In December 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry revealed that Russia was engaging in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.
In December 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry revealed that Russia was engaging in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The announcement, which coincided with US moves to reduce troop presence in the country and transfer security control to Afghan forces, caught the world by surprise.1 2016 saw a sudden increase in the Taliban’s offensive attacks and its establishment of control over more territory than during the past decade and a half.2
Subsequently, in April 2017, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, accused Russia of providing weapons to the Taliban.3 This was the first time a senior US commander made such allegations regarding Russian support to the Taliban. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov termed the allegations ‘unprofessional and groundless’ and charged that it was an attempt to ‘put the blame for Washington’s failures in Afghanistan [on Russia]’.4 Russia, in turn, accused the US of supporting Islamic State operatives in Afghanistan.5 Even earlier, in 2016, the head of the Asia and West Asian department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Zamir Kabulov, had stated, ‘It is some miracle that Taliban leaders who wouldn’t cooperate with Islamic State in Afghanistan tend to be hit by American airstrikes. And those who do are being left alone’.6
While these accusations and counter-accusations reflect Cold-War rhetoric, it is important to understand why Russia has begun to engage with the Taliban and what its aims in Afghanistan are in the foreseeable future. Even though Russia’s links with the Taliban are purported to have begun around 2007, renewed attention was focused on such links from 2014 onwards after the West, led by the US, imposed sanctions on Russia in the wake of Crimea voting to become a part of Russia. The counter-pressure from the Russian side was bound to be generated. The open declaration of Russian assistance to the Taliban can be read as an effort to gain a bargaining position vis-à-vis Washington to extract concessions on the Crimean issue.7
Moreover, many in Russia consider the US presence in its neighbourhood as a latent threat.8 They view the US ‘war on terror’ as a smokescreen and allege that the major American objective is to maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan in order to keep a check on Russia, Pakistan, China and Iran at the same time. Many analysts and officials see the US intentionally trying to prolong the conflict for its own strategic interests and using the Islamic State as a proxy to counter these countries.9 The Russians therefore might be very keen to lend assistance to the Taliban in order to increase US casualties and thus force a US withdrawal. This would pave the way for a resurgent Moscow to increase its influence beyond Central Asia in Afghanistan and Pakistan, besides being involved in West Asia.10
Another factor for the Russian involvement could be the need to tackle the growing menace of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Moscow takes very seriously Islamic State statements threatening attacks against its interests, especially in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian airliner in Egypt and the more recent St. Petersburg metro bombings which have been attributed to the group. Further, Russia’s support to the Assad government in Syria is also bound to attract the wrath of the Islamic State.
Russia is therefore worried that if there is a growth of Islamic State influence in Afghanistan, there is a possibility of radicalisation taking place on a larger scale in the former Soviet Central Asian states. This would then make the Russian underbelly vulnerable to increased cross border terrorist attacks. Another major worry for Moscow is that many ex-Taliban combatants have switched allegiance to the Islamic State and moreover many Islamic State recruits are Central Asians as well as Russians. Given all this, the Taliban is naturally seen as an emerging ally for Russia.
Many analysts further note that Russia is aligning with the Taliban to control the menace of drugs, specifically opium. These drugs are consumed in Russia on a large scale and they are transported through the country for further consumption in Europe.11 It is also a fact, however, that proceeds from the drug trade are a major source of funding for the Taliban. Finally, the most important reason for the Russian engagement with the Taliban could be not to miss the chance of shaping the political scenario in Afghanistan if and when the Americans leave.12 Moscow may possibly be hoping that the Taliban, which is seen as more of a nationalist movement in contrast to the radical Islamist character of the Islamic State, would help secure the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan, as reiterated by one ex-Taliban leader, Syed Mohammad Akbar Agha.13
Notwithstanding all this, it may be better for Russia to consolidate its links with the Taliban only after the latter enters the political mainstream and severs connections with all terrorist organisations. Otherwise, Russia would stand guilty of supporting a terrorist group, akin to what the US did in the 1980s to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen as to what extent the ‘red-line’ approach accepted in the Moscow six-party talks in February 2017 would be followed by the Kremlin. That approach indicated that the Taliban must give up violence, abide by Afghanistan’s constitution and break links with other terrorist organisations.14 The Russian engagement with the Taliban has created new dynamics, the repercussions of which will be felt in the region and beyond.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The main objective would be for Modi and Trump to come on the same page on key issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, South China Sea and the future of climate change.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to the United States at the invitation of President Donald Trump on June 25-26, 2017. This will be the first meeting between the two leaders although they have had telephonic conversations on three earlier occasions. These interactions have created a suitable atmosphere for Modi's visit.
National Security Adviser (NSA) AK Doval visited Washington DC twice, and Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar thrice, since Trump's election to establish contacts with their counterparts and other senior officials. Jaishankar will be travelling to Washington DC again on June 21 to flesh out the deliverables of this crucial Modi-Trump meeting.
In the reverse direction, the American NSA, General HR McMaster, visited New Delhi to confer with Indian leaders about the security situation in South Asia and particularly Afghanistan. He also called on Prime Minister Modi.
The press Statement issued by the White House on June 12, 2017 announcing Prime Minister Modi's visit states that discussions to strengthen ties and advance common priorities relating to fighting terrorism, promoting economic growth and reforms will take place. Mention is also made of ''expanding security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.''
Modi’s visit is being looked at with a little hope, considerable apprehension and some enthusiasm. Trump is about to complete five months of his tenure. Since he is a new-comer to office and has not held any government or public office so far, his views and positions on a large number of international and foreign policy issues are not known. What has become increasingly clear over the last months is that Trump continues to be unpredictable, impulsive and temperamental; he is prone to change his positions very quickly; he lacks a strategic view of the world; he tends to reduce all relations to transactional, economic terms, and is prone to launch into outbursts on the basis of specious data.
The focus of Modi’s forthcoming visit will be to build a personal rapport and a working relationship with Trump. The main objective would be for Modi and Trump to come on the same page on key issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, South China Sea and the future of climate change. While Modi will raise India’s concerns over H-1B visas, the essential goal would be to establish a comfort level and understanding with Trump and his establishment on issues of key and critical concern. It will be a challenge for Modi to enrol Trump as a staunch and unwavering supporter of stronger India-US partnership. But it is a matter of satisfaction that barring Trump’s eruption on June 1, 2017 when he made a scathing attack on India (and China) for demanding ‘’billions and billions and billions of dollars’’ for meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Trump has had positive things to say about India and Modi.
On the bilateral front, defence will be an important subject. Considering the fact that Trump prefers to operate on a transactional basis, it would seem appropriate for some major defence acquisitions to be announced during Modi’s visit. The United States has emerged as India’s second largest defence supplier, next only to Russia, with orders worth USD 16 billion in the kitty. Progressive manufacture in, and transfer of technology to, India should be woven into the defence procurements that are announced. Indian companies have also decided to import 250 civilian aircraft from Being Aerospace. This should create more than 25,000 jobs in America, which should be gratifying for Trump.
The question of H1B visas to Indian professionals is likely to come up. Modi could refer to the role of skilled Indian talent in enriching the American economy and society and urge that the US develop a reflective, balanced and farsighted perspective on the movement of skilled professionals. It should be remembered that the India-US partnership is not a single-issue relationship and bilateral ties should not be viewed only through the prism of the H1B visa issue. Modi should apprise Trump about the creation of jobs in the United States by Indian investments. Trump should be disabused of the idea that it is a one-way street.
Some of the most consequential discussions can be expected to take place on US policies regarding China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Trump’s views on dealing with China have not crystallised. His position has swung from one end to the other. He has already created a vacuum by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, leaving the way open for China to expand its presence. By reneging on the Paris Climate Change Agreement, he has allowed China to assume a leadership position on this vital issue. A comprehensive, long-term understanding on strategies to deal with China’s aggressive and hegemonic rise should be reached. Relations with Japan, North Korea, South China Sea, China’s Belt Road Initiative and its increasing forays in the Indian Ocean can be expected to be in focus during the Modi-Trump discussions.
Little clarity has emerged on Trump's strategy to deal with the spectre of international terrorism and the worsening situation in Afghanistan. A well thought-through strategy to deal with Pakistan’s persistent support for terrorist forces needs to be worked out. Also, greater attention needs to be given to ensuring stability and security in Afghanistan.
During the visit, Prime Minister Modi will use the opportunity to meet and share views with other interlocutors like the two Houses of the US Congress where India enjoys huge support, with the business community, and the Indian diaspora. All these deliberations will send a powerful message to President Trump and his administration about the vigorous and wide-spread enthusiasm that exists for India and the India-US partnership in the US political system, business community and society.
The success of the visit will be gauged by the commitment to bilateral ties that Modi is able to get from Trump. His task would be to get Trump’s recognition that a strong, stable and prosperous India is in America’s own interest. Although no big bang announcements are expected at this stage, one can be cautiously optimistic of a mutually beneficial outcome.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Uruguay’s Armed Forces – Maintaining Effectiveness on a Budget
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
June 20, 2017
While Uruguay has been able to preserve the combat capability of its armed forces despite budgetary restrictions, it remains to be seen whether this can continue without substantial infusions of money for capital acquisitions.
Uruguay, a small nation of some 176,215 square kilometre with a population of a mere 3,493,000, is a relatively prosperous country with a high per capita income of some USD 16,000 per annum in nominal terms.1 The country is a stable, liberal democracy with strong democratic institutions and one of the least politicised military establishments in the region. However, even that military felt itself compelled to usurp political power in 1973 after the outbreak of urban terrorism, perpetrated by the Tupamaro guerrillas which had its roots among the disillusioned middle-class youth adversely affected by a declining economic situation.2De facto military rule through civilian puppet governments lasted until 1984 when a peaceful transition of power took place. Since then, the military has remained apolitical, the guerrillas being successfully contained.
Nowadays, the country’s armed forces are perhaps best known for being among the highest – if not the highest – per capita contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.3 However, the country’s military, which is almost unique among the larger South American militaries in being composed entirely of volunteers, has been a pioneer of inclusive policies. Not only has discrimination against the enlistment of homosexuals been eliminated, but the recruitment of women has also been encouraged, to the extent that 25 per cent of the country’s armed forces are female with no restriction on their serving in combat roles.4 Yet, despite these progressive social policies, the Uruguayan armed forces, like so many in the region, have had to struggle to maintain combat capabilities in the face of limited budgets which hover around 1.9 to 2.5 per cent of GDP.5
Fortunately, Uruguay faces neither an external threat nor any internal unrest that is beyond the ability of the 27,000 strong National Police to handle. To date, despite some incidents of corruption, the country’s law-enforcement and legal institutions have shown themselves equal to the task.6 However, the country does face the challenge posed by narco-traffickers who make use of Montevideo’s port as well as the country’s porous borders with Argentina and Brazil. While not a grower of cocaine, Uruguay is a trans-shipment hub and its rate of cocaine consumption is the third highest in the region after Chile and Argentina.7 Though the country’s National Police have thus far performed well, the armed forces have added their expertise to the counter-narcotics effort, with the Air Force in particular playing an important role in airspace monitoring.
The Uruguayan Army
Uruguay’s army has some 14,000 personnel and, compared to that of neighbouring Paraguay, is heavily mechanised. Organised into four “divisions” (in reality, brigade sized formations), the army is relatively well-equipped compared to the other two services and has been able to sustain its combat capabilities with infusions of overhauled second-hand systems from a variety of sources reflecting a deliberate effort to diversify the sources of weapons supply.
The country is divided into four Military Regions, each garrisoned by a nominal division – 1st Division HQ Montevideo, 2nd Division HQ San Jose, 3rd Division HQ Tacuarembo and 4th Division HQ Minas – and each of which consists of a single infantry brigade of three battalions, one or more cavalry regiments, an artillery group and supporting engineering, medical and logistical elements.8 This basic organisational structure has remained unchanged since the 1980s.
In cavalry regiments, pride of place is occupied by a force of 15 Israeli T-55 rebuilds, known as the Ti-67 Tiran, acquired in 1997. The Tiran is a modification of captured T-55 tanks and is equipped with 105 mm L7 main guns and updated fire control systems. These vehicles are augmented by a force of 47 locally and Brazilian modernized M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, re-equipped with 90 mm guns.9 A batch of 25 Brazilian M-41s was acquired in 2013 to replace an ageing force of M-24 Chaffee light tanks which had been delivered in 1957.10
While neither the Ti-67s nor the M-41s are new vehicles, they present Uruguay with a potent armoured force, augmented by a force of EE-9 Cascavel armoured cars and a substantial fleet of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) which include 15 BMP-1s obtained from the Czech Republic, 140 MOWAG Piranhas from Canada and 130 Czech OT-93s operating alongside older M113s and Condor 1 APCs.
Artillery support is modest, with four dozen M101 105 mm howitzers acquired from the Republic of Korea in 1981 together with eight M114 155 mm howitzers. These assets are augmented by eight M102 105 mm howitzers acquired in 1972 and six 2S1 Gvodzika 122 mm self-propelled howitzers purchased from the Czech Republic in 1998. Anti-aircraft capability is even more modest with only fourteen 20 mm guns in service, although eight twin TCM-20 anti-aircraft guns are radar directed with Elta M-2016 radars.11
The Uruguayan Navy
Uruguay’s Navy has approximately 5,700 personnel and operates a fleet of second-hand vessels that will soon be in dire need of either major overhauls or replacement. The most “modern” assets, delivered in 2008, are two class frigates obtained from Portugal. These ships – ROU 01 Uruguay (ex-Comandante João Belo) and ROU 02 Comandante Pedro Campbell (ex-Comandante Sacadura Cabral) – had entered Portuguese service in 1967 and 1969, respectively, making the vessels nearly 50 years old at present.12 These vessels replaced three Commandant Rivière class vessels obtained from France between 1988 and 1991. But they had relatively short lives in Uruguayan service owing to chronic serviceability problems. It is of interest to note that the MM.38 Exocet missiles, normally fitted to the João Belo class while in Portuguese service, do not appear to have been transferred to Uruguay.
That these vessels are the most modern in the Uruguayan fleet is indicative of the vintage of the rest of the navy. Three Kondor-II-class minesweepers, formerly of the former East German Navy, and two Cape-class patrol boats, formerly of the US Coast Guard, round out the navy’s modest combat assets, serving alongside a small force of survey ships, river patrol craft and search and rescue vessels.13
Uruguay’s maritime patrol assets have declined in quality and quantity since the decommissioning of its fleet of Grumman S-2G Tracker anti-submarine aircraft in 2001. Now, two Beechcraft B-200T Super King Air fill the maritime patrol role, augmented by a BAE Systems Jetstream T2 and five helicopters.14 The Uruguayan air force supplements these assets with four CASA C-212-200M for maritime patrol and search and rescue.
The Uruguayan Air Force
The 3000 strong Uruguayan Air Force (FAU) is organised into three Air Brigades:
Air Brigade I
No. 3 Squadron (Transport)
No. 5 Squadron (Helicopters)
Air Brigade II
No. 1 Squadron (Attack)
No. 2 Squadron (Fighters)
The Advanced Training Squadron
Air Brigade III
No. 7 Squadron (Observation & Liaison)
As can be seen, Nos. 3, 5 and 7 Squadrons operate the transport (6 aircraft), helicopters (12), and observation and liaison (11) assets of the force. Twelve Aermacchi SF-260 training aircraft fulfil the basic training role. Combat assets, such as they are, are concentrated in the three squadrons of Air Brigade II. These were once reasonably potent when the FAU operated Lockheed F-80, T-33 and Cessna A-37 jet aircraft.15
However, over the past 36 years, the Argentine FMA IA.58 Pucara spearheaded the FAU, with six aircraft on strength with No. 1 Squadron (Attack). The type served with distinction as a potent counter to narcotics trafficking flights. Unfortunately, the Pucara became increasingly difficult to maintain and on March 17, 2017, the type was retired from service, effectively halving the dedicated combat assets of the force.16 The aircraft was highly regarded in FAU service and no replacement is in sight.17
A force of up to 12 Cessna A-37s in No. 2 Squadron (Fighters) forms the core of the FAU combat force, augmented by five weapons-capable Pilatus PC-7 combat capable training aircraft with the Advanced Training Squadron.18 The former type has been reinforced by replacement aircraft and spares from Ecuador to keep the squadron at a sustainable level.19
Despite the infusion of aircraft and components from Ecuador, spares problems and maintenance issues also affect the A-37s, with the loss of an aircraft in August 2016.20 Protestations from the FAU as to the airworthiness of the aircraft did little to ease concerns.21 This is especially true of the ejection seats used on the aircraft, and the FAU sought the assistance of Martin-Baker’s Argentine subsidiary to replace the ejection seats.22 In addition, the FAU has contracted with ENAER of Chile to repair the engines of the type in the hopes of prolonging the service life of the aircraft.23
Yet, the FAU is only prolonging the inevitable. Repairing ageing assets may be practical in the short-term, but it is inevitable that replacements for the A-37 and the now-decommissioned Pucara need to be found. China has offered its Hongdu L-15 advanced trainer for the role and the FAU has expressed interest in the type.24 However, no contracts have been signed and it is questionable as to whether the Uruguayan government will make the necessary funds available to facilitate such a purchase. Uruguay had previously shown interest in procuring 10 former Swiss-Air Force Northrop F-5E/Fs, but no deal for the same has materialised and the A-37s soldier on with numbers set to decrease as the years progress.
Conclusion
Uruguay has enjoyed a period of both political and relative economic stability for a number of decades since the transition to civilian rule in 1984. However, this has never translated into lavish budgets for the armed forces. Uruguay maintains what is effectively an arsenal of second-hand weapons systems. While undoubtedly more modern than the antiquated assets of neighbouring Paraguay, Uruguay’s ageing inventory will inevitably pose problems as the military seeks to maintain a core level of capability within the budgetary constraints laid down by the government. Uruguay’s army is in considerably better shape than either the Air Force or the Navy, with both the latter services facing the spectre of increasing maintenance burdens as their assets age. To date, Uruguay has been able to preserve the combat capability of its armed forces despite budgetary restrictions. It remains to be seen whether this can continue without substantial infusions of money for capital acquisitions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. A.J. English, Armed Forces of Latin America (Jane’s, London: 1984), p. 424.
3. “U.S. Relations With Uruguay BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS: Fact Sheet,” United States Department of State, September 7, 2016, at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2091.htm (Accessed June 18, 2017).
11. M. Bromley & I. Guevarra, “Arms Modernization in Latin America,” in A.TH. Tan., ed., The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook (Routledge: Abingdon, 2010), p. 172.
12. Commodore S. Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2012-2013 (IHS Jane’s: Surrey, 2013), p. 977.
BIMSTEC needs to build on regional synergies and work towards utilising the available resources optimally by focusing on fewer priority areas and undertaking projects that are economically feasible.
On June 06 this year, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) completed 20 years of its establishment. Comprising of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan, BIMSTEC is home to 1.5 billion people, accounting for approximately 21 per cent of the world population, and a combined GDP of US$ 2.5 trillion.1 The growth rate sustained by the BIMSTEC countries is around six per cent per annum.2 However, despite its huge potential in terms of enhancing regional cooperation between parts of South and Southeast Asia, BIMSTEC has long suffered from lack of resources and proper coordination among its member states.
So far, BIMSTEC has held only three summit meetings. The first one was held in Thailand in 2004, seven years after the establishment of the grouping; the second one was held four years later in India in 2008, and the third one six years later in Myanmar in 2014. The fourth summit meeting is expected to take place later this year in Nepal, the current Chair of BIMSTEC. Again, it took 17 long years for BIMSTEC to finally establish its permanent secretariat in Dhaka in 2014.
The Initiative
Initially known as the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC), it was formed after representatives from the aforesaid four countries met at Bangkok in June 1997. With Myanmar joining the grouping as a full member in December the same year, the ‘BIST-EC’ was renamed as ‘BIMST-EC’. In February 2004, when Nepal and Bhutan too joined, the grouping was renamed as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation or BIMSTEC.
According to the June 1997 ‘Declaration on the Establishment of the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC)’, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, the founding objectives of the sub-regional initiative were: creating an enabling environment for rapid economic development of the sub-region, encouraging the spirit of equality and partnership, promoting active collaboration and mutual assistance in the areas of common interests of the member countries, accelerating support for each other in the fields of education, science and technology, etc.3
So far, the seven-member grouping has identified 14 priority sectors and has signed a Free Trade Agreement (2004) and a Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking (2009). Few working groups too have been formed.
For India, the establishment of BIMST-EC, later BIMSTEC, was yet another opportunity, besides the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to engage with Southeast Asia, at least partially. The scope for direct connectivity with Southeast Asia via Northeast India and Myanmar, counter-terrorism and anti-insurgency cooperation with Myanmar and other members, potential access to alternative energy resources in Myanmar as well as economic opportunities available in the ASEAN region had evoked sufficient interest in New Delhi to join BIST-EC.
Besides India, other members too considered it as an important mechanism to achieve their national goals and regional aspirations. Myanmar, for example, became a member at a time when the junta in the country was facing serious international criticism. Membership in regional and sub-regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC provided its military rulers an opportunity to gain some sort of recognition among the regional stakeholders. Today, Myanmar sees itself as a gateway for BIMSTEC to ASEAN, primarily due to its strategic location between South and Southeast Asia.
Thailand, on the other hand, was looking for an opportunity to enhance its trade and connectivity with the South Asian countries under the ambit of its ‘Look West’ policy. So, in a way, India’s ‘Look East’ and Thailand’s ‘Look West’ policy complemented each other within the ambit of BIMSTEC. The ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the India-Myanmar Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project are expected to further augment connectivity and economic cooperation in the sub-region and beyond.
Countries like Sri Lanka considered BIMSTEC as an opportunity to engage with the economically booming Southeast Asian countries, especially after several failed attempts to join ASEAN in the decade prior to the establishment of BIMSTEC. With India and Thailand as its important economic partners, Sri Lanka is looking forward to the implementation of BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement and BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement.4 For the land-blocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, BIMSTEC holds the prospect of enhancing their connectivity with the rest of the region.
Challenges
In today’s context, the possibility of enhancing physical, digital and people-to-people connectivity in the sub-region is huge. Similarly, the potential to tap the vast energy resources and scope for intra-regional trade and investment too is enormous. Though largely devoid of bilateral tensions, as is the case in SAARC, BIMSTEC does not seem to have made much progress. The so-called sluggishness in BIMSTEC last two decades is attributed to many factors. India, the largest member of the grouping, has often been criticised for not providing a strong leadership to BIMSTEC. Both Thailand and Myanmar are criticised for having ignored BIMSTEC in favour of ASEAN. This despite the fact that BIMSTEC was formed at a time when the ASEAN countries were suffering from severe financial crisis in 1997-98 and also as both Thailand and Myanmar experienced political turmoil in the following decade.
Absence of a permanent secretariat for a long time and lack of commitment to invest in several priority areas identified by the member states were seen as some of the key institutional factors holding the BIMSTEC back. The ‘noodle bowl effect’ of regionalism too was at work as formation of another sub-regional initiative, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, with the proactive membership of China, created more doubts about the exclusive potential of BIMSTEC.
Renewed Interest
Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his message on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of BIMSTEC, described the sub-regional grouping as “a natural platform” to fulfill India’s “key foreign policy priorities of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’”.5 Earlier in October 2016, India had hosted the BIMSTEC members at Goa during the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Outreach Summit. It was viewed as a pragmatic step on India’s part, demonstrating its potential to play the role of a regional leader, an aspiration which was instrumental in transforming its ‘Look East’ into ‘Act East’ policy. The BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit is believed to have given BIMSTEC its due importance by inviting its members to participate in a larger platform comprising five major emerging economies of the world.
India has been clearly signaling its renewed interest in BIMSTEC. India is already the lead country for four priority sectors, namely, transportation and communication, environment and disaster management, tourism, and counter-terrorism and trans-national crime. Within few months of the Goa Summit, India hosted the first meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs in New Delhi in March 2017. Though BIMSTEC leaders spoke about many issues at the Goa Summit, the highlight clearly was the open discussion on combating terrorism in the region.
In an effort to strengthen sub-regional cooperation on combating terrorism and trans-national crime, the BIMSTEC member states are trying to implement a convention on anti-terrorism. Except for Nepal and Bhutan, all member states of BIMSTEC have ratified it.6 BIMSTEC is now trying to sign a Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. In fact, the 17th BIMSTEC Senior Officials’ Meeting, conducted in Kathmandu in February 2017, referred to the progress made in other sectors too. To name a few, it pointed to India hosting a working group meeting to finalise the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement, finalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Grid Interconnection to facilitate electricity trade in the sub-region, and a meeting of BIMSTEC Trade Negotiating Committee to fast-track the process of trade facilitation in the region.7 In fact, the declaration issued at the end of the Goa Summit had also stated that BIMSTEC needs to have a Coastal Shipping Agreement to allow the member states to trade freely within the sub-region.8 It is noteworthy that between 2002 and 2014, the intra-BIMSTEC trade registered a very marginal growth, from 3.6 to 4.3 per cent only.9
Apart from India, other member states too appear to be showing interest in strengthening BIMSTEC. Former Thai Ambassador Kobsak Chutkul, who was earlier involved in the establishment of BIMSTEC, recently observed that though BIMSTEC is neither ASEAN nor SAARC, yet it is on a ‘solid ground’. He described it as a ‘complimentary organisation’ which can support the people in the region.10
Identifying lack of media coverage and public awareness about the grouping as one of the shortcomings, the BIMSTEC Secretary General Ambassador Sumith Nakandala too pointed to the importance of making BIMSTEC more effective in a recent conference held at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.11 On the 20th anniversary of BIMSTEC, the Bhutanese foreign minister was said to have observed that ‘the two decades of regional experience have taught that the path to achieving common goal and aspirations is not without challenges and setbacks’.12 These statements show that while BIMSTEC member states consider it as an important sub-regional grouping, bridging the South and Southeast Asia, they are equally aware of the impediments facing it.
For BIMSTEC to become an enabler of regional cooperation, it will have to evolve as an organisation that works through a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. The people-centric approach seems to be the best as BIMSTEC seriously lags behind ASEAN and other regional organisations in terms of people-to-people contacts. Also, the organisation needs to focus on fewer priority areas for purpose of better implementation. It needs to undertake projects that are economically feasible and result-driven. This would add to the credibility of BIMSTEC. Finally, since the BIMSTEC region is notable for its diversity, the member states need to build on the regional synergies and work towards utilising the available resources in the most optimal manner. This would help build a stronger and a more dynamic BIMSTEC.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.“BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead”, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi, 2016, p. 1 (Accessed June 14, 2017).
6. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India to Focus on BIMSTEC After Hurdles from Pak”, The Economic Times, January 30, 2017 (Accessed June 08, 2017). Both Nepal and Bhutan have started the process of ratification in their parliament and national assembly, respectively.
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Economic Relations, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan
Britain and the European Union: Exit Now, Re-enter Later
Bharat Wariavwalla
June 14, 2017
The EU needs Britain and Britain equally needs Europe. So, an arrangement that exists today between EU and Norway could well be a model for Britain.
Having voted to exit from the European Union (EU) in the referendum of June 2016, Britain’s foremost problem, domestic and foreign, was how to secure the best terms of exit. In one sense, the recent election was about this. The contestants, the ruling Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party, fought this issue before the British people and the people gave a messy verdict. The Conservatives led by Theresa May gained 318 seats, eight short of a majority, and the Labour led by Jeremy Corbyn won 261 seats, 29 more than it had in 2015. This is indeed impressive. May, with over confidence verging on arrogance, and Corbyn, modest but doughty, fought in the market place of democracy. May lost and Corbyn won, not arithmetically but morally.
May made the terms of Exit from the EU the only issue in the election. Corbyn talked about both the Exit and the state of British society and politics. This appealed to people who were more concerned with how their schools, health care, and transport are run rather than with the EU. May said that Britain needed a strong and stable leadership to negotiate the Exit terms with the EU. Corbyn said that a more prosperous and egalitarian Britain is as important as an Exit deal with the EU. People found Corbyn more appealing than May. The youth in particular found Corbyn’s ideas of a more egalitarian Britain and a more ecologically balanced world more appealing than May’s thumping declarations about British sovereignty.
As many commentators have said, Britain will now negotiate with the EU with weak cards. Its ace card was strong support at home for a cheap exit from the EU. The cost of exit is now high because its protagonist knows that within Britain opinion is divided, and besides, the Prime Minister does not command strong support in her party.
It is not just that Britain deals with the EU from a position of weakness but that the EU today is stronger. The turning point in the EU’s fortune was the decisive victory of a pro-EU movement in the presidential election in France last month. Emmanuel Macron is a firm Europeanist. The movement he leads, En Marche, is pro-market and in favour of European unity. Macron is also in favour of a strong alliance with Germany as well as German-French partnership to steer EU affairs. Both France and Germany want Britain to honour all its obligations to the EU. Which means, Britain’s huge dues to the EU. Theresa May prevaricates on this point and sometimes talks about linking the dues with Britain’s access to the EU’s single market. Britain heavily depends on such access. Over half its exports go to EU countries.
At the same time, the EU also needs Britain. It needs the City’s (London) unrivalled status as a leading world centre of finance. A mutually advantageous exit agreement is, therefore, in the interest of both. A kind of agreement that Norway has – it is not an EU member but has access to its single market – could be a model for an EU-Britain agreement. Britain, with a USD 2.6 trillion economy, is the second largest in Europe and the fifth largest in the world. Neither the EU nor Britain can live in isolation of each other.
Public sentiments against the integration of Europe are on the decline in European countries. The anti-Europe, anti-immigration, and racist parties lost the electoral contest to liberal, pro-Europe parties in Holland, France and Austria during the past six months. And Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest in the world, is a well rooted liberal democracy and solidly in favour of European unity.
Britain must accept the reality of the EU and negotiate with it on that assumption. Its isolation from Europe is accentuated by its isolation from Trump’s America. During the 2016 presidential election, Trump often said that NATO was obsolete and that he was going to lift sanctions against Russia, a country that wishes the death of the EU. After assuming power in January 2017, Trump slightly moderated his previous stand on these issues. But it is difficult to build a long term policy with Trump who is too capricious and impulsive to give American foreign policy a clear direction.
Trump’s America has abandoned its long standing policy of a special relationship with Britain. Gone for good are the days of intimate relationships between Roosevelt and Churchill, Thatcher and Reagan, and more recently Blair and George Bush Jr. If Theresa May thought she could forge a close relationship with Trump, she was greatly mistaken. Her recent visit to America must have dashed any hope of such a relationship. It is such intimacy with America that gave Britain in the past an advantage in dealing with Europe. That’s now gone.
In the Brexit referendum, Remain or Exit, out of a voter turnout of 73 per cent, 51 per cent voted for exit. Globalization and its consequences, unemployment, a sense of loss of identity, were some of the factors in the making of the exit vote. These factors are also there, of course, in varying degrees in all European countries that have had elections. In France, some 42 per cent were against the EU because the EU stood for globalization. In Holland and in Austria roughly the same percentage of people voted against the EU.
In Britain, however, there is another important strand in popular thinking that is distinctly British: insularity. This is not the place to discuss whence this feeling of insularity emerged. Probably, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which established democracy gave the people a feeling that they were distinct from the peoples of the Continent. But the feeling of being distinct is there and it expresses itself politically in Britain’s relations with Europe. Thus, Britain opposed the creation of the European Common Market in 1957 by setting up a European Free Trade Association. And when that did not work it sought membership of the EU in 1961. Subsequently, it opposed the creation of the Euro in 1999 and stayed away from other arrangements aimed at the political and economic integration of Europe. There were weighty factions in both the Conservative and Labour parties who called for Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. David Cameron, then prime minister, called for a referendum in response to a strong faction in his party braying for withdrawal from the EU. In short, Britain feels uneasy in Europe and secure behind the English Channel.
Insularity or no insularity, Britain and the EU need each other. The British economy is the second largest economy in Europe, and the City is an unrivalled centre of finance and money. The EU needs Britain and Britain equally needs Europe. So, an arrangement that exists today between EU and Norway could well be a model for Britain. Norway is not in the EU but it has access to its Single Market, which is what would ideally suit Britain as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s New Initiative in Africa: The Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
Ruchita Beri
June 13, 2017
The Corridor marries India’s brand of human resources development and capacity building with Japan’s objective of delivering quality infrastructure in the region.
During the recent annual meeting of the Africa Development Bank at Gandhinagar, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the launch of India’s latest initiative in Africa, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), in partnership with Japan. This initiative is the latest in a series of steps taken by India including the Third India Africa Forum Summit and a number of high level visits to 16 African countries over the last two years, all aimed to boost ties with the continent. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor highlights the growing importance of Africa in Indian foreign policy and also signals India’s willingness to partner with like-minded countries, such as Japan, in this region.
India in Africa
The African Development Bank meeting in Gandhinagar has shifted the spotlight back to India’s relations with the 54 countries in Africa. India’s historical ties with this region are well known. Economic engagement with African countries has increased in the last two decades with a large number of public and private sector companies from India investing in Africa. Trade has seen a five-fold increase from USD 11.9 billion in 2005-2006 to 56.7 billion in 2015-16.1 India engages with African countries at three levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. Multilateral engagement was launched with the first India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2008. The third IAFS hosted by the Indian government in 2015 revealed the agenda that would help to empower Africans and bring Africa and India closer in the future. During the summit, India pledged USD 10 billion in concessional lines of credit to African countries.
India’s engagement with the continent is consultative and is, to a large extent, driven by the demands of the African countries. Further, India postulates that its partnership is an amalgam of African development priorities in keeping with the African Union’s long term plan and the Africa Agenda 2063, as well as India’s development objectives. There is no doubt that India’s engagement is highly appreciated by Africans. As Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, noted, “This cooperation is both a mutual privilege and priority” and that it is a “pleasure to partner with such an inveterate and committed investor in Africa.”2
Japan in Africa
Japan also has a long standing relationship with African countries. The main feature of Japan’s Africa policy is its support for African “ownership”. The most important Japanese initiative in Africa is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which was set up in 1993 to promote Africa’s development and security through multilateral cooperation.3 To some extent, TICAD refocussed the world’s attention on Africa. It was launched at a time when, following the end of the Cold War, Western donors had reduced their economic assistance to Africa and did not consider the region to be strategically important. It is important to note that this forum meets every five years in partnership with the United Nations Office of Special Adviser on Africa, the United Nation Development Programme, the World Bank and the African Union Commission. At the last TICAD summit, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged USD 30 billion in the form of public and private sector investments in Africa.4
Thus, in recent years, both Japan and India have been engaging with African countries. To some extent, this engagement may be driven by efforts to garner support from the 54 African countries for their candidacy in a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC). India and Japan are part of the G4 initiative along with Germany and Brazil seeking an early implementation of UNSC reforms. It is interesting to note that both India and Japan are speaking the same language and calling for “African empowerment” or “African ownership.” The main difference is that, unlike Japan, India has not invited any multilateral agency to be part of the IAFS process. This does not, however, imply that India is not open to triangular cooperation with African partners. India and the United States are collaborating with African countries for promoting agricultural growth, energy security, health, women’s empowerment and peacekeeping training.5 Similarly, India has been open to working together with Japan in Africa.
Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
India and Japan institutionalised a dialogue on Africa in 2010.6 Since then, they have been exploring the possibilities of cooperation in Africa’s socio- economic development. However, it was only during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan in November 2016 that the idea of the two countries promoting a growth corridor between Asia and Africa was crystallised.7
During the Africa Development Bank meeting, India unveiled the Vision Document of the Asian Africa Growth Corridor.8 The vision document was prepared jointly by Indian and Japanese think tanks, i.e. Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries (RIS), Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and Institute for Development Economics - Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), in consultation with other think tanks in Asia and Africa.
The main objective of the corridor is to enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa. The corridor will focus on four areas: Development Cooperation Projects, Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity, Enhancing Skills, and People-to-People Partnership. Agriculture, health, technology, and disaster management have been identified as the main areas of development cooperation. According to the vision document, AAGC will focus on enhancing skills and research and development capacities in Africa. It will also strive to develop institutional, industrial and transport infrastructure in the Asia -Africa region. The corridor will facilitate greater people-to-people exchanges amongst the participating countries.
Even as it has launched the AAGC initiative, India has made it clear that it is not interested in joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is seeking to revive the global economy through a 21st century silk road that traverses through Europe, Asia and Africa. Its refusal to participate in the Chinese initiative is due to concerns about sovereignty given that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a part of the Belt and Road, passes through Indian territory under Pakistan’s control. There is no doubt that comparisons will be made regarding the merits of the Indo-Japanese and Chinese initiatives.
Be that as it may, the AAGC marries India’s brand of human resources development and capacity building with Japan’s objective of delivering quality infrastructure in the region. Moreover, both India and Japan have consulted with think tanks in Africa and Asia while conceptualising this plan. Efforts should be made to fast track the next steps to turn these innovative ideas to reality.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It is unlikely that Qatar will agree to align its foreign policy with that of Riyadh and to rein in Al Jazeera.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt cut off diplomatic relations as well as air, sea, and trade links with Qatar on June 5, 2017, accusing it of funding terrorism. Of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Kuwait and Oman did not act against Qatar while Kuwait has since been engaged in mediation but without any visible success so far. The crisis has affected Qatar, which is the world’s largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exporter, with the highest per capita income at $127,660.
President Trump’s role
US President Donald Trump paid a two-day state visit to Saudi Arabia starting on May 20. While newly-elected US Presidents traditionally go either to neighbouring Mexico or Canada, Trump chose instead to go to Saudi Arabia. The foundation for Trump’s unusual choice was laid in mid-March 2017, when the KSA’s Defence Minister, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, 31, son of Saudi King Salman, came to Washington on an invitation from Secretary of Defence James Mattis. The Saudi Prince was invited for lunch with Trump as a huge snow storm delayed the arrival of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whom Trump was scheduled to meet.
Trump used the opportunity to get closer to Riyadh which was already in a hostile confrontation with Iran. Trump’s moves gelled with his policy of getting tough with Iran, and his keenness to undo as much of Barack Obama’s legacy as possible. It was agreed during the meeting with Prince Salman that Riyadh would place orders for a huge amount of arms and equipment and also pledged to invest in a big way in the US.
During Trump’s visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia successfully projected itself as the undisputed leader of the Arab/Muslim world by inviting over 50 heads of state for the ‘Arab-Islamic American Summit’. Egypt’s President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, and others spoke at the Summit about the need to stop the funding for terrorists. It was reported that some of them told Trump that Qatar had not stopped sending money to terrorists.
In short, King Salman had the confidence at the end of the visit that if there was a move to break off diplomatic relations with and to humiliate Qatar based on its ‘funding of terrorism’ charge, Trump will approve of such a move. This was confirmed when Trump tweeted claiming credit for the isolation of Qatar shortly after the Gulf states broke off diplomatic ties.
Mixed signals from US
While Trump claimed credit for Qatar’s isolation, the Pentagon made it clear that there were no plans to move the US Central Command air base in Qatar which has 100 aircraft and 11,000 military personnel. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former CEO of Exxon Mobile, on June 9 called for an early resolution of the crisis through talks and urged Qatar to do more to stop the funding of terrorism. Trump meanwhile later on the same day publicly reiterated his support to King Salman and said nothing about an early resolution of the crisis through talks. The mixed signals might be deliberate, or more likely, a reflection of the inherent incoherence of the Trump Administration.
Cyber war against Qatar
The Qatar News Agency (QNA) on May 23 carried a story, later deleted, that the Emir of Qatar, while speaking at a military graduation ceremony, had flagged tensions with the Trump administration, and that Qatar had good relations with Israel, praised Iran as a strong Islamic power and reiterated that Hamas deserved support. The hacked twitter account of the Qatari Foreign Minister spoke of plans to withdraw ambassadors from Egypt and elsewhere. The KSA and UAE dismissed the Qatari claim that the QNA had been hacked, despite two teams from the US and the UK concluding that the hacking operation might have started in April.
Qatar’s response
After the initial shock as a result of the cutting off of diplomatic ties, Qatar has reacted with a degree of sobriety and calmness. It has not taken any retaliatory action against KSA and others. Egypt has 300,000 of its nationals in Qatar. Though Egypt’s air space is closed to Qatar, the Egyptians in Qatar have not been expelled. Qatar has been in touch with Turkey, Iran, Germany and Russia. Turkey’s Parliament passed a resolution authorizing the government to send troops to Qatar where a Turkish base has been under construction for a while. Arrangements have been made for food items to come from Iran and Turkey. Denied entry into the airspace of its neighbours, Qatar Airways planes now fly over Iran and Turkey.
Roots of the confrontation
Essentially, Riyadh resents Qatar’s independent foreign policy. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Al Jazeera, the popular channel owned by Qatar, is the bete noire. Qatar’s only land border is with Saudi Arabia. In 1992, there was a clash at the border and two Qatari soldiers were killed. In 2002, Riyadh recalled its ambassador from Doha over critical coverage of KSA by Al Jazeera. The ambassador returned only in 2008.
In August 2013, when Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani took over as the Emir of Qatar, Riyadh had hoped that there would be a change in Qatar’s policy. The expected change did not happen and in March 2014, KSA, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew ambassadors, who were sent back in December of the same year. At that time, Qatar had entered into long bilateral negotiations and might have given certain assurances. It is evident therefore that the issue is not the ‘funding of terrorism’, but Qatar’s support to Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and Al Jazeera’s coverage of KSA among other policies that has attracted the ire of the KSA and UAE.
There is also the suspicion in Riyadh that Qatar is getting too close to Iran. However, Riyadh cannot realistically expect Qatar to join it in a confrontation with Iran for the simple reason that Qatar and Iran share the gas field South Pars, the largest in the world. A look at the map shows that if blockaded by KSA, the only way Qatar can be in touch with the rest of the world is through Iran.
India’s stance
India wants harmony and stability in the region. There are 8 million Indians in the GCC and their remittances home at about $36 billion is of great importance to India. The country further imports about 75 per cent of its hydrocarbon requirements from the GCC. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a press release on June 10 urged all parties to ‘resolve their differences through a process of constructive dialogue and peaceful negotiations based on well-established international principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries’. The MEA further stated that ‘international terrorism, violent extremism and religious intolerance pose grave threat not only to regional stability but also to the global peace and order and must be confronted by all countries in a coordinated and comprehensive manner’.
How will the crisis end?
A few scenarios can be envisaged:
Qatar agrees to align its foreign policy with that of Riyadh and to rein in Al Jazeera. This is most unlikely.
Kuwait manages to bring out a compromise saving face for all parties. This is probable.
Qatar has reached out to Iran and Turkey to reduce the inconveniences arising out of the diplomatic and economic blockade by its three GCC neighbours. This policy could be strengthened in the near future.
The blockade seriously affects the functioning of the Central Command’s air base at Al Udeid. The US steps in and promotes a compromise. This is highly probable.
The GCC has discussed plans to have a common currency and common defence forces. It is an important contributor to regional stability and harmony. A prolonged confrontation can hurt the GCC and the wider region. The GCC should treat the crisis as an opportunity and fortify its internal coherence. The well-wishers of the GCC including India should help out in the process.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), India-GCC Relations, Qatar, Cyber Warfare, United States of America (USA)
India’s record in wind energy development is good. But the existing technology is fast becoming outdated. Evolving technologies like kite wind should therefore be considered.
Despite the focus on developing solar energy, wind energy in India has seen steady development in the last decade. With 32,279.77 MW of installed wind generation capacity (compared to 12,288.83 MW of solar power), India is one of the leading generators of wind energy worldwide. Yet, due to certain constraints, and more recently the more competitive rates in solar energy, there are concerns that the share of wind energy may decline. No doubt, unlike non-storage solar energy, wind turbines are not affected by night and day. However, generation of electricity depends on both the season and geographical location. Besides, wind farms require massive areas of land. In India, wind turbines produce 70 to 80 per cent of their generation in a span of six months. Moreover, to calculate the annual kilowatt per hour (kWh) produced from a turbine, one has to calculate the estimated number of hours of wind at a certain height as well as its speed. On an average, in India, the plant load factor (PLF) is only around 20 to 30 per cent. Hence, with a 25 per cent PLF, a 1.5 MW turbine would produce around 3,285,000 kWh in a year. Below a wind speed of around 30 mph, however, the amount of energy generated would be quite small.1
The government has announced that its target for wind energy generation by 2022 is 60,000 MW. Harnessing this potential will require huge investments as well as the requisite land. However, this problem may be resolvable through the use of a new technology – scores of kites to generate wind energy. This technology is believed to not only cut the cost of generating wind energy but also enhance the efficiency quotient. Although several companies are working on different models, the basic idea is to locate the kites, which are essentially light and controllable aerodynamic flying devices, in a formation at heights of around 750 metres and more in order to harvest the strong and consistent winds available in that region of the atmosphere (wind velocity at those heights is twice that at the ground level) and thus generate low-cost energy.2
The system is operated in periodic pumping cycles, alternating between reel-out and reel-in of the lines attached to the kite and the drum on the ground. During the traction phase, the kite is flown in a figure-eight-like pattern and pulls on the tether lines, which are used to transmit power from the kite to the ground as the lines unroll from large drums coupled to electric drives used as generators. When the kite reaches the end of the line extension, the electric drives are driven in reverse to pull in the kite. Once the kite is brought down to the lowest height, a new traction phase commences. By depowering the kite during the passive phase, less energy is used to pull in the kite than is extracted from the wind during the traction phase, resulting in net power generation. During reel-out, the kite flies in figure-eight manoeuvers at high speeds of 70 to 90 km/h, creating a high traction force which is converted into electricity by the drum and the connected generator. Once the kite reaches the maximum height, it is de-powered by releasing the steering lines so that the whole wing rotates and aligns with the wind. Using the drum/generator module as a winch, the kite is then pulled back to the initial position to start the next pumping cycle. De-powering reduces the traction force during reel-in by 80 per cent, thereby allowing less energy to be consumed as against the energy generated during the reel-out cycle. A crucial element of the technology is the automatic control and synchronisation of the drum/generator module and the flight dynamics of the kite.3 Once the descent is complete, the kite is allowed to climb once more, where it generates electricity once again. This allows these kites to be more efficient than traditional wind turbines.4
According to some estimates, the cost of generation from these kites could be around 50 to 60 per cent less than from traditional wind farms, both on- and off-shore. Moreover, these kite power systems can be flexible. As modular, small-scale power production plants, they can be applied to single houses, for autonomous electricity production as well as for remote areas and villages not yet connected to the power grid. At the same time, they can also serve as huge power plants generating several megawatts and even gigawatts. For example, an Italian firm, KiteGen, has developed a prototype with a capacity for producing 27 MW of peak power.5
The concept has been in existence for a while, and several private companies are involved in developing this technology, particularly European firms such as Swiss Kite Power, Altaeroes Energies, Ampyx Power, KiteGen, SkySails and Minesto. The UK government has been the first to give the green light to launch the country’s first kite power plant by awarding a contract for that purpose to Kite Power Systems (KPS). Interestingly, the funding for KPS has been jointly provided by Shell and the Department of Energy and Climate Change.6 KPS has successfully tested a 40 KW version, while the testing of a 500 KW version will commence in July/August in Scotland. It is also working on a 3 MW version with the aim of eventually ramping it up to 6 MW.7 The UK hopes to supply power to more than 5000 homes by 2020 through these giant kites.8 If successful, these kite farms could replace offshore wind turbines.
Some of the advantages kite power systems have over conventional turbines include negligible noise emission and bird hits, near invisibility, and ability to withstand storms. Moreover, they do not need huge concrete foundations and tonnes of steel for the tower and the blades. As a result, they do not require scarce metals or rare earth elements like neodymium for the magnet in a wind power plant, thereby making them far more environment-friendly than their conventional counterparts.9 Wind kites also require less power to operate.
Nevertheless, some technical issues will have to be resolved before these kites can replace traditional turbines. A major challenge is lightning, which could damage the small computer placed inside the kite. Furthermore, given the height at which the kites would be flying, the location of these wind farms will have to be carefully planned so as not to interfere with or hamper the flight paths of aeroplanes.
Although India is no longer deemed power-deficient, it is by no means energy secure as millions of people do not have access to grid connections. As connectivity increases, the demand for power will surge. Moreover, initiatives like Make in India, Power for All Campaign for total rural electrification by the end of 2017, and the drive to ramp up the use of electric vehicles in place of fossil fuel-based vehicles, among others, will see a quantum jump in energy consumption. While evolving solar technology can fill some of the gap, the government should also look at other new energy technologies across the energy spectrum to meet its energy generation target. India’s record in wind energy development is good. But the existing technology is fast becoming outdated. Evolving technologies like kite wind should therefore be considered.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Changes in the SCOMET List: What it means for the Indian Defence Industry
Laxman Kumar Behera, G. Balachandran
June 08, 2017
The formal inclusion of the Munitions List within the SCOMET framework explicitly brings the defence industry under the purview of India’s global commitment to non-proliferation.
India has recently announced a revised list of controlled items whose export is regulated. The revised list, which comes into effect from May 1, 2017, is part of “India’s International commitments and obligations in the field of non-proliferation.” The list has an impact on the domestic defence industry, which is slowly but steadily gaining a foothold under the Make in India programme.
Changes in the SCOMET List
The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), vide Notification No. 5 dated April 24, 2017, has issued a revised list of what in Indian parlance is known as SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and Technologies) items, whose export is either prohibited or permitted under an explicit authorisation. The revised list of items is part of India’s larger commitment to non-proliferation as enshrined in various laws, particularly the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010. The revised list is also part of India’s efforts to harmonise its list of controlled items with those of the four multilateral export control regimes: Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Australia Group. India is already a member of the MTCR besides being an adherent to NSG Guidelines. The latest revised list reflects not only the updated list of controlled items of the first two regimes but also of the latter which India wishes to join as a member.
In comparison to the previous SCOMET list which had eight categories, the revised list has nine broad categories, with each category containing an exhaustive list of items, running into over 200 pages. Category 8, the newly added one, has been included for the purpose of harmonising India’s list of dual use items with that of the WA. The nine categories of the revised SCOMET list are:
Category 0: Nuclear material, nuclear-related other materials, equipment and technology
Category 1: Toxic chemical agent and other chemicals
Category 2: Micro-organism, toxins
Category 3: Material, materials processing equipment, and related technologies
Category 4: Nuclear-related other equipment, assemblies and components; test and production equipment; and related technology, not controlled under category 0
Category 5: Aerospace systems, equipment including production and test equipment, related technology and specially designed components and accessories thereof
Category 6: Munitions List
Category 7: Electronics, computers, and information technology including information security
Category 8: Special materials and related equipment, material processing, electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and propulsion
Implications for the Indian Defence Industry
From the defence industry’s point of view, Category 6 (Munitions List), which was hitherto ‘reserved’, is the most relevant as the export of any items listed under the category would be controlled as per the new guidelines. It is, however, to be noted that, although the SCOMET list has included munitions items for the first time, a somewhat similar list was earlier available outside the SCOMET framework in the form of the list of Military Stores notified by the DGFT. With the formal inclusion of munitions items in the SCOMET list, the previous Military Stores list now stands withdrawn. This apart, the list of Munitions items, is much more comprehensive and in line with the munition items covered in the WA list. In comparison to 17 broad categories that the previous Military Stores list had, the munitions list now has 22 categories.
Export of SCOMET List items with the exception of Category 1A chemicals (which are also part of Munitions List’s Category 6A007.b) are permitted under an export licence authorisation to be provided by the competent authorities. With certain exceptions, the export licensing authority for munitions items is the Department of Defence Production (DDP), which was also the licensing authority for the previous military stores items. The DDP’s grant of export licence is governed by the Standard Operation Procedure (SOP), which has been revised to reflect the Munitions List and India’s commitment to non-proliferation. The revised SOP divides the whole procedure into six parts (as opposed to five parts in the previous SOP), with the inclusion of a dedicated part for the export authorisation of technology and software related to munitions items. The six parts are:
Part A: Export of select Munitions List items (mostly consisting of lethal items but excluding components and accessories)
Part B: Export of Munitions List items other than those covered in Part A
Part C: Export of Munitions List of Items for exhibition purposes
Part D: Export of Munitions List items for testing and evaluation
Part E: In-principle approval for Munitions List items for participation in Tenders/RFP [Request for Proposal]/NIT [Notice Inviting Tender]
Part F: Approval for transfer of technology/software for design, development, manufacturing, training, maintenance services, upgrade and overhaul of Munitions List items
Like in the previous SOP, the revised SOP also stipulates the standard conditions pertaining to multi-agency stakeholder consultation and end-use certification for the grant of export authorisation (see Table below). The consultation of stakeholders – who include representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the concerned armed force, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Planning and International Cooperation (PIC) Wing of the MoD and other concerned agencies – is mandatory for all items figuring in Parts A and F, whereas consultation with the MEA is mandatory only for items whose export destination is a country that figures in the MEA’s ‘negative list’.
Table: End Use and Stakeholder Consultation Requirements for Export Authorisation of Munitions List Items
EUC
Stakeholders Consultation
Part-A (Lethal Items)
Mandatory. EUC to be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Mandatory
Part-B (Components & Accessories)
Mandatory. EUC may not be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Consultation with MEA only if the export is intended to a country which features in the MEA’s ‘negative list’
Part-C (Exhibition)
Mandatory. EUC may not be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Required for Part A items. For Part-B items, consultation with MEA only if the export is intended to a country which features in the MEA’s ‘negative list’
Part-D (Testing & Evaluation)
Mandatory. EUC may not be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Required for Part A items. For Part-B items, consultation with MEA only if the export is intended to a country which features in the MEA’s ‘negative list’
Part-E (Tender/RFP/NIT)
Mandatory. EUC may not be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Required for Part A items. For Part-B items, consultation with MEA only if the export is intended to a country which features in the MEA’s ‘negative list’
Part-F (Software & Technology)
Mandatory. EUC to be signed and stamped by the government of the end-user country
Mandatory
A Caution for the Defence Industry
The formal inclusion of the Munitions List within the SCOMET framework explicitly brings the defence industry under the purview of India’s global commitment to non-proliferation. The defence industry is now expected to play the game by the rules set forth in various laws, including the provision of ‘catch-all control’ that prohibits anybody from exporting any material, equipment or technology knowing that such export could be used for weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. Any violation of laws will attract penalties ranging from suspension or cancellation of licence to punishment ranging from six months to life imprisonment.
The defence industry also needs to exercise caution in identifying the correct category in which an item intended for export falls. There may be a possibility of a few items figuring in both the Munitions List and one of other categories of the SCOMET List. For the defence industry, the key to decide category jurisdiction of an item is the end-use of the intended export. If the ultimate end use is for military purpose, then the category jurisdiction is the Munitions List; otherwise, other relevant category would apply. This simple understanding of category jurisdiction would save the industry crucial time in processing of export authorisation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The decision to target Qatar clearly indicates that the region is now divided into two camps and that the Arab Gulf countries are in no mood to accept neutral players.
The news that Saudi Arabia along with UAE, Bahrain and Egypt have severed diplomatic ties with Qatar over the latter’s alleged support for Islamist groups and sympathetic attitude towards Iran and its proxies may have come as a surprise. But the crisis has been in the making for long. UAE and Qatar have been on a collision course for a long time over Qatar’s patronisation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. For its part, Egypt under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has resented Qatar’s support for former President Mohammed Morsi. Cairo and Doha had a serious spat in 2014 over what Egyptian authorities termed as incitement of unrest in Egypt by Qatari backed media, especially the Al-Jazeera network. The crisis had led to the three GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain—and Egypt recalling their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. The matter could be resolved only through Omani and Kuwaiti mediation and persistent Saudi pressure leading to the closure of Al-Jazeera’s Arabic language Egyptian broadcast Mubasher Misr in December 2014.
Saudi Arabia’s problem with Qatar is more layered and complex, and involves three major contentious issues. Firstly, Saudi Arabia resents Qatar’s sympathetic attitude towards Iran and its regional ambitions and Iranian proxies especially Hezbollah. The Kingdom sees the Islamic Republic as the primary force behind regional instability and internal tensions in many countries including Bahrain, Yemen and in its own Eastern Province. Riyadh has on several occasions accused Tehran of meddling in internal affairs of regional countries and provoking sectarian strife in the region. This was most recently visible during President Donald Trump’s Riyadh visit when he singled out Iran as the regional rogue state behind the widespread turmoil in the Middle East. Though Qatar has significant economic contacts with Iran – they share the Pars gas field, which Qatar resumed developing in April 2017 – it has taken a neutral stance on Saudi-Iran tensions. Riyadh interprets this stance as an indication of Doha’s soft-corner for Tehran. The disclosure of the alleged remarks made by Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani on May 25 during an address to a military graduation ceremony sympathising with Iran and terming it as a legitimate regional player only confirmed this for Riyadh.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia, especially under King Salman, has despised Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other ‘moderate’ Islamist groups. Saudi-Brotherhood relations had worsened in the late 1990s, with Riyadh beginning to see the Brotherhood’s brand of Islam as dangerous and akin to questioning the monarchical system. Earlier, the Kingdom had shared good relations with the Brotherhood for a long time and had provided safe haven for exiled Egyptian Brothers. But because of growing internal criticism from the Sahwa (awakening) movement—a Brotherhood-inspired Saudi Islamist group—and others, Saudi authorities began a crackdown on the Sahwis and most members were either incarcerated or had to go into exile. After this, Doha remained the only Arab Gulf capital to continue patronising the Muslim Brotherhood. Though King Abdullah, after assuming power in 2005, had tried to accommodate some of the remnants of the Brotherhood inspired groups, the wave of Arab uprisings in 2011, popularly termed as Arab Spring, changed the dynamics and led to the Kingdom’s adoption of a zero-tolerance attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates or inspired groups including the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas.
Thirdly, Saudi Arabia sees Qatar’s independent foreign policy as problematic. Qatar wishes to play a larger regional role and has carved out an independent foreign policy through mediation in regional conflicts, especially in extending support to the Islamist faction in the Palestinian national movement, that is, Hamas. It also took a pro-Morsi stance during the 2013 crisis in Egypt which was at odds with the Saudi and Emirati support for the removal of Morsi. Even in Syria, Doha had adopted an independent policy of supporting the ‘moderate Islamist’ groups along with Ankara when Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries were supporting the ‘secular’ opposition. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Doha following an independent and parallel foreign policy weakens the Arab Gulf position in regional politics and strengthens the Iranian position. In addition, the Qatari use of the Al-Jazeera network to criticise regional governments is seen as undermining the legitimacy and authority of the Gulf monarchies. This had created problems between Riyadh and Doha in the past. For example, in 2002, Saudi Arabia had recalled its ambassador from Doha after overt criticism of the Abdullah Peace Plan offering Arab normalisation of ties with Israel in exchange for peace with Palestine. At the same time, Doha not following a coordinated foreign policy stance becomes a prestige issue for Riyadh. Qatar wishes to emerge from the shadows of its larger neighbour and a resentful Saudi Arabia views it as an undermining of its own regional standing.
Even the current crisis emanates from the complex relations shared by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. The Saudi Press Agency statement of June 5 declaring the severing of diplomatic ties and closure of all land, sea and air transit to and from Qatar made it clear that the decision was taken as a result of Doha’s persistent overt and covert support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian proxies as well as for using the media to instigate internal strife in neighbouring countries. Hence, the collective move is aimed at putting pressure on Doha to abandon its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, scale down the media criticism of internal matters of neighbouring countries and end the sympathetic approach towards Iran.
Though Doha’s early reaction has been measured, it has rejected claims made by Riyadh and others as “allegations” and the move as “unjustified.” A Qatari cabinet statement termed the severing of ties as pressure tactics on “Qatar to abandon its national decision-making and sovereignty.” A statement from the Qatari foreign ministry termed the “allegations” against Doha as without any basis. In a media interaction, Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani raised questions about the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council, showing that Doha might not be cowed down by pressure. Qatar has received support from Tehran and Ankara which latter have urged the parties involved to resolve the crisis through dialogue and in a peaceful manner instead of resorting to punitive measures. Nevertheless, Doha will find it difficult to endure the isolation because of its possible economic cost and adverse impacts on its gas exports and foreign trade. The move to isolate Qatar, the largest exporter of natural gas and an important OPEC member, might also have ramifications for the international energy market.
The timing of the move is significant as it comes two weeks after Trump’s Riyadh visit. Trump has tweeted his support for the move to isolate Qatar underlining that the US was in the know of the plans. The decision to target Qatar clearly indicates that the region is now divided into two camps and that the Arab Gulf countries are in no mood to accept neutral players. Kuwaiti efforts to mediate have proved futile so far and indicates that the escalation was orchestrated with a plan to not leave any room for Qatar to manoeuvre without conceding to the demands. The crisis can lead to Doha either substantially curtailing its foreign policy activism, thus aligning with the Arab Gulf, or it can be the beginning of the disintegration of the GCC. The problem is reflective of a larger regional crisis facing the Middle East and indicates a further sharpening of regional faultlines.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab Spring
In December 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry revealed that Russia was engaging in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.
In December 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry revealed that Russia was engaging in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The announcement, which coincided with US moves to reduce troop presence in the country and transfer security control to Afghan forces, caught the world by surprise.1 2016 saw a sudden increase in the Taliban’s offensive attacks and its establishment of control over more territory than during the past decade and a half.2
Subsequently, in April 2017, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, accused Russia of providing weapons to the Taliban.3 This was the first time a senior US commander made such allegations regarding Russian support to the Taliban. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov termed the allegations ‘unprofessional and groundless’ and charged that it was an attempt to ‘put the blame for Washington’s failures in Afghanistan [on Russia]’.4 Russia, in turn, accused the US of supporting Islamic State operatives in Afghanistan.5 Even earlier, in 2016, the head of the Asia and West Asian department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Zamir Kabulov, had stated, ‘It is some miracle that Taliban leaders who wouldn’t cooperate with Islamic State in Afghanistan tend to be hit by American airstrikes. And those who do are being left alone’.6
While these accusations and counter-accusations reflect Cold-War rhetoric, it is important to understand why Russia has begun to engage with the Taliban and what its aims in Afghanistan are in the foreseeable future. Even though Russia’s links with the Taliban are purported to have begun around 2007, renewed attention was focused on such links from 2014 onwards after the West, led by the US, imposed sanctions on Russia in the wake of Crimea voting to become a part of Russia. The counter-pressure from the Russian side was bound to be generated. The open declaration of Russian assistance to the Taliban can be read as an effort to gain a bargaining position vis-à-vis Washington to extract concessions on the Crimean issue.7
Moreover, many in Russia consider the US presence in its neighbourhood as a latent threat.8 They view the US ‘war on terror’ as a smokescreen and allege that the major American objective is to maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan in order to keep a check on Russia, Pakistan, China and Iran at the same time. Many analysts and officials see the US intentionally trying to prolong the conflict for its own strategic interests and using the Islamic State as a proxy to counter these countries.9 The Russians therefore might be very keen to lend assistance to the Taliban in order to increase US casualties and thus force a US withdrawal. This would pave the way for a resurgent Moscow to increase its influence beyond Central Asia in Afghanistan and Pakistan, besides being involved in West Asia.10
Another factor for the Russian involvement could be the need to tackle the growing menace of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Moscow takes very seriously Islamic State statements threatening attacks against its interests, especially in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian airliner in Egypt and the more recent St. Petersburg metro bombings which have been attributed to the group. Further, Russia’s support to the Assad government in Syria is also bound to attract the wrath of the Islamic State.
Russia is therefore worried that if there is a growth of Islamic State influence in Afghanistan, there is a possibility of radicalisation taking place on a larger scale in the former Soviet Central Asian states. This would then make the Russian underbelly vulnerable to increased cross border terrorist attacks. Another major worry for Moscow is that many ex-Taliban combatants have switched allegiance to the Islamic State and moreover many Islamic State recruits are Central Asians as well as Russians. Given all this, the Taliban is naturally seen as an emerging ally for Russia.
Many analysts further note that Russia is aligning with the Taliban to control the menace of drugs, specifically opium. These drugs are consumed in Russia on a large scale and they are transported through the country for further consumption in Europe.11 It is also a fact, however, that proceeds from the drug trade are a major source of funding for the Taliban. Finally, the most important reason for the Russian engagement with the Taliban could be not to miss the chance of shaping the political scenario in Afghanistan if and when the Americans leave.12 Moscow may possibly be hoping that the Taliban, which is seen as more of a nationalist movement in contrast to the radical Islamist character of the Islamic State, would help secure the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan, as reiterated by one ex-Taliban leader, Syed Mohammad Akbar Agha.13
Notwithstanding all this, it may be better for Russia to consolidate its links with the Taliban only after the latter enters the political mainstream and severs connections with all terrorist organisations. Otherwise, Russia would stand guilty of supporting a terrorist group, akin to what the US did in the 1980s to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen as to what extent the ‘red-line’ approach accepted in the Moscow six-party talks in February 2017 would be followed by the Kremlin. That approach indicated that the Taliban must give up violence, abide by Afghanistan’s constitution and break links with other terrorist organisations.14 The Russian engagement with the Taliban has created new dynamics, the repercussions of which will be felt in the region and beyond.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The main objective would be for Modi and Trump to come on the same page on key issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, South China Sea and the future of climate change.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to the United States at the invitation of President Donald Trump on June 25-26, 2017. This will be the first meeting between the two leaders although they have had telephonic conversations on three earlier occasions. These interactions have created a suitable atmosphere for Modi's visit.
National Security Adviser (NSA) AK Doval visited Washington DC twice, and Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar thrice, since Trump's election to establish contacts with their counterparts and other senior officials. Jaishankar will be travelling to Washington DC again on June 21 to flesh out the deliverables of this crucial Modi-Trump meeting.
In the reverse direction, the American NSA, General HR McMaster, visited New Delhi to confer with Indian leaders about the security situation in South Asia and particularly Afghanistan. He also called on Prime Minister Modi.
The press Statement issued by the White House on June 12, 2017 announcing Prime Minister Modi's visit states that discussions to strengthen ties and advance common priorities relating to fighting terrorism, promoting economic growth and reforms will take place. Mention is also made of ''expanding security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.''
Modi’s visit is being looked at with a little hope, considerable apprehension and some enthusiasm. Trump is about to complete five months of his tenure. Since he is a new-comer to office and has not held any government or public office so far, his views and positions on a large number of international and foreign policy issues are not known. What has become increasingly clear over the last months is that Trump continues to be unpredictable, impulsive and temperamental; he is prone to change his positions very quickly; he lacks a strategic view of the world; he tends to reduce all relations to transactional, economic terms, and is prone to launch into outbursts on the basis of specious data.
The focus of Modi’s forthcoming visit will be to build a personal rapport and a working relationship with Trump. The main objective would be for Modi and Trump to come on the same page on key issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, South China Sea and the future of climate change. While Modi will raise India’s concerns over H-1B visas, the essential goal would be to establish a comfort level and understanding with Trump and his establishment on issues of key and critical concern. It will be a challenge for Modi to enrol Trump as a staunch and unwavering supporter of stronger India-US partnership. But it is a matter of satisfaction that barring Trump’s eruption on June 1, 2017 when he made a scathing attack on India (and China) for demanding ‘’billions and billions and billions of dollars’’ for meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Trump has had positive things to say about India and Modi.
On the bilateral front, defence will be an important subject. Considering the fact that Trump prefers to operate on a transactional basis, it would seem appropriate for some major defence acquisitions to be announced during Modi’s visit. The United States has emerged as India’s second largest defence supplier, next only to Russia, with orders worth USD 16 billion in the kitty. Progressive manufacture in, and transfer of technology to, India should be woven into the defence procurements that are announced. Indian companies have also decided to import 250 civilian aircraft from Being Aerospace. This should create more than 25,000 jobs in America, which should be gratifying for Trump.
The question of H1B visas to Indian professionals is likely to come up. Modi could refer to the role of skilled Indian talent in enriching the American economy and society and urge that the US develop a reflective, balanced and farsighted perspective on the movement of skilled professionals. It should be remembered that the India-US partnership is not a single-issue relationship and bilateral ties should not be viewed only through the prism of the H1B visa issue. Modi should apprise Trump about the creation of jobs in the United States by Indian investments. Trump should be disabused of the idea that it is a one-way street.
Some of the most consequential discussions can be expected to take place on US policies regarding China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Trump’s views on dealing with China have not crystallised. His position has swung from one end to the other. He has already created a vacuum by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, leaving the way open for China to expand its presence. By reneging on the Paris Climate Change Agreement, he has allowed China to assume a leadership position on this vital issue. A comprehensive, long-term understanding on strategies to deal with China’s aggressive and hegemonic rise should be reached. Relations with Japan, North Korea, South China Sea, China’s Belt Road Initiative and its increasing forays in the Indian Ocean can be expected to be in focus during the Modi-Trump discussions.
Little clarity has emerged on Trump's strategy to deal with the spectre of international terrorism and the worsening situation in Afghanistan. A well thought-through strategy to deal with Pakistan’s persistent support for terrorist forces needs to be worked out. Also, greater attention needs to be given to ensuring stability and security in Afghanistan.
During the visit, Prime Minister Modi will use the opportunity to meet and share views with other interlocutors like the two Houses of the US Congress where India enjoys huge support, with the business community, and the Indian diaspora. All these deliberations will send a powerful message to President Trump and his administration about the vigorous and wide-spread enthusiasm that exists for India and the India-US partnership in the US political system, business community and society.
The success of the visit will be gauged by the commitment to bilateral ties that Modi is able to get from Trump. His task would be to get Trump’s recognition that a strong, stable and prosperous India is in America’s own interest. Although no big bang announcements are expected at this stage, one can be cautiously optimistic of a mutually beneficial outcome.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While Uruguay has been able to preserve the combat capability of its armed forces despite budgetary restrictions, it remains to be seen whether this can continue without substantial infusions of money for capital acquisitions.
Uruguay, a small nation of some 176,215 square kilometre with a population of a mere 3,493,000, is a relatively prosperous country with a high per capita income of some USD 16,000 per annum in nominal terms.1 The country is a stable, liberal democracy with strong democratic institutions and one of the least politicised military establishments in the region. However, even that military felt itself compelled to usurp political power in 1973 after the outbreak of urban terrorism, perpetrated by the Tupamaro guerrillas which had its roots among the disillusioned middle-class youth adversely affected by a declining economic situation.2De facto military rule through civilian puppet governments lasted until 1984 when a peaceful transition of power took place. Since then, the military has remained apolitical, the guerrillas being successfully contained.
Nowadays, the country’s armed forces are perhaps best known for being among the highest – if not the highest – per capita contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.3 However, the country’s military, which is almost unique among the larger South American militaries in being composed entirely of volunteers, has been a pioneer of inclusive policies. Not only has discrimination against the enlistment of homosexuals been eliminated, but the recruitment of women has also been encouraged, to the extent that 25 per cent of the country’s armed forces are female with no restriction on their serving in combat roles.4 Yet, despite these progressive social policies, the Uruguayan armed forces, like so many in the region, have had to struggle to maintain combat capabilities in the face of limited budgets which hover around 1.9 to 2.5 per cent of GDP.5
Fortunately, Uruguay faces neither an external threat nor any internal unrest that is beyond the ability of the 27,000 strong National Police to handle. To date, despite some incidents of corruption, the country’s law-enforcement and legal institutions have shown themselves equal to the task.6 However, the country does face the challenge posed by narco-traffickers who make use of Montevideo’s port as well as the country’s porous borders with Argentina and Brazil. While not a grower of cocaine, Uruguay is a trans-shipment hub and its rate of cocaine consumption is the third highest in the region after Chile and Argentina.7 Though the country’s National Police have thus far performed well, the armed forces have added their expertise to the counter-narcotics effort, with the Air Force in particular playing an important role in airspace monitoring.
The Uruguayan Army
Uruguay’s army has some 14,000 personnel and, compared to that of neighbouring Paraguay, is heavily mechanised. Organised into four “divisions” (in reality, brigade sized formations), the army is relatively well-equipped compared to the other two services and has been able to sustain its combat capabilities with infusions of overhauled second-hand systems from a variety of sources reflecting a deliberate effort to diversify the sources of weapons supply.
The country is divided into four Military Regions, each garrisoned by a nominal division – 1st Division HQ Montevideo, 2nd Division HQ San Jose, 3rd Division HQ Tacuarembo and 4th Division HQ Minas – and each of which consists of a single infantry brigade of three battalions, one or more cavalry regiments, an artillery group and supporting engineering, medical and logistical elements.8 This basic organisational structure has remained unchanged since the 1980s.
In cavalry regiments, pride of place is occupied by a force of 15 Israeli T-55 rebuilds, known as the Ti-67 Tiran, acquired in 1997. The Tiran is a modification of captured T-55 tanks and is equipped with 105 mm L7 main guns and updated fire control systems. These vehicles are augmented by a force of 47 locally and Brazilian modernized M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, re-equipped with 90 mm guns.9 A batch of 25 Brazilian M-41s was acquired in 2013 to replace an ageing force of M-24 Chaffee light tanks which had been delivered in 1957.10
While neither the Ti-67s nor the M-41s are new vehicles, they present Uruguay with a potent armoured force, augmented by a force of EE-9 Cascavel armoured cars and a substantial fleet of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) which include 15 BMP-1s obtained from the Czech Republic, 140 MOWAG Piranhas from Canada and 130 Czech OT-93s operating alongside older M113s and Condor 1 APCs.
Artillery support is modest, with four dozen M101 105 mm howitzers acquired from the Republic of Korea in 1981 together with eight M114 155 mm howitzers. These assets are augmented by eight M102 105 mm howitzers acquired in 1972 and six 2S1 Gvodzika 122 mm self-propelled howitzers purchased from the Czech Republic in 1998. Anti-aircraft capability is even more modest with only fourteen 20 mm guns in service, although eight twin TCM-20 anti-aircraft guns are radar directed with Elta M-2016 radars.11
The Uruguayan Navy
Uruguay’s Navy has approximately 5,700 personnel and operates a fleet of second-hand vessels that will soon be in dire need of either major overhauls or replacement. The most “modern” assets, delivered in 2008, are two class frigates obtained from Portugal. These ships – ROU 01 Uruguay (ex-Comandante João Belo) and ROU 02 Comandante Pedro Campbell (ex-Comandante Sacadura Cabral) – had entered Portuguese service in 1967 and 1969, respectively, making the vessels nearly 50 years old at present.12 These vessels replaced three Commandant Rivière class vessels obtained from France between 1988 and 1991. But they had relatively short lives in Uruguayan service owing to chronic serviceability problems. It is of interest to note that the MM.38 Exocet missiles, normally fitted to the João Belo class while in Portuguese service, do not appear to have been transferred to Uruguay.
That these vessels are the most modern in the Uruguayan fleet is indicative of the vintage of the rest of the navy. Three Kondor-II-class minesweepers, formerly of the former East German Navy, and two Cape-class patrol boats, formerly of the US Coast Guard, round out the navy’s modest combat assets, serving alongside a small force of survey ships, river patrol craft and search and rescue vessels.13
Uruguay’s maritime patrol assets have declined in quality and quantity since the decommissioning of its fleet of Grumman S-2G Tracker anti-submarine aircraft in 2001. Now, two Beechcraft B-200T Super King Air fill the maritime patrol role, augmented by a BAE Systems Jetstream T2 and five helicopters.14 The Uruguayan air force supplements these assets with four CASA C-212-200M for maritime patrol and search and rescue.
The Uruguayan Air Force
The 3000 strong Uruguayan Air Force (FAU) is organised into three Air Brigades:
Air Brigade I
No. 3 Squadron (Transport)
No. 5 Squadron (Helicopters)
Air Brigade II
No. 1 Squadron (Attack)
No. 2 Squadron (Fighters)
The Advanced Training Squadron
Air Brigade III
No. 7 Squadron (Observation & Liaison)
As can be seen, Nos. 3, 5 and 7 Squadrons operate the transport (6 aircraft), helicopters (12), and observation and liaison (11) assets of the force. Twelve Aermacchi SF-260 training aircraft fulfil the basic training role. Combat assets, such as they are, are concentrated in the three squadrons of Air Brigade II. These were once reasonably potent when the FAU operated Lockheed F-80, T-33 and Cessna A-37 jet aircraft.15
However, over the past 36 years, the Argentine FMA IA.58 Pucara spearheaded the FAU, with six aircraft on strength with No. 1 Squadron (Attack). The type served with distinction as a potent counter to narcotics trafficking flights. Unfortunately, the Pucara became increasingly difficult to maintain and on March 17, 2017, the type was retired from service, effectively halving the dedicated combat assets of the force.16 The aircraft was highly regarded in FAU service and no replacement is in sight.17
A force of up to 12 Cessna A-37s in No. 2 Squadron (Fighters) forms the core of the FAU combat force, augmented by five weapons-capable Pilatus PC-7 combat capable training aircraft with the Advanced Training Squadron.18 The former type has been reinforced by replacement aircraft and spares from Ecuador to keep the squadron at a sustainable level.19
Despite the infusion of aircraft and components from Ecuador, spares problems and maintenance issues also affect the A-37s, with the loss of an aircraft in August 2016.20 Protestations from the FAU as to the airworthiness of the aircraft did little to ease concerns.21 This is especially true of the ejection seats used on the aircraft, and the FAU sought the assistance of Martin-Baker’s Argentine subsidiary to replace the ejection seats.22 In addition, the FAU has contracted with ENAER of Chile to repair the engines of the type in the hopes of prolonging the service life of the aircraft.23
Yet, the FAU is only prolonging the inevitable. Repairing ageing assets may be practical in the short-term, but it is inevitable that replacements for the A-37 and the now-decommissioned Pucara need to be found. China has offered its Hongdu L-15 advanced trainer for the role and the FAU has expressed interest in the type.24 However, no contracts have been signed and it is questionable as to whether the Uruguayan government will make the necessary funds available to facilitate such a purchase. Uruguay had previously shown interest in procuring 10 former Swiss-Air Force Northrop F-5E/Fs, but no deal for the same has materialised and the A-37s soldier on with numbers set to decrease as the years progress.
Conclusion
Uruguay has enjoyed a period of both political and relative economic stability for a number of decades since the transition to civilian rule in 1984. However, this has never translated into lavish budgets for the armed forces. Uruguay maintains what is effectively an arsenal of second-hand weapons systems. While undoubtedly more modern than the antiquated assets of neighbouring Paraguay, Uruguay’s ageing inventory will inevitably pose problems as the military seeks to maintain a core level of capability within the budgetary constraints laid down by the government. Uruguay’s army is in considerably better shape than either the Air Force or the Navy, with both the latter services facing the spectre of increasing maintenance burdens as their assets age. To date, Uruguay has been able to preserve the combat capability of its armed forces despite budgetary restrictions. It remains to be seen whether this can continue without substantial infusions of money for capital acquisitions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
BIMSTEC needs to build on regional synergies and work towards utilising the available resources optimally by focusing on fewer priority areas and undertaking projects that are economically feasible.
On June 06 this year, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) completed 20 years of its establishment. Comprising of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan, BIMSTEC is home to 1.5 billion people, accounting for approximately 21 per cent of the world population, and a combined GDP of US$ 2.5 trillion.1 The growth rate sustained by the BIMSTEC countries is around six per cent per annum.2 However, despite its huge potential in terms of enhancing regional cooperation between parts of South and Southeast Asia, BIMSTEC has long suffered from lack of resources and proper coordination among its member states.
So far, BIMSTEC has held only three summit meetings. The first one was held in Thailand in 2004, seven years after the establishment of the grouping; the second one was held four years later in India in 2008, and the third one six years later in Myanmar in 2014. The fourth summit meeting is expected to take place later this year in Nepal, the current Chair of BIMSTEC. Again, it took 17 long years for BIMSTEC to finally establish its permanent secretariat in Dhaka in 2014.
The Initiative
Initially known as the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC), it was formed after representatives from the aforesaid four countries met at Bangkok in June 1997. With Myanmar joining the grouping as a full member in December the same year, the ‘BIST-EC’ was renamed as ‘BIMST-EC’. In February 2004, when Nepal and Bhutan too joined, the grouping was renamed as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation or BIMSTEC.
According to the June 1997 ‘Declaration on the Establishment of the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC)’, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, the founding objectives of the sub-regional initiative were: creating an enabling environment for rapid economic development of the sub-region, encouraging the spirit of equality and partnership, promoting active collaboration and mutual assistance in the areas of common interests of the member countries, accelerating support for each other in the fields of education, science and technology, etc.3
So far, the seven-member grouping has identified 14 priority sectors and has signed a Free Trade Agreement (2004) and a Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking (2009). Few working groups too have been formed.
For India, the establishment of BIMST-EC, later BIMSTEC, was yet another opportunity, besides the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to engage with Southeast Asia, at least partially. The scope for direct connectivity with Southeast Asia via Northeast India and Myanmar, counter-terrorism and anti-insurgency cooperation with Myanmar and other members, potential access to alternative energy resources in Myanmar as well as economic opportunities available in the ASEAN region had evoked sufficient interest in New Delhi to join BIST-EC.
Besides India, other members too considered it as an important mechanism to achieve their national goals and regional aspirations. Myanmar, for example, became a member at a time when the junta in the country was facing serious international criticism. Membership in regional and sub-regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC provided its military rulers an opportunity to gain some sort of recognition among the regional stakeholders. Today, Myanmar sees itself as a gateway for BIMSTEC to ASEAN, primarily due to its strategic location between South and Southeast Asia.
Thailand, on the other hand, was looking for an opportunity to enhance its trade and connectivity with the South Asian countries under the ambit of its ‘Look West’ policy. So, in a way, India’s ‘Look East’ and Thailand’s ‘Look West’ policy complemented each other within the ambit of BIMSTEC. The ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the India-Myanmar Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project are expected to further augment connectivity and economic cooperation in the sub-region and beyond.
Countries like Sri Lanka considered BIMSTEC as an opportunity to engage with the economically booming Southeast Asian countries, especially after several failed attempts to join ASEAN in the decade prior to the establishment of BIMSTEC. With India and Thailand as its important economic partners, Sri Lanka is looking forward to the implementation of BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement and BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement.4 For the land-blocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, BIMSTEC holds the prospect of enhancing their connectivity with the rest of the region.
Challenges
In today’s context, the possibility of enhancing physical, digital and people-to-people connectivity in the sub-region is huge. Similarly, the potential to tap the vast energy resources and scope for intra-regional trade and investment too is enormous. Though largely devoid of bilateral tensions, as is the case in SAARC, BIMSTEC does not seem to have made much progress. The so-called sluggishness in BIMSTEC last two decades is attributed to many factors. India, the largest member of the grouping, has often been criticised for not providing a strong leadership to BIMSTEC. Both Thailand and Myanmar are criticised for having ignored BIMSTEC in favour of ASEAN. This despite the fact that BIMSTEC was formed at a time when the ASEAN countries were suffering from severe financial crisis in 1997-98 and also as both Thailand and Myanmar experienced political turmoil in the following decade.
Absence of a permanent secretariat for a long time and lack of commitment to invest in several priority areas identified by the member states were seen as some of the key institutional factors holding the BIMSTEC back. The ‘noodle bowl effect’ of regionalism too was at work as formation of another sub-regional initiative, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, with the proactive membership of China, created more doubts about the exclusive potential of BIMSTEC.
Renewed Interest
Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his message on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of BIMSTEC, described the sub-regional grouping as “a natural platform” to fulfill India’s “key foreign policy priorities of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’”.5 Earlier in October 2016, India had hosted the BIMSTEC members at Goa during the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Outreach Summit. It was viewed as a pragmatic step on India’s part, demonstrating its potential to play the role of a regional leader, an aspiration which was instrumental in transforming its ‘Look East’ into ‘Act East’ policy. The BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit is believed to have given BIMSTEC its due importance by inviting its members to participate in a larger platform comprising five major emerging economies of the world.
India has been clearly signaling its renewed interest in BIMSTEC. India is already the lead country for four priority sectors, namely, transportation and communication, environment and disaster management, tourism, and counter-terrorism and trans-national crime. Within few months of the Goa Summit, India hosted the first meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs in New Delhi in March 2017. Though BIMSTEC leaders spoke about many issues at the Goa Summit, the highlight clearly was the open discussion on combating terrorism in the region.
In an effort to strengthen sub-regional cooperation on combating terrorism and trans-national crime, the BIMSTEC member states are trying to implement a convention on anti-terrorism. Except for Nepal and Bhutan, all member states of BIMSTEC have ratified it.6 BIMSTEC is now trying to sign a Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. In fact, the 17th BIMSTEC Senior Officials’ Meeting, conducted in Kathmandu in February 2017, referred to the progress made in other sectors too. To name a few, it pointed to India hosting a working group meeting to finalise the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement, finalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Grid Interconnection to facilitate electricity trade in the sub-region, and a meeting of BIMSTEC Trade Negotiating Committee to fast-track the process of trade facilitation in the region.7 In fact, the declaration issued at the end of the Goa Summit had also stated that BIMSTEC needs to have a Coastal Shipping Agreement to allow the member states to trade freely within the sub-region.8 It is noteworthy that between 2002 and 2014, the intra-BIMSTEC trade registered a very marginal growth, from 3.6 to 4.3 per cent only.9
Apart from India, other member states too appear to be showing interest in strengthening BIMSTEC. Former Thai Ambassador Kobsak Chutkul, who was earlier involved in the establishment of BIMSTEC, recently observed that though BIMSTEC is neither ASEAN nor SAARC, yet it is on a ‘solid ground’. He described it as a ‘complimentary organisation’ which can support the people in the region.10
Identifying lack of media coverage and public awareness about the grouping as one of the shortcomings, the BIMSTEC Secretary General Ambassador Sumith Nakandala too pointed to the importance of making BIMSTEC more effective in a recent conference held at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.11 On the 20th anniversary of BIMSTEC, the Bhutanese foreign minister was said to have observed that ‘the two decades of regional experience have taught that the path to achieving common goal and aspirations is not without challenges and setbacks’.12 These statements show that while BIMSTEC member states consider it as an important sub-regional grouping, bridging the South and Southeast Asia, they are equally aware of the impediments facing it.
For BIMSTEC to become an enabler of regional cooperation, it will have to evolve as an organisation that works through a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. The people-centric approach seems to be the best as BIMSTEC seriously lags behind ASEAN and other regional organisations in terms of people-to-people contacts. Also, the organisation needs to focus on fewer priority areas for purpose of better implementation. It needs to undertake projects that are economically feasible and result-driven. This would add to the credibility of BIMSTEC. Finally, since the BIMSTEC region is notable for its diversity, the member states need to build on the regional synergies and work towards utilising the available resources in the most optimal manner. This would help build a stronger and a more dynamic BIMSTEC.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The EU needs Britain and Britain equally needs Europe. So, an arrangement that exists today between EU and Norway could well be a model for Britain.
Having voted to exit from the European Union (EU) in the referendum of June 2016, Britain’s foremost problem, domestic and foreign, was how to secure the best terms of exit. In one sense, the recent election was about this. The contestants, the ruling Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party, fought this issue before the British people and the people gave a messy verdict. The Conservatives led by Theresa May gained 318 seats, eight short of a majority, and the Labour led by Jeremy Corbyn won 261 seats, 29 more than it had in 2015. This is indeed impressive. May, with over confidence verging on arrogance, and Corbyn, modest but doughty, fought in the market place of democracy. May lost and Corbyn won, not arithmetically but morally.
May made the terms of Exit from the EU the only issue in the election. Corbyn talked about both the Exit and the state of British society and politics. This appealed to people who were more concerned with how their schools, health care, and transport are run rather than with the EU. May said that Britain needed a strong and stable leadership to negotiate the Exit terms with the EU. Corbyn said that a more prosperous and egalitarian Britain is as important as an Exit deal with the EU. People found Corbyn more appealing than May. The youth in particular found Corbyn’s ideas of a more egalitarian Britain and a more ecologically balanced world more appealing than May’s thumping declarations about British sovereignty.
As many commentators have said, Britain will now negotiate with the EU with weak cards. Its ace card was strong support at home for a cheap exit from the EU. The cost of exit is now high because its protagonist knows that within Britain opinion is divided, and besides, the Prime Minister does not command strong support in her party.
It is not just that Britain deals with the EU from a position of weakness but that the EU today is stronger. The turning point in the EU’s fortune was the decisive victory of a pro-EU movement in the presidential election in France last month. Emmanuel Macron is a firm Europeanist. The movement he leads, En Marche, is pro-market and in favour of European unity. Macron is also in favour of a strong alliance with Germany as well as German-French partnership to steer EU affairs. Both France and Germany want Britain to honour all its obligations to the EU. Which means, Britain’s huge dues to the EU. Theresa May prevaricates on this point and sometimes talks about linking the dues with Britain’s access to the EU’s single market. Britain heavily depends on such access. Over half its exports go to EU countries.
At the same time, the EU also needs Britain. It needs the City’s (London) unrivalled status as a leading world centre of finance. A mutually advantageous exit agreement is, therefore, in the interest of both. A kind of agreement that Norway has – it is not an EU member but has access to its single market – could be a model for an EU-Britain agreement. Britain, with a USD 2.6 trillion economy, is the second largest in Europe and the fifth largest in the world. Neither the EU nor Britain can live in isolation of each other.
Public sentiments against the integration of Europe are on the decline in European countries. The anti-Europe, anti-immigration, and racist parties lost the electoral contest to liberal, pro-Europe parties in Holland, France and Austria during the past six months. And Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest in the world, is a well rooted liberal democracy and solidly in favour of European unity.
Britain must accept the reality of the EU and negotiate with it on that assumption. Its isolation from Europe is accentuated by its isolation from Trump’s America. During the 2016 presidential election, Trump often said that NATO was obsolete and that he was going to lift sanctions against Russia, a country that wishes the death of the EU. After assuming power in January 2017, Trump slightly moderated his previous stand on these issues. But it is difficult to build a long term policy with Trump who is too capricious and impulsive to give American foreign policy a clear direction.
Trump’s America has abandoned its long standing policy of a special relationship with Britain. Gone for good are the days of intimate relationships between Roosevelt and Churchill, Thatcher and Reagan, and more recently Blair and George Bush Jr. If Theresa May thought she could forge a close relationship with Trump, she was greatly mistaken. Her recent visit to America must have dashed any hope of such a relationship. It is such intimacy with America that gave Britain in the past an advantage in dealing with Europe. That’s now gone.
In the Brexit referendum, Remain or Exit, out of a voter turnout of 73 per cent, 51 per cent voted for exit. Globalization and its consequences, unemployment, a sense of loss of identity, were some of the factors in the making of the exit vote. These factors are also there, of course, in varying degrees in all European countries that have had elections. In France, some 42 per cent were against the EU because the EU stood for globalization. In Holland and in Austria roughly the same percentage of people voted against the EU.
In Britain, however, there is another important strand in popular thinking that is distinctly British: insularity. This is not the place to discuss whence this feeling of insularity emerged. Probably, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which established democracy gave the people a feeling that they were distinct from the peoples of the Continent. But the feeling of being distinct is there and it expresses itself politically in Britain’s relations with Europe. Thus, Britain opposed the creation of the European Common Market in 1957 by setting up a European Free Trade Association. And when that did not work it sought membership of the EU in 1961. Subsequently, it opposed the creation of the Euro in 1999 and stayed away from other arrangements aimed at the political and economic integration of Europe. There were weighty factions in both the Conservative and Labour parties who called for Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. David Cameron, then prime minister, called for a referendum in response to a strong faction in his party braying for withdrawal from the EU. In short, Britain feels uneasy in Europe and secure behind the English Channel.
Insularity or no insularity, Britain and the EU need each other. The British economy is the second largest economy in Europe, and the City is an unrivalled centre of finance and money. The EU needs Britain and Britain equally needs Europe. So, an arrangement that exists today between EU and Norway could well be a model for Britain. Norway is not in the EU but it has access to its Single Market, which is what would ideally suit Britain as well.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Corridor marries India’s brand of human resources development and capacity building with Japan’s objective of delivering quality infrastructure in the region.
During the recent annual meeting of the Africa Development Bank at Gandhinagar, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the launch of India’s latest initiative in Africa, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), in partnership with Japan. This initiative is the latest in a series of steps taken by India including the Third India Africa Forum Summit and a number of high level visits to 16 African countries over the last two years, all aimed to boost ties with the continent. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor highlights the growing importance of Africa in Indian foreign policy and also signals India’s willingness to partner with like-minded countries, such as Japan, in this region.
India in Africa
The African Development Bank meeting in Gandhinagar has shifted the spotlight back to India’s relations with the 54 countries in Africa. India’s historical ties with this region are well known. Economic engagement with African countries has increased in the last two decades with a large number of public and private sector companies from India investing in Africa. Trade has seen a five-fold increase from USD 11.9 billion in 2005-2006 to 56.7 billion in 2015-16.1 India engages with African countries at three levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. Multilateral engagement was launched with the first India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2008. The third IAFS hosted by the Indian government in 2015 revealed the agenda that would help to empower Africans and bring Africa and India closer in the future. During the summit, India pledged USD 10 billion in concessional lines of credit to African countries.
India’s engagement with the continent is consultative and is, to a large extent, driven by the demands of the African countries. Further, India postulates that its partnership is an amalgam of African development priorities in keeping with the African Union’s long term plan and the Africa Agenda 2063, as well as India’s development objectives. There is no doubt that India’s engagement is highly appreciated by Africans. As Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, noted, “This cooperation is both a mutual privilege and priority” and that it is a “pleasure to partner with such an inveterate and committed investor in Africa.”2
Japan in Africa
Japan also has a long standing relationship with African countries. The main feature of Japan’s Africa policy is its support for African “ownership”. The most important Japanese initiative in Africa is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which was set up in 1993 to promote Africa’s development and security through multilateral cooperation.3 To some extent, TICAD refocussed the world’s attention on Africa. It was launched at a time when, following the end of the Cold War, Western donors had reduced their economic assistance to Africa and did not consider the region to be strategically important. It is important to note that this forum meets every five years in partnership with the United Nations Office of Special Adviser on Africa, the United Nation Development Programme, the World Bank and the African Union Commission. At the last TICAD summit, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged USD 30 billion in the form of public and private sector investments in Africa.4
Thus, in recent years, both Japan and India have been engaging with African countries. To some extent, this engagement may be driven by efforts to garner support from the 54 African countries for their candidacy in a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC). India and Japan are part of the G4 initiative along with Germany and Brazil seeking an early implementation of UNSC reforms. It is interesting to note that both India and Japan are speaking the same language and calling for “African empowerment” or “African ownership.” The main difference is that, unlike Japan, India has not invited any multilateral agency to be part of the IAFS process. This does not, however, imply that India is not open to triangular cooperation with African partners. India and the United States are collaborating with African countries for promoting agricultural growth, energy security, health, women’s empowerment and peacekeeping training.5 Similarly, India has been open to working together with Japan in Africa.
Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
India and Japan institutionalised a dialogue on Africa in 2010.6 Since then, they have been exploring the possibilities of cooperation in Africa’s socio- economic development. However, it was only during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan in November 2016 that the idea of the two countries promoting a growth corridor between Asia and Africa was crystallised.7
During the Africa Development Bank meeting, India unveiled the Vision Document of the Asian Africa Growth Corridor.8 The vision document was prepared jointly by Indian and Japanese think tanks, i.e. Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries (RIS), Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and Institute for Development Economics - Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), in consultation with other think tanks in Asia and Africa.
The main objective of the corridor is to enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa. The corridor will focus on four areas: Development Cooperation Projects, Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity, Enhancing Skills, and People-to-People Partnership. Agriculture, health, technology, and disaster management have been identified as the main areas of development cooperation. According to the vision document, AAGC will focus on enhancing skills and research and development capacities in Africa. It will also strive to develop institutional, industrial and transport infrastructure in the Asia -Africa region. The corridor will facilitate greater people-to-people exchanges amongst the participating countries.
Even as it has launched the AAGC initiative, India has made it clear that it is not interested in joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is seeking to revive the global economy through a 21st century silk road that traverses through Europe, Asia and Africa. Its refusal to participate in the Chinese initiative is due to concerns about sovereignty given that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a part of the Belt and Road, passes through Indian territory under Pakistan’s control. There is no doubt that comparisons will be made regarding the merits of the Indo-Japanese and Chinese initiatives.
Be that as it may, the AAGC marries India’s brand of human resources development and capacity building with Japan’s objective of delivering quality infrastructure in the region. Moreover, both India and Japan have consulted with think tanks in Africa and Asia while conceptualising this plan. Efforts should be made to fast track the next steps to turn these innovative ideas to reality.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Vision Document, http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Vision-Document.pdf
It is unlikely that Qatar will agree to align its foreign policy with that of Riyadh and to rein in Al Jazeera.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt cut off diplomatic relations as well as air, sea, and trade links with Qatar on June 5, 2017, accusing it of funding terrorism. Of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Kuwait and Oman did not act against Qatar while Kuwait has since been engaged in mediation but without any visible success so far. The crisis has affected Qatar, which is the world’s largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exporter, with the highest per capita income at $127,660.
President Trump’s role
US President Donald Trump paid a two-day state visit to Saudi Arabia starting on May 20. While newly-elected US Presidents traditionally go either to neighbouring Mexico or Canada, Trump chose instead to go to Saudi Arabia. The foundation for Trump’s unusual choice was laid in mid-March 2017, when the KSA’s Defence Minister, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, 31, son of Saudi King Salman, came to Washington on an invitation from Secretary of Defence James Mattis. The Saudi Prince was invited for lunch with Trump as a huge snow storm delayed the arrival of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whom Trump was scheduled to meet.
Trump used the opportunity to get closer to Riyadh which was already in a hostile confrontation with Iran. Trump’s moves gelled with his policy of getting tough with Iran, and his keenness to undo as much of Barack Obama’s legacy as possible. It was agreed during the meeting with Prince Salman that Riyadh would place orders for a huge amount of arms and equipment and also pledged to invest in a big way in the US.
During Trump’s visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia successfully projected itself as the undisputed leader of the Arab/Muslim world by inviting over 50 heads of state for the ‘Arab-Islamic American Summit’. Egypt’s President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, and others spoke at the Summit about the need to stop the funding for terrorists. It was reported that some of them told Trump that Qatar had not stopped sending money to terrorists.
In short, King Salman had the confidence at the end of the visit that if there was a move to break off diplomatic relations with and to humiliate Qatar based on its ‘funding of terrorism’ charge, Trump will approve of such a move. This was confirmed when Trump tweeted claiming credit for the isolation of Qatar shortly after the Gulf states broke off diplomatic ties.
Mixed signals from US
While Trump claimed credit for Qatar’s isolation, the Pentagon made it clear that there were no plans to move the US Central Command air base in Qatar which has 100 aircraft and 11,000 military personnel. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former CEO of Exxon Mobile, on June 9 called for an early resolution of the crisis through talks and urged Qatar to do more to stop the funding of terrorism. Trump meanwhile later on the same day publicly reiterated his support to King Salman and said nothing about an early resolution of the crisis through talks. The mixed signals might be deliberate, or more likely, a reflection of the inherent incoherence of the Trump Administration.
Cyber war against Qatar
The Qatar News Agency (QNA) on May 23 carried a story, later deleted, that the Emir of Qatar, while speaking at a military graduation ceremony, had flagged tensions with the Trump administration, and that Qatar had good relations with Israel, praised Iran as a strong Islamic power and reiterated that Hamas deserved support. The hacked twitter account of the Qatari Foreign Minister spoke of plans to withdraw ambassadors from Egypt and elsewhere. The KSA and UAE dismissed the Qatari claim that the QNA had been hacked, despite two teams from the US and the UK concluding that the hacking operation might have started in April.
Qatar’s response
After the initial shock as a result of the cutting off of diplomatic ties, Qatar has reacted with a degree of sobriety and calmness. It has not taken any retaliatory action against KSA and others. Egypt has 300,000 of its nationals in Qatar. Though Egypt’s air space is closed to Qatar, the Egyptians in Qatar have not been expelled. Qatar has been in touch with Turkey, Iran, Germany and Russia. Turkey’s Parliament passed a resolution authorizing the government to send troops to Qatar where a Turkish base has been under construction for a while. Arrangements have been made for food items to come from Iran and Turkey. Denied entry into the airspace of its neighbours, Qatar Airways planes now fly over Iran and Turkey.
Roots of the confrontation
Essentially, Riyadh resents Qatar’s independent foreign policy. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Al Jazeera, the popular channel owned by Qatar, is the bete noire. Qatar’s only land border is with Saudi Arabia. In 1992, there was a clash at the border and two Qatari soldiers were killed. In 2002, Riyadh recalled its ambassador from Doha over critical coverage of KSA by Al Jazeera. The ambassador returned only in 2008.
In August 2013, when Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani took over as the Emir of Qatar, Riyadh had hoped that there would be a change in Qatar’s policy. The expected change did not happen and in March 2014, KSA, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew ambassadors, who were sent back in December of the same year. At that time, Qatar had entered into long bilateral negotiations and might have given certain assurances. It is evident therefore that the issue is not the ‘funding of terrorism’, but Qatar’s support to Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and Al Jazeera’s coverage of KSA among other policies that has attracted the ire of the KSA and UAE.
There is also the suspicion in Riyadh that Qatar is getting too close to Iran. However, Riyadh cannot realistically expect Qatar to join it in a confrontation with Iran for the simple reason that Qatar and Iran share the gas field South Pars, the largest in the world. A look at the map shows that if blockaded by KSA, the only way Qatar can be in touch with the rest of the world is through Iran.
India’s stance
India wants harmony and stability in the region. There are 8 million Indians in the GCC and their remittances home at about $36 billion is of great importance to India. The country further imports about 75 per cent of its hydrocarbon requirements from the GCC. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a press release on June 10 urged all parties to ‘resolve their differences through a process of constructive dialogue and peaceful negotiations based on well-established international principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries’. The MEA further stated that ‘international terrorism, violent extremism and religious intolerance pose grave threat not only to regional stability but also to the global peace and order and must be confronted by all countries in a coordinated and comprehensive manner’.
How will the crisis end?
A few scenarios can be envisaged:
The GCC has discussed plans to have a common currency and common defence forces. It is an important contributor to regional stability and harmony. A prolonged confrontation can hurt the GCC and the wider region. The GCC should treat the crisis as an opportunity and fortify its internal coherence. The well-wishers of the GCC including India should help out in the process.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s record in wind energy development is good. But the existing technology is fast becoming outdated. Evolving technologies like kite wind should therefore be considered.
Despite the focus on developing solar energy, wind energy in India has seen steady development in the last decade. With 32,279.77 MW of installed wind generation capacity (compared to 12,288.83 MW of solar power), India is one of the leading generators of wind energy worldwide. Yet, due to certain constraints, and more recently the more competitive rates in solar energy, there are concerns that the share of wind energy may decline. No doubt, unlike non-storage solar energy, wind turbines are not affected by night and day. However, generation of electricity depends on both the season and geographical location. Besides, wind farms require massive areas of land. In India, wind turbines produce 70 to 80 per cent of their generation in a span of six months. Moreover, to calculate the annual kilowatt per hour (kWh) produced from a turbine, one has to calculate the estimated number of hours of wind at a certain height as well as its speed. On an average, in India, the plant load factor (PLF) is only around 20 to 30 per cent. Hence, with a 25 per cent PLF, a 1.5 MW turbine would produce around 3,285,000 kWh in a year. Below a wind speed of around 30 mph, however, the amount of energy generated would be quite small.1
The government has announced that its target for wind energy generation by 2022 is 60,000 MW. Harnessing this potential will require huge investments as well as the requisite land. However, this problem may be resolvable through the use of a new technology – scores of kites to generate wind energy. This technology is believed to not only cut the cost of generating wind energy but also enhance the efficiency quotient. Although several companies are working on different models, the basic idea is to locate the kites, which are essentially light and controllable aerodynamic flying devices, in a formation at heights of around 750 metres and more in order to harvest the strong and consistent winds available in that region of the atmosphere (wind velocity at those heights is twice that at the ground level) and thus generate low-cost energy.2
The system is operated in periodic pumping cycles, alternating between reel-out and reel-in of the lines attached to the kite and the drum on the ground. During the traction phase, the kite is flown in a figure-eight-like pattern and pulls on the tether lines, which are used to transmit power from the kite to the ground as the lines unroll from large drums coupled to electric drives used as generators. When the kite reaches the end of the line extension, the electric drives are driven in reverse to pull in the kite. Once the kite is brought down to the lowest height, a new traction phase commences. By depowering the kite during the passive phase, less energy is used to pull in the kite than is extracted from the wind during the traction phase, resulting in net power generation. During reel-out, the kite flies in figure-eight manoeuvers at high speeds of 70 to 90 km/h, creating a high traction force which is converted into electricity by the drum and the connected generator. Once the kite reaches the maximum height, it is de-powered by releasing the steering lines so that the whole wing rotates and aligns with the wind. Using the drum/generator module as a winch, the kite is then pulled back to the initial position to start the next pumping cycle. De-powering reduces the traction force during reel-in by 80 per cent, thereby allowing less energy to be consumed as against the energy generated during the reel-out cycle. A crucial element of the technology is the automatic control and synchronisation of the drum/generator module and the flight dynamics of the kite.3 Once the descent is complete, the kite is allowed to climb once more, where it generates electricity once again. This allows these kites to be more efficient than traditional wind turbines.4
Source:https://www.thememo.com/2017/05/30/kite-wind-farms-take-off-in-uk-as-fut....
According to some estimates, the cost of generation from these kites could be around 50 to 60 per cent less than from traditional wind farms, both on- and off-shore. Moreover, these kite power systems can be flexible. As modular, small-scale power production plants, they can be applied to single houses, for autonomous electricity production as well as for remote areas and villages not yet connected to the power grid. At the same time, they can also serve as huge power plants generating several megawatts and even gigawatts. For example, an Italian firm, KiteGen, has developed a prototype with a capacity for producing 27 MW of peak power.5
The concept has been in existence for a while, and several private companies are involved in developing this technology, particularly European firms such as Swiss Kite Power, Altaeroes Energies, Ampyx Power, KiteGen, SkySails and Minesto. The UK government has been the first to give the green light to launch the country’s first kite power plant by awarding a contract for that purpose to Kite Power Systems (KPS). Interestingly, the funding for KPS has been jointly provided by Shell and the Department of Energy and Climate Change.6 KPS has successfully tested a 40 KW version, while the testing of a 500 KW version will commence in July/August in Scotland. It is also working on a 3 MW version with the aim of eventually ramping it up to 6 MW.7 The UK hopes to supply power to more than 5000 homes by 2020 through these giant kites.8 If successful, these kite farms could replace offshore wind turbines.
Some of the advantages kite power systems have over conventional turbines include negligible noise emission and bird hits, near invisibility, and ability to withstand storms. Moreover, they do not need huge concrete foundations and tonnes of steel for the tower and the blades. As a result, they do not require scarce metals or rare earth elements like neodymium for the magnet in a wind power plant, thereby making them far more environment-friendly than their conventional counterparts.9 Wind kites also require less power to operate.
Nevertheless, some technical issues will have to be resolved before these kites can replace traditional turbines. A major challenge is lightning, which could damage the small computer placed inside the kite. Furthermore, given the height at which the kites would be flying, the location of these wind farms will have to be carefully planned so as not to interfere with or hamper the flight paths of aeroplanes.
Although India is no longer deemed power-deficient, it is by no means energy secure as millions of people do not have access to grid connections. As connectivity increases, the demand for power will surge. Moreover, initiatives like Make in India, Power for All Campaign for total rural electrification by the end of 2017, and the drive to ramp up the use of electric vehicles in place of fossil fuel-based vehicles, among others, will see a quantum jump in energy consumption. While evolving solar technology can fill some of the gap, the government should also look at other new energy technologies across the energy spectrum to meet its energy generation target. India’s record in wind energy development is good. But the existing technology is fast becoming outdated. Evolving technologies like kite wind should therefore be considered.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The formal inclusion of the Munitions List within the SCOMET framework explicitly brings the defence industry under the purview of India’s global commitment to non-proliferation.
India has recently announced a revised list of controlled items whose export is regulated. The revised list, which comes into effect from May 1, 2017, is part of “India’s International commitments and obligations in the field of non-proliferation.” The list has an impact on the domestic defence industry, which is slowly but steadily gaining a foothold under the Make in India programme.
Changes in the SCOMET List
The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), vide Notification No. 5 dated April 24, 2017, has issued a revised list of what in Indian parlance is known as SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and Technologies) items, whose export is either prohibited or permitted under an explicit authorisation. The revised list of items is part of India’s larger commitment to non-proliferation as enshrined in various laws, particularly the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010. The revised list is also part of India’s efforts to harmonise its list of controlled items with those of the four multilateral export control regimes: Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Australia Group. India is already a member of the MTCR besides being an adherent to NSG Guidelines. The latest revised list reflects not only the updated list of controlled items of the first two regimes but also of the latter which India wishes to join as a member.
In comparison to the previous SCOMET list which had eight categories, the revised list has nine broad categories, with each category containing an exhaustive list of items, running into over 200 pages. Category 8, the newly added one, has been included for the purpose of harmonising India’s list of dual use items with that of the WA. The nine categories of the revised SCOMET list are:
Implications for the Indian Defence Industry
From the defence industry’s point of view, Category 6 (Munitions List), which was hitherto ‘reserved’, is the most relevant as the export of any items listed under the category would be controlled as per the new guidelines. It is, however, to be noted that, although the SCOMET list has included munitions items for the first time, a somewhat similar list was earlier available outside the SCOMET framework in the form of the list of Military Stores notified by the DGFT. With the formal inclusion of munitions items in the SCOMET list, the previous Military Stores list now stands withdrawn. This apart, the list of Munitions items, is much more comprehensive and in line with the munition items covered in the WA list. In comparison to 17 broad categories that the previous Military Stores list had, the munitions list now has 22 categories.
Export of SCOMET List items with the exception of Category 1A chemicals (which are also part of Munitions List’s Category 6A007.b) are permitted under an export licence authorisation to be provided by the competent authorities. With certain exceptions, the export licensing authority for munitions items is the Department of Defence Production (DDP), which was also the licensing authority for the previous military stores items. The DDP’s grant of export licence is governed by the Standard Operation Procedure (SOP), which has been revised to reflect the Munitions List and India’s commitment to non-proliferation. The revised SOP divides the whole procedure into six parts (as opposed to five parts in the previous SOP), with the inclusion of a dedicated part for the export authorisation of technology and software related to munitions items. The six parts are:
Like in the previous SOP, the revised SOP also stipulates the standard conditions pertaining to multi-agency stakeholder consultation and end-use certification for the grant of export authorisation (see Table below). The consultation of stakeholders – who include representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the concerned armed force, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Planning and International Cooperation (PIC) Wing of the MoD and other concerned agencies – is mandatory for all items figuring in Parts A and F, whereas consultation with the MEA is mandatory only for items whose export destination is a country that figures in the MEA’s ‘negative list’.
Table: End Use and Stakeholder Consultation Requirements for Export Authorisation of Munitions List Items
EUC
Stakeholders Consultation
A Caution for the Defence Industry
The formal inclusion of the Munitions List within the SCOMET framework explicitly brings the defence industry under the purview of India’s global commitment to non-proliferation. The defence industry is now expected to play the game by the rules set forth in various laws, including the provision of ‘catch-all control’ that prohibits anybody from exporting any material, equipment or technology knowing that such export could be used for weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. Any violation of laws will attract penalties ranging from suspension or cancellation of licence to punishment ranging from six months to life imprisonment.
The defence industry also needs to exercise caution in identifying the correct category in which an item intended for export falls. There may be a possibility of a few items figuring in both the Munitions List and one of other categories of the SCOMET List. For the defence industry, the key to decide category jurisdiction of an item is the end-use of the intended export. If the ultimate end use is for military purpose, then the category jurisdiction is the Munitions List; otherwise, other relevant category would apply. This simple understanding of category jurisdiction would save the industry crucial time in processing of export authorisation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The decision to target Qatar clearly indicates that the region is now divided into two camps and that the Arab Gulf countries are in no mood to accept neutral players.
The news that Saudi Arabia along with UAE, Bahrain and Egypt have severed diplomatic ties with Qatar over the latter’s alleged support for Islamist groups and sympathetic attitude towards Iran and its proxies may have come as a surprise. But the crisis has been in the making for long. UAE and Qatar have been on a collision course for a long time over Qatar’s patronisation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. For its part, Egypt under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has resented Qatar’s support for former President Mohammed Morsi. Cairo and Doha had a serious spat in 2014 over what Egyptian authorities termed as incitement of unrest in Egypt by Qatari backed media, especially the Al-Jazeera network. The crisis had led to the three GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain—and Egypt recalling their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. The matter could be resolved only through Omani and Kuwaiti mediation and persistent Saudi pressure leading to the closure of Al-Jazeera’s Arabic language Egyptian broadcast Mubasher Misr in December 2014.
Saudi Arabia’s problem with Qatar is more layered and complex, and involves three major contentious issues. Firstly, Saudi Arabia resents Qatar’s sympathetic attitude towards Iran and its regional ambitions and Iranian proxies especially Hezbollah. The Kingdom sees the Islamic Republic as the primary force behind regional instability and internal tensions in many countries including Bahrain, Yemen and in its own Eastern Province. Riyadh has on several occasions accused Tehran of meddling in internal affairs of regional countries and provoking sectarian strife in the region. This was most recently visible during President Donald Trump’s Riyadh visit when he singled out Iran as the regional rogue state behind the widespread turmoil in the Middle East. Though Qatar has significant economic contacts with Iran – they share the Pars gas field, which Qatar resumed developing in April 2017 – it has taken a neutral stance on Saudi-Iran tensions. Riyadh interprets this stance as an indication of Doha’s soft-corner for Tehran. The disclosure of the alleged remarks made by Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani on May 25 during an address to a military graduation ceremony sympathising with Iran and terming it as a legitimate regional player only confirmed this for Riyadh.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia, especially under King Salman, has despised Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other ‘moderate’ Islamist groups. Saudi-Brotherhood relations had worsened in the late 1990s, with Riyadh beginning to see the Brotherhood’s brand of Islam as dangerous and akin to questioning the monarchical system. Earlier, the Kingdom had shared good relations with the Brotherhood for a long time and had provided safe haven for exiled Egyptian Brothers. But because of growing internal criticism from the Sahwa (awakening) movement—a Brotherhood-inspired Saudi Islamist group—and others, Saudi authorities began a crackdown on the Sahwis and most members were either incarcerated or had to go into exile. After this, Doha remained the only Arab Gulf capital to continue patronising the Muslim Brotherhood. Though King Abdullah, after assuming power in 2005, had tried to accommodate some of the remnants of the Brotherhood inspired groups, the wave of Arab uprisings in 2011, popularly termed as Arab Spring, changed the dynamics and led to the Kingdom’s adoption of a zero-tolerance attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates or inspired groups including the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas.
Thirdly, Saudi Arabia sees Qatar’s independent foreign policy as problematic. Qatar wishes to play a larger regional role and has carved out an independent foreign policy through mediation in regional conflicts, especially in extending support to the Islamist faction in the Palestinian national movement, that is, Hamas. It also took a pro-Morsi stance during the 2013 crisis in Egypt which was at odds with the Saudi and Emirati support for the removal of Morsi. Even in Syria, Doha had adopted an independent policy of supporting the ‘moderate Islamist’ groups along with Ankara when Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries were supporting the ‘secular’ opposition. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Doha following an independent and parallel foreign policy weakens the Arab Gulf position in regional politics and strengthens the Iranian position. In addition, the Qatari use of the Al-Jazeera network to criticise regional governments is seen as undermining the legitimacy and authority of the Gulf monarchies. This had created problems between Riyadh and Doha in the past. For example, in 2002, Saudi Arabia had recalled its ambassador from Doha after overt criticism of the Abdullah Peace Plan offering Arab normalisation of ties with Israel in exchange for peace with Palestine. At the same time, Doha not following a coordinated foreign policy stance becomes a prestige issue for Riyadh. Qatar wishes to emerge from the shadows of its larger neighbour and a resentful Saudi Arabia views it as an undermining of its own regional standing.
Even the current crisis emanates from the complex relations shared by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. The Saudi Press Agency statement of June 5 declaring the severing of diplomatic ties and closure of all land, sea and air transit to and from Qatar made it clear that the decision was taken as a result of Doha’s persistent overt and covert support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian proxies as well as for using the media to instigate internal strife in neighbouring countries. Hence, the collective move is aimed at putting pressure on Doha to abandon its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, scale down the media criticism of internal matters of neighbouring countries and end the sympathetic approach towards Iran.
Though Doha’s early reaction has been measured, it has rejected claims made by Riyadh and others as “allegations” and the move as “unjustified.” A Qatari cabinet statement termed the severing of ties as pressure tactics on “Qatar to abandon its national decision-making and sovereignty.” A statement from the Qatari foreign ministry termed the “allegations” against Doha as without any basis. In a media interaction, Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani raised questions about the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council, showing that Doha might not be cowed down by pressure. Qatar has received support from Tehran and Ankara which latter have urged the parties involved to resolve the crisis through dialogue and in a peaceful manner instead of resorting to punitive measures. Nevertheless, Doha will find it difficult to endure the isolation because of its possible economic cost and adverse impacts on its gas exports and foreign trade. The move to isolate Qatar, the largest exporter of natural gas and an important OPEC member, might also have ramifications for the international energy market.
The timing of the move is significant as it comes two weeks after Trump’s Riyadh visit. Trump has tweeted his support for the move to isolate Qatar underlining that the US was in the know of the plans. The decision to target Qatar clearly indicates that the region is now divided into two camps and that the Arab Gulf countries are in no mood to accept neutral players. Kuwaiti efforts to mediate have proved futile so far and indicates that the escalation was orchestrated with a plan to not leave any room for Qatar to manoeuvre without conceding to the demands. The crisis can lead to Doha either substantially curtailing its foreign policy activism, thus aligning with the Arab Gulf, or it can be the beginning of the disintegration of the GCC. The problem is reflective of a larger regional crisis facing the Middle East and indicates a further sharpening of regional faultlines.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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