Manipur has the dubious distinction of having the maximum numbers of bandhs, which adversely affect its economy and inconvenience the people. Though directed against the state, these bandhs underscore the deepening polarization of society and polity there. With about two dozens militant groups, Manipur is one of the most volatile states in India.

Topographically, Manipur is divided into hill and valley. The densely populated valley, constituting just one-fourth of the geographical area, is surrounded on all sides by the sparsely populated hills which constitute two-third of the remainder. The tribal groups, who mainly inhabit the hills, are generally critical of the state government which is largely dominated by the Meitei community that lives in the valley.

The state government's near ineffectiveness in meeting the growing aspirations of the people and the alleged excesses committed by the security forces in the course of countering militancy are the main reasons for calling bandhs in the state. Militants also call for bandhs on days of national significance like Republic Day, Independence Day, etc. Today, bandhs or blockades (blockades in Manipur refer mainly to blocking of the movement of goods-laden vehicles along the inter-state highways) have become the most common and effective means to force the government to redress popular grievances. It is observed that the tribal groups mainly resort to blockade of the inter-state highways that serve as the life-line of the landlocked state. In contrast, in the plains, bandhs are common.

A recent online opinion poll conducted by a news portal (Kanglaonline.com) revealed that 13 per cent of the 996 respondents considered the "unreasonable demands of numerous organizations" as the major factor for bandhs in the state. 7 per cent of the respondents identified "insensitive government that works only when there is large scale violence" as the main reason for bandhs. 3 per cent said that bandhs have become a favourite pastime of the people. Interestingly, an overwhelming majority (71 per cent) of the respondents considered all the above factors as responsible for bandhs.

As things stand, there were altogether 42 bandhs (state-wide, district-wide, etc.) in the state during 2006-07 (till January) as well as 77 blockades of inter-state highways. The figures for 2005-06 stood at 48 and 97, and for 2004-05 they were 20 and 60, respectively. Two organisations - the All Naga Students' Association of Manipur (ANSAM) and the Meitei Erol Eyek Lionasillon Apunba Lup (MEELAL) - were responsible for calling the maximum number of these bandhs or blockades during these three years. While the former has significant influence in the Naga-dominated hill regions, the latter draws its strength from the valley.

Manipur is connected by road to the rest of India and to Myanmar by three national highways (NH-39, NH-53 and NH-150). The Mao-Imphal section of NH-39 is the state's major link route to the outside world. Several hundred trucks ply this route daily bringing essential commodities such as food grains, petrol, diesel, cooking gas, etc. from other parts of the country. A large number of passenger buses and other vehicles too ply on this highway. Along with it, the Imphal-Moreh section of NH-39 is also widely used by the business community to shop at the key town of Moreh on the Indo-Myanmar border. With no rail links, a blockade of these highways has been the most common and effective method for agitators to bring pressure to bear on the state government.

Along with the innumerable bandhs and blockages, another factor which compounds the problem is the so-called "taxes" levied by insurgent groups. Several militant groups, particularly the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac-Muivah (NSCN-IM), impose different rates of 'illegal tax' on commercial vehicles plying these routes, depending on the value of the consignments being carried. For example, on the Mao-Imphal section of NH-39, the NSCN-IM reportedly charges an oil tanker Rs. 3,000 per trip, Rs. 2000 for trucks carrying cooking gas cylinders, and Rs. 1,000 for those carrying cement. Apart from this, the outfit also regularly collects illegal permit fee from trucks to ply on this highway. Other militant groups too are active in their respective areas of operation.

Along with the militant menace, the frequent bandhs and blockades imposed on the inter-state highways by protestors have severely affected economic activities in the state and have led to acute shortages of essential commodities, including life-saving medicines. It is useful, in this context, to recall the 52-day-long (June 19 to August 11, 2005) blockade of the Mao-Imphal section of the NH-39 imposed by ANSAM in protest against the state government's decision to declare June 18 as 'State Integrity Day' in honour of 18 persons killed while protesting against the extension of ceasefire between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM to Manipur. To provide relief to the people, the Indian Air Force was pressed into service to airlift medicines to Manipur from Guwahati.

As is evident, such bandhs and blockades have had an adverse impact on Manipur's economy. According to a state government study, the economic impact of bandhs during 2004-05 was estimated at about Rs. 106.8 crores, while the total economic loss due to the blockades on highways was estimated at about Rs. 139.2 crores. The total loss thus was Rs. 246 crores. The same study estimated that during 2005-06 the total loss caused by bandhs and blockades was Rs. 553.23 crores. And the estimated loss for 2006-07 (till January 31, 2007) was Rs. 520.73 crores.

Besides affecting the economy, bandhs and blockades also expose the deepening divide between the hills and the plains. For instance, the introduction of the old Meitei script in schools across the state - in the wake of an agitation in Meitei areas demanding such a step - was not well received by Manipur's tribal population, which saw it as an attempt to impose the dominant Meitei language and culture on them. Similarly, when Nagas living in the hill districts of Manipur organised an agitation for affiliating schools there to the Nagaland Board of Secondary Education, Meiteis in the valley interpreted it as a step towards integrating these areas with the state of Nagaland. In this context, it is worth noting that most issues on which bandhs and blockades are organised are exclusive to one or the other groups that make up Manipur's population. The only issue that actually brought them all together was the agitation against the withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

This unhealthy state of affairs is not only a reflection of state failure but also of the increasing polarization between people living in the plains and the hills. It is imperative that the state government gears itself to meeting the aspirations of the people. This would enable it to mobilize civil society groups against the increasing number of bands and blockades as well as initiate stringent measures to curb the growing lawlessness in the state.

In the midst of the domestic hullabaloo surrounding the nuclear deal in India, the United States convened a special meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on September 20, 2007 at Vienna on the sidelines of the IAEA Annual General Conference to brief members on the deal. The NSG derives its important position in international civil nuclear commerce from its membership, which currently stands at forty-five and includes a majority of countries engaged in nuclear trade. NSG members control roughly 80 per cent of the global uranium reserves and about 78 per cent of global uranium production.1 Currently, Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan are the only three non-NSG countries producing significant amounts of uranium. However, they are party to Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and once the African and Central Asian nuclear weapon free zones come into force they too would insist upon full scope safeguards for any transfer of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear weapon states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NSG members possess a stranglehold on the entire spectrum of nuclear technology, given that there is no supplier country outside of the NSG with civilian nuclear technology.

Till recently, India has been suspicious of the NSG's activities given that the Group was set up in response to its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in May 1974. Because NSG guidelines do not possess the sanctity of an international treaty and their implementation is left to the will of the member countries through their respective national export control laws, India initially managed to circumvent them by approaching supplier countries directly. But this route was blocked in 1992 when the Warsaw Guidelines were drawn up, which made a full-scope safeguards agreement with the Internal Atomic Energy Agency a precondition for the supply of Trigger List items to 'non-nuclear weapon states'.

Modification of the NSG Guidelines is imperative to allow India to embark on civil nuclear trade with supplier countries. However, the fact that the Group works on the basis of consensus makes this a complex issue. The NSG is an amalgamation of several supplier countries, each working with its own set of priorities and motivations. It therefore becomes important to map out the manner in which member states have received the Indo-US nuclear deal and how they are likely to vote on an India-specific waiver as and when the matter comes up for discussion.

NSG members can be broadly classified into five groups (see Table below). The first group comprises of countries that have supported the deal over the last two years. The second group consists of states that are likely to go along with the United States and Russia on the issue. Members of the New Agenda Coalition comprise the third group. The fourth group consists of countries that do not wish to see the dilution of the NPT as a consequence of the India deal.

China is one country that does not fit into any of these categories and thus remains a class apart. Initially, in the wake of the July 18, 2005 joint statement, Beijing had maintained a studied silence on the issue. Subsequently, it launched a verbal tirade against the US move, depicting as an example of American 'double standards'. It went on to say that if the US made a "nuclear exception" for India other powers could do the same with their friends, which would ultimately weaken the global non-proliferation regime. 'Hypocrisy' is the word that comes to mind here, given China's past proliferation record of extending wide-ranging assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme including complete weapons design, ring magnets, missile systems, etc.

There have been subsequent reports, mentioning unnamed sources in the Chinese delegation to the IAEA Board of Governors, that China would give its assent to the US proposal for an NSG exception clause for India in return being allowed to continue exporting power reactors to Pakistan. This is in total contrast to the de-hyphenation that the Bush administration has introduced in its ties with India and Pakistan, with Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns going to the extent of declaring that the nuclear deal is unique to India and will not be extended "in any way, shape or form" to any other country including Pakistan.

In recent months, however, China has adopted a more ambivalent stand. On September 6, 2007, for instance, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson blandly pointed out that "…within the Nuclear Suppliers Group there are different views about relaxing the restrictions on nuclear exports to India" without any hint about what China's views in this regard are.

Possible sub-groupings within the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the Indo-US deal2

Over the last two years India has been lobbying various member states of the NSG to secure support for an exception in its favour. In June 2005 the Minister of State for External Affairs, Anand Sharma visited Brazil and South Africa and held discussions on this issue. In July 2006, Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary and currently the Prime Minister's Special Envoy on the nuclear deal, hosted NSG Ambassadors at Washington in a bid to assuage their concerns. Also, in the run up to the Rio Plenary, Ronen Sen, India's ambassador to the United States, met several representatives of NSG states in a bid to energise opinion in favour of the agreement. India's diplomatic efforts have reaped benefits in the form of support from several NSG members like France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Cyprus, Australia and South Africa.

There are, however, several countries that have expressed concerns about providing an exception for India. Most are concerned about the impact the deal will have on the NPT. Norway and Ireland, for example, have in the past expressed concerns about the deal. During the Plenary session of the NSG held at Rio de Janeiro on May 29, 2006, Norway, Sweden and Ireland were three significant hold outs. During his visit to New Delhi in December 2005, Norwegian Prime Minster Jens Stoltenberg told reporters that Norway appreciated India's need for civil nuclear energy, but insisted that India sign the NPT if it wanted the NSG to modify the guidelines in its favour. But Norwegian diplomats were quick to clarify subsequently that their government did not intend to make India joining the NPT a pre-condition for its membership in the NSG.

The issue of NSG membership, though separate from the current debate on granting an exception to India, is likely to arise subsequently. Currently, the NSG criterion for membership requires the applicant to be a NPT signatory. In future, when India begins to engage in civil nuclear commerce with NSG members, it would not like to be in a situation where it has to adhere to NSG Guidelines including any future amendments without being a party to the decision-making process.

The internal dynamics of the NSG are quite complex. One example of this is the fact that Brazil and South Africa, despite being members of the New Agenda Coalition, have extended support for the Indo-US nuclear deal. Members of this Coalition are otherwise vociferous supporters of full-scope safeguards as a condition for transfer of trigger list items and technology to 'non-nuclear weapon states'. It is thus possible that there may be other NSG members who would similarly extend support for the India-specific waiver in spite of their existing allegiances.

Amendment to the NSG Guidelines

It is understood that the existing NSG Guidelines need to be modified to enable India to participate in civil nuclear commerce with the Group's members. As India is not a member of the Group, it has to rely upon the United States and its allies to pursue the matter. In the July 18, 2005 statement, the US had agreed to work with "like minded states" to modify NSG Guidelines. Key Indian decision makers have made statements to the effect that they expect the US to work out a "clean and unconditional" exemption for India from the NSG.

A clear cut exception would necessarily mean that the NSG allows participating governments to conduct civil nuclear commerce with India without insisting upon full scope safeguards. Currently Article 4(a) of the NSG Part I Guidelines requires full scope safeguards for transfer of trigger list items or related technology to 'non-nuclear weapon states'.

The US had circulated a pre-decisional draft prior to a NSG consultative group meeting in Vienna held on March 22-23, 2006. It provided for a clean India-specific exception and for removal of the requirement of full-scope safeguards, thereby allowing NSG members to "transfer Trigger List items and/or related technology to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India…" It has been reported that China and Japan raised several questions at this meeting, many of which were critical of the deal. As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in a March 2006 article, the American draft cleverly skirted the issue of India's 'non-nuclear weapon state' status by referring to it as "a State not party, and never having been a party, to the NPT." Such phraseology allows an exception to be granted without referring to India as a 'non-nuclear weapon state'. By adopting this line, the US seeks to assuage the concerns of its domestic non-proliferation lobby while at the same time paying due heed to India's concerns about being classified as a 'non-nuclear weapon state'.

It has been reported that China subsequently circulated a draft at the NSG, which allows civil nuclear cooperation though without an India specific exception. The Chinese draft reportedly lays down criteria for granting such an exception without naming India.

During its initial stages, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was called the London Club, and the standing joke is that it still very much functions like one. Therefore, what actually transpired last week at the special meeting held in Vienna will take some time to seep out. In any event, India and the US need to work towards building a consensus at the NSG and strategise means to overcome the possible opposition of China and/or states that have non-proliferation concerns to the grant of a clear and unconditional exception for India.

Notes

• 1. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• 2. The table is not definitive. It is meant to serve as a pointer to the positions of various countries on the India specific exception based either on statements made on the issue or on their national policies.
• 3. Switzerland has not come out with any reaction to the US proposal on granting a permanent exception to India. However, it is possible that domestic nuclear industry might convince the government citing the enormous economic potential that a waiver in favour of India would open up.
• 4. Ireland and Sweden were critical of the deal at the Rio Plenary held in May 2006.

Hyderabad has been reeling under deadly terror strikes. Three months after the serial blasts at Mecca Masjid on May 18, 2007, another pair of coordinated attacks rocked the city on August 25. Repeated attacks by outfits with support from foreign covert agencies have made Hyderabad an epicentre of terrorist operations in India. The twin blasts on August 25 and the subsequent recovery of unexploded bombs from different places pointed to a security lapse as well as a delayed government response to demands for beefing up the city's protective measures in the aftermath of the May explosions.

The pair of synchronized attacks took place at two popular spots among people, and resulted in the death of 42 people (including 14 Muslims) and injury to over 100. The first bomb exploded at around 7.30 pm during a laser show on Hyderabad's history in Lumbini Park, an open-air theatre and India's biggest laser show arena with a seating capacity of 1,800. The bomb ripped through four middle rows of seats and took 11 lives from an audience of about 500 people. The second explosion took place at a popular restaurant in Kothi, where famous eateries and book stalls are located. Both targets are located at the heart of Hyderabad's commercial district.

Though investigations are on, no substantive clues have been found so far. But a few people have been arrested in connection with the incidents. Immediately after the blast, 25 people were arrested by the state police for interrogation, which was of not much help. Then, on the next day, three cycle shop owners were detained from Bhongir in Nalgonda district on suspicion of supplying bicycle ball bearings that were used as pellets in the bombs. On the third day, an Assamese, who apparently looked like a Bangladeshi, was apprehended because of suspicious behaviour. It needs to be borne in mind here that the militant outfit suspected of carrying out these terror attacks is the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), which is based in Bangladesh and is said to regularly infiltrate into India to recruit cadres and open sleeping cells across the country including in Assam.

On August 29, 2007, a computer-generated portrait of a person, suspected to have planted the bomb in Lumbini Park, was produced. Interestingly, in the course of a narcoanalysis test conducted on one of the arrested persons, Syed Imran Khan, it was learnt that some 10 kilograms of Royal Demolition eXplosive (RDX) were smuggled into the city in February 2007 out of which 800 grams were used in the bombs that ripped through Mecca Masjid. This information was to an extent substantiated by the subsequent arrest of a Bangladeshi national, Shareefa Rustomji, who confirmed that explosives have been smuggled into the city.

Despite all out efforts, the Andhra police have not been able to track down the actual perpetrator, though the needle of suspicion points towards the HuJI chief, Sahid Bilal aka Aamir, who had also been accused of masterminding the Mecca Masjid blasts on May 18, 2007; the Samjhauta Express explosions near Panipat on February 19, 2007 and the October 12, 2005 suicide attack on the Special Task Force headquarters in Hyderabad. At the same time, the possibility of the involvement of cadres of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and/or of the Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) are also being investigated, given that over a dozen trained international terror outfits are on the prowl in the city. In fact, one reliable report has stated that at least 1000 active foreign terror elements are currently operating in Andhra Pradesh. Since Muslims constitute 40 per cent of the city's population, it is often considered easy for foreign Islamic militant groups and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to recruit jehadi elements and establish sleeping cells in Hyderabad.

What has made the city vulnerable are the booming IT sector and general laxity in security. Central agencies have repeatedly warned that Hyderabad has been on the terrorist radar since the early 1990s. It is worth mentioning that both the blasts in May and August 2007 happened despite National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan warning against possible terrorist strikes in the city. However no adequate measures seem to have been undertaken. Authorities in Hyderabad have been blamed for not providing adequate security and for not investing sufficient resources for intelligence gathering on terrorism. The counter-intelligence wing, whose job is to tackle terror threats, is said to be understaffed and ill-trained, whereas the anti-Naxal wing is well sustained with money and manpower. Moreover, out of the state's 80,000-odd police force, only about 30,000 are reportedly well equipped, serving as they do in special wings. In addition, most of the better equipped personnel are either posted in Naxal-prone areas or are committed to protecting the 294 MLAs and 90 MLCs in the state. As Naxalites primarily target political figures and government property, Naxalism is treated with greater seriousness than other threats. The total number of fatalities in Andhra Pradesh caused by left-wing extremism in the last three years (2005-2007) is 546 (including civilian, security forces and Naxals), which is said to be the highest among the 13 Naxal-affected states in the country.

One important fact that has come to light in the course of the last few significant terrorist strikes in India is that terrorists seem to be targeting sensitive places like temples, mosques, theatres, crowded markets, etc. on days of congregation. Bombs have been set to go off during prayers on holy days, during evening rush hours or on weekends when a large number of people are likely to be present. For instance, the latest blasts at Lumbini Park in Hyderabad and the bomb exploded in New Delhi's Sarojini Nagar market in October 2005 took place on a Saturday evening. The May 2005 terrorist targeting of the Liberty and Satyam cinemas in Delhi occurred on a Sunday. Most attacks on mosques have occurred on Fridays so as to have maximum impact: the May 2007 Mecca Masjid blasts; the September 19, 2006 attack on Arehmani Masjid and Bada Kabrastan in Malegon; and the April 14, 2006 targeting of Delhi's Jama Masjid. The September 2002 terrorist attack on the Akshardam Temple in Gandhinagar was on a Tuesday. Security establishments around the country need to factor this aspect in their security drills and enhance their vigilance on such occasions.

The successive terrorist strikes in Hyderabad not only reveal the fact that the city is emerging as a breeding ground for terrorists, but also exposes the inadequacies of the security establishment in the city.

"I want a country where the army cannot arrest anyone without a warrant. I want our political parties to be democratic, transparent and accountable. I want fair and neutral judges. I want the right to vote. I want there to be no such thing as a legal fatwa. I want the war criminals of the 1971 genocide to be tried, condemned and jailed. I want to vote. I want a country worthy of my desh-prem. I want a country." -- Tahmima Anam, New Statesman, January 22, 2007.

An innocuous football match on August 20 between students of two Dhaka University departments in the university campus turned violent when students clashed with the police in the gymnasium. A verbal duel between a policeman and a student sparked the clash, which left hundreds injured. The sudden outbreak of violence led to students going on a violent rampage and demanding the immediate withdrawal of the army camp, which had been established in the campus after the caretaker government assumed power. While the caretaker government's expression of apology to the students for the incident and its decision to remove the army camp with immediate effect were steps in the right direction, the marked sense of anger amongst the students as well as professors has spread far beyond the university campus.

The demand for the withdrawal of army camps (a feature introduced by the second caretaker government) from all university campuses swiftly gained ground. And within hours the agitation had spread to the Rajshahi University campus, turning it into a virtual battle ground between police forces and protesting students. Media reports indicate that the violence took a turn for the worse with students of the Islamic Chatra Shibir joining the fray. The situation worsened further when several hundreds more from other colleges like Kabi Nazrul Islam and Suhrawardy College joined a students procession in a show of solidarity. The sudden escalation of violence led to the imposition of curfew and the government closing down universities and colleges in all metropolises, thus forcing students to vacate hostels immediately on Wednesday evening.

Indeed, university campuses in Bangladesh have been grounds for political battles, and students taking recourse to violence has not been an unknown occurrence in the past. Significantly, given the present prevailing emergency situation under a civilian interim government in Bangladesh, such an incident has the potential to result in far reaching consequences. In brief, the present political condition in Bangladesh arose in the wake of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led coalition government completing its term. The scheduled 9th Jatiya Sangsad (parliamentary) elections had to be postponed since the ground situation was not conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, leading to the second caretaker government taking over the reins of power in January 2007. Initially, the Fakhruddin Ahmed-led cabinet of ten advisors was welcomed by most people, but, now, eight months later, public opinion seems to have undergone considerable change.

In his first nationwide telecast on January 22, Fakhuruddin Ahmed outlined a comprehensive seven point 'reform' program aimed at meeting the "people's demand" for uprooting corruption, the introduction of ID cards and the use of transparent ballot boxes, etc. He also expressed his government's intent to make "all-out efforts to hold an election participated by and acceptable to all." While it is true that the imposition of an emergency stabilised the volatile political situation, the caretaker government however soon assumed a character that had not been envisaged for it under the constitution. According to the 13th constitutional amendment which legalised this form of government in Bangladesh, the caretaker government is meant to provide "to the Election Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general election…." But the present interim government has gone far beyond the mandate that had been assigned to it, with Chief Advisor Ahmed reiterating his commitment to hold elections only before the end of 2008.

The caretaker government's drive against corruption found many supporters initially, but public enthusiasm began to wane as it gradually became clear that this Army-backed government was acquiring increasing powers. On the one hand, it endeared itself to the people through populist measures, but on the other its increasing political involvement, including repressive measures against Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia and their parties, have forced many people to question its real intentions. Bangladesh today finds itself in the unenviable position of having to choose between an unelected government running the country along military lines and elected governments run by political leaders who have not allowed democracy to fully take root.

What clearly emerges from the current violence involving students is the underlying political tension in Bangladesh. The situation on the streets is far from normal. Bangladeshis are tired of the constant power struggle between the two main political alliances, and have also become wary of the interim government. However, instances of people's opposition against government policies being expressed openly have so far been few. The notable exception being the hundreds of Awami supporters who defied a political ban to come out on to the streets to greet Sheikh Hasina on her return from the United States.

It is in this context that the violence being witnessed in recent days assumes significance. A banal exchange between a student and a policeman provided the trigger for the suppressed frustration and latent anger that had been building up over the past few months against the present government. Given the unpredictable nature of the present situation, there is a lurking fear that the military could intervene directly in the country's politics if the caretaker government were to prove its inability to address the growing public resentment against its rule. Bangladesh thus seems set to endure a further period of political instability.