The results of the second round of elections in Iran's ninth Presidential elections, announced June 24, are not unexpected given that the first round held on June 17 revealed that the victorious President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a much greater appeal for the average Iranian voter than his opponent, the former Iranian President and pragmatic cleric Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The verdict was conclusive with 62 percent of the 28 million votes cast going to the former Mayor of Tehran, Mr. Ahmadinejad, who is perceived to be a hardliner and close to the all-powerful Iranian Shia clergy. Iran's new President will assume office in August and he will be the first non-cleric to hold this post since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

In his first official statement on June 25, Mr. Ahmadinejad said that he would strive to create a "modern, advanced, powerful and Islamic model" for the world – a formulation which will be very carefully studied in different capitals, particularly in Washington.

Tehran's relevance in the regional security and strategic calculus has always been acknowledged and its pivotal geo-strategic location, proven energy potential and distinctive strategic culture are significant indicators.

Currently Iran is part of the 'axis of evil' configuration from Washington's perspective and much of the US response flows from the anxiety about Iran's nuclear transgressions and the allegations about support to terrorism in West Asia apropos Israel.

Iran is a declared non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) as part of the NPT regime and, over the last four years, the US has accused Tehran of violating its treaty obligations and pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program. The AQ Khan network is also part of the transgression pattern by way of WMD material that has been supplied to Iran and currently the EU is trying to play the role of a mediator in the Iran-US nuclear impasse.

However, it is evident from the pre-election campaign speeches that the Iranian President-elect is unlikely to bring about any radical changes in the prevailing Iran-US relationship and, consequently, the regional security calculus will continue to be brittle with the potential to deteriorate, should the EU efforts fail.

The Bush denunciation of the elections as being suspect have not helped the tenor of Iran-US relations and the hawks on both sides will be strengthened by the results.

At the regional level, the ascendancy of the conservative Shia clergy in Iran – both in the executive and in the parliament – will have its own effect on the Shia constituency in the neighbouring Arab states.

Iraq is the proximate state and the Shias represent the majority. The democratic electoral process is still nascent and contested in Iraq and the Ahmadinejad experience will influence events in Baghdad – either indirectly or otherwise.

The on-going tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the under-currents of intra- political Islam will also be impacted with tangible implications for the energy/oil domain.

The determination of the Bush team to usher in genuine democracy in the Greater Middle East has had unintended consequences and Iran is a prime example. Ensuring that elected regimes in the region are also supportive or subaltern to the US is not a feasible proposition and could well become a strategic oxymoron for the Bush team.

While it is true that the Iranian Supreme Guardian Council had disallowed a number of candidates (including all the women) from contesting the presidential polls, the June 25 results are reflective of democracy – the prevailing Iranian variant.

The irony for the US is further compounded by the fact that in 1953 when democratic aspirations were surfacing in Iran, Washington intervened to suppress the people's will and supported the Shah's monarchy, which was finally overthrown in the 1979 Khomeini Revolution.

Now the Iranian people have made their choice – no doubt a bitterly contested one, for there are a large number of Iranians who are opposed to the conservatism associated with the Iranian clergy.

More than 70 percent of Iran's population is less than 30 and unemployment currently at 12 percent is growing. The aspirations and frustration of the people are increasing and there is a palpable divide between the few who are affluent and the vast number who are impoverished (Iran's per capita income is US $ 2,000) as also between the urban and the rural populace.

Thus, the domestic turbulence in Iran is likely to grow if the new President imposes a draconian socio-cultural code which will affect the western leaning young. The clergy is deeply critical of what they see as the pollution of susceptible Iranian youth by the excesses of the Great Satan-the US – and its permissive modes.

India has a long and abiding relationship with Iran and outgoing President Khatami was the Chief Guest at the Indian Republic Day parade during the Vajpayee-led NDA years. Iran remains a very important source for India's growing energy requirements and a major LNG deal has just been signed. The possibility of importing gas from Iran is being examined as also transit routes to Central Asia and to that extent India's holistic security profile is inexorably linked with Iran.

Hence, any turbulence within Iran or related degradation of the regional security grid will be undesirable. Given the US stance on Iran, the need for a calibrated approach in India's bilateral relations with both the US and Iran is imperative. In the evolving security mosaic at the global and regional level, the Ahmadinejad victory in Iran represents a very distinctive challenge.

Japan’s relations with India are at crossroads, even as we recently completed 53 years of the establishment of diplomatic ties. The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi recently as part of his four-nation tour which took him to South Asia and Europe proved to be an apt opportunity for both countries to carve strategies to solidify ties for the future. The significance of Koizumi’s visit cannot be understated considering the fact that this is the first visit by a Japanese head of state after a hiatus of nearly half a decade. Prior to that, only two serving Japanese heads of state have visited India with a 10 year gap. While these statistics amply demonstrate that a regular exchange of high-level political visits have been a weak link in Indo-Japanese ties, perhaps Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit is a landmark one as it promises to initiate bilateral comprehensive ventures into two areas - economic and strategic, which were lying potentially untapped for several years.

The highlight of the Prime Minister’s visit was indubitably the signing of the ‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of a Japan-India Global Partnership’ — an eight-fold initiative announced towards strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership, which include the following:

• Enhanced and upgraded dialogue architecture, including strengthening of the momentum of high-level exchanges, launching of a High Level Strategic Dialogue and full utilization of the existing dialogue mechanisms
• Comprehensive economic engagement, through expansion of trade in goods and services, investment flows and other areas of economic cooperation, and exploration of a Japan-India economic partnership agreement
• Enhanced security dialogue and cooperation
• Science and Technology Initiative
• Cultural an academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts
• Cooperation in ushering a new Asian era
• Cooperation in the UN and other international organization, including early reform of the UN Security Council
• Cooperation in responding to global challenges and opportunities.

While this eight-fold initiative incorporates many issues addressed by the two countries in their Joint Declaration of December 2001, it is certainly a more comprehensive delineation and framework of areas of common interests and concerns.

The two sides have realized the need to focus on the strategic dimension of the partnership, being two prominent Asian powers. As the world’s largest democracy, and a regional military and economic power, India is emerging as a critical actor in the region. The preeminence of Japan lies not only in its tremendous economic power, despite recent setbacks, but also in its rapidly expanding role both in the regional and international system. The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in areas like environment, energy, disarmament, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism measures and security. The two leaders have also reaffirmed the need for Tokyo and New Delhi to hold a regular dialogue in the security and defence field. A regular strategic dialogue between the National Security Advisor and Advisor to the Japanese Prime Minister has been agreed upon.

Maritime cooperation has been an integral part of such cooperation, encompassing control of piracy and security of sea-lanes of communication. Japan is the second largest energy consumer and the geo-strategic importance of India is critical to ensure a steady and uninterrupted supply of energy resources from the Middle East. Choke points like the Malacca, Sunda and other straits are prone to piracy. Japan is not alien to these problems and there have been several incidents of Japanese ships like Tenyu (1998), Global Mars (2000) and Idaten (2005) coming under attack while in transit. In fact, the Japanese vessel Alondra Rainbow hijacked by pirates in 1999 was rescued by the Indian navy. Under the aforementioned 8 point program, the two sides have envisaged interaction between the two Coast Guards and Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces, joint exercises and information sharing and technical assistance. A decision was taken to launch oil and natural gas cooperation between Tokyo and New Delhi.

On the political front, the restructuring of the UN Security Council is of core interest to both countries and was perhaps the one of the most critical issues under discussion. The structure and present composition of the UN Security Council has come under review for it’s disconnect with the present international architecture, lack of representation of developing countries and ineffectiveness in dealing with situations. Japan and India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN apex body as representatives from the Asian region forms the crux of the commonality of interests between the two countries. The two sides, now part of the G-4 club also comprising Brazil and Germany have joined hands towards achieving this goal. Leaders of both countries have stressed on the need to address this issue prior to the UN Summit of September 2005 and vociferously supported each other’s candidacy.

Economically, the two sides made a breakthrough in the sense that they decided to augment ties in the trade and investment field. A Japan-India Joint Study Group to be inaugurated in June 2005 is expected to make recommendations towards this end. The feasibility of establishing a FTA is also under consideration and study. The aim is to attempt to expand their annual trade with each other from 6 billion dollars to 15 billion dollars by 2010. It may be of interest and relevance to mention here that India has emerged as the largest recipient of yen loans under the official development assistance program in 2004. Besides, Japan has agreed to fund large-scale infrastructure projects. A noteworthy proposal in this regard is to examine the viability of building a freight corridor connecting Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata, expected to cost approximately 5 billion dollars.

In a nutshell, it can be stated that there is a unique paradox that has defined India-Japan relations at large. On the one hand, there has been the absence of any major dispute. On the other, however, what has been missing is the richness that could have characterized bilateral ties. In other words, the relationship to date can be chronicled as one of missed opportunities. It is clear that the synergy of Indo-Japanese cooperation is essential not just to further bilateral relations, but for the greater cause of a more secure Asia-Pacific region. Even though the visit by Prime Minister Koizumi was short, it should be used as bedrock for furthering bilateral ties. An increased awareness among the general populace of the two nations as envisaged under the eight-fold initiative is equally crucial as the extent of media coverage received by such landmark steps as Koizumi’s visit and need to be highlighted. While India’s embarkation on a ‘Look East’ policy in the last decade was symptomatic of the significance India attaches to the region, the time has come to exploit the full potential of interaction with countries like Japan. The two countries should work together in the areas of common interests and concerns in the years to come so that they can look back at their relations with pride and satisfaction at the end of the next five decades, when we celebrate a hundred years of the establishment of relations.

Ms Shirin Tahir-Kheli, the special adviser to the US government on UN reforms, will be in Delhi this week, beginning Monday, and clearly of the 101 proposals in six different areas made by the High Level Panel, the one that will attract the most attention will be the question of the Security Council expansion – and India's status in the matter along with that of Japan, Germany and Brazil -- the so-called G 4.

It is instructive that on May 15 it was reported that the US had cautioned the G 4 that they may aspire for UNSC membership – but even if granted, this would be without the critical veto. The privileged status of the veto will remain the exclusive turf of the Permanent 5 -- the P 5 -- who are also the Nuclear five as recognized in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the N 5.

Ms Tahir-Kheli's visit is important for she will advise the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the matter and, to that extent, UN reforms apart, the resilience of the bilateral relationship with the USA will also be on the anvil.

The US has repeatedly stated that it supports the candidature of Japan alone among the G-4 about entering the UNSC and that it would prefer a consensus regarding other entrants -- a 'consensual' position that Washington shares with Beijing, even though both are diametrically opposed about Tokyo's candidature.

China has vehemently opposed Japan's inclusion at the high table of the UN and hence consensus on the issue will remain elusive. The US is averse to unambiguously supporting India's candidature when Pakistan is so viscerally opposed to such inclusion and hence there will be no major change in the Bush policy in this regard.

However, as Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran observed in Washington on Friday, India will not let the bilateral relationship be predicated on a single issue and that the reform of the UN – to which the US is committed goes beyond the expansion of the UNSC.

In short, despite the resolve of the G -4 to mobilize support for their inclusion which is unexceptionable, realpolitik will dictate otherwise and this reality cannot be refuted. But the additional reality that cannot be ignored is that the UNSC as it is structured today remains an anachronism and while those who are inside are opposed to any expansion or dilution of their special status, the power and relevance grid of the world has changed radically.

Currently, there are six nodes of criticality in the global system that is located within the overall context of globalization and related trade and economic interdependence and these include the USA, complemented by its strategic allies the European Union, and Japan, and the more autonomous powers Russia, China and India.

While there are noticeable asymmetries by way of individual military, economic and socio-political indicators, this is the new hexagon of global relevance and on current evidence it is almost inevitable that by 2050, the US, China and India will be the three major economies and will constitute the equivalent of a tri-polar world order.

Hence, there is an existential reality about India that has to be acknowledged and this is India's USP. Thus acquiring a certain relevance in the global economic matrix that has evolved from G 7 to G 8 to include Russia is axiomatic and working towards a G 10 that includes China and India is the more prudent direction to pursue.

In the strategic domain, it is pertinent that the global community is currently engaged at the UN in the last lap of the NPT Review Conference that concludes on May 27 and again India is not a member of this regime but has an abiding interest in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

India's relevance in the global nuclear matrix was noted in May 1998 and it is a travesty that the NPT does not recognize the de facto reality of the global nuclear order since it has kept India, Pakistan and Israel -- the three other nuclear weapon states out of its purview.

Thus we have a make-believe global framework wherein the UNSC on one hand and the NPT on the other attempt to defy the logic of empiricism and irrefutable reality – the King Canute syndrome.

India has reiterated its commitment to contribute to global strategic stability and this was reflected in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's remarks on May 17 when he asserted that India is willing to shoulder ''its share of international obligations as a partner against proliferation provided our legitimate interests are safeguarded.''

In the same period, India has also adopted necessary legislation to bring its export control laws to global levels of stringency and this in turn should give a fillip to the strategic dialogue with the US.

Given India's holistic military profile and fledgling military-industrial base, it would not be invalid to suggest that by the end of this decade, the world will have four nodes of military relevance namely -- the US (complemented by the EU and Japan), Russia, China and India -- the equivalent of an M 4. One dimension of this was acknowledged in the December 2004 tsunami disaster.

Thus the G 10 and the M 4 will become representative of the global reality as opposed to the P5 and N 5 and it would be prudent for India to make itself more relevant in this framework as opposed to expending its diplomatic energies in resurrecting moribund organizations that are fast losing their salience.

It is encouraging that India has already signalled its willingness to join those structures that protect the collective interest without jeopardizing its own and the Container Security Initiative (CSI), where Delhi is cooperating with Washington, is case in point.

In like fashion, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) accords an opportunity for advancing India's credentials in managing regional turbulence and exigencies. Consequently, it would be prudent for India to calibrate its response to UN reforms per se and internalize the tenet that quiet and confident power indicators are inherently recognized by the peer group and that pique or petulance is unbecoming of what Delhi seeks.

Hopefully, Ms Tahir-Kheli will become more aware of this mismatch between global strategic reality -- perceived and emergent – during her interaction with Indian interlocutors.

The immediate challenge ahead for the state parties to the NPT in the ongoing Review Conference, May 2-27, 2005 in New York, is how to salvage the tarnished image of the treaty. The efficacy of the treaty is under scrutiny primarily on three issues— disarmament, nonproliferation, and universality of compliance. The unraveling facts of over the last two years, related to various kinds of breaches of the NPT commitments by Libya, Iran and North Korea, add to further suspicion over the credibility of the treaty. While the critics believe that NPT has remained flawed ever since it came into force in 1970, the advocates of the NPT insist that it is still the most reliable tool to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a sharp division between the NWS and NNWS within the NPT on issues such as the right of the NNWS to use nuclear technology for energy purposes, and growing role of nuclear weapons in the future security policies of nuclear weapon states.

It would be interesting to see how the ongoing RevCom would address the critical concerns as expressed in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel, December 2, 2004, which says: “we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible.” The Director General of the IAEA has already talked about the need for amendment and reinforcement of the treaty. While advocating the raising of ‘the bar for inspection standards by establishing the additional protocol as the norm for verifying compliance’, he called on all the countries within and outside the NPT to ‘put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.’

Underplaying the fact that the NPT lacks universal acceptance, two historical decisions were taken at the NPT Review Conference in 1995— first, to extend the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely, and second, the general agreement to reinforce the objectives to ensure universal adherence. In strategic parlance, the extension of the treaty successfully guaranteed and legitimised the nuclear weapons status of the P-5 states. The subsequent Review Conference of year 2000 was significant in that it agreed to a ‘13-point Action Plan’ in which there was ‘an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals’.

Before, speculating over the outcome of the ongoing RevCom, it is important to re-examine as to why despite repeated claims by its members to strengthen the treaty’s effectiveness, failures are more glaring than success. In reality, there remains a huge gap between the commitments made by the NPT signatory states and their actual willingness to execute the obligations. This gap can be referred to as ‘symptomatic non-compliance’, causing the inherent weaknesses of the NPT regime.

‘Symptomatic non-compliance’ can be analysed primarily in three different ways. First, the continuing pursuit of advancement and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by countries like America and China hardly augur well for any attempt at future comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. Second, the then super powers, U.S.A and former Soviet Union, themselves had either tacitly helped or overseen transfer of nuclear weapons technology to some countries during the Cold War for strategic and security reasons. The most glaring trajectory of permissive proliferation was witnessed in the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile collaborations. Third, the NPT signatories like Libya, Iran and North Korea manipulated the loopholes in the NPT. The larger picture emerging out of the disclosures from within the NPT states is the legacy of selective proliferation as perpetuated by major state actors of the world.

Article VI of the NPT provides that “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. But this provision does not prescribe any time frame. The nuclear policy approach in the existing nonproliferation regime is more related to the political and security leverage as attached by the P-5 states to the nuclear status of a state than to the real concern of them for global disarmament. The American abrogation of 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and its pursuit for Nuclear Posture Review— neither of these two indicate the elimination of nuclear weapons in near future. Under the 13-point Action Plan of 2000 Review Conference, it is worth recalling that the U.S.A as a party to the NPT had committed to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of international strategic stability. But later on the Bush administration called the ABM treaty irrelevant for its national security interest in the new international security dynamics. There is no guarantee that potential nuclear policy strategies of the US will not be at odds with its commitment to NPT.

Russia is also working on refinement of delivery systems including the submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Russian President has recently been quoted as saying that “We (Russia) will continue to consistently and successively build up the armed forces in general and its nuclear component.” He explained it further by saying: “I am sure that in the near future weapons will appear ... which other nuclear powers do not and will not possess.” (“Putin says Russia working on new nuclear systems”, Reuters, November 17, 2004). The Chinese drive for modernizing its force capabilities may also seriously undermine its role towards nuclear disarmament. Like China, the UK and France have shown little interest in joining any international arms reduction dialogue.

The P-5 states have not only failed to give a time-bound treaty commitment for complete nuclear disarmament, they have also not taken appropriate steps to tame the proliferators. A.Q. Khan himself has admitted: “Many suppliers approached us with the details of the machinery and with figures and numbers of instruments and materials ... In the true sense of the word, they begged us to purchase their goods. ….. We purchased whatever we required.” (“Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan— The Father of the Islamic Bomb”, The Risk Report, Vol.1, No.6, July-August, 1995, Page. 5 http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/khan.html)

Khan has also explained that his long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset for his country. Subsequently, according to his own admission, middlemen, exporters, and businessmen from France, Holland and Germany flocked to Pakistan to offer price lists for high-technology goods and to learn what Pakistan needed. (William J Broad, David E. Sanger & Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Proliferation: How Dr. AQ Khan Created His Nuclear Network”, South Asia Tribune, Issue No 79, February 15-21, 2004). It is evident from Khan’s own admission as to how he was used by Pakistan to work through European intermediaries to obtain crucial nuclear weapons related supplies. The connections that Khan developed during that period were subsequently used for the long running nuclear black bazaar.

In the background of today’s debate over the complexity of nuclear proliferation network, one can hardly believe the acts of past proliferation as handiwork of mere middlemen or intermediaries. Expressing concern over the details emerging out of the allegedly erring NPT signatory states like Libya and Iran and their connections to the Khan-led network, Mohammed El Baradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has admitted that Khan had commercial contacts with at least 20 different countries and large companies.

Of course, Pakistan can be seen as a proliferation threat but as a non-member state is not bound by the NPT regime, the legal charges are largely nullified. However, Pakistan cannot be absolved for its past omissions and commissions. It is a well known fact now that for both state and non-state actors, Pakistan was the source of nuclear technology, material and expertise worldwide, until the nuclear exposé in 2003.

It is a secret, now being swept under the carpet, that European firms have recklessly supported the A.Q. Khan-led nuclear trade market to proliferate nuclear weapons equipments and know-how in different parts of the world. Whistleblowers raised an alarm when the Pakistani Commerce Ministry published a full-page newspaper advertisement with an application form in year 2000 to sell nuclear materials and equipments. Even, a nuclear sale pamphlet from KRL (Khan Research Laboratories) was found doing the rounds outside Pakistan. It is only since February 2004, after Khan’s confessions, links are now being investigated of his network with the nuclear programmes of North Korea, Iran and Libya.

But has adequate attention been paid to the role of European suppliers in the now-known- but-long-running nuclear proliferation network? Despite much praise by many for NPT and NSG, proliferation links in Europe apparently prospered well along the Khan’s international nuclear black bazaar.

Without rectifying the deficiencies carried from the past, the advocacy of old nonproliferation regimes, like the NPT, would lack strength, coherence and universality. The international community in fact requires the review of past proliferation records with of various states and non-state actors from an intra-systemic perspective. In fact, change is inexorable in any environment. If the international security system requires structural changes at institutional and policy levels, then the world community should also work towards evolving universally acceptable nonproliferation mechanisms. But that is also not easy in the current political environment.

Nuclear proliferation as an issue of international threat and challenge has also been endorsed in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (‘A more secured world: Our shared responsibility’, December 2, 2004). It expresses the concern that some countries under the cover of the current NPT are seeking to covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programme. A second long-term concern as mentioned in the report is that at least 40 states possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them to build nuclear weapons.

Does the NPT-regime effectively address the present changes in the international security realities? Has the time come to look for new initiatives to replace the older not-so-effective regimes to address the problem of proliferation in the absence of universally consensual mechanisms? The 2005 Review Conference clearly has major challenges before it and if these issues are not addressed meaningfully it could end up performing some rituals without moving forward.

What then could we expect from the discussions in the ongoing RevCom? The following is a brief list of expectations:

1. Difference of perceptions between the NWS and NNWS on the progress of ‘Disarmament’ efforts may persist as ever before.
2. Emphasis may be renewed on earlier ‘declarations’— “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” of 1995 and “13 Practical Steps” of 2000 Review Conferences.
3. Reiteration of call for signing the CTBT.
4. Reiteration of commitment by NWS towards Article VI of the NPT.
5. Effectiveness of the NPT would be measured in terms of compliance record of NNWS and the RevCom may call for improving compliance record by the NNWS.
6. Success of Libya would be lauded, while North Korean experience would be a matter of concern.
7. Iran would be urged to reconsider alternative routes to fulfill nuclear energy demands than insisting on self-sufficiency in fuel cycle capability.
8. A proposal may come up to include more explicitly the ‘non-state actors’ as one of the sources of supply under Article II.
9. Commitment to strengthen verification role of the IAEA, perhaps proposing Additional Protocol to be mandatory for NNWS under Article III of the NPT.
10. Amendment to Article IV and Article V may be proposed in accordance with the possible changes in Article II and Article III.
11. The concept of nuclear weapon free zones may be appreciated under Article VII.
12. Review of Article X may be proposed or at least inclusion of the ‘intent’ to do so in future. (It is a difficult proposition because none of the states would easily agree to surrender the ‘sovereign right’ to come out of any international treaty at any required point of time on national security concerns.)
13. Some of the key provisions of the UN Resolution 1540 may be included in a final declaration, i.e., calling for more stringent domestic export control laws and mechanisms.