Singapore and Indonesia to communist zealot such as Vietnam and Cuba, that it became impossible to evolve a common agenda.
Whatever little residual relevance that the non-aligned movement had disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It was no more possible to use the earlier tactic of pitting one super power against the other to extract some political and economic mileage. With the discrediting of the communist ideology, anything even remotely connected to that ideology was distanced from. Market forces, liberalization, globalization, etc., became the new buzzwords. There was no common interest or political philosophy among the developing world except advancement of one’s interests in whatever way possible.
By the time the golden jubilee of the Bandung Conference was celebrated in April 2005, people had virtually forgotten about the non-aligned movement. One might wonder why such a big show was put up by Indonesia and what was expected to be achieved. It has been obvious that what has been touted as inevitable the process of globalization is and the wonders it has been doing in promoting the prosperity and development of the developing world, certain basic concerns linger on. No doubt some countries have benefited from globalization but vast majority of people has remained poor and has not seen the fruits of this prosperity. Income disparities are growing within most of the developing countries as also between the developed and developing nations as well. There could not be a better country than Indonesia that can understand the ravages of globalization as witnessed in the aftermath of the 1997-98 financial crisis that hit the Asia Pacific region. It is yet to recover from the debilitating effects it has had on its economy which pushed more than 70 million people below the poverty line literally overnight. If China’s recent breakneck speed growth is showcased as a miracle, there is a downside to it in terms of massive environmental degradation, indiscriminate use of resources in an unproductive way, and social dislocation by way population movement seeking employment. Developed world is relocating all those polluting and less value-added industries to the developing countries in the name of economic development.
Therefore, the current Bandung summit can be a good opportunity to have a serious introspection and to draw a new political agenda for the developing countries to not only strike a better deal vis-à-vis the North but also renew their own cooperation. Moreover, there is a host of other issues that can only be tackled with the cooperation several countries. For instance, terrorism, drug pedaling, gunrunning, human trafficking, etc., are impinging on these countries. Similarly, no one can be expected to resolve a number of recurring problems such as poverty and inter-ethnic hostilities in Africa. There are also several diseases like AIDS, SARS, avian flu, etc., that require greater cooperation and coordination among the developing countries in order to fight them.
So far there are no indications that an institutional mechanism might be set up by those that attended the recent summit meeting but that may become inevitable if some of the above mentioned problems afflicting these are to be addressed.
IDSA COMMENT
Koizumi Visit – Need to Advance Strategic Dialogue and Content
C Uday Bhaskar
May 02, 2005
The visit of the Japanese PM Mr. Junichiro Koizumi to Delhi on April 29 is the last in a series of high levels visits that have the potential to fundamentally re- alter India's bi-lateral relations with the major poles of relevance in the post Cold War/post 9-11 global systemic and the challenge will be in realizing the potential that has been agreed to at the highest political level. These visits began with that of Ms. Condi Rice, the US Secretary of State in mid March and this was followed by the Chinese PM Mr. Wen Jiabao in early April.
The visit of the Japanese PM Mr. Junichiro Koizumi to Delhi on April 29 is the last in a series of high levels visits that have the potential to fundamentally re- alter India's bi-lateral relations with the major poles of relevance in the post Cold War/post 9-11 global systemic and the challenge will be in realizing the potential that has been agreed to at the highest political level. These visits began with that of Ms. Condi Rice, the US Secretary of State in mid March and this was followed by the Chinese PM Mr. Wen Jiabao in early April. In retrospect it would be valid to infer that the Rice visit and its immediate aftermath (the background briefing of March 25 in Washington that outlined a new US policy to South Asia) has had a non-linear impact on the visits that followed and the manner in which Beijing and Tokyo now perceive Delhi in the emerging global strategic matrix.
It is pertinent that the Rice and Wen visits dwelt on the need to advance the 'strategic' content of their respective country's relationship with India and the Koizumi-Manmohan Singh eight fold initiative follows in much the same mould. There was reference to a "global partnership" that reflected the broad convergences that both nations shared across the political, economic and strategic spectrum and they reiterated their commitment to respond to the emerging regional and global challenges. A high level strategic dialogue between the Indian National Security Adviser Mr. M K Narayanan and his Japanese interlocutor Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Special Adviser to Mr. Koizumi has also been agreed to – and this will provide the appropriate framework for such consultations.
Perhaps the most important consensus – albeit symbolic at this stage – is that India and Japan have agreed to work as "partners against proliferation" and this reflects their common anxieties about nuclear non-proliferation, clandestine networks and deviant regimes that abet such activity. Given that the May 1998 nuclear tests by India had led to considerable tension in the bi-lateral relationship, this is a positive development and should be managed with requisite sensitivity – on both sides. This nuanced shift in Tokyo's position is also indicative of the changes that are taking place in Japan's internal polity and related security discourse and the emergence of a 'normal' Japan that will assume what it deems to be legitimate security responsibilities at both the regional and global level.
This gradual assertion by Japan comes during the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima nuclear bombing and is also linked to the claim that Tokyo has made as regards the permanent membership of the UN Security Council – yet another issue on which India and Japan share a common aspiration. But as noted over the last fortnight, China and other neighbors including Taiwan and South Korea have given vent to their anti-Japanese sentiment and are determined to raise this issue at the UN later this year. But unlike other Asian neighbors, India has no animus against Japan – despite the experience of World War II – and this point was highlighted by the Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh – that India and Japan have stood by each other in their hour of need.
This strategic affinity and empathy is now poised to be translated into tangible action and the Koizumi visit has laid the framework – however tentative – for this kind of security and strategic co-operation. Given Japan's past diffidence and strict constitutional interpretation, many bi-lateral military and security initiatives that would be deemed normal were not allowed but this time the two leaders agreed that the interaction between the two Coast Guards and the Navies would be enhanced. As it happens since the 1999 incident when the Indian Coast Guard responded with commendable speed in rescuing a hijacked Japanese merchant ship, the co-operation between the two Coast Guards is robust. Extending this to the naval sphere is logical and Japan's technical competence in ship-building and design and its state-of-art naval technology and India's operational credibility can provide natural complementarities.
In like fashion, the shared convergence in energy matters will be given a strategic orientation – and here again apart from the safety of the sea-lines of communication that India and Japan share with other major oil dependent economies including China and South Korea – the possibility of working together in the Russian Far East and prospecting elsewhere could be explored. The real challenge is that till now Japan has been reluctant to either invest or engage with India in a sustained manner and the nuclear issue further exacerbated matters. Japan preferred to engage with China, Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN and it is only now that India's economic potential is being acknowledged in Tokyo. However bi-lateral trade remains very low and at US $ 4 billion, this is a contrast to the Indian trade with China that is closer to $ 15 billion and set to double in less than five years.
The less noticed agreement is that Japan and India have agreed to promote the spread of the Japanese language in India and a target of 30,000 learners at different stages by 2010 is a welcome step. Japanese insularity and its distinctive strategic culture make it imperative to have a language affinity and both the trade potential and security dialogue will acquire a fillip if Japanese language studies are encouraged in India from school level onwards. I would describe this as being truly long-term and strategic and since education is a state subject in India, this matter should receive the highest attention from state education officials. It merits recall that many schools and colleges in Europe and North America are prioritizing the study of Japanese and Chinese and for good strategic reason.
Bi-lateral relations between India and Japan have remained stunted for many reasons not the least the contrast between the two peoples and their cultures. Japan is a nation where individual excellence gets synthesized into a collective zeal and whether it is the Japanese private sector of the 1970s and 80s – or the precision with which the Japanese bullet trains are run – this is in sharp contrast to the cacophonous, complacent and often chaotic Indian experience. Currently all of Asia is in a state of flux and the emergence of both China and India have significant tectonic implications for the conduct of international relations. Japan is the third pole of relevance in the Asian strategic calculus and the manner in which the Koizumi visit is translated into tangible action will have a significant bearing on the evolving regional and global systemic.
India-Japan Relations
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
EU Arms Embargo on China: The German debate
Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
May 02, 2005
The move by the European Union (EU) to lift the 15-year old arms embargo on China seems at present to have been set aside till the end of 2005. An informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on April 15 at Gymnich, Luxembourg under the present Luxembourg presidency concluded to take no decision regarding the embargo. The press release issued after the meeting is a carefully drafted document. Essentially the press statement seems to please everyone.
The move by the European Union (EU) to lift the 15-year old arms embargo on China seems at present to have been set aside till the end of 2005. An informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on April 15 at Gymnich, Luxembourg under the present Luxembourg presidency concluded to take no decision regarding the embargo. The press release issued after the meeting is a carefully drafted document. Essentially the press statement seems to please everyone. It attempts to project the unity of the 25 member nations of the EU on this issue; on the other hand it does not want to offend China and depicts her as “an increasingly indispensable actor on the international scene.” It does not mention the Anti-Secession Law against Taiwan passed by the Chinese National People’s Congress on March 14, or the tensions in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations because of the demonstrations staged by Chinese students against Japanese establishments in China. The statement also says that “discussions on this topic will continue both within the EU and with our partners.” Again it is not mentioned with which partners the discussions would get the priority, since the EU has already strategic partnerships with China, India and Japan in the Asian continent. However, it is quite obvious that decision with the senior partner across the Atlantic, the US, would be given utmost importance. Tough postures of the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and warnings by the US Congress to impose embargo on the EU should the latter lift the sanctions on China, seem to have strongly influenced the EU decision.
Nevertheless, internal politics of the European Union as well as national politics within the member nations have also had its bearings on the EU decision. In order to advance their trade interests, France and Germany have, for some time, become strong advocates of lifting the post-1989 arms embargo on China. However, at a time when all the attention is focused on two major European events namely the British parliamentary elections and the EU Constitution ratification referendum in France, debate within Germany on the arms embargo decision certainly deserves consideration. Unlike France and Britain, differences within the partners of the German ruling coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens in this matter have come to the fore.
The stance taken by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder is already well known. In conformity with his standpoint he has made six visits to China during his incumbency. On the occasion of his last visit to Asia in October 2004, the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, commented (October 15, 2004) “For a long time, Schröder’s interest in Asia could be summed up in three words: China, China, China. The continent’s other giant, India failed to create any sort of glow on his radar screen.” This assessment was also shared by Schröder himself at a meeting in Delhi where he said that the German economy ought to seek opportunities primarily not only in China and Japan but in India as well.
In the recent debate Chancellor Schröder by persistently promoting the line to lift the embargo, has positioned himself not only against his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also against Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coalition partner, the Greens. Commenting upon a possible discussion on the arms export embargo in the Lower House of the German Parliament (Bundestag), Schröder insisted in an interview on March 31st to the German weekly, Die Zeit, that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag, the final authority of foreign policy making lies with the federal government. This kind of stance by Schröder is often termed by the German opposition as Alleingang (go-it-alone policy). Informed quarters may compare such strong individualistic positioning as typical of Schröder. Just one week after Schröder’s interview to Die Zeit, the difference between the Chancellor and his own Foreign Minister came out into the open. Joschka Fischer in an interview on April 6 to the same weekly pronounced that he, his party and the parliamentary faction have a sceptical stand in this respect. Here it must be mentioned that Joschka Fischer in his speech to the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March this year depicted the human rights situation in China as a source of concern. He insisted on rapid results in specific areas of deficit as far as the Chinese human rights situation is concerned. It is quite natural that the divergences in public on this matter have become a delight for the German opposition Christian Democrats. The 169th Plenary Session of Bundestag on April 14 witnessed a stormy debate on this issue. During the debate both the main blocs in the Bundestag have opposed each other citing their respective past and present stances vis-à-vis China. Joschka Fischer, cornered by the opposition, did not give any concrete answer whether he was for or against the arms embargo, but concluded that he had to work towards a European consensus-building on this issue.
It is apparent that the issue of EU arms embargo is shelved for the time being. A revised and stricter version of EU Arms Export Code of Conduct is expected which would attempt to address this issue of observance of human rights and other criteria by the recipient nations. Lifting the embargo on arms export to China might coincide with some other developments like the enforcement of a new EU Arms Export Code of Conduct and the Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the meantime, France and Germany at the official level would persist in lifting the embargo citing various reasons like the need to oppose the ‘containment’ of China and simultaneously averting a possible clash with the US, integrating China into the international system, etc. Joschka Fischer’s interview in the German daily Handelsblatt (April 17) is remarkable. In this interview he says that one of the greatest challenges would be to integrate rising world powers like China and India into the world system, so that they do not feel dejected. Fischer’s concern about China is quite understandable, but citing India as a case in point is a bit mystifying. Equating China with India in the context of integration into the international community seems to be simplistic. Fischer could have been more specific about the scale of integration into the international community and the respective places of India and China therein. Official enthusiasm shown by Germany to lift the arms embargo on China appears to be based on the reciprocal support of China to the German membership of the UN Security Council. But it must be remembered that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have already formed the Group of Four (G 4). At the last 59th UN General Assembly in September 2004, all the four countries in a joint statement pledged to support each other’s candidature for UNSC membership. In order to realise their aspiration, the G4 understandably has to go a long way as it needs the nod of the P5. Comparing the largest democracy at this juncture with a nation which still does not have a multi-party electoral system may undermine the cohesion of the G4 and act as weapons for other regional competitors which are serious enough to prevent the entry of the G4 into the UN Security Council. Being politically, economically and strategically the most important European nation, Germany’s stand on specific issues carries weight at the level of EU and globally as well. Observance of Human rights in any part of the world is one of the most important pillars of German foreign policy. Most pertinently, Germany has been criticising the human rights situation in China at various international fora, but has also engaged China in a “Dialogue on Constitutional State” (Rechtsstaatdialog). German Foreign Ministry has also been maintaining close contacts with the Chinese political activists and cyber-dissidents. But the recent disagreement within the ruling coalition in Germany shows the need for a cohesive China Policy that would deal with specific issues like human rights or environment protection not episodically but over a specific time frame.
At the level of EU it emerges that till the end of 2005 the arms embargo against China is not likely to be lifted. Austria and Finland, two smaller members are scheduled to hold the EU presidencies respectively in 2006. Given recent history, Chinese diplomatic persuasion of the EU majors and the presidencies would continue to have a favourable effect. But the US measures on EU would have to be taken into account. Therefore, the possible scenario is that for a positive outcome, China has to wait till 2007 when Germany would hold the first half of EU presidency. However, in between the EU itself is expected to go through the litmus test on its existence, i.e., the EU constitution ratification referenda in various West European nations. Negative voting on this issue in any member nation might set the whole European integration process in a reverse gear. Moreover, Germany will go for national polls in the autumn of 2006. Therefore, in the European agenda lifting the arms embargo on China would not be as important as it has turned out to be in the last few months. On the contrary, consensus-building on the issue of arms embargo would become less significant than the issue of importing textiles from China. Already thirteen members of the EU have been exerting pressure on Brussels to protect indigenous European manufacturing units. Nicolas Schmit, the Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, identifies the subject as an ”extremely thorny dossier”. Keeping in mind that common trade is one of the most important elements in the first pillar of the EU, it would be interesting to observe which topic would get EU priority in the coming days, textiles or the arms embargo.
European Union
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
The sky is no limit: Rivalry between Boeing and Airbus goes back a long way
Ajey Lele
April 29, 2005
It's a strange coincidence that Air India approved the purchase of up to 50 long-range Boeing aircraft at a cost of about Rs 300 billion and at the same time its rival Airbus successfully completed the maiden test flight of the biggest airliner, the Airbus double-decker A380, an aircraft designed to carry 800 passengers.
The A380 ended the four-decade reign of Boeing’s 747 jumbo as the biggest airliner to have flown. It has taken more than a decade and approximately USD$15.55 billion to develop the A380, subsidised by European governments.
It's a strange coincidence that Air India approved the purchase of up to 50 long-range Boeing aircraft at a cost of about Rs 300 billion and at the same time its rival Airbus successfully completed the maiden test flight of the biggest airliner, the Airbus double-decker A380, an aircraft designed to carry 800 passengers.
The A380 ended the four-decade reign of Boeing’s 747 jumbo as the biggest airliner to have flown. It has taken more than a decade and approximately USD$15.55 billion to develop the A380, subsidised by European governments.
The A380 is a key weapon in the battle by Airbus to keep its edge over Boeing. However, Boeing is eyeing the market for smaller long-range airliners and probably this is where Air India could have found them more useful. The Air India order would be of 50 long-range Boeing aircraft — including 27 of the new 787 long-range jets subject to government approval.
The Boeing-Airbus rivalry is an old rivalry and Boeing wants to end the dominance of Airbus, which has outsold them since 2001. However, this competition is not merely about competition amongst two business rivals. The policies of the US and French (read European) governments have always favoured their own companies. There has always been a debate about these governments giving unfair subsidies to these companies.
In the current geopolitical context, the Boeing order could be seen as part of an overall push towards a closer Indo-American strategic alliance. Also it could be treated as a success of a US lobby ‘‘managing’’ its corporate interests in India. Naturally the Airbus group is dejected. They are irked because Air India authorities have opted for Boeing 787 in the deal fully knowing well that this aircraft will take to the skies only by 2010. Also they allege that the tender norms were changed to help Boeing. However, Air India has refuted these charges. For Boeing this is the second order coming their way in the recent past. Air Canada has placed an order for purchase of 96 Boeing 777 and 787 planes. Their assessment is that fuel burn and maintenance cost savings with induction of 787 could be of the order of 20 to 30 per cent.
These two big ‘‘catches’’ by Boeing indicate that the American government has played its cards well. Now the question is: will Boeing stop at grabbing the civil aviation contract or will it attempt to look for defence contracts in India? Boeing can offer high technology collaboration in various areas of military aviation but they would have more competitors. Much will depend on strategic and economic interests of both nations, and not merely the avionics on board an aircraft. But one thing is sure. It’s not just the sheer volume in customers’ orders — it’s the penetration deep in the heart of Airbus territory which Boeing has succeeded in achieving with this deal.
IDSA COMMENT
UNSC: let India’s track record speak for itself
C Uday Bhaskar
April 26, 2005
The visit of UN secretary- general Kofi Annan to Delhi has generated predictable interest in the nature of the relationship that India currently has with this apex global body and the status that it seeks. This is so, even as the UN is attempting a review of its structural framework based on the inputs provided by a high-level panel that has since submitted its report.
The visit of UN secretary- general Kofi Annan to Delhi has generated predictable interest in the nature of the relationship that India currently has with this apex global body and the status that it seeks. This is so, even as the UN is attempting a review of its structural framework based on the inputs provided by a high-level panel that has since submitted its report.
The more visible aspect of the latter is the revamp of the UN Security Council. The proposals include two options — one that envisages an increase in the number of permanent members with the veto power, and another that seeks to freeze the veto power to the existing five members and increase the non-veto members in the UNSC.
India has already staked its claim to be a part of the revamped UNSC along with Germany, Japan and Brazil, but on current evidence this re-vamp of the UNSC is going to be bitterly contested.
Some basic realities of the UN merit recall in the run up to its 60th anniversary celebrations later in 2005. For a global community that subscribed to normative democratic values in the aftermath of colonialism and which in turn became the bedrock for the East-West divide of the Cold War, the UN since its inception in 1945 is among the least democratic bodies in the world.
The UNSC with its five permanent members, who are also the five nations that have been classified as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)— namely, the US, Russia the UK, France and China—are the core management team that take all the relevant security and strategic decisions at the UN. Yes, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) includes all member-states and they are all equal, irrespective of size and other indicators, but at best they can make recommendations that have to be approved by the UNSC.
India has had to live with this reality for 60 years and in these decades, the UN has many positive achievements to its credit. Much of this has been enabled by the manner in which the global community has sought to empower the UN that is not a supra government but a reflection of the collective will of individual nations.
In 2005, the global centre of gravity is slowly returning to Asia, where it existed in the 19th century, before the tenets of political economy specific to colonialism shifted this core to Europe and then the US. To that extent, the invalidity of the UNSC, as it exists today, is an existential reality.
However, if the recent turbulence in China over Japan’s candidature to the UNSC is any indication, it is evident that there will be no quick consensus about how the UNSC is to be revamped. Much the same could be applied to the German and Brazilian claims and the nations that are bitterly opposed to them. And even for India, the Pakistani position that is vehemently opposed to Delhi’s possible admission is well-known.
During the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Delhi, it was noted that Beijing supports India’s claim to the UNSC and the exact choice of word and phrase was minutely examined. While this statement was received with enthusiasm in India, the more nuanced Chinese position is becoming more evident wherein Beijing has aligned itself with those nations who are against any swift decision regarding UNSC expansion. Reports from Islamabad suggest that according to the Pakistani leadership, Beijing has assured them that there is no emphatic support for India’s case to join the UNSC.
A recall of this tedious litany is to highlight the central point that any meaningful expansion of the UNSC, that would be in consonance with India’s legitimate aspirations, is not on the cards anytime soon. Thus, it may be more prudent for India to make the point that its candidature is self-evident, but it should not invest too much capital —political or diplomatic — in making this a litmus test for its many bilateral and multilateral relations.
There are some existential realities that make the case for India. These include the US National Intelligence Council estimate that by 2020, barely 15 years from now, India’s GDP will be on the threshold of overtaking European economies and will be next only to the US, China and Japan. Three of these nations are Asian and the relevance of the continent and these three states cannot be ignored.
Militarily, India has a credible profile that is being incrementally nurtured, and as far as the UN is concerned, the Indian contribution is distinctive. The Indian military has participated with great credit in 41 of the 59 UN peacekeeping missions over the last 60 years. And it is estimated that in the years ahead, the Indian contribution will increase.
Thus, the preferred option would be for India to stake its claim but in a detached and dignified manner. It would be more prudent for Delhi to make itself more relevant to the management of regional and global security and stability, as it did during the December 2004 tsunami tragedy, and let this track-record speak for itself. There is an old saying in rural India that if you make yourself relevant and indispensable, the village panchayat will have no option but to invite you, more so when they see your well-fed buffaloes and the polished lathi! Some consistent extrapolation from this indigenous wisdom may not be misplaced.
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
IDSA COMMENT
Redefining the ties
Sujit Dutta
April 26, 2005
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India would be noted for three landmark steps: The establishment of a strategic and cooperative partnership, the agreement on the political parameters and guidelines for settling the territorial/boundary issue, and the decision on a comprehensive economic partnership and regional trading arrangement.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India would be noted for three landmark steps: The establishment of a strategic and cooperative partnership, the agreement on the political parameters and guidelines for settling the territorial/boundary issue, and the decision on a comprehensive economic partnership and regional trading arrangement.
All the three steps seek not only to qualitatively upgrade bilateral relationship but also to shape the larger strategic environment of Asia. The rise of China, the resurgence of nationalism in Japan and the US's desire to maintain its predominance in the Asia Pacific region, along with the rise of India in the Indian Ocean and the Southern Asia region have created a new Asian security atmosphere leading to a tussle for a new balance of power. China's rising concerns about US and Japan have forced it to rethink its Asia policy and its approach towards India. It is keen to mitigate the problems and build a secure partnership.
What are the chances that such a partnership will become a reality over the next few years? Or that the boundary issue will be fairly and satisfactorily resolved and the security dilemma flowing from China's regional military ties mitigated? The joint statement commits both sides to respect each other's security concerns and interests, but the issues are still there and would have to be tackled for mutual gain and in a fair manner. Too much power bargaining, especially by China, may have negative results.
Today, India-China relations are better than at any time in the past 55 years. Both are in the midst of a major internal transition. They also need each other for their large markets, and for overcoming serious external security challenges and for cooperating on common global and regional aspirations. As the two principal rising powers of Asia, their bilateral relationship and ability to coexist peacefully through a period of rapid power shift and huge domestic transition are of great strategic significance. Expanded economic and trade ties and more frequent high-level political and institutionalised strategic dialogue are, therefore, being perceived as being the bedrock of relations in this new stage. Trade is expected to touch $20 billion in three years and $30 billion in five years. Mutual investments are set to rise.
Besides the larger issues, there have been other gains during the summit. The Sikkim issue has been settled and China has backed India's representation in the UN Security Council; a protocol to strengthen the confidence building agreements of 1996 has been adopted. In addition, the expansion in air travel will facilitate trade and tourism. Asia's largest emerging powers are in the midst of redefining their relationship with an orientation towards a new and yet uncertain Asian future.
India-China Relations
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Trade bloc: Can we trust China?
Sujit Dutta
April 25, 2005
Globalisation and regionalisation of trade and investment are drawing in all countries and becoming an irresistible trend in Asia. China is at the centre of this new structure. Since 1992 in particular, as investments in labour-intensive manufacturing from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia have moved in a rising wave though the open Chinese door, steeply raising its trade profile.
Globalisation and regionalisation of trade and investment are drawing in all countries and becoming an irresistible trend in Asia. China is at the centre of this new structure. Since 1992 in particular, as investments in labour-intensive manufacturing from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia have moved in a rising wave though the open Chinese door, steeply raising its trade profile.
Textiles, clothing, toys, electrical goods, furniture and TVs from China have dominated Western markets for several years now. Newer products — computers, portable electric lamps, synthetic dyes, railway locomotives, steel tubing and casing for oil wells, radio navigation equipment, and even ships — are now being exported in growing quantities. China is also becoming a large exporter of industrial commodities, with steel exports nearly quintupling in the first quarter of this year compared with a year ago. The Uruguay Round agreement to phase out textile quotas from January this year has also been a huge boon for it: many expect China to account for half of all world textile production in five years.
The challenge to India's trade could not be framed any more explicitly. But India too can take full advantage from the new arrangements and ongoing economic and technological shifts to become the second hub of global manufacturing.
By keeping its currency tightly pegged to the dollar, which has declined over the past three years, China has made its goods even more competitive in countries using currencies like the euro that have appreciated against the dollar. This has helped China export more, and discouraged businesses in China from importing. Their labour laws too are highly flexible, working hours long, and wage rates low — practices that are well below acceptable standards in most democracies.
It is in these areas that India would have to remain alert, and use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms under the WTO to ensure fair competition. Also, there is no immediate case for free trade with China. Indian infrastructure, tariff rates, modernisation are not yet prepared for a fully open economy. China has taken 25 years to reach here.
However, these are not arguments for not trading but for speedier reforms and capability build-up. There is simply no alternative but to trade when the rest of the world is creating deep interdependence with China. The consequences of not trading would be worse. India should not distrust China. It must engage and compete both for the world and the large China markets: the fate of its industry and services, and of employment for its millions, depends on it.
India-China Relations, Trade
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
The Changing Definition of Kashmir
Ashutosh Misra
April 15, 2005
If the attack on the district collector’s office in Srinagar in January and the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir tourist office on the eve of the inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service came as a harsh reminder of Kashmir’s violent history, the overall mood in the valley, for a couple of reasons, suggested otherwise. In recent months, the people of Kashmir have sent a message: Freedom can wait, but development cannot. Two developments symbolise the transformation of popular mood.
If the attack on the district collector’s office in Srinagar in January and the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir tourist office on the eve of the inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service came as a harsh reminder of Kashmir’s violent history, the overall mood in the valley, for a couple of reasons, suggested otherwise. In recent months, the people of Kashmir have sent a message: Freedom can wait, but development cannot. Two developments symbolise the transformation of popular mood. First, the municipal corporation elections and the second, the operationalisation of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. The civic polls—held in all 14 districts of J&K after a span of 25 years (last time in 1980)—witnessed a large voter turnout, with women outnumbering men in the queue at polling booths in many places. It suggests that militancy now seems to be losing steam and the common man is ready to fight for peace, basic amenities and development.
In the municipal elections, voter turnout was recorded between 30-35 per cent with disturbed areas like Qazigund in Anantnag recording 78 per cent turnout. Pulwama with 56.6 per cent, Dooru with 65.99 per cent and Jammu with 65 per cent hinted the dawn of a new phase in the troubled state. In Srinagar, killings of several candidates by terrorists and call for a boycott by them along with APHC fell on deaf ears. Ignoring their calls, people came out to vote and the turnout was around 20 per cent, which was very impressive. Rajouri and Poonch recorded 81 and 76 per cent turnout respectively.
The fact that no single party could sweep the polls speaks of the representative character of democracy in J&K. If the Progressive Democratic Party won in Ganderbal, home constituency of the Abdullahs, it lost to the National Conference in Srinagar. The Congress and PDP won in Charar-e-Shareif and in Jammu, the Congress edged past the BJP’s tally of 26, with 27 seats.
If the bus service has been underscored by the criticism of parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, it has given the people of not only PoK but J&K too, a cause for celebration. The service goes to benefit the common people who are, after all, at the ‘‘core’’ of the core. Such an exchange will not only transform the perceptions of the people about each other, but also improve the overall atmospherics of Indo-Pak ties. The impact of the bus service in the overall rapprochement can be discerned from the threats that have come from the terrorists to the passengers of the bus. By the same token, courage shown by the passengers to board the bus against all odds could well open a new chapter in the history of Indo-Pak relations. No wonder, it has been considered the ‘Mother of all CBMs’ and rightly so. It is a clear indication that people on both sides of the Chenab have been longing to meet and have been given a new lease of life. The link that would be maintained through the bus service, once every two weeks, alone has the potential of transforming Indo-Pakistan relations. Its importance is also augmented by the enthusiasm shown by PM Manmohan Singh himself, who initiated the policy of ‘peace with dignity’ and ‘wining hearts and minds’ and even went to Srinagar to flag off the bus, despite terrorist threats. Even long-time political foes Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti have been unanimous in their support for the bus. It is sad to see some analysts in discussions on TV demeaning the importance of the bus service, by labelling the coverage by the press as unwarranted “hype”. To see the bus service as just another CBM in the long list of CBMs, would be a big mistake.
The decision by India and Pakistan to start the bus service holds immense promise for the troubled state. It suggests that both have the political strength to take bold decisions and to break from past prejudices. On the bus service, two issues caused repeated deadlocks—travel documents and domicile of the passengers. On both fronts, the two sides showed flexibility and understanding. Pakistan insisted on UN documents for travel and keeping the service exclusively for Kashmiris. India’s contention was to use passport as a travel document and for the service to be open for all Indians. The two stands were reflective of the respective official stands on Kashmir, and how India and Pakistan looked at the Kashmir issue. However, as Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in his press conference in Islamabad, the bus service has been effected without any prejudice and with a humanitarian approach, where it becomes a win-win situation for all. The bus service could well become a psychological facilitator when India and Pakistan discuss the Kashmir issue.
A lot still remains to be achieved. Many such measures have to be taken to soothe historic wounds and mend strained bilateral relations. The future would demand much greater compromises and policy shifts by both sides on Kashmir. For Pakistan, it still is the ‘problem of Kashmir’, i.e., Kashmir is a ‘disputed territory’ and an ‘unfinished agenda’ of Partition; and for India, it is the ‘problem’ in Kashmir, suggesting that the accession of Kashmir to India is final and complete, and the challenge now remains in addressing cross-border terrorism, development and grievances of the people of Kashmir. The two divergent approaches leave little scope for a compromise. It is a challenging proposition, but the breakthrough in the bus service has shown that both sides possess the political will. The future of Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations has never looked as bright as it currently does.
Jammu and Kashmir, India-Pakistan Relations
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Sino-Indian Ties Critical for Emerging Strategic Systemic
C Uday Bhaskar
April 11, 2005
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi on April 11-12 comes soon after that of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (March 16) and will be followed by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit in end-April.
While this scheduling may be a matter of coincidence, the outcome of the Wen visit and the manner in which it impacts the Sino-Indian relationship has the potential to significantly shape the emerging Asian strategic systemic and related security landscape.
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi on April 11-12 comes soon after that of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (March 16) and will be followed by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit in end-April.
While this scheduling may be a matter of coincidence, the outcome of the Wen visit and the manner in which it impacts the Sino-Indian relationship has the potential to significantly shape the emerging Asian strategic systemic and related security landscape.
Currently, both India and China exude a similar set of anxieties and aspirations about their bilateral relationship as they grapple with the turbulence of an animated post 9/11 global and regional systemic.
It merits notice that the bilateral relationship has never been more positive and while political relations are stable, the trade figures are impressive. From a very modest base in the early 1990s, bilateral trade increased to US $ 5 billion in 2002-2003 and is already poised to cross $ 14 billion. This has increased by a factor of 13 times in a decade and may soon cross the $ 50 billion mark.
Both nations have been major trading states and it is often forgotten that two centuries ago, China and India accounted for more than half the global GDP. However, whether this will be the pattern for the immediate future as far as the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship is concerned will depend to a large extent on the kind of choices made by the Chinese leadership that is currently consolidating a transition phase.
China's socio-economic growth indicators over the last two decades are unprecedented and it must be acknowledged that whatever be the reservations about an authoritarian regime, the Chinese leadership has been able to effectively eradicate poverty across a one billion plus demographic profile.
Today, Beijing consciously encourages the use of the phrase 'the peaceful rise of China' to allay any fears among its Asian neighbours but it is moot as to how successful this packaging campaign has been.
The facts on the ground suggest that China has stoked nascent nationalism in Japan and currently Beijing and Tokyo are locked in a bitter and emotional recall of the excesses of World War II.
China has allowed a signature campaign against Japan's entry into the UN Security Council and the 1937 rape of Nanjing is back in focus. The fact that Japan has chosen to identify China as a source of security concern and the reference to Taiwan has heightened Sino-Japanese mutual animosity and aggrieved nationalism just short of becoming militant is the flavour of the times.
The smaller South East Asian states are wary of what they see as the inevitable pull that the 'dragon' exudes, given its political, trade and military profile, and fear that they will be swamped as their dependency index apropos China is steadily increasing.
In its second term, the Bush administration has unveiled a more robust pan-Asian policy in which democracy has become the preferred median and this was conveyed unambiguously during Ms Rice's recent whistle-stop tour of Asia that began in Delhi.
The subsequent assertion by the US that it will assist India in becoming a world power, including the military dimension, will be monitored closely by Beijing which is uneasy about the US ties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
While it is nobody's case that the US-India relationship should be predicated on an anti- China plank, it is evident that the emphasis placed by the US on the concert of democracies leads to an unstated concatenation in the Chinese strategic perception.
The Wen visit comes against this backdrop and it stands to reason that the Chinese leadership would not like to simultaneously antagonise all the major Asian states, thereby lending credence to the perception that the rise of China is synonymous with a belligerent Beijing.
On current evidence it appears that there is the likelihood of some agreement on the principles that will guide the long-pending territorial and border dispute between the two Asian giants and this is welcome.
The more complex contestation will be in the manner in which the two elites and the DNA that characterizes their strategic culture (use of force) relate to each other and the external systemic.
Historically, the Middle Kingdom has chosen force to 'control' events in a manner that they believe is conducive to Beijing's abiding interest and India has been made aware of this trait in 1962.
Internally also, the authoritarian constituency in China still relies on 'control' and this was the case in both Tiananmen and the Falun Gong. In many ways, this is an extrapolation of the Chinese adage that a single mountain can accommodate only one tiger.
India, on the other hand, has preferred 'accommodation' and is reticent about the use of force and this trait is derived from the internalisation of both non-violence and the pacifism inherent to the Indian ethos.
To that extent, there is a certain strategic dissonance between India and China and managing this mismatch between perceptions and actions will be complex and challenging.
Both countries are trying to make the appropriate choices in relating to the regional and global dynamic and this ranges from the overwhelming US military profile, the compulsions of globalisation, growing energy needs and urgent socio-economic choices linked to environmental issues.
The US-China-Japan-India strategic equipoise will define the tranquility/turbulence index for Asia and, by extension, the global canvas and to that extent the tea leaves that surround the Wen Jiabao visit should be read for issues beyond contested territoriality and enhanced trade ties.
India-China Relations
IDSA COMMENT
Global Oil Politics and the Energy Security in the Asian region
Nandakumar Janardhanan
April 11, 2005
The oil price in the international energy market appears set to remain high for the rest of this year despite the attempt of the oil giants to increase production. The major sufferers of the price hike are those Asian countries whose dependency on Persian Gulf oil is alarmingly growing day by day. Meanwhile, the OPEC countries’ plan to revise the price band of oil to a higher level, currently set at $22-$28 per barrel, suggests that the international oil price would not come back to a ‘pre-Iraq level’.
The oil price in the international energy market appears set to remain high for the rest of this year despite the attempt of the oil giants to increase production. The major sufferers of the price hike are those Asian countries whose dependency on Persian Gulf oil is alarmingly growing day by day. Meanwhile, the OPEC countries’ plan to revise the price band of oil to a higher level, currently set at $22-$28 per barrel, suggests that the international oil price would not come back to a ‘pre-Iraq level’. Is the ‘enormous’ energy demand by the Asian countries the fundamental reason behind the growing oil price in the world? It is felt that any attempt to secure energy supplies by Asian countries would be under continuous challenge from many forces around the world – the balance seekers of world power. The two hundred and ninety million people who live in the United States make up just five per cent of the world’s population, but they consume a quarter of the world’s oil supply. In this context, if the energy demand in the developed countries is compared with that of the Asian region the present oil demand of Asia can never be projected as a ‘demand shock’.
World Energy Situation
This year’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) by IEA predicts that the worldwide demand of oil will touch new heights with an increase of 1.6 per cent a year to 90 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2010 from the current 82 million b/d and to 121 million b/d in 2030. The major demand boom will be in the present energy-poor nations, especially the import dependent developing countries. According to IEA (Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, IEA, May 2004), the adverse economic impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing developing countries is generally more severe than for OECD countries. Since the growing oil prices will be a threat to the import dependent countries in the future, most of these nations would invest more on developing indigenous and traditional energy resources. Though this would not be helpful in avoiding the risk of oil dependency completely, it would give way in future energy investments to a reconsideration of the potential of other available energy materials. Simultaneously, to a great extent, investments in the field of nuclear energy would considerably increase in the Asian region which might be an eyebrow raising factor for the West. As noted, the growing price impact on the developing countries would affect the world economy in general. This would also reflect in the GDP of OPEC and its oil revenues, as higher prices would not compensate fully for lower production.
Zeroing in on the Asia-Pacific
As the recent WEO projects the rise of Russia as the ‘energy superpower’ in the coming years, the Siberian resources would be able to supply a notable quantity of oil to the East Asian markets. In the east, the Asian giants, Japan and China are involved in oil politics regarding the trans-Siberian energy pipeline from Taishet (previously the plan was to construct the line from Angarsk, but later the point of origin was changed by Moscow) in Siberia to the East Asian markets. Moreover, Russia is looking for a partner, which can make financial and technical support to the development of the oil fields in the Siberian region. The Russian energy pipeline has got a greater dimension since it can be an energy umbilical cord to the Asian Region. As the major energy consumers of the region, it would be the responsibility of both Japan and China to look for the fast realization of the energy pipeline. Both China and Japan must cooperate in this regard as well as to promote a pattern of constructive sharing of available energy resources in the region. As of now, this would seem to be a less practical idea due to different reasons including the information on the available quantity of resources in the Siberian region. Initiatives in this regard such as AMEM+3 (ASEAN Ministers’ Energy Meeting + China, Japan and South Korea) must be able to develop a collective bargaining to ensure adequate supply of energy to the Asian countries from the Persian Gulf and other energy rich areas of the world. The initiatives in energy cooperation would bring closer cooperation in many other fields including greater economic integration among the Asian countries.
In a meeting between American and Russian delegates on September 21, 2004, the Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref indicated that the US is a promising oil export market. This shows the possibility of large scale export of Siberian energy to the United States through the Murmansk port in Western Siberia. So far, the Russian plan is to exclusively export oil and gas in the Eastern Siberian region to the Eastern market mainly China, Japan and the Koreas. But any kind of energy politics over the pipeline construction by these countries would adversely affect the fast realisation of the same.
Politics of Energy Information
Energy security has been one of the most important issues of national interest to any import dependent country. Hence, the present political volatility in the Persian Gulf poses a major threat to the developing economies. Most experts are concerned with the economic impacts of energy security. But to a great extent the ‘politics of energy information’ has also been haunting the imported energy dependent countries for the past many years. The information regarding energy resources, availability, accessibility, transportation and costs etc., play a major role in the orbit of energy information in the world. The energy policy of a country and the future plans of resource development, energy investments etc., are largely dependent on the information available in the world. Today the information regarding the same has been largely manipulated by some of the interest groups. These interest groups include the energy dependent Western countries, energy companies that are active in the upstream and downstream energy activities etc.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, (Counselor, CSIS) America's security role in the Persian Gulf region gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies that are dependent on energy exports from the region. While on one hand the growing oil and gas consumption is projected as a major challenge to the developing economies of the world, on the other hand use of coal and the use of nuclear energy are brought under strict observation in the name of environmental security or nuclear non-proliferation. This approach of the developed world would adversely affect the overall development of the import dependent regions and in the longer run these restrictions would turn out to be critical impediments in their economic development. The developing economies of Asia have to seek all possible damage limiting measures in this regard. It may also include a wide range of measures like enhancing cooperation among the countries in the region in the creation of energy stockpiles, developing energy networks, effective sharing of resources, increasing energy efficiency and diversification of supply.
Exactly fifty years back in 1955 leaders from 29 countries spanning Asia and Africa met in the town of Bandung on West Java in Indonesia from April 18 to 25 to deliberate on a new strategy they should adopt vis-à-vis the rest of the world to make their voice heard and to make their presence felt at a time when the world was in grips of the most intensive ideological warfare between those who ardently advocated communism and those opposed it as fervently led respectively by the former Soviet Union and the United States.
Exactly fifty years back in 1955 leaders from 29 countries spanning Asia and Africa met in the town of Bandung on West Java in Indonesia from April 18 to 25 to deliberate on a new strategy they should adopt vis-à-vis the rest of the world to make their voice heard and to make their presence felt at a time when the world was in grips of the most intensive ideological warfare between those who ardently advocated communism and those opposed it as fervently led respectively by the former Soviet Union and the United States. That these ideological fights would end up as proxy wars in the newly liberated and yet to be liberated of countries of the South became crystal clear with the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The American direct military intervention in Vietnam in 1954 after the French failed to subdue the spirited nationalist movement of that country further reinforced what had been suspected by some enlightened leaders such as India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. Simultaneously, vast majority of the in Africa were still reeling under the colonial rule where many were waging armed struggles.
Much of the economic power and military muscle was heavily concentrated in the West and, despite partial decolonization, their stranglehold on their former colonies was still very strong. Most of the countries in the South had very little option other than chose one of the pillars that dominated world politics.
This was the backdrop against which the Bandung Conference was held. Given the circumstances prevalent then, the primary focus of this Conference was anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. All the prominent and well-known leaders of that time attended the Conference such as, aside from Nehru and Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister of the Gold Coast (later Ghana), Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, Chou En Lai, premier of China, Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of Vietnam. Many other Asian and African nations, including Japan, sent representatives.
It was an attempt to carve a niche for the countries of the South and towards that end the Bandung Conference was instrumental in creating and advancing the concept of positive neutralism. While it was known that many newly independent countries like India had advocated to maintain neutrality by refusing to take sides with either of the ideological groupings of the West, positive neutralism was supposed to be different from being merely neutral. It meant to take active part in global politics for the promotion of decolonization and to get a better deal for the countries of the South. It was envisaged that the primary location to play that role would be the United Nations.
A major upshot of the movement that started at Bandung gradually encompassed other developing countries was the emergence in 1961 a new global movement called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the third alternative. Thus, the Bandung was instrumental in laying the foundation for NAM which became a significant force in the sixties and the seventies. NAM forced the adoption of resolutions at the United Nation for New International Economic Order and New International Information Order that led to the earmarking of considerable sums as aid by the developed to the developing nations. It is not as though NAM had such a smooth sailing forging the Third World solidarity. If the pro-U.S. 1965 military coup in Indonesia was the first blow, there were other developments that dented the credibility of NAM, for instance the a signing of a peace and friendship agreement between India and the Soviet Union in 1971, the emergence of dictatorship in Egypt, etc. Military coups and authoritarian regimes gaining access to power in many countries in Africa and Latin America further weakened the movement.
By the time the second round of the Cold War got underway starting from the emergence of the Indochina countries as communist defeating the U.S. in the mid-1970s, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1978, and a series of other developments in Africa and Southeast Asia, NAM, although had more than 100 nations as members, had become too amorphous and the principles for which it had been fighting for had become too vague and impractical.
The emergence of economic tigers in Asia, called the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), and many others abandoning the socialist path that the leading countries had been advocating created a serious ideological crisis for NAM. Successful economic policies these countries pursued underscored the significance of attracting direct investments from and opening up of the markets of the developed countries rather than harping on doles in the form of aid. The non-aligned movement included such diverse countries- rabidly anti-communist and pro-American like Singapore and Indonesia to communist zealot such as Vietnam and Cuba, that it became impossible to evolve a common agenda.
Whatever little residual relevance that the non-aligned movement had disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It was no more possible to use the earlier tactic of pitting one super power against the other to extract some political and economic mileage. With the discrediting of the communist ideology, anything even remotely connected to that ideology was distanced from. Market forces, liberalization, globalization, etc., became the new buzzwords. There was no common interest or political philosophy among the developing world except advancement of one’s interests in whatever way possible.
By the time the golden jubilee of the Bandung Conference was celebrated in April 2005, people had virtually forgotten about the non-aligned movement. One might wonder why such a big show was put up by Indonesia and what was expected to be achieved. It has been obvious that what has been touted as inevitable the process of globalization is and the wonders it has been doing in promoting the prosperity and development of the developing world, certain basic concerns linger on. No doubt some countries have benefited from globalization but vast majority of people has remained poor and has not seen the fruits of this prosperity. Income disparities are growing within most of the developing countries as also between the developed and developing nations as well. There could not be a better country than Indonesia that can understand the ravages of globalization as witnessed in the aftermath of the 1997-98 financial crisis that hit the Asia Pacific region. It is yet to recover from the debilitating effects it has had on its economy which pushed more than 70 million people below the poverty line literally overnight. If China’s recent breakneck speed growth is showcased as a miracle, there is a downside to it in terms of massive environmental degradation, indiscriminate use of resources in an unproductive way, and social dislocation by way population movement seeking employment. Developed world is relocating all those polluting and less value-added industries to the developing countries in the name of economic development.
Therefore, the current Bandung summit can be a good opportunity to have a serious introspection and to draw a new political agenda for the developing countries to not only strike a better deal vis-à-vis the North but also renew their own cooperation. Moreover, there is a host of other issues that can only be tackled with the cooperation several countries. For instance, terrorism, drug pedaling, gunrunning, human trafficking, etc., are impinging on these countries. Similarly, no one can be expected to resolve a number of recurring problems such as poverty and inter-ethnic hostilities in Africa. There are also several diseases like AIDS, SARS, avian flu, etc., that require greater cooperation and coordination among the developing countries in order to fight them.
So far there are no indications that an institutional mechanism might be set up by those that attended the recent summit meeting but that may become inevitable if some of the above mentioned problems afflicting these are to be addressed.
The visit of the Japanese PM Mr. Junichiro Koizumi to Delhi on April 29 is the last in a series of high levels visits that have the potential to fundamentally re- alter India's bi-lateral relations with the major poles of relevance in the post Cold War/post 9-11 global systemic and the challenge will be in realizing the potential that has been agreed to at the highest political level. These visits began with that of Ms. Condi Rice, the US Secretary of State in mid March and this was followed by the Chinese PM Mr. Wen Jiabao in early April.
The visit of the Japanese PM Mr. Junichiro Koizumi to Delhi on April 29 is the last in a series of high levels visits that have the potential to fundamentally re- alter India's bi-lateral relations with the major poles of relevance in the post Cold War/post 9-11 global systemic and the challenge will be in realizing the potential that has been agreed to at the highest political level. These visits began with that of Ms. Condi Rice, the US Secretary of State in mid March and this was followed by the Chinese PM Mr. Wen Jiabao in early April. In retrospect it would be valid to infer that the Rice visit and its immediate aftermath (the background briefing of March 25 in Washington that outlined a new US policy to South Asia) has had a non-linear impact on the visits that followed and the manner in which Beijing and Tokyo now perceive Delhi in the emerging global strategic matrix.
It is pertinent that the Rice and Wen visits dwelt on the need to advance the 'strategic' content of their respective country's relationship with India and the Koizumi-Manmohan Singh eight fold initiative follows in much the same mould. There was reference to a "global partnership" that reflected the broad convergences that both nations shared across the political, economic and strategic spectrum and they reiterated their commitment to respond to the emerging regional and global challenges. A high level strategic dialogue between the Indian National Security Adviser Mr. M K Narayanan and his Japanese interlocutor Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Special Adviser to Mr. Koizumi has also been agreed to – and this will provide the appropriate framework for such consultations.
Perhaps the most important consensus – albeit symbolic at this stage – is that India and Japan have agreed to work as "partners against proliferation" and this reflects their common anxieties about nuclear non-proliferation, clandestine networks and deviant regimes that abet such activity. Given that the May 1998 nuclear tests by India had led to considerable tension in the bi-lateral relationship, this is a positive development and should be managed with requisite sensitivity – on both sides. This nuanced shift in Tokyo's position is also indicative of the changes that are taking place in Japan's internal polity and related security discourse and the emergence of a 'normal' Japan that will assume what it deems to be legitimate security responsibilities at both the regional and global level.
This gradual assertion by Japan comes during the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima nuclear bombing and is also linked to the claim that Tokyo has made as regards the permanent membership of the UN Security Council – yet another issue on which India and Japan share a common aspiration. But as noted over the last fortnight, China and other neighbors including Taiwan and South Korea have given vent to their anti-Japanese sentiment and are determined to raise this issue at the UN later this year. But unlike other Asian neighbors, India has no animus against Japan – despite the experience of World War II – and this point was highlighted by the Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh – that India and Japan have stood by each other in their hour of need.
This strategic affinity and empathy is now poised to be translated into tangible action and the Koizumi visit has laid the framework – however tentative – for this kind of security and strategic co-operation. Given Japan's past diffidence and strict constitutional interpretation, many bi-lateral military and security initiatives that would be deemed normal were not allowed but this time the two leaders agreed that the interaction between the two Coast Guards and the Navies would be enhanced. As it happens since the 1999 incident when the Indian Coast Guard responded with commendable speed in rescuing a hijacked Japanese merchant ship, the co-operation between the two Coast Guards is robust. Extending this to the naval sphere is logical and Japan's technical competence in ship-building and design and its state-of-art naval technology and India's operational credibility can provide natural complementarities.
In like fashion, the shared convergence in energy matters will be given a strategic orientation – and here again apart from the safety of the sea-lines of communication that India and Japan share with other major oil dependent economies including China and South Korea – the possibility of working together in the Russian Far East and prospecting elsewhere could be explored. The real challenge is that till now Japan has been reluctant to either invest or engage with India in a sustained manner and the nuclear issue further exacerbated matters. Japan preferred to engage with China, Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN and it is only now that India's economic potential is being acknowledged in Tokyo. However bi-lateral trade remains very low and at US $ 4 billion, this is a contrast to the Indian trade with China that is closer to $ 15 billion and set to double in less than five years.
The less noticed agreement is that Japan and India have agreed to promote the spread of the Japanese language in India and a target of 30,000 learners at different stages by 2010 is a welcome step. Japanese insularity and its distinctive strategic culture make it imperative to have a language affinity and both the trade potential and security dialogue will acquire a fillip if Japanese language studies are encouraged in India from school level onwards. I would describe this as being truly long-term and strategic and since education is a state subject in India, this matter should receive the highest attention from state education officials. It merits recall that many schools and colleges in Europe and North America are prioritizing the study of Japanese and Chinese and for good strategic reason.
Bi-lateral relations between India and Japan have remained stunted for many reasons not the least the contrast between the two peoples and their cultures. Japan is a nation where individual excellence gets synthesized into a collective zeal and whether it is the Japanese private sector of the 1970s and 80s – or the precision with which the Japanese bullet trains are run – this is in sharp contrast to the cacophonous, complacent and often chaotic Indian experience. Currently all of Asia is in a state of flux and the emergence of both China and India have significant tectonic implications for the conduct of international relations. Japan is the third pole of relevance in the Asian strategic calculus and the manner in which the Koizumi visit is translated into tangible action will have a significant bearing on the evolving regional and global systemic.
The move by the European Union (EU) to lift the 15-year old arms embargo on China seems at present to have been set aside till the end of 2005. An informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on April 15 at Gymnich, Luxembourg under the present Luxembourg presidency concluded to take no decision regarding the embargo. The press release issued after the meeting is a carefully drafted document. Essentially the press statement seems to please everyone.
The move by the European Union (EU) to lift the 15-year old arms embargo on China seems at present to have been set aside till the end of 2005. An informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on April 15 at Gymnich, Luxembourg under the present Luxembourg presidency concluded to take no decision regarding the embargo. The press release issued after the meeting is a carefully drafted document. Essentially the press statement seems to please everyone. It attempts to project the unity of the 25 member nations of the EU on this issue; on the other hand it does not want to offend China and depicts her as “an increasingly indispensable actor on the international scene.” It does not mention the Anti-Secession Law against Taiwan passed by the Chinese National People’s Congress on March 14, or the tensions in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations because of the demonstrations staged by Chinese students against Japanese establishments in China. The statement also says that “discussions on this topic will continue both within the EU and with our partners.” Again it is not mentioned with which partners the discussions would get the priority, since the EU has already strategic partnerships with China, India and Japan in the Asian continent. However, it is quite obvious that decision with the senior partner across the Atlantic, the US, would be given utmost importance. Tough postures of the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and warnings by the US Congress to impose embargo on the EU should the latter lift the sanctions on China, seem to have strongly influenced the EU decision.
Nevertheless, internal politics of the European Union as well as national politics within the member nations have also had its bearings on the EU decision. In order to advance their trade interests, France and Germany have, for some time, become strong advocates of lifting the post-1989 arms embargo on China. However, at a time when all the attention is focused on two major European events namely the British parliamentary elections and the EU Constitution ratification referendum in France, debate within Germany on the arms embargo decision certainly deserves consideration. Unlike France and Britain, differences within the partners of the German ruling coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens in this matter have come to the fore.
The stance taken by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder is already well known. In conformity with his standpoint he has made six visits to China during his incumbency. On the occasion of his last visit to Asia in October 2004, the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, commented (October 15, 2004) “For a long time, Schröder’s interest in Asia could be summed up in three words: China, China, China. The continent’s other giant, India failed to create any sort of glow on his radar screen.” This assessment was also shared by Schröder himself at a meeting in Delhi where he said that the German economy ought to seek opportunities primarily not only in China and Japan but in India as well.
In the recent debate Chancellor Schröder by persistently promoting the line to lift the embargo, has positioned himself not only against his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also against Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coalition partner, the Greens. Commenting upon a possible discussion on the arms export embargo in the Lower House of the German Parliament (Bundestag), Schröder insisted in an interview on March 31st to the German weekly, Die Zeit, that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag, the final authority of foreign policy making lies with the federal government. This kind of stance by Schröder is often termed by the German opposition as Alleingang (go-it-alone policy). Informed quarters may compare such strong individualistic positioning as typical of Schröder. Just one week after Schröder’s interview to Die Zeit, the difference between the Chancellor and his own Foreign Minister came out into the open. Joschka Fischer in an interview on April 6 to the same weekly pronounced that he, his party and the parliamentary faction have a sceptical stand in this respect. Here it must be mentioned that Joschka Fischer in his speech to the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March this year depicted the human rights situation in China as a source of concern. He insisted on rapid results in specific areas of deficit as far as the Chinese human rights situation is concerned. It is quite natural that the divergences in public on this matter have become a delight for the German opposition Christian Democrats. The 169th Plenary Session of Bundestag on April 14 witnessed a stormy debate on this issue. During the debate both the main blocs in the Bundestag have opposed each other citing their respective past and present stances vis-à-vis China. Joschka Fischer, cornered by the opposition, did not give any concrete answer whether he was for or against the arms embargo, but concluded that he had to work towards a European consensus-building on this issue.
It is apparent that the issue of EU arms embargo is shelved for the time being. A revised and stricter version of EU Arms Export Code of Conduct is expected which would attempt to address this issue of observance of human rights and other criteria by the recipient nations. Lifting the embargo on arms export to China might coincide with some other developments like the enforcement of a new EU Arms Export Code of Conduct and the Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the meantime, France and Germany at the official level would persist in lifting the embargo citing various reasons like the need to oppose the ‘containment’ of China and simultaneously averting a possible clash with the US, integrating China into the international system, etc. Joschka Fischer’s interview in the German daily Handelsblatt (April 17) is remarkable. In this interview he says that one of the greatest challenges would be to integrate rising world powers like China and India into the world system, so that they do not feel dejected. Fischer’s concern about China is quite understandable, but citing India as a case in point is a bit mystifying. Equating China with India in the context of integration into the international community seems to be simplistic. Fischer could have been more specific about the scale of integration into the international community and the respective places of India and China therein. Official enthusiasm shown by Germany to lift the arms embargo on China appears to be based on the reciprocal support of China to the German membership of the UN Security Council. But it must be remembered that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have already formed the Group of Four (G 4). At the last 59th UN General Assembly in September 2004, all the four countries in a joint statement pledged to support each other’s candidature for UNSC membership. In order to realise their aspiration, the G4 understandably has to go a long way as it needs the nod of the P5. Comparing the largest democracy at this juncture with a nation which still does not have a multi-party electoral system may undermine the cohesion of the G4 and act as weapons for other regional competitors which are serious enough to prevent the entry of the G4 into the UN Security Council. Being politically, economically and strategically the most important European nation, Germany’s stand on specific issues carries weight at the level of EU and globally as well. Observance of Human rights in any part of the world is one of the most important pillars of German foreign policy. Most pertinently, Germany has been criticising the human rights situation in China at various international fora, but has also engaged China in a “Dialogue on Constitutional State” (Rechtsstaatdialog). German Foreign Ministry has also been maintaining close contacts with the Chinese political activists and cyber-dissidents. But the recent disagreement within the ruling coalition in Germany shows the need for a cohesive China Policy that would deal with specific issues like human rights or environment protection not episodically but over a specific time frame.
At the level of EU it emerges that till the end of 2005 the arms embargo against China is not likely to be lifted. Austria and Finland, two smaller members are scheduled to hold the EU presidencies respectively in 2006. Given recent history, Chinese diplomatic persuasion of the EU majors and the presidencies would continue to have a favourable effect. But the US measures on EU would have to be taken into account. Therefore, the possible scenario is that for a positive outcome, China has to wait till 2007 when Germany would hold the first half of EU presidency. However, in between the EU itself is expected to go through the litmus test on its existence, i.e., the EU constitution ratification referenda in various West European nations. Negative voting on this issue in any member nation might set the whole European integration process in a reverse gear. Moreover, Germany will go for national polls in the autumn of 2006. Therefore, in the European agenda lifting the arms embargo on China would not be as important as it has turned out to be in the last few months. On the contrary, consensus-building on the issue of arms embargo would become less significant than the issue of importing textiles from China. Already thirteen members of the EU have been exerting pressure on Brussels to protect indigenous European manufacturing units. Nicolas Schmit, the Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, identifies the subject as an ”extremely thorny dossier”. Keeping in mind that common trade is one of the most important elements in the first pillar of the EU, it would be interesting to observe which topic would get EU priority in the coming days, textiles or the arms embargo.
It's a strange coincidence that Air India approved the purchase of up to 50 long-range Boeing aircraft at a cost of about Rs 300 billion and at the same time its rival Airbus successfully completed the maiden test flight of the biggest airliner, the Airbus double-decker A380, an aircraft designed to carry 800 passengers.
The A380 ended the four-decade reign of Boeing’s 747 jumbo as the biggest airliner to have flown. It has taken more than a decade and approximately USD$15.55 billion to develop the A380, subsidised by European governments.
It's a strange coincidence that Air India approved the purchase of up to 50 long-range Boeing aircraft at a cost of about Rs 300 billion and at the same time its rival Airbus successfully completed the maiden test flight of the biggest airliner, the Airbus double-decker A380, an aircraft designed to carry 800 passengers.
The A380 ended the four-decade reign of Boeing’s 747 jumbo as the biggest airliner to have flown. It has taken more than a decade and approximately USD$15.55 billion to develop the A380, subsidised by European governments.
The A380 is a key weapon in the battle by Airbus to keep its edge over Boeing. However, Boeing is eyeing the market for smaller long-range airliners and probably this is where Air India could have found them more useful. The Air India order would be of 50 long-range Boeing aircraft — including 27 of the new 787 long-range jets subject to government approval.
The Boeing-Airbus rivalry is an old rivalry and Boeing wants to end the dominance of Airbus, which has outsold them since 2001. However, this competition is not merely about competition amongst two business rivals. The policies of the US and French (read European) governments have always favoured their own companies. There has always been a debate about these governments giving unfair subsidies to these companies.
In the current geopolitical context, the Boeing order could be seen as part of an overall push towards a closer Indo-American strategic alliance. Also it could be treated as a success of a US lobby ‘‘managing’’ its corporate interests in India. Naturally the Airbus group is dejected. They are irked because Air India authorities have opted for Boeing 787 in the deal fully knowing well that this aircraft will take to the skies only by 2010. Also they allege that the tender norms were changed to help Boeing. However, Air India has refuted these charges. For Boeing this is the second order coming their way in the recent past. Air Canada has placed an order for purchase of 96 Boeing 777 and 787 planes. Their assessment is that fuel burn and maintenance cost savings with induction of 787 could be of the order of 20 to 30 per cent.
These two big ‘‘catches’’ by Boeing indicate that the American government has played its cards well. Now the question is: will Boeing stop at grabbing the civil aviation contract or will it attempt to look for defence contracts in India? Boeing can offer high technology collaboration in various areas of military aviation but they would have more competitors. Much will depend on strategic and economic interests of both nations, and not merely the avionics on board an aircraft. But one thing is sure. It’s not just the sheer volume in customers’ orders — it’s the penetration deep in the heart of Airbus territory which Boeing has succeeded in achieving with this deal.
The visit of UN secretary- general Kofi Annan to Delhi has generated predictable interest in the nature of the relationship that India currently has with this apex global body and the status that it seeks. This is so, even as the UN is attempting a review of its structural framework based on the inputs provided by a high-level panel that has since submitted its report.
The visit of UN secretary- general Kofi Annan to Delhi has generated predictable interest in the nature of the relationship that India currently has with this apex global body and the status that it seeks. This is so, even as the UN is attempting a review of its structural framework based on the inputs provided by a high-level panel that has since submitted its report.
The more visible aspect of the latter is the revamp of the UN Security Council. The proposals include two options — one that envisages an increase in the number of permanent members with the veto power, and another that seeks to freeze the veto power to the existing five members and increase the non-veto members in the UNSC.
India has already staked its claim to be a part of the revamped UNSC along with Germany, Japan and Brazil, but on current evidence this re-vamp of the UNSC is going to be bitterly contested.
Some basic realities of the UN merit recall in the run up to its 60th anniversary celebrations later in 2005. For a global community that subscribed to normative democratic values in the aftermath of colonialism and which in turn became the bedrock for the East-West divide of the Cold War, the UN since its inception in 1945 is among the least democratic bodies in the world.
The UNSC with its five permanent members, who are also the five nations that have been classified as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)— namely, the US, Russia the UK, France and China—are the core management team that take all the relevant security and strategic decisions at the UN. Yes, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) includes all member-states and they are all equal, irrespective of size and other indicators, but at best they can make recommendations that have to be approved by the UNSC.
India has had to live with this reality for 60 years and in these decades, the UN has many positive achievements to its credit. Much of this has been enabled by the manner in which the global community has sought to empower the UN that is not a supra government but a reflection of the collective will of individual nations.
In 2005, the global centre of gravity is slowly returning to Asia, where it existed in the 19th century, before the tenets of political economy specific to colonialism shifted this core to Europe and then the US. To that extent, the invalidity of the UNSC, as it exists today, is an existential reality.
However, if the recent turbulence in China over Japan’s candidature to the UNSC is any indication, it is evident that there will be no quick consensus about how the UNSC is to be revamped. Much the same could be applied to the German and Brazilian claims and the nations that are bitterly opposed to them. And even for India, the Pakistani position that is vehemently opposed to Delhi’s possible admission is well-known.
During the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Delhi, it was noted that Beijing supports India’s claim to the UNSC and the exact choice of word and phrase was minutely examined. While this statement was received with enthusiasm in India, the more nuanced Chinese position is becoming more evident wherein Beijing has aligned itself with those nations who are against any swift decision regarding UNSC expansion. Reports from Islamabad suggest that according to the Pakistani leadership, Beijing has assured them that there is no emphatic support for India’s case to join the UNSC.
A recall of this tedious litany is to highlight the central point that any meaningful expansion of the UNSC, that would be in consonance with India’s legitimate aspirations, is not on the cards anytime soon. Thus, it may be more prudent for India to make the point that its candidature is self-evident, but it should not invest too much capital —political or diplomatic — in making this a litmus test for its many bilateral and multilateral relations.
There are some existential realities that make the case for India. These include the US National Intelligence Council estimate that by 2020, barely 15 years from now, India’s GDP will be on the threshold of overtaking European economies and will be next only to the US, China and Japan. Three of these nations are Asian and the relevance of the continent and these three states cannot be ignored.
Militarily, India has a credible profile that is being incrementally nurtured, and as far as the UN is concerned, the Indian contribution is distinctive. The Indian military has participated with great credit in 41 of the 59 UN peacekeeping missions over the last 60 years. And it is estimated that in the years ahead, the Indian contribution will increase.
Thus, the preferred option would be for India to stake its claim but in a detached and dignified manner. It would be more prudent for Delhi to make itself more relevant to the management of regional and global security and stability, as it did during the December 2004 tsunami tragedy, and let this track-record speak for itself. There is an old saying in rural India that if you make yourself relevant and indispensable, the village panchayat will have no option but to invite you, more so when they see your well-fed buffaloes and the polished lathi! Some consistent extrapolation from this indigenous wisdom may not be misplaced.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India would be noted for three landmark steps: The establishment of a strategic and cooperative partnership, the agreement on the political parameters and guidelines for settling the territorial/boundary issue, and the decision on a comprehensive economic partnership and regional trading arrangement.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India would be noted for three landmark steps: The establishment of a strategic and cooperative partnership, the agreement on the political parameters and guidelines for settling the territorial/boundary issue, and the decision on a comprehensive economic partnership and regional trading arrangement.
All the three steps seek not only to qualitatively upgrade bilateral relationship but also to shape the larger strategic environment of Asia. The rise of China, the resurgence of nationalism in Japan and the US's desire to maintain its predominance in the Asia Pacific region, along with the rise of India in the Indian Ocean and the Southern Asia region have created a new Asian security atmosphere leading to a tussle for a new balance of power. China's rising concerns about US and Japan have forced it to rethink its Asia policy and its approach towards India. It is keen to mitigate the problems and build a secure partnership.
What are the chances that such a partnership will become a reality over the next few years? Or that the boundary issue will be fairly and satisfactorily resolved and the security dilemma flowing from China's regional military ties mitigated? The joint statement commits both sides to respect each other's security concerns and interests, but the issues are still there and would have to be tackled for mutual gain and in a fair manner. Too much power bargaining, especially by China, may have negative results.
Today, India-China relations are better than at any time in the past 55 years. Both are in the midst of a major internal transition. They also need each other for their large markets, and for overcoming serious external security challenges and for cooperating on common global and regional aspirations. As the two principal rising powers of Asia, their bilateral relationship and ability to coexist peacefully through a period of rapid power shift and huge domestic transition are of great strategic significance. Expanded economic and trade ties and more frequent high-level political and institutionalised strategic dialogue are, therefore, being perceived as being the bedrock of relations in this new stage. Trade is expected to touch $20 billion in three years and $30 billion in five years. Mutual investments are set to rise.
Besides the larger issues, there have been other gains during the summit. The Sikkim issue has been settled and China has backed India's representation in the UN Security Council; a protocol to strengthen the confidence building agreements of 1996 has been adopted. In addition, the expansion in air travel will facilitate trade and tourism. Asia's largest emerging powers are in the midst of redefining their relationship with an orientation towards a new and yet uncertain Asian future.
Globalisation and regionalisation of trade and investment are drawing in all countries and becoming an irresistible trend in Asia. China is at the centre of this new structure. Since 1992 in particular, as investments in labour-intensive manufacturing from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia have moved in a rising wave though the open Chinese door, steeply raising its trade profile.
Globalisation and regionalisation of trade and investment are drawing in all countries and becoming an irresistible trend in Asia. China is at the centre of this new structure. Since 1992 in particular, as investments in labour-intensive manufacturing from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia have moved in a rising wave though the open Chinese door, steeply raising its trade profile.
Textiles, clothing, toys, electrical goods, furniture and TVs from China have dominated Western markets for several years now. Newer products — computers, portable electric lamps, synthetic dyes, railway locomotives, steel tubing and casing for oil wells, radio navigation equipment, and even ships — are now being exported in growing quantities. China is also becoming a large exporter of industrial commodities, with steel exports nearly quintupling in the first quarter of this year compared with a year ago. The Uruguay Round agreement to phase out textile quotas from January this year has also been a huge boon for it: many expect China to account for half of all world textile production in five years.
The challenge to India's trade could not be framed any more explicitly. But India too can take full advantage from the new arrangements and ongoing economic and technological shifts to become the second hub of global manufacturing.
By keeping its currency tightly pegged to the dollar, which has declined over the past three years, China has made its goods even more competitive in countries using currencies like the euro that have appreciated against the dollar. This has helped China export more, and discouraged businesses in China from importing. Their labour laws too are highly flexible, working hours long, and wage rates low — practices that are well below acceptable standards in most democracies.
It is in these areas that India would have to remain alert, and use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms under the WTO to ensure fair competition. Also, there is no immediate case for free trade with China. Indian infrastructure, tariff rates, modernisation are not yet prepared for a fully open economy. China has taken 25 years to reach here.
However, these are not arguments for not trading but for speedier reforms and capability build-up. There is simply no alternative but to trade when the rest of the world is creating deep interdependence with China. The consequences of not trading would be worse. India should not distrust China. It must engage and compete both for the world and the large China markets: the fate of its industry and services, and of employment for its millions, depends on it.
If the attack on the district collector’s office in Srinagar in January and the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir tourist office on the eve of the inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service came as a harsh reminder of Kashmir’s violent history, the overall mood in the valley, for a couple of reasons, suggested otherwise. In recent months, the people of Kashmir have sent a message: Freedom can wait, but development cannot. Two developments symbolise the transformation of popular mood.
If the attack on the district collector’s office in Srinagar in January and the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir tourist office on the eve of the inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service came as a harsh reminder of Kashmir’s violent history, the overall mood in the valley, for a couple of reasons, suggested otherwise. In recent months, the people of Kashmir have sent a message: Freedom can wait, but development cannot. Two developments symbolise the transformation of popular mood. First, the municipal corporation elections and the second, the operationalisation of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. The civic polls—held in all 14 districts of J&K after a span of 25 years (last time in 1980)—witnessed a large voter turnout, with women outnumbering men in the queue at polling booths in many places. It suggests that militancy now seems to be losing steam and the common man is ready to fight for peace, basic amenities and development.
In the municipal elections, voter turnout was recorded between 30-35 per cent with disturbed areas like Qazigund in Anantnag recording 78 per cent turnout. Pulwama with 56.6 per cent, Dooru with 65.99 per cent and Jammu with 65 per cent hinted the dawn of a new phase in the troubled state. In Srinagar, killings of several candidates by terrorists and call for a boycott by them along with APHC fell on deaf ears. Ignoring their calls, people came out to vote and the turnout was around 20 per cent, which was very impressive. Rajouri and Poonch recorded 81 and 76 per cent turnout respectively.
The fact that no single party could sweep the polls speaks of the representative character of democracy in J&K. If the Progressive Democratic Party won in Ganderbal, home constituency of the Abdullahs, it lost to the National Conference in Srinagar. The Congress and PDP won in Charar-e-Shareif and in Jammu, the Congress edged past the BJP’s tally of 26, with 27 seats.
If the bus service has been underscored by the criticism of parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, it has given the people of not only PoK but J&K too, a cause for celebration. The service goes to benefit the common people who are, after all, at the ‘‘core’’ of the core. Such an exchange will not only transform the perceptions of the people about each other, but also improve the overall atmospherics of Indo-Pak ties. The impact of the bus service in the overall rapprochement can be discerned from the threats that have come from the terrorists to the passengers of the bus. By the same token, courage shown by the passengers to board the bus against all odds could well open a new chapter in the history of Indo-Pak relations. No wonder, it has been considered the ‘Mother of all CBMs’ and rightly so. It is a clear indication that people on both sides of the Chenab have been longing to meet and have been given a new lease of life. The link that would be maintained through the bus service, once every two weeks, alone has the potential of transforming Indo-Pakistan relations. Its importance is also augmented by the enthusiasm shown by PM Manmohan Singh himself, who initiated the policy of ‘peace with dignity’ and ‘wining hearts and minds’ and even went to Srinagar to flag off the bus, despite terrorist threats. Even long-time political foes Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti have been unanimous in their support for the bus. It is sad to see some analysts in discussions on TV demeaning the importance of the bus service, by labelling the coverage by the press as unwarranted “hype”. To see the bus service as just another CBM in the long list of CBMs, would be a big mistake.
The decision by India and Pakistan to start the bus service holds immense promise for the troubled state. It suggests that both have the political strength to take bold decisions and to break from past prejudices. On the bus service, two issues caused repeated deadlocks—travel documents and domicile of the passengers. On both fronts, the two sides showed flexibility and understanding. Pakistan insisted on UN documents for travel and keeping the service exclusively for Kashmiris. India’s contention was to use passport as a travel document and for the service to be open for all Indians. The two stands were reflective of the respective official stands on Kashmir, and how India and Pakistan looked at the Kashmir issue. However, as Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in his press conference in Islamabad, the bus service has been effected without any prejudice and with a humanitarian approach, where it becomes a win-win situation for all. The bus service could well become a psychological facilitator when India and Pakistan discuss the Kashmir issue.
A lot still remains to be achieved. Many such measures have to be taken to soothe historic wounds and mend strained bilateral relations. The future would demand much greater compromises and policy shifts by both sides on Kashmir. For Pakistan, it still is the ‘problem of Kashmir’, i.e., Kashmir is a ‘disputed territory’ and an ‘unfinished agenda’ of Partition; and for India, it is the ‘problem’ in Kashmir, suggesting that the accession of Kashmir to India is final and complete, and the challenge now remains in addressing cross-border terrorism, development and grievances of the people of Kashmir. The two divergent approaches leave little scope for a compromise. It is a challenging proposition, but the breakthrough in the bus service has shown that both sides possess the political will. The future of Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations has never looked as bright as it currently does.
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi on April 11-12 comes soon after that of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (March 16) and will be followed by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit in end-April.
While this scheduling may be a matter of coincidence, the outcome of the Wen visit and the manner in which it impacts the Sino-Indian relationship has the potential to significantly shape the emerging Asian strategic systemic and related security landscape.
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi on April 11-12 comes soon after that of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (March 16) and will be followed by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit in end-April.
While this scheduling may be a matter of coincidence, the outcome of the Wen visit and the manner in which it impacts the Sino-Indian relationship has the potential to significantly shape the emerging Asian strategic systemic and related security landscape.
Currently, both India and China exude a similar set of anxieties and aspirations about their bilateral relationship as they grapple with the turbulence of an animated post 9/11 global and regional systemic.
It merits notice that the bilateral relationship has never been more positive and while political relations are stable, the trade figures are impressive. From a very modest base in the early 1990s, bilateral trade increased to US $ 5 billion in 2002-2003 and is already poised to cross $ 14 billion. This has increased by a factor of 13 times in a decade and may soon cross the $ 50 billion mark.
Both nations have been major trading states and it is often forgotten that two centuries ago, China and India accounted for more than half the global GDP. However, whether this will be the pattern for the immediate future as far as the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship is concerned will depend to a large extent on the kind of choices made by the Chinese leadership that is currently consolidating a transition phase.
China's socio-economic growth indicators over the last two decades are unprecedented and it must be acknowledged that whatever be the reservations about an authoritarian regime, the Chinese leadership has been able to effectively eradicate poverty across a one billion plus demographic profile.
Today, Beijing consciously encourages the use of the phrase 'the peaceful rise of China' to allay any fears among its Asian neighbours but it is moot as to how successful this packaging campaign has been.
The facts on the ground suggest that China has stoked nascent nationalism in Japan and currently Beijing and Tokyo are locked in a bitter and emotional recall of the excesses of World War II.
China has allowed a signature campaign against Japan's entry into the UN Security Council and the 1937 rape of Nanjing is back in focus. The fact that Japan has chosen to identify China as a source of security concern and the reference to Taiwan has heightened Sino-Japanese mutual animosity and aggrieved nationalism just short of becoming militant is the flavour of the times.
The smaller South East Asian states are wary of what they see as the inevitable pull that the 'dragon' exudes, given its political, trade and military profile, and fear that they will be swamped as their dependency index apropos China is steadily increasing.
In its second term, the Bush administration has unveiled a more robust pan-Asian policy in which democracy has become the preferred median and this was conveyed unambiguously during Ms Rice's recent whistle-stop tour of Asia that began in Delhi.
The subsequent assertion by the US that it will assist India in becoming a world power, including the military dimension, will be monitored closely by Beijing which is uneasy about the US ties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
While it is nobody's case that the US-India relationship should be predicated on an anti- China plank, it is evident that the emphasis placed by the US on the concert of democracies leads to an unstated concatenation in the Chinese strategic perception.
The Wen visit comes against this backdrop and it stands to reason that the Chinese leadership would not like to simultaneously antagonise all the major Asian states, thereby lending credence to the perception that the rise of China is synonymous with a belligerent Beijing.
On current evidence it appears that there is the likelihood of some agreement on the principles that will guide the long-pending territorial and border dispute between the two Asian giants and this is welcome.
The more complex contestation will be in the manner in which the two elites and the DNA that characterizes their strategic culture (use of force) relate to each other and the external systemic.
Historically, the Middle Kingdom has chosen force to 'control' events in a manner that they believe is conducive to Beijing's abiding interest and India has been made aware of this trait in 1962.
Internally also, the authoritarian constituency in China still relies on 'control' and this was the case in both Tiananmen and the Falun Gong. In many ways, this is an extrapolation of the Chinese adage that a single mountain can accommodate only one tiger.
India, on the other hand, has preferred 'accommodation' and is reticent about the use of force and this trait is derived from the internalisation of both non-violence and the pacifism inherent to the Indian ethos.
To that extent, there is a certain strategic dissonance between India and China and managing this mismatch between perceptions and actions will be complex and challenging.
Both countries are trying to make the appropriate choices in relating to the regional and global dynamic and this ranges from the overwhelming US military profile, the compulsions of globalisation, growing energy needs and urgent socio-economic choices linked to environmental issues.
The US-China-Japan-India strategic equipoise will define the tranquility/turbulence index for Asia and, by extension, the global canvas and to that extent the tea leaves that surround the Wen Jiabao visit should be read for issues beyond contested territoriality and enhanced trade ties.
The oil price in the international energy market appears set to remain high for the rest of this year despite the attempt of the oil giants to increase production. The major sufferers of the price hike are those Asian countries whose dependency on Persian Gulf oil is alarmingly growing day by day. Meanwhile, the OPEC countries’ plan to revise the price band of oil to a higher level, currently set at $22-$28 per barrel, suggests that the international oil price would not come back to a ‘pre-Iraq level’.
The oil price in the international energy market appears set to remain high for the rest of this year despite the attempt of the oil giants to increase production. The major sufferers of the price hike are those Asian countries whose dependency on Persian Gulf oil is alarmingly growing day by day. Meanwhile, the OPEC countries’ plan to revise the price band of oil to a higher level, currently set at $22-$28 per barrel, suggests that the international oil price would not come back to a ‘pre-Iraq level’. Is the ‘enormous’ energy demand by the Asian countries the fundamental reason behind the growing oil price in the world? It is felt that any attempt to secure energy supplies by Asian countries would be under continuous challenge from many forces around the world – the balance seekers of world power. The two hundred and ninety million people who live in the United States make up just five per cent of the world’s population, but they consume a quarter of the world’s oil supply. In this context, if the energy demand in the developed countries is compared with that of the Asian region the present oil demand of Asia can never be projected as a ‘demand shock’.
World Energy Situation
This year’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) by IEA predicts that the worldwide demand of oil will touch new heights with an increase of 1.6 per cent a year to 90 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2010 from the current 82 million b/d and to 121 million b/d in 2030. The major demand boom will be in the present energy-poor nations, especially the import dependent developing countries. According to IEA (Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy, IEA, May 2004), the adverse economic impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing developing countries is generally more severe than for OECD countries. Since the growing oil prices will be a threat to the import dependent countries in the future, most of these nations would invest more on developing indigenous and traditional energy resources. Though this would not be helpful in avoiding the risk of oil dependency completely, it would give way in future energy investments to a reconsideration of the potential of other available energy materials. Simultaneously, to a great extent, investments in the field of nuclear energy would considerably increase in the Asian region which might be an eyebrow raising factor for the West. As noted, the growing price impact on the developing countries would affect the world economy in general. This would also reflect in the GDP of OPEC and its oil revenues, as higher prices would not compensate fully for lower production.
Zeroing in on the Asia-Pacific
As the recent WEO projects the rise of Russia as the ‘energy superpower’ in the coming years, the Siberian resources would be able to supply a notable quantity of oil to the East Asian markets. In the east, the Asian giants, Japan and China are involved in oil politics regarding the trans-Siberian energy pipeline from Taishet (previously the plan was to construct the line from Angarsk, but later the point of origin was changed by Moscow) in Siberia to the East Asian markets. Moreover, Russia is looking for a partner, which can make financial and technical support to the development of the oil fields in the Siberian region. The Russian energy pipeline has got a greater dimension since it can be an energy umbilical cord to the Asian Region. As the major energy consumers of the region, it would be the responsibility of both Japan and China to look for the fast realization of the energy pipeline. Both China and Japan must cooperate in this regard as well as to promote a pattern of constructive sharing of available energy resources in the region. As of now, this would seem to be a less practical idea due to different reasons including the information on the available quantity of resources in the Siberian region. Initiatives in this regard such as AMEM+3 (ASEAN Ministers’ Energy Meeting + China, Japan and South Korea) must be able to develop a collective bargaining to ensure adequate supply of energy to the Asian countries from the Persian Gulf and other energy rich areas of the world. The initiatives in energy cooperation would bring closer cooperation in many other fields including greater economic integration among the Asian countries.
In a meeting between American and Russian delegates on September 21, 2004, the Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref indicated that the US is a promising oil export market. This shows the possibility of large scale export of Siberian energy to the United States through the Murmansk port in Western Siberia. So far, the Russian plan is to exclusively export oil and gas in the Eastern Siberian region to the Eastern market mainly China, Japan and the Koreas. But any kind of energy politics over the pipeline construction by these countries would adversely affect the fast realisation of the same.
Politics of Energy Information
Energy security has been one of the most important issues of national interest to any import dependent country. Hence, the present political volatility in the Persian Gulf poses a major threat to the developing economies. Most experts are concerned with the economic impacts of energy security. But to a great extent the ‘politics of energy information’ has also been haunting the imported energy dependent countries for the past many years. The information regarding energy resources, availability, accessibility, transportation and costs etc., play a major role in the orbit of energy information in the world. The energy policy of a country and the future plans of resource development, energy investments etc., are largely dependent on the information available in the world. Today the information regarding the same has been largely manipulated by some of the interest groups. These interest groups include the energy dependent Western countries, energy companies that are active in the upstream and downstream energy activities etc.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, (Counselor, CSIS) America's security role in the Persian Gulf region gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies that are dependent on energy exports from the region. While on one hand the growing oil and gas consumption is projected as a major challenge to the developing economies of the world, on the other hand use of coal and the use of nuclear energy are brought under strict observation in the name of environmental security or nuclear non-proliferation. This approach of the developed world would adversely affect the overall development of the import dependent regions and in the longer run these restrictions would turn out to be critical impediments in their economic development. The developing economies of Asia have to seek all possible damage limiting measures in this regard. It may also include a wide range of measures like enhancing cooperation among the countries in the region in the creation of energy stockpiles, developing energy networks, effective sharing of resources, increasing energy efficiency and diversification of supply.
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