The United Jehad Council (UJC) – an umbrella organisation of 13 Kashmiri militant groups and five non-Kashmiri terrorist groups with observer status – signed a declaration on October 16 banning the use, production or trade of victim-activated anti-personnel mines as prohibited under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It also affirmed to continue its struggle for self-determination guided by the rules of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the protection of victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 Additional Protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I). The UJC stated in its declaration that the use of anti-personnel mines is equivalent to blind terror and is prohibited under Islam. It also clarified that it neither had nor shall use anti-personnel mines or any other victim-activated explosive device that can be triggered by the proximity, activity or contact of a human being or animal. Interestingly, it also called upon the Indian Armed Forces to immediately halt the use of anti-personnel mines or other victim-activated weapons in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). But at the same time, the UJC warned that it may continue to use command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the future.

The original copy of the pledge was signed by Syed Salahuddin, chief of the UJC, and handed over to the mission member of the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) in Muzaffarabad (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). The ICBL is a network of more than 1400 groups in over 90 countries, working to eradicate anti-personnel mines. It calls for a worldwide ban on anti-personnel landmines, universal membership of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, support for the needs and rights of landmine survivors and demining and risk education to safeguard lives and livelihoods. The Mine Ban Treaty, also referred to as the Ottawa Convention, is an international agreement that bans anti-personnel landmines. Approximately 40 countries remain outside the treaty, including China, Egypt, Finland, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States. Armed opposition groups or “non-state actors” cannot become party to the Treaty, since only recognised governments can join. However, these groups can make use of mechanisms like Deeds of Commitment or Codes of Conduct, wherein they declare their commitment to stop the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines and co-operate in victim assistance and mine clearing activities.

By committing themselves to this international agreement, militants in J&K have been able to garner media attention, raise their brand equity and share the same pedestal as state actors. However, this commitment also brings with it enhanced responsibility and obligation to implement the pledge at the functional level. The implementation aspect is a matter of honour, reputation and credibility. As a starting point, they need to understand and comprehend the ramifications of their commitments in the declaration.

Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty defines the term anti-personnel mine as a “mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” Further, a mine is a “munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area.” It is apparent from the definition that the Treaty does not take a narrow view of a mine being an explosive device buried under the ground, as is normally understood. Ipso facto, it also includes within its ambit all IEDs that are concealed elsewhere, subject to their means of actuation, wherein the victim is the initiator of the device.

The UJC’s affirmation that militants in J&K have never resorted to the use of mines is untenable. They have been taking recourse to planting mines close to the border and also in remote areas in the hinterland on routes largely frequented by the Army. They continue to do so even now. Anti-personnel mines have been recovered repeatedly from militants infiltrating across the border. Moreover, the IEDs used by militants in the initial phase of militancy in J&K were predominantly mechanically initiated, requiring the victim to inadvertently disturb the device. They were not “command-detonated”. But over a period of time the trigger mechanism of IEDs has evolved to electric and radio-controlled means of initiation, wherein the presence of a terrorist for target discrimination and detonation became necessary. Consequently, militants will have to employ only command actuated IEDs now to uphold their pledge. Any unattended explosive device should be an anathema for them.

It is, however, a common tactic of militants in J&K to booby trap their vacated hideouts in inaccessible areas and caches of arms and ammunition to inflict casualties on the security forces. And some injured militants who find themselves cornered often place hand grenades with safety pins removed under their equipment or body parts with the same intent. Such tactics will also need to be given up.

Accepting allegiance to the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law also places significant obligations on the militants. One salient aspect is that “in any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. It is prohibited to employ weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” Moreover, weapons that are inherently indiscriminate and whose use violates “the public conscience” are also prohibited. Recent trends in J&K indicate militants and their outsourced agents resorting to grenade lobbing incidents in crowded places, ostensibly to target the security forces, but resulting in indiscriminate civilian casualties. Militants operating in that state will need to curb this tactic as well.

The call for India and Pakistan to end the use of mines and victim-activated weapons needs to be viewed from the perspective of the obtaining security calculus. We need to make it clear to the ICBL that India has never used mines or other victim-detonated weapon systems in any internal security scenario, including in J&K. No new mines are being laid along the borders with Pakistan. Existing minefields, essentially astride the Line of Control on both sides, are a part of the accepted defensive layout. They minefields are fenced and marked properly so that civilians and cattle do not enter inadvertently. In fact, these minefields act as a deterrent to heavily armed infiltrating militants, restrict their avenues of movement, and facilitate successful interception by the Army. Perhaps, at this stage, it may be premature to think that they are redundant.

In case J&K militant groups are serious about this issue, they will need to issue comprehensive guidelines to their cadre already operating in the state and also incorporate the changes required in the training imparted. Though India is not a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, it will be in its interest to highlight any violations of the code that the militants have unilaterally pledged to adhere to.

Myanmar has been in the eye of the storm in recent months. In August, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the Myanmarese military regime led by Than Shwe is known, arbitrarily increased the fuel prices from US $1.18 to $1.96 per gallon. This sudden decision caught the country's impoverished people by surprise, who subsequently began a massive non-violent protest. Similar mass protests had taken place in 1988 against the military regime's removal of bank notes from circulation resulting in loss of savings for the common people. However, this time around, there was a spectacular difference to the protests. It was led by the revered Myanmarese monks, who stated that they were representing the wishes of the people for better living conditions, establishing a dialogue for national reconciliation, and the release of political prisoners. Prominent amongst the prisoners is Aun San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy, who has been under house arrest since 1989.

What has followed since the August protests has been reported widely in the world press. Caught off guard by monks joining the protests this time, the military regime responded with disproportionate violence to terrorise and intimidate the protestors. On September 26, in a brutal military crackdown in Yangon and Mandalay, several monks and peaceful protestors were killed and several thousands arrested and put in prison. Eye witnesses and video clippings of the Myanmarese military response suggest that military personnel were operating under the influence of methamphetamine, a drug that increases aggression. The BBC reported that until the first week of October, the military had raided more than ten monasteries and suggested that the nearly 1000 missing monks had been murdered in cold blood. Amidst the brutal repression of the monks, the common people continue to protest. Amnesty International reported on October 13 that arrests continue and that people are being forcefully detained on a regular basis.

The international community has taken strong note of the unfolding crisis in Myanmar. On October 11, the UN Security Council's President Leslie Kojo Christian of Ghana issued a statement deploring the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators. The statement also asked Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary General's Special Advisor on Myanmar, to find a solution to the crisis at the earliest. It must be noted that amidst international pressure, the Myanmar regime invited Gambari in order to offer his good offices to resolve the unfolding crisis. The UN Human Rights Council, in a special session held on October 2, also condemned the violence. Similarly, the Council of the European Union (EU) has strongly condemned the brutal military crackdown in a meeting at Luxemburg on October 15-16. It has also sought the application of direct pressure on the military regime through stronger measures including an export ban on Myanmar's timber, mining, and precious stones. The US Congress has also added its voice to this general condemnation.

But are these statements sufficient to deter a desperate military regime, clutching onto power by violent means, from carrying out massive human rights violations. It is sad but true that such international debate and condemnation of the Myanmarese military regime's behaviour is not good enough to stop its brutal measures. It is indeed plausible that if the monks manage to take to the streets again, which appears highly unlikely given the calculated brutal military repression that has been unleashed on them, the regime's response will be even more brutal, the international community's condemnation notwithstanding.

The Myanmar military regime seems to be absolutely confident that there will be no international military intervention against its human rights violations. The reason for this is not hard to find - the presence of China in Myanmar's vicinity and its growing influence in the latter's internal politics. Indeed, China, with its veto power in the UN Security Council, is the reason for the continued immunity enjoyed by the Myanmarese regime from international sanctions and explains to a large extent its belligerent behaviour. This is where countries like India (without the power of UNSC veto) lose out to China in the game of wooing Myanmar, despite adopting a policy of constructive engagement with the regime there. It is only China that can effectively stand between Myanmar and the UNSC passing a resolution declaring the internal situation in the country as a threat to international peace and security. In January 2007, both China and Russia had cast vetoes blocking a UNSC Resolution against the SPDC.

It is not hard to understand why China is protecting Myanmar's military regime. In recent years, it has been aggressively pursuing a policy of securing resources to feed its rapid economic development, and Myanmar's abundant natural gas reserves are a great attraction in this regard. China is also keen to develop alternate energy routes besides the Malacca Straits, which could be blocked in the event of a conflict. Myanmar's deep sea ports and opening to the Andaman Sea offer a viable route for Chinese oil imports.

It is also interesting to note that the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a full member since 1997, has come in for increased international pressure to condemn Myanmar's recent belligerent behaviour. ASEAN had accommodated Myanmar in the hope that inclusion rather than isolation would facilitate political reforms within that country. Also, ASEAN members like Thailand are keen to procure gas from Myanmar. Significantly, in January 2007, ASEAN drafted a Charter, which affirms its commitment to the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. It has also established a human rights commission. These developments might be in response to increased focus on such issues at the international level. However, ASEAN must make it imperative for members to adhere to minimum requirements of human rights norms in order to pressurise Myanmar's military regime to change their ways. In this context, it is heartening to observe that ASEAN foreign ministers, in a statement on September 27, condemned the violence unleashed by the Myanmar regime against peaceful protestors. ASEAN also needs to use its institutional influence to pressurise China into playing a more constructive role vis-à-vis the Myanmar regime.

Democracies like the United States, Japan and India need to be more pro-active in enabling political reforms in Myanmar. It is not enough for the US to sanction Myanmar's regime and continue with its policy of diplomatic isolation. Such a "hands off" policy is unlikely to work. Instead, the US needs to create realistic channels of pressure by opening up diplomatic contacts with Myanmar so that it can exert direct pressure on the military junta. In this context, it is worth nothing the change in Japan's Myanmar policy in recent years. From a completely "hands off" policy in the 1980s and 1990s, Japan has moved towards supporting UNSC statements on Myanmar's status recently and has also indicated its commitment to human rights and democracy.

With regard to India, its Myanmar policy has been hinged on "constructive engagement" in order to procure natural gas, obtain security co-operation to control insurgency in the North-East, and build roads connecting the North-East with Southeast Asia through Myanmar for bolstering economic linkages. It is, however, a truism that when it comes to tapping Myanmar's gas reserves, China has the upper hand vis-à-vis India. As for the other two issues, it could prove dangerous to depend on an unpredictable military regime for effective co-operation. If Myanmar were to become a failed state, India stands in direct danger of cross border flows of violence, drugs and disease. It is therefore important that India factors in these aspects as well while formulating its response to the unfolding crisis in Myanmar.

Since the launch of its July 2006 military offensive on Maavilaru, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government has made remarkable advances in almost all aspects of establishing its control over the Eastern province. This is largely thanks to the military inputs provided by the Karuna faction as well as technical, financial and military assistance provided by the international community. The ascendance of the security forces has indeed given much confidence to the Sri Lankan government in militarily engaging the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse, the government “is determined to liberate the remainder of the un-cleared areas in the (rebel controlled) Wanni (region) from the clutches of the LTTE, the same way it liberated the East.”

Military success in the East has buoyed up the Rajapaksa Government, which has had to take considerable flak on human rights violations during these operations. The seeming helplessness of the LTTE in the face of the Sri Lankan military’s advance has greatly contributed to the government’s confidence as well as the determination to take the Tigers head on in the North as well. Moreover, victory in the East has meant that the Sri Lankan security forces have been placed in a position of relative strength, with the confidence to take on the Tigers. In fact, the security forces have made considerable improvements in organisation, maintenance and operations, as well as in the quality and quantity of weapons used during the last few years. Given all this, the Rajapaksa government is hoping to dislodge the Tigers from the North completely in three years time, and has relegated the political process to the back burner. The lack of a strong opposition, discord within the LTTE and immense support from the Sinhala segment of the population are added incentives for the adoption of such a militarist approach.

But it is one thing to gain control of the East and another to repeat this in the North. A combination of Karuna’s input and the lack of a good local LTTE commander helped the Sri Lankan military in the East. Retaking the north—Wanni—is likely to prove to be a more challenging task. There are two notable sources of risk in attempting this. The first is with respect to Wanni’s terrain and the psyche of the LTTE. Wanni – in particular Killinochchi and Mullaitivu – is well-fortified and heavily mined. It is the LTTE’s stronghold and the Sri Lankan forces are bound to face strong, committed and trained Tigers in this area. It appears that the LTTE is already regrouping its forces, including the deadly black Tigers who are capable of inflicting heavy casualties. Moreover, the imminent arrival of the monsoon will be a boon to the Tiger’s guerrilla offensive while at the same time it would hinder the Sri Lankan military advance. Moreover, the Sri Lankan forces lack effective local intelligence and support base in the Wanni region. All these mean that the Sri Lankan military may not be able to inflict a total defeat on the LTTE.

The second risk in trying to militarily regain the North relates to its consequence not only for the government but also for the country as a whole. Wanni is a trigger point and any attack on this LTTE heartland is likely to lead to all out war. The Tigers are likely to respond with spirited attacks, including suicide bombings, against the security forces and the Sinhalese population. Further, the island’s economy, dependent as it is on tourism and international aid, would be adversely affected by such a conflict. It has been reported that revenues from tourism have already come down by 20 per cent in mid-2007. There are also likely to be repercussions on the domestic political as well as international fronts. Though the current domestic political situation in Sri Lanka is stable to an extent, the adverse economic impact of a full-fledged war could provide a boost to the United National Party, the break-away group of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by Mangala Samaraweera and the Janata Vimukti Peramuna, and help them mobilise people against the government. Similarly, the government’s evident lack of concern for human rights is likely to complicate diplomacy and the mobilisation of the international community on its side. The international community is already upset with the Rajapaksa government, as is evident from recent attempts by Senator Patrick Leahy to cut aid to Sri Lanka and the idea floated by the UN Human Rights Commission and the US-based Human Rights Watch to set up a UN human rights monitoring mission in Sri Lanka. And most notably, the spill over effect of a war, on India and in particular on Tamil Nadu, especially given the expected refugee influx is likely to invite Indian displeasure as well.

The present approach of the Rajapaksa government with its emphasis on militarily crushing the LTTE has put the idea of resuming negotiations on the backburner. The very idea of initiating operations in Wanni makes the idea of negotiations a non-starter. While it is true that violence and terrorism require a military response, simply depleting the LTTE’s strength would not bring peace to the island and would not form a prerequisite for a political solution. What is also necessary is a fair power sharing agreement that would to begin with bring at least moderate Tamils on board.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) will convene its 17th National Congress from October 15. The "highest decision-making body" of the CPC, the party congress is mandated to convene every five years. The 17th Party Congress assumes importance as its pronouncements and anticipated leadership shuffles would indicate the direction of state policy in the coming years. Reports in the state controlled media have referred to the 17th Party Congress 'electing' a fresh CPC Central Committee as well as a Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

As widely reported, the 17th Party Congress will comprise of 2217 delegates 'elected' by 38 electoral units across the country. The electoral units are made up of provinces, municipalities, the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, a unit each representing Taiwan, Overseas Chinese and the PLA.

Reflecting perhaps the current nature of political discourse on 'ensuring transparency' and 'accountability', the more than 70 million members of the CPC, and increasingly, ordinary citizens, may contact the Party Congress and its delegates to address their complaints and grievances. The CPC does not disguise the fact that strengthening the role of the Party Congress is to be done under the leadership of the Party with 'democratic centralism' as the core. 'Rule by law' (yifa zhiguo) is the term used to describe the limited nature of political reform in post-Deng China. The avenue through which the CPC could introduce a 'rule by law' has been to pay more consideration to the place and role of the Party Congress. To strengthen the Party Congress' legislative and supervisory role, the CPC has been amending the constitution and has declared that it would establish a 'socialist legal system' by the year 2010.

The credit for commencing the process of revitalising and ensuring a process of orderly formalism in Chinese politics goes to Deng Xiaoping. The effect of growing 'political institutionalisation' in the PRC has led to the creation of a vertical political structure in which 'formal institutions' play a significant role over 'informal networks' - also known as 'connections' (guanxi). Under Deng's stewardship, the Party Central Committee recommenced regular functions, meeting at least once a year as mandated by the Party constitution, in striking contrast to its irregular convocation during the last fifteen years of Mao's leadership. Throughout the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin years, party congresses and the National People's Congress (NPC) - China's legislature - have met fastidiously following the five-year schedule stipulated by the Party (Article 18) and PRC (Article 60) constitutions. For the Hu Jintao leadership, the mantra guiding political thought and action of the CPC is of 'realising institutionalisation, standardisation and procedural formalisation (zhiduhua, guifanhua, chengxuhua) of socialist democratic politics.'

Reflecting a 'pro-society' slant, the central theme of the 17th Party Congress is widely expected to be on 'Harmonious society.' Under Hu Jintao's leadership, the policy refrain revolves around two axioms - 'harmonious society' (hexie shehui), and its foreign policy equivalent 'harmonious world' (hexie shijie). The Central Committee of the CPC during the 6th Plenum of October 2006 adopted the ideological plank of 'Building Socialism and Harmonious Society' leading to a quasi official campaign on 'harmonious society.' The 17th Party Congress is expected to include 'harmonious society' in the CPC's charter (mirroring Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents'). 'Harmonious society/world,' from a perspective of the Hu Jintao - Wen Jiabao leadership, attempts to chart the direction of China's 'socioeconomic development' and setting the tenor of national priorities.

A noteworthy aspect of the current Chinese leadership (and possibly of the new leaders to emerge from the 17th Party Congress) is that they are highly qualified and technically trained, and that background has largely influenced their approach to decision-making in the political, economic and strategic spheres. Being representative of a non-revolutionary generation of leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have since 2002 had to seek legitimacy and a new power platform through procedural authority and 'institutional innovation' (zhidu chuangxin). As representatives with a technocratic background (all members of the current Standing Committee are engineers), the leadership, it could be interpreted, has deferred to expertise and institutions to forge policies and consensus.

As a result of political institutionalisation, the very temperament and structure of politics in China is undergoing a process of transformation. First, the fixed tenure nature of the highest political office from one political leader to another can be considered politically meaningful and orderly. Second, institutional loyalty as opposed to personal loyalty is becoming the norm. Third, the political space has vastly expanded to accommodate diverse interests. Fourth, with party ideology becoming more accommodative to suit the current socio-economic reality (the 'Three Represents' being a case in point) political legitimacy for the leadership continues. Lastly, having gone through the chaos and autarky that was the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when the entire body politic was 'hollowed out,' there seems to be general consensus amongst the political class in Beijing that institutionalisation of the political structure is necessary to ensure political stability and accommodate growing social concerns.