Iran began clandestinely developing a uranium enrichment programme in the early 1980s and claims that it is for peaceful purposes and solely for civilian use. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has claimed that firstly, Iran has no need for nuclear weapons and secondly, that nuclear weapons are forbidden by Islam. Nonetheless, many nations remain suspicious and Iran’s continued defiance of UN Security Council resolutions which demand that Iran cease uranium enrichment has seemingly put Tehran on a collision course with the United States and the European Union, especially the UK, France, and Germany. Further, Washington and its European counterparts have even managed to bring sanctions-shy China and Russia on board to push for further sanctions in the event of Iran not heeding the calls of the U.N. Security Council.

Although wounded by the misadventure in Iraq and despite several resignations, remnants of the neo-conservative movement remain in Washington. It has been reported that Vice President Dick Cheney is thoroughly convinced that Iran’s nuclear ambitions have a hidden military agenda and are aimed at acquiring regional hegemony – something that would be highly detrimental to Washington’s interests in the region – and is a strong advocate of the use of force to frustrate Iran’s suspected designs. Many believe that any attack on Iran would involve air strikes on suspected nuclear installations as well as attacks on missile sites, command and control centres, and bases used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Further, many of these same analysts seem to feel that the conflict would remain confined to the Middle East, with possible impacts on American interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel. However, they have forgotten about Colombia.

Plan Colombia is a highly controversial framework that was drafted by Washington and Bogotá to assist the Colombian government (presently headed by Alvaro Uribe) to combat narcotics trafficking activities that have fuelled an over 40-year insurgency by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) from the jungles of south-eastern Colombia. Although FARC has its roots as a Marxist movement and received limited funding from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in the early 1980s it began to discover the profitability of the cocaine trade and has since lost nearly any trait of a leftist movement. At present, FARC is estimated to reap profits of roughly US$2 million per day by supplying 90 per cent of the world’s cocaine.

Plan Colombia has seen billions of dollars in US aid flood Colombia, resulting in a heavy American security presence in the country in the form of military advisors and private defence contractors, some of whom have been captured and remain in FARC custody. Plan Colombia has been heavily criticised in the United States as a poor investment that has not delivered tangible results and there are calls to drastically reform the framework or scrap it altogether. Further complicating this matter is Colombia’s geographic proximity to radical left-wing and virulently anti-American Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, Latin America’s largest oil producer and a nation that has a well-documented history of tolerance and occasional active support for FARC’s activities in its territory. Needless to say, the stakes for Washington are high.

So how does Iran fit into this equation? Iran’s strong ties with Venezuela are well known and Tehran would likely have no qualms in providing Caracas both heavy and light weaponry. Although Chavez’s rhetoric has alarmed some, his hostility towards the United States will not extend past words and economic actions, such as making life more difficult for US companies operating in the Orinoco belt, and would not proactively engage in conventional military action against the United States or its interests in Latin America. As such, Washington’s greatest security threat to its interests in Colombia lie in the Tri-Border Region, an ungoverned pocket of space that falls under the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. In this lawless area lives a substantial Arab diaspora of mostly Lebanese descent and is home to a branch of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Sunni Islamist group that has been blamed for attacks on Jewish/Israeli targets in Argentina and Panama. Further, it has been claimed that Hezbollah attacks in Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, and even Canada have been foiled by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Some believe that FARC is the logistics partner for Hezbollah in Latin America and that this partnership would be extremely beneficial to both parties. Hezbollah has a worldwide fund-raising network that engages in smuggling, extortion, counterfeit currency, and various other nefarious activities. By working with Hezbollah, FARC would gain access to the Middle East, something that could greatly boost its operational capacities in both drug trafficking and its fight against Bogotá. Through the use of Hezbollah’s established network in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, FARC would be able to obtain advanced weaponry such as anti-tank mines, mortars, and anti-aircraft systems. Conversely, Hezbollah would be granted access to FARC’s extremely lucrative smuggling routes and could greatly increase its revenue generation as well as expand its operations throughout Latin America and the Middle East.

A critical component of this relationship is the mutual benefit derived from joint training. Hezbollah has a wealth of experience in fighting both conventional and unconventional conflicts. For example, its terrorist acts such as the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and its involvement in the 1996 attacks on the Khobar Towers in Riyadh are well known. These operations involved extensive surveillance, intelligence gathering, training of operatives, and development of local contacts. Further, Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006 demonstrated that it can also hold its ground against a conventionally superior force. Few military analysts predicted that Hezbollah’s crudely-made Katyusha rockets would hold off Israeli fighter jets, missile-fitted spy drones, and Israeli ground forces. Lessons from these operations would greatly benefit FARC’s strategic thinkers. Likewise, FARC’s extensive experience in irregular, jungle warfare (greatly enhanced since training provided by the IRA) could also assist Hezbollah in preparing for its next conflict with Israel. Further, FARC could pass on specialised knowledge such as advanced bomb or mortar making, a body of knowledge that Hezbollah would find most useful given its choice of tactics in the Middle East.

In the event of an attack on Iran, Tehran may attempt to activate Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Region in an effort to work through FARC to indirectly strike the United States in Colombia. As such, when discussing the possibilities of an attack on Iran, increased instability and threats to American interests in Colombia must be a consequence that is factored into the decision making process. Iran, through its Hezbollah proxy, has consistently demonstrated its global reach and there exists a possibility that the current regime in Iran would not be opposed to expanding the conflict outside of the Middle East if it were attacked.

Tension has subsided across the Taiwan Strait in recent years. China has adopted a “wait and see” approach and has chosen to focus more on economic growth, scientific development, and securing energy supplies, while Taiwan has been content with the status quo up until recently. Further, trade links between Taiwan and the Mainland are expanding rapidly and there have even been discussions about increasing air traffic in order to promote stronger business ties. However, Beijing’s passing of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 and Taiwan’s failed attempt to join the United Nations this year clearly demonstrate that the issue is far from settled. In addition, although Hu Jintao and his top leadership have tried not to bring as much publicity to the Taiwan issue, to interpret these omissions as a softening of China’s stance on Taiwan would be incorrect.

A Taiwan invasion has been the focus of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since at least 1993, the year the Nanjing Military Region (MR) received a weapons preference and training exercises in the region began to increase. Consequently, there has been much speculation regarding PLA strategy in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, and especially the role of the PLA Special Operations Forces (SOF). It has been generally accepted amongst analysts that any first wave of attack against Taiwan would involve precision strikes that would attempt to paralyse the island’s infrastructure as well as command and control nodes. However, in order for these precision strikes to occur, the PLA would likely have to clandestinely land a small ground force to lace the targets.

According to a 2003 US Department of Defense report to Congress titled “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” the SOF are expected to play a vital role in “achieving objectives in which limited goals, scale of force, and time would be crucial to victory.” In any invasion of Taiwan, all of these factors would be of critical importance, especially time. An attack on the self-governing island would have to be without much prior warning and would have to complete its objectives quickly in order to prevent third party involvement and to present the world with an indisputable fait accompli. Further, the outcome would have to be decisive as anything less would bring about further international condemnation and dash Beijing’s hopes of reunification for at least a generation. Given the high stakes of any use of force against Taiwan, the SOF has been given a priority.

The SOF’s Taiwan-focused training has made them highly proficient at locating and destroying transportation nodes, logistics depots, and conducting reconnaissance missions. They are also strong in the fields of communications security and deception and their mandate now includes counter-terrorism, unconventional combat, as well as direct attack missions. As such, it would be prudent for India to take note of these upgrades in capabilities and to realise that the PLA is no longer an oversized, inflexible military but rather a rapidly modernising force that has placed emphasis upon mobility, science, and technology.

China’s behaviour in the subcontinent, such as the provision of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Pakistan, demonstrates that, at a minimum, it is hedging its bets against India and would prefer to see New Delhi’s freedom of movement restricted within the region. Also, the 90,000 square kilometres of disputed territory is a sore spot in Sino-Indian ties, though this issue has been temporarily put on the back burner. However, these territorial disputes may flare up in future, possibly when both nations have become much more developed and have greater military capabilities. China has also begun to construct infrastructure near the Indian border, some of which is still disputed territory (Aksai Chin), and the PLA has a heavy presence in Tibet. Seemingly in response to these moves, India has taken steps to increase transportation infrastructure in its northern frontier regions such as Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims is a part of China.

Although a conflict with China over disputed territory is by no means imminent, it would be wise for Indian policy makers and defence analysts to take note of the SOF’s relatively newly acquired strengths, especially its ability to locate and destroy transportation nodes and logistics depots. In the event of hostilities, a PLA first strike would likely involve air strikes followed by a ground incursion and in order for this to occur, the SOF would need to create ground conditions that would be conducive to such operations. India should remain vigilant along its disputed border with China and should maximise any opportunity that it has to observe Taiwan-focused PLA training.

After nearly two decades of active militancy and disturbed conditions, Jammu and Kashmir is today witnessing a distinct change in the ground situation and signs of return to normalcy are clearly noticeable. Commercial activity in the State has picked up, people are no longer hesitant to move out at night and participate enthusiastically in national and religious functions. This year Kashmiri Pandits performed puja in ancient Hindu temples in the heart of the Valley and celebrated Dussehra in Srinagar after a gap of 20 years. A record number of tourists has thronged the Valley in the last two years bringing hope and cheer to the tourism industry.

There could be a number of reasons for the welcome change in the situation after nearly two decades of violence. Prominent among these seems to be the consistent international pressure on Pakistan during the last few years to stop abetting terrorism. Pakistan moreover is increasingly becoming embroiled in internal conflict, with the military and security agencies ranged against fundamentalist groups. The ongoing peace process with India can also be said to have contributed to Pakistan’s decision to rein in militant and terrorist outfits that target Jammu & Kashmir. At the same time, the usefulness of the formidable fence constructed along the Line of Control in curtailing easy routes of ingress and egress for militants and terrorists across the border cannot be ignored.

The civil administration in the state is far greater tuned in and has started functioning normally. Government officials right down to grass root levels report to their offices regularly. Even the legal as well as redressal machineries have become efficient and effective. There is increased pressure on the Security Forces (SF) to vacate Government buildings and premises so that the offices located there could start functioning. The local police have emerged as a formidable law enforcement agency after a period of disarray during the initial stages of militancy. This has been a result of the experience and confidence gathered during anti-terrorist operations, better equipment and weaponry and actionable human intelligence. They are no longer a silent partner in joint operations with the Army and contribute in an equal measure.

With improvements in the education system, revival of traditional business and commercial activity, better road connectivity, spread of cell phone networks and cable television, people have become more prosperous, aware and better connected. The masses have reclaimed their voice, and the media plays a vital role. No story is more than a few minutes away from the local and national media. Cases of alleged misbehaviour by the security forces are headline news. It may, therefore, not be imprudent to say that the system of checks and balances is firmly in place and functioning.

The level of terrorism in the State is at its lowest in recent history. Indicators pointing to the same are reduced levels of infiltration, decline in the number of terrorists killed in encounters with security forces and a substantial drop in terrorist initiated incidents. Most of the surviving terrorists can be easily called ‘goondas’ or criminals, not jehadis. Terrorism is a means to earn easy money and power rather than an instrument of jehad. Rarely do terrorists give a pitched fight to the security forces and instead choose to run and fight another day. With foreign coffers tightened and the supply of warlike stores from across the border reduced, tanzeems are finding it difficult to pay and arm their cadres. Gone are the days when people turned up in large numbers and shops downed shutters to mourn the killed terrorists. The security forces have to play a critical role in ensuring that the situation is not reversed. They need to continue to relentlessly pursue the dual strategy of checking infiltration across the LoC and neutralising the remaining terrorists in the hinterland.

With the ground situation improving, the civil administration and police firmly in place, the military aspect of the solution to the militancy in Jammu & Kashmir has been reached. As Lt. Gen. T.K. Sapru, GOC 16 Corps, said at a recent function in Jammu, "Our task was to bring down the level of violence and we have done it." Is the situation not ripe for a political solution to bring the beleaguered State back onto the rails?

International pressure on Myanmar’s military government has intensified following the recent political upheaval triggered by a hike in fuel prices in August. This has brought into sharp focus the policies of Myanmar’s neighbours – China, India and the ASEAN States – whose reaction to the Naypyidaw regime has differed from capitals that are relatively distant. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Ibrahim Gambari held consultations with leaders in New Delhi besides meeting Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo recently. This has raised expectations of a resolution of the situation in Myanmar.

Many factors have given this movement great prominence. First, the demonstrations in Myanmar’s many cities, including Yangon, attracted wide international attention as the events occurred under intense new age media glare including internet blogging. The movement successfully sidestepped media restrictions and censorship to reach out to the wider international audience by taking advantage of modern technology. Second, these events occurred at a time when the SPDC had taken the first step on the road to democracy by completing the work of the National Convention (convened to prepare a new Constitution). Another irony is that the generals were trying to implement IMF injunctions to cut fuel price subsidies when public wrath engulfed them. Third, Buddhist monks, the most revered institution of Myanmar society, are taking the regime head on. In terms of numbers (about 400,000), they almost match the military, and both institutions have equally deep roots within society. Fourth, the protests coincided with the UN General Assembly session in New York. UN Special envoy Ibrahim Gambari met Myanmar’s Than Shwe and Maung Aye in Naypyidaw on October 2. He also met Suu Kyi twice. The result has been increased dissemination of information on day-to-day events.

The viewer’s vantage point has often determined the approach adopted towards Myanmar. The United States and the European Union have traditionally been at the forefront of imposing sanctions against the regime for not complying with international standards of human rights and democracy. Countries in Myanmar’s neighbourhood have, however, generally adopted a more flexible approach. Starting with the 1988 movement when the regime suffered international ostracism and sanctions, it has been China that has come to Myanmar’s rescue with military and economic aid besides moral and diplomatic support. Both ASEAN and Japan have also favoured a policy of engagement, though this approach (of engagement and non-interference in internal affairs) has been questioned. During the ongoing developments, Tokyo changed tack immediately after a Japanese video journalist got killed while filming the demonstrations.

India’s understanding of the geopolitical context has led it to favour a policy of engaging the regime in power. It desires stability and growth in Myanmar, and has sought to balance geopolitical imperatives with its commitment to democracy. Factors that have necessitated the accommodative Indian approach are: the importance of containing insurgency in India’s northeast, growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, and energy requirements. New Delhi’s policy has traversed the entire spectrum from support to the pro-democracy/opposition groups to support for the military regime. It has also attempted in the past to ride two horses at the same time – with mixed results. The lessons learnt from these experiences have possibly shaped its current approach.

When fleet-footed Beijing bagged the contract for offshore Arakan gas, India was made to realize the costs of delay. It was this which possibly prompted Indian Oil Minister Murli Deora’s recent visit to Myanmar, when three accords were signed between the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and its counterpart Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). India also pledged US $150 million for gas exploration in three blocks, the AD-2, AD-3 and AD-9 off the Rakhine coast.

India’s policy has its critics among some of the opposition parties plus the 88 Generation Myanmar leaders based in India. They have sought to put pressure on the Indian government to re-examine its policy towards the ruling junta in Myanmar. New Delhi, however, sees merit in working through quiet diplomacy and has nuanced its position in the light of the developing situation. When External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee met his Myanmar counterpart Nyan Win on the sidelines of the UN General Debate in New York on October 2, he expressed the hope that “the process of national reconciliation and political reform, initiated by the Government of Myanmar, would be taken forward expeditiously.” At the same time, he also expressed “concern at the present situation” prevailing there. India also voted for a UN Human Rights Council resolution calling on the authorities to release Aung San Suu Kyi, despite expressing differences over the text of the resolution. Mr. Mukherjee suggested that the Myanmar government should consider undertaking an inquiry into recent incidents and the use of force on pro-democracy protesters in that country. This was a move forward from his earlier statement at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, on September 21, when he had emphasised the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country.

Various options have previously been tried in dealing with supposedly ‘recalcitrant’ states. Under current international circumstances, the military option is perhaps not a serious choice. At the same time, international diplomatic pressure has persuaded the military junta to make some conciliatory gestures. Sr. Gen. Than Shwe has offered to meet Aung San Suu Kyi personally albeit on the precondition that she stops supporting sanctions. Possibly a sustainable solution to the situation can be found through an active role for the United Nations and Myanmar’s neighbours including India and ASEAN.

India knows that the Military is a deeply entrenched institution in Myanmar and controls every lever of power. Though the Buddhist monks may balance the military numerically, and have great moral clout, economic and coercive power is vested in the military. If this institution were to be abruptly displaced, the result could be utter chaos. As Myanmar scholar Thant Myint-U points out, if you expect that by peeling away the Military you would find something underneath you would be terribly disappointed.