IDSA Comments

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • Title Author Date Summary Body Topics Research Area Banner Image Image Category
    Dr. Manmohan Singh’s Message on Arunachal Pradesh M. Amarjeet Singh March 04, 2008

    Apart from launching several new development initiatives, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh served as a big boost to the morale of the Arunachalis, whose territory China repeatedly claims.

    Apart from launching several new development initiatives, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh served as a big boost to the morale of the Arunachalis, whose territory China repeatedly claims.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a traditional and underdeveloped economy and lags behind the national average in most components of infrastructure. With a population of about 10.98 lakhs (Census 2001), its literacy rate of 54.3 per cent falls below the national average and is also the lowest in the entire Northeast. Its per capita income of Rs. 19566 (2003-04) at constant (1993-94) prices is much below the national average. Road transport, the only means of communication in the state, is abysmal. Several district headquarters are yet to be connected by road, forcing people to travel through neighbouring Assam. As many as 34 of the state’s 157 administrative centres and 2453 of its 3860 villages are yet to be connected by road. It has a road density of just 18.65 km per 100 sq. km, as against the national average of 84 km. In comparison, Assam’s road density is 87.22, Manipur’s is 48.99, and Meghalaya’s 37.8. Arunachal also fairs poorly in health care facilities.

    “The sun kisses India first in Arunachal Pradesh. It is our land of the rising sun… It is my sincere hope that like the sun, Arunachal Pradesh will also rise from the east as a new star and become one of the best regions of our country,” Dr. Singh said while addressing a public meeting at Itanagar on January 31, the first day of his two-day visit to the state. In this context, Dr. Singh identified four priority areas of concern for ensuring rapid development of the state: (a) connectivity (through roads, railways and airports); (b) infrastructure (roads, power and drinking water); (c) educational and healthcare facilities; and (d) economic development (tourism, food processing, and large scale power projects).

    Keeping these priority areas in mind, Dr. Singh announced a number of development projects for the state. The most prominent among them was the 1,840 kilometre Trans-Arunachal Pradesh two-lane highway from Tawang to Mahadevpur. The cost of this project is estimated to be about Rs. 5,500 crore. This is a flagship highway and one of the most important road projects to be taken up by the Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance government. Once completed, it is expected to contribute immensely to the state’s economic development. Besides, other projects announced by Dr. Singh include: a Rs. 550 crore programme to bring power to every home with non-conventional energy; a Rs. 400 crore flood relief package; and a Rs. 245 crore railway project connecting Harmoti in Assam and Itanagar. The rail link from Harmoti to Itanagar will reduce travel time to destinations outside the state and provide better access.

    With an estimated potential of over 30,000 MW, Arunachal Pradesh ranks first in the country in terms of hydroelectric power potential. Nevertheless, this potential has remained untapped. Keeping this mind, Dr. Singh laid the foundation for the 3,000-MW Dibang Multipurpose Power Project (the country’s biggest hydel project), and the 110-MW Pare Power Project. The Dibang power project is expected to generate revenue of as much as Rs. 300 crores annually to the state. The cost of the project as estimated in November 2007 was about Rs. 16,425 crores. Further, the prime minister also laid the foundation for various other projects including a secretariat building in Itanagar; and water supply projects for Itanagar and Naharlagun.

    Dr. Singh’s reference to Arunachal as “our land of the rising sun” seems to have been intended to send a loud and clear message to China that the state is an indispensable part of India. This message has also come as a boost to Arunachalis anxious about repeated Chinese claims over their land. The subsequent announcement of daily helicopter services between Guwahati in Assam and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh also carries significance given Chinese claims on and interest in acquiring Tawang in particular. In fact, it is the Chinese claim over Tawang that has been to a great extent holding up the resolution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute.

    The Prime Minister’s announcement of several new development initiatives also underscores India’s bid to match similar developments across Arunachal’s 1030 kilometre border with China. There are as many as 1447 extremely backward villages situated along the state’s 1680 km long border with China, Myanmar and Bhutan. The backwardness of these border areas becomes even more distinct when compared with the rapid pace of development in Tibet on the other side of the Sino-Indian border.

    Seeking to boost the morale of soldiers braving hostile weather conditions in the inhospitable terrain of the state, Dr. Singh lauded their efforts in guarding the border as well as fighting insurgency and terrorism. He also assured them that the air infrastructure in the state would be upgraded.

    Dr. Singh’s initiatives are indeed encouraging because despite being one of India's most strategically located frontiers, Arunachal Pradesh is a rather poorly developed state. Being the least densely populated (13 persons per sq. km.) Indian state and surrounded as it is by three countries, Arunachal Pradesh indeed needs special attention.

    Northeast India, Arunachal Pradesh Terrorism & Internal Security IDSA COMMENT
    Naxalite Mayhem in Nayagarh Nihar R. Nayak February 28, 2008

    In a meticulously planned offensive, reminiscent of the February 2004 attack at Koraput in Orissa, around 360 highly trained armed cadres belonging to the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) also known as Naxalites, including women cadres, carried out simultaneous attack on district armory, police training school armory, and the police stations of Nayagarh town, Nuagoan, Dasapalla and the Mahipur police outpost in Nayagarh district in Orissa. Nearly 15 police personnel including a civilian were killed and 5 others injured in the attack.

    In a meticulously planned offensive, reminiscent of the February 2004 attack at Koraput in Orissa, around 360 highly trained armed cadres belonging to the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) also known as Naxalites, including women cadres, carried out simultaneous attack on district armory, police training school armory, and the police stations of Nayagarh town, Nuagoan, Dasapalla and the Mahipur police outpost in Nayagarh district in Orissa. Nearly 15 police personnel including a civilian were killed and 5 others injured in the attack. The attack was allegedly planned by the Central Military Commission of the CPI-Maoists and executed with active coordination of Bansadhra division of Orissa State committee.

    The rebels approached the town from two directions with all available vehicles including cargo trucks, bus, Jeeps and motorbikes. Before the attack, they had disconnected all communication lines, disrupted power supply and blocked all entry points to the town. Eyewitness sources informed that before launching the attack, the Naxalites asked the people to stay indoors, making it clear that their intention was to decamp with huge arms and ammunitions. The Naxalites seized around 1, 200 arms including 500 .303 rifle, 400 Insas rifles, 3 light machine guns, 20 AK-47s and 70 self-loading rifles. The seizure also included more than one lakh bullets from armory and police stations in five trucks and a bus which they had hijacked. The naxalites virtually siege the town for two hours by blocking all entry roads, including National Highway 224, to the Nayagarh town. Adequately armed, the rebels were believed to have retreated in separate directions to nearest wildlife sanctuaries like Satkosia and Sunabeda in the west, Mahanadi Bisapally and Balukhand sanctuary in south-west and south.

    Though Nayagarh district had been unaffected by the Naxalite, they are relatively active in neighbouring Gajapati and parts of Kandhamal district. However, in 2006 a local news paper reported about a possible Maoists movement in the Nayagarh forests. In fact, the Naxalites had sent a message to the then District Magistrate on possible attacks in the district in 2005. The district police, however, did not pay attention. Nayagarh is the home town of the CPI-Maoist Orissa State Committee secretary, Sabysachi Panda. Despite all ominous signs, the district administration failed to anticipate any Naxalite attack on the police stations and armory.

    The events of 15 February indicate that a well entrenched Maoist ‘sleeper armed squad’ was operational in Nayagarah for a long time. The anatomy of the attack prove that the Maoist have changed their strategy by not undertaking any prior attacks in a particular area where they want to procure arms and funds. Since the affected states have decided to disarm police stations located in interior areas, Maoists have begun targeting only those police stations that have arms cache. As a result, such attacks are on expected lines. Clearly, the rebels were aware of the deployment of the security forces on Assembly duty. The Naxalites have even penetrated the intelligence system with their sympathisers. These sympathisers might have purposefully leaked the Assembly duty information to the Naxalites. This indicates that the Naxalites have carefully studied the force deployment of the Orissa police with the knowledge that Nayagarh district, earlier with Bhubaneswar, is now under the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), Cuttack. The distance between the reserve battalion located in Cuttack city and Nayagarh made the task easy for the Naxalites.

    The incident puts the spotlight on the police force. Such a calibrated attack requires coordinated planning, probably spanning a month. Since there were no reports of any squads operating in the district, Maoist sympathisers, in all probability, would have played a key role in collating social and strategic information like class and caste structure of the local people, roads, forests, presence of staffs in the police stations, locations of police stations, sentry position, building structure, inventory of armory and its locations. Interestingly, unlike the Koraput attack, the Maoist did not take the help of militia. On the other hand, the use of transport vehicles throughout the operations was quite alarming. The Maoists also applied divergent tactics by engaging security forces in arranging of fake meetings and training camps in Gajapati, Malkangiri and Koraput.

    The Naxalites are extending their reach to coastal districts after consolidating position in southern and northern districts in Orissa. The Nayagarh incident not only demonstrates the enormous inefficiency of the State machinery but also points to an emergence of a new mobile warfare strategy in other Naxal affected states too. One important aspect of the attack was the complete dominance of the armed squads with practically no help from the militia. The looted arms will in all likelihood be used in new areas like the Dandkaranya region. It is to be noted that the movement has been sustained for more than 40 years with poor governance, weak federal laws and lack of political will strongly contributing to its growth. Unless a balanced development plan is formulated taking into account the democratic institutions, human development and security agencies, the problem would remain unresolved.

    Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Orissa Terrorism & Internal Security IDSA COMMENT
    Satellite Interception: US BMD Survives the Acid Test A. Vinod Kumar February 26, 2008

    Rarely would a defence R&D agency get an actual operational scenario to test the capability of a military system before attaining total technological maturity. The much-maligned U.S. Missile Defence Agency (MDA) silenced its long-time critics by utilising such an opportunity through a successful interception of a dysfunctional military reconnaissance satellite which threatened to hit the Earth with hazardous fuel.

    Rarely would a defence R&D agency get an actual operational scenario to test the capability of a military system before attaining total technological maturity. The much-maligned U.S. Missile Defence Agency (MDA) silenced its long-time critics by utilising such an opportunity through a successful interception of a dysfunctional military reconnaissance satellite which threatened to hit the Earth with hazardous fuel. The seemingly successful interception and destruction of the orbiting satellite on February 21 by an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system is a landmark in the US BMD development and in all likelihood would galvanise other such programmes currently under development-stage.

    Being the first ever real-time outer space interception by a BMD system, the MDA used the ship-based Aegis system, the US’ only operational BMD currently deployed in Pacific Ocean (also employed by Japan and Australia). The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the main interceptor used in this mission, has a ‘hit-to-kill technology’ to intercept and destroy an incoming threat in ‘Exo-atmosphere’ (outside Earth’s atmosphere). With a 250+ km range, the SM-3 operates in conjunction with the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars and sensors. For this particular mission, the Aegis was complemented by the powerful Cobra Dane and X-band radar (deployed on a floating platform) to impart precision tracking and targeting.

    Mission-analysis reveals that the MDA has a multi-stage interception plan. The USS Lake Erie (Ticonderoga class cruiser) was to launch the first SM-3 and possibly a second one, if the first intercept failed. A second ship, the Decatur (Arleigh Burke class destroyer) kept ready a third SM-3 to be used if the initial two attempts failed. The SM-3s deployed in the USS Lake Erie was modified (through changes in its targeting software) to track the cold satellite, unlike its actual design capability of targeting heated warheads. The intercept convoy was deployed off the Hawaii Islands to track the satellite in its orbit and launch the interceptors when the intercept window was opened on the morning of February 21. Along with the radar and tracking systems, various space-based platforms were also put into service for data collection that fed to the mission controls at the Vandenberg Air Force Base and at the space command in Colorado Springs. In the end, the MDA mission proved successful after the first SM-3, reportedly launched from the USS Lake Erie, destroyed the satellite on impact thus taking out the target in the first hit, but sparking of debris some of which might re-enter the atmosphere in the coming days.

    This landmark mission was necessary. The satellite planned to be destroyed had stopped communicating with mission control facilities shortly after it was launched 14 months ago, and thereafter began a slow descent towards Earth. The primary objective of the intercept mission was to destroy a fuel tank aboard the satellite which was holding over 450-kg of hydrazine, a toxic fuel. Had the tank survived a re-entry of the falling satellite, it could have caused serious danger to the point of impact and more so if it was a population centre. Though it is yet to be confirmed whether the intercept successfully destroyed the fuel tank, the mere fact that this was the first ever operational intercept outside Earth’s atmosphere by a US is significant in many ways, particularly as a major milestone in the global evolution of BMD technology.

    The successful intercept assumes further significance for the US MDA which has increasingly been under the scanner for its slow progress. Such widespread criticisms led to unrelenting Congressional insinuations and budgetary cuts. While the Agency has sensibly deployed an operational system (Aegis BMD), it only partially clears misgivings on whether the Ground Based Mid-Course Defence System (GBMDS), the main US mid-course interceptor for exo-atmopsheric interception, is capable of undertaking similar interception in the future. Employing the Aegis BMD, which is an early ascent/late descent mid-course system, for this task carried a calculated technological risk as the system was assigned with a complex task of intercepting a target cruising at a high closing speed of more than 22,000 miles per hour. The Aegis BMD system has hitherto only been tested against slower-moving targets under pseudo-operational conditions.

    Though the GBMDS and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) are being developed to undertake interception at this speed outside Earth’s atmosphere, considering that these systems are yet to achieve development maturity, the MDA had no other options but to employ an operational system for this high-risk task. The other limited choices would have been to either use an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) system or employ extended-range theatre-wide defence systems like the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD). Using the THAAD was an unfeasible option as the system is yet to be operationally deployed, and has the range (90-120 km) to undertake interception only at the threshold of the Earth’s atmosphere. This would have been highly risky as the interceptor might not necessarily gain the velocity to intercept the satellite outside the Earth’s atmosphere eventually causing the satellite or its debris to make re-entry into the atmosphere and causing damages to the area of impact.

    On the other hand, deploying the ASAT systems, tailored for such tasks, was considered a political risk considering the momentum being generated against weaponisation of space and the usage of ASAT weapons. Washington had strongly criticized the recent ASAT test by China for destroying a defunct satellite, and had termed the action as a provocative step towards weaponisation of space. Taking the same method to destroy a non-military asset would have been viewed as hypocritical. Moreover, as soon as the Pentagon contemplated an outer space destruction of the satellite using a missile system, Russia and China lost no time in criticizing the US plans and unequivocally stating that it would not only harm other space assets but also lead to space weaponisation.

    Though the SM-3 or GBMDS are designed as exclusive anti-ballistic missile systems with the objective of shooting down hostile ballistic missiles, their utility in attacking space assets of rival country cannot be underestimated. While the debate regarding the BMD had rarely touched upon the ASAT dimensions, the event of February 21 is likely to trigger a conundrum on the usage of BMD systems in outer space. However, the US officials have tried to reassure the international community on the distinctiveness of this mission compared to the Chinese ASAT test arguing that the Chinese effort was to test an ASAT weapon while their mission was not a missile test but to intercept the falling satellite in a much lower orbit than most working satellites.

    Such arguments notwithstanding, the successful intercept of February 21 would clearly go down as a significant phase in the evolution of the BMD technology. Importantly, the MDA can now with rejuvenated confidence convince the Congress and its stakeholders on the reliability and efficacy of such systems in undertaking successful interceptions in actual operational conditions. This test could thus be deemed as a testament to the feasibility of BMDs.

    Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) North America & Strategic Technologies IDSA COMMENT
    Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS): Where from…Whither-Bound? Gurpreet S Khurana February 22, 2008

    The 2-day Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in New Delhi (February 14-15, 2008) may well turn out to be a historic event for the countries of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As an arrangement for multilateral naval and maritime security cooperation among regional countries, IONS not only offered a forum for exchange of views but also showcased its importance and reach.

    The 2-day Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in New Delhi (February 14-15, 2008) may well turn out to be a historic event for the countries of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As an arrangement for multilateral naval and maritime security cooperation among regional countries, IONS not only offered a forum for exchange of views but also showcased its importance and reach. Conceived within the ambit of Article 52 of UN Charter, inspired by the initial successes of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and modelled on the lines of the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), IONS has the potential to successfully coalesce the imagination of regional states, and serve as a valuable platform to synergise their resources and energies towards maintaining ‘good order’ in the Indian Ocean.

    This is not the first time the idea of a multilateral security arrangement has been mooted for the IOR. The initial idea of IOR-ARC was conceived to encompass a security agenda, but could never fructify due to the extreme diversities among regional countries, and their equally divergent security perceptions. The IOR-ARC that eventually came into existence in March 1997 among 18 countries sidelined security issues to a more economic grouping.

    Many existing and new sub-regional groupings have since attempted to fill the void as ‘localised’, but more ‘manageable’ cooperative security arrangements. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the East African Community, and the South African Development Community (SADC). Although some of these have been less successful in the domain of maritime security, the efforts to make these more relevant in this direction have persevered. Considering the existence of such sub-regional security arrangements, a region-wide security arrangement like IONS probably does not make sense, or does it? One view clearly expresses the need for a wider geographical overarching mechanism for collective security. Such a setup on a regional-level can comprehensively respond to the security threats that span all sub-regions contained within the IOR. Furthermore, such an expanded cooperative arrangement would need to be contextualised in terms of the larger Asian, and even global construct, through coordination with similar security groupings elsewhere in the world. The imperative to include extra-regional powers as observers in IONS stems from this rationale, besides the need to obviate suspicions and geo-political schisms.

    Another important question that arises is: considering that such initiatives have often failed in the past, what is the probability that the IONS would succeed? The course that the IOR navies have charted on India’s initiative may not be ‘fair-weather’. But it could be sustained if due cognisance is given to the potential ‘hazards’. First and foremost, the more powerful littoral states including India would need to resist the temptation of attempting to dominate centre-stage. Secondly, many security issues conceived in the IONS agenda pertain to ‘hard’ security responses with military connotations. These are likely to generate an element of fear and distrust in some states, particularly the smaller ones. So, “don’t run before you learn to walk” may be an apt dictum to sustain the initiative. The IONS must, therefore, initially focus on capacity building of the smaller littoral states, not only in respect of hardware, but also in terms of information-sharing towards maritime domain awareness (MDA), training of maritime forces and law-enforcement agencies, and cross-fertilisation of standard operating procedures (SoP) and best practices. A cue could be taken from the ongoing multilateral efforts towards security/safety in the Malacca Straits. Rather than focussing on ‘security’ in the waterway, the user-states have begun to direct their resources to improve navigational safety. The rationale is that this would reduce the vulnerability of shipping and other maritime activity in the waterway, and thereby itself contribute to security. There may be fundamental differences in the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean, notably the fact that much of the Straits are territorial waters of the three countries bordering the waterway. Notwithstanding, there is a common factor: the sensitivities of the Straits-littorals over sovereignty issues are likely to be similar to those of many IOR-littorals. IONS could also begin with security issues involving benign role of maritime forces, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and marine pollution response. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that IONS is a naval initiative, the inclusion of non-naval, but pressing maritime issues would enhance its relevance and worth. These issues include development of future technologies for harnessing marine resources, sharing of hydrographic expertise towards compiling data for Legal Continental Shelf (LCS) claims (the cut-off date for countries to submit their claims to the UN is fast approaching), and formulating a regional action plan to mitigate the effects of climate change.

    And finally the most crucial question - how would IONS succeed in the light of the prevailing diversity among regional countries and varied threat perceptions? Regional diversity may not be as deep-rooted as it is projected. In this context, Admiral Arun Prakash, former Indian naval chief, aptly indicated during the IONS Seminar that the genesis of the diversity lies in the effects of the colonial era, viz. in the relatively recent past. With the increasing multi-faceted intra-regional interactions bought about by globalisation, the impediment is bound to attenuate over the years - slowly but surely. Furthermore, IONS could in its own small way, complement the IOR-ARC’s economic agenda and even contribute towards mitigating the diversity of IOR countries.
    (The views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Indian Navy)

    IDSA COMMENT
    HuJI after the Death of its India Chief T. Khurshchev Singh February 13, 2008

    The India Chief of Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI), Bashir Ahmed Mir also called as Sabha, was killed in an encounter with the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on January 24, 2008. HuJI was allegedly involved in a number of deadly operations in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan in the recent past. Bashir Ahmed Mir is believed to be the mastermind behind some of these attacks.

    The India Chief of Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI), Bashir Ahmed Mir also called as Sabha, was killed in an encounter with the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on January 24, 2008. HuJI was allegedly involved in a number of deadly operations in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan in the recent past. Bashir Ahmed Mir is believed to be the mastermind behind some of these attacks.

    HuJI’s objective is to establish Islamic rule by waging jihad. It is the largest international terrorist organisation created by Pakistan. There is little information about its exact origins and date of founding. However, it had a significant involvement in fighting the Soviets alongside the Afghan mujahideen, which indicates that, perhaps, it was founded sometime in the 1980s. In 1985, the outfit split into two groups, with the splinter group calling itself Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). Both groups continued to thrive even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. They re-amalgamated in December 1993 to form the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA). But this unity did not last long and they split in the wake of the 1997 American proscription of HuA as a terrorist organisation because of its connections with Osama bin Laden. While HuM was fully involved in terrorist attacks in J&K, the HuJI was not that active.

    In 1992, the Bangladesh unit of HuJI – HuJI-B – was established with direct support from al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The unit was involved in recruiting Bangladeshi, Rohingya (Myanmarese) and Indian Muslims to fight in J&K and other parts of India. It recruits students from madrassas, with several of which it has very close links. By 2005, the outfit had spread its tentacles to almost 24 countries, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Fiji, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland and parts of Africa. Apart from fuelling extremism in India’s Northeast, the Bangladesh unit is reported to have set its sight on carrying out subversive activities in other parts of India as well.

    Over the past few years, the outfit has been involved in a series of bombings in India. The first significant attack was carried out on January 22, 2002 on the US Consulate in Kolkata, in which four security personnel were killed and 17 others, including civilians, were injured. It was also involved in the suicide attack on the Special Task Force (STF) office of Hyderabad police on October 12, 2005. On March 7, 2006, the outfit triggered three serial blasts at Sankatmochan Temple and the railway station in Varanasi, killing 21 civilians and injuring 62 others. Subsequently, the group was believed to have been involved, along with the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, in the 2006 Mumbai suburban train blasts. The blast in Samjhauta Express that left 66 people dead on February 19, 2007, is also believed to have been perpetrated by HuJI. Similarly, it was accused of setting-off blasts at Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad, on May 18, 2007, in which 11 devotees died. The Hyderabad police charged HuJI terrorist Mohammed Abdul Sahed alias Bilal for the attack and held that Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX) and Trinitrotoluene (TNT), used in the attack, were procured from Bangladesh. Again, in Hyderabad on August 25, 2007, serial blasts claimed the lives of 44 civilians at the Lumbani Park and Gokul Chat Bhandar. It was suspected that the operation was carried out by the same group and investigators subsequently arrested a Bangladeshi woman, Shareefa Rustomji, in Hyderabad, in this connection. On October 11, 2007, HuJI reportedly set-off an explosion killing two devotees at a dargah (shrine) in Ajmer in Rajasthan. In the latest incident of this kind, the group is believed to have carried out the coordinated blasts in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, killing 15 people and injuring 80 others on November 23, 2007.

    The HuJI Chief has been accused of masterminding all these strikes across India. He and his assistant, Aftab Alam Ansari, who was arrested by the West Bengal Criminal Investigation Department and the Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force from Kolkata on December 28, 2007, were accused of organising the multiple bombings in UP in November 2007. Bashir Ahmed Mir went to Pakistan in 1992, trained in Pakistan occupied Kashmir from 1994 to 1995, and recruited youth from within and outside India. After serving as an instructor at Alaq-e-Ghair in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, he returned to J&K, but was arrested by the police in 2000. As soon as his detention was revoked in 2002, he went underground and became the Commander-in-chief of HuJI in 2004.

    The death of its chief is unlikely to weaken the group or decrease its subversive actives in India. Perhaps, its activities may reduce in J&K, but will remain the same in other parts of the country. Unlike other outfits such as the LeT and HuM, its cadre strength in J&K is very limited given that most have been neutralised by the security forces.

    HuJI’s terrorist activities in J&K over the past few years have been few. There was a lone report in 2007; one in 2006; three in 2005; four in 2004; and five in 2003. These reports were based on incidents such as killing, arrest or surrender of HuJI cadres.

    While the outfit is arguably weak in J&K, it is challenging the Indian state in other parts of the country with support from HuJI-B, local sleeper cells and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Perhaps, HuJI’s abilities to operate beyond J&K today is based on the support from its well organised and structured counterparts, HuJI-B and local SIMI activists. HuJI-B has a stronger network than HuJI in India, because of the former’s relatively easy access to India’s Northeast and eastern states. Nevertheless, both have launched strikes together in Assam, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, etc. The elaborate network came to light following the interrogation of activists arrested in connection with the various blasts.

    In the immediate term, HuJI might seek to avenge the death of its chief. The group is known to have conducted revenge attacks. As the outfit claimed in an e-mail that originated in Delhi, the serial blasts in UP were perpetrated to avenge the arrest of three JeM terrorists on November 16, 2007. It is important to note here that Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder of JeM, was closely linked with the HuJI chief. Both worked together in HuJI’s earlier incarnation as HuA.

    The possibility of revenge attacks appears more likely in the wake of revelations made in late December 2007 by five HuJI terrorists, arrested from Barabanki (UP) and Doda (J&K). They reportedly told their interrogators that the outfit was planning to attack important and busy locations in India, including the Gateway of India in Mumbai.

    Moreover, it may not be difficult for the outfit to launch attacks because it has an elaborate network –– comprising cadres, sleeper cells and local supporters/sympathisers –– across the country. Therefore, pragmatism persuades one to suggest that instead of rejoicing over the elimination of Bashir, or considering it a significant achievement, intelligence and security agencies should be extra vigilant in order to prevent a revenge terror strike by the outfit.

    Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) Terrorism & Internal Security IDSA COMMENT
    Pakistan in Doldrums Alok Bansal February 02, 2008

    Pakistan today presents the picture of a nation at war with itself. It is not very often that one sees the armed forces of a state pounding its own citizens with helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. The inferno that had been ablaze in South Waziristan and North Waziristan for some time has now engulfed all the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the flames from FATA have set almost the entire North West Frontier Province (NWFP) on fire.

    Pakistan today presents the picture of a nation at war with itself. It is not very often that one sees the armed forces of a state pounding its own citizens with helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. The inferno that had been ablaze in South Waziristan and North Waziristan for some time has now engulfed all the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the flames from FATA have set almost the entire North West Frontier Province (NWFP) on fire. The predominantly Pakhtoon militants, sometimes supported by foreign militants, now feel emboldened enough to attack security forces in well-fortified garrisons and have succeeded in capturing at least three of them. They have even succeeded in attacking and inflicting casualties in Razmak camp in North Waziristan Agency, the largest fortified garrison in FATA. They are not only attacking security forces personnel but are also taking away arms and ammunition in the process. In one daring operation, militants captured four truckloads of arms and ammunition from the security forces.

    Swat Valley in N.W.F.P., which had been taken over by the militants a few months ago, has not yet returned to normalcy. Despite large scale army operations, the government’s hold on the region remains at best tenuous. Maulana Fazlullah, the religious leader heading the militants, remains at large and militants still manage to publicly behead government collaborators in the region, although the security forces claim to be in complete control of the valley. The militancy has now spread to Bannu and Kohat. In Bannu, the militants took school children as hostage and had to be given safe passage to facilitate the release of the students. In Kohat, the militants attacked army posts and the ‘Friendship Tunnel’, a crucial link that connects the region with the rest of Pakistan and had been built with Japanese collaboration. They have even threatened to blow up the tunnel using explosive laden trucks manned by suicide bombers. Shops in Darra Adamkhel, the largest market for illegal arms and ammunition in the world, have been broken into by militants, and guns and ammunitions have been taken away. The security forces lost 23 men and killed over 60 militants before they could regain a modicum of control over the region. Over 30,000 residents of the region, who have taken shelter in Peshawar and other towns, are still reluctant to return as the militants are still hiding in the mountains.

    While the militants have been taking on the security forces in open combat in FATA and the adjoining regions of NWFP, suicide bombers have been targeting them in the rest of the province as well as in other Pakistani cities. Bomb blasts and rocket firings have become a common phenomenon throughout the NWFP. According to media reports, even Peshawar, the capital and seat of the provincial administration, presents the picture of a terrorised city. On January 30, 2008, three bomb blasts ripped through the city and three rockets were fired on Peshawar Airport, within a span of less than nine hours.

    Outside NWFP and FATA, militants are making their presence felt in the cities of Punjab. The ease with which they managed to assassinate Benazir Bhutto and carry out attacks on Musharraf in Rawalpindi clearly indicates that this garrison city has become a militant stronghold. The recent capture of arms and ammunition in Karachi indicates that militants are quite active in Pakistan’s largest city and commercial hub. The menace of sectarianism, an offshoot of Islamic radicalism, has been raising its ugly head quite often and in the recent past resulted in a number of violent incidents in the days preceding Muharram. Besides religious extremism, the insurgency in Balochistan continues to simmer, even though the media glare has moved away from it.

    Besides security, Pakistan is being plagued by other problems as well. There have been severe shortages of flour, which affects the common man the most. The situation was so grave that the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid), which had been administering Pakistan for the last five years, did not hesitate to distance itself from the interim administration and blamed it for the shortages. Similarly Pakistan, which at one stage had surplus power, is facing acute power shortages and had to resort to forcible closure of some industries to conserve power. Even now most of the industries including steel mills are getting power for only 10 to 14 hours a day, resulting in enormous financial losses. Some industries have become bankrupt and have closed permanently.

    In the political arena, Musharraf is losing support with each passing day and is undoubtedly amongst the most unpopular leaders in the world today. Despite having the firm support of the higher Army leadership, his position is becoming untenable. Recent statements by a large number of retired defence officers point towards an anti-Musharraf undercurrent within the Army, especially amongst the rank and file. Benazir Bhutto’s assassination has deprived the state of an option to make a smooth transition to a somewhat democratic and moderate state. Benazir had been brought back at the behest of the United States by issuing a National Reconciliation Ordinance, which gave her immunity from prosecution for all the acts of omission and commission committed during her two tenures as Prime Minister. The United States believed that her presence in Pakistan will help to channel popular opposition to the regime through her party, which had hitherto been resulting in support for religious forces in the absence of both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif.

    Benazir’s exit has created a major problem for the US-sponsored plan for a democratic transition. If the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had decided to boycott the elections and gone along with the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML(N)), it would have created an even bigger problem for Musharraf and the state of Pakistan. But the PPP’s decision to participate in the elections has salvaged the situation somewhat. It has not only forced PML (N) to participate in the elections but has also given the state a chance to facilitate a smooth transition to democracy. However, at the moment, it does not appear that elections will be totally free and fair. The extent of rigging will decide the eventual outcome and credibility of the elections. Radical elements will gain further ground if the public does not perceive the elections as credible.

    The ascendance of radical elements at this juncture will have a catastrophic effect on the global war on terror, especially in light of the fact that the possibility of these elements gaining some sort of access to Pakistan’s nuclear establishment cannot be totally ruled out. The international community needs to ensure the security of Pakistan’s stockpile of radioactive material to prevent it being used in a ‘dirty bomb’. It also needs to prevent Pakistan’s radicalisation by pressurising Musharraf to usher in a genuine democratic and federal structure in Pakistan. At present, the Pakistani establishment appears to be trying to buy peace by appeasing the militants and as part of its policy is trying to promulgate Shariah Regulations in seven districts of NWFP, namely, Dir Upper, Dir Lower, Swat, Shangla, Buner, Malakand and Chitral. But appeasement will only help to foster greater radicalisation in long term, as was clearly evident in the case of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad and Swat Valley, where ignoring of fundamentalist sermons being broadcast through FM radio proved catastrophic subsequently. The situation in Pakistan appears to be grave and requires drastic measures from the state and the international community to prevent further deterioration.

    Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan South Asia IDSA COMMENT
    The Attempt to Sideline Muivah M. Amarjeet Singh February 02, 2008

    The ongoing attempt to unify Naga insurgent groups is unlikely to end the two-decade old factional rivalry and killings in Nagaland. This is because the unification idea is largely seen as a deliberate attempt to sideline Thuingaleng Muivah and his Tangkhul tribe’s hegemony over the Naga insurgency movement. The end result of this effort is likely to be an escalation in fratricidal killings.

    The ongoing attempt to unify Naga insurgent groups is unlikely to end the two-decade old factional rivalry and killings in Nagaland. This is because the unification idea is largely seen as a deliberate attempt to sideline Thuingaleng Muivah and his Tangkhul tribe’s hegemony over the Naga insurgency movement. The end result of this effort is likely to be an escalation in fratricidal killings.

    On November 23, a section of Naga insurgents led by Azheto Chophy of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and C. Singson of the NSCN-(NSCN-K), signed a ‘Joint Declaration’ at Niuland near Dimapur, which claimed that the two warring factions are being united. This development also confirmed rumours about a split within the NSCN-IM, with a small section led by Azheto Chophy forming a new group under the name of NSCN-Unification Camp. The new group, reportedly stationed at Vihokhu near Dimapur town, seeks to unite all Naga insurgent groups for the common cause. In its view, Muivah has been an obstacle to the unification of Nagas and was wont “to give vent to his ire on those opposing his hegemony.” For its part, the NSCN-IM has announced the dismissal of 27 of its former members who had “defected” along with Azheto Chophy.

    A few days after the ‘Joint Declaration’ was signed, a six-month inter-factional ceasefire was announced between the NSCN-K, the Naga National Council (NNC), the Unification Core Committee (UCC), and the Azheto Chophy-led NSCN group, as has been proposed by civil society groups like the Joint Forum of Nagaland Goanbura Federation and the Nagaland Dubashis Association.

    While a section of Nagas hailed this development, others chose to remain silent. The Western Sumi Hoho, for instance, appealed to all Nagas and civil society groups to support the recent unification move. But most of the major civil society groups, which are known to be close to the NSCN-IM, remained silent.

    The NSCN-IM has criticised the unification move as “something against the honesty of approach towards initiating a genuine search for unity among the Nagas.” General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah said in a statement on December 21, 2007 that: “Some talk of unity devoid of common agenda, some talk of unity only for the sake of unity. And some other talks of it with ulterior motive behind to deceive the people. Unity among the Nagas is a serious matter which can never be dealt with by any irrational, un-authorised and un-mandated individual or group of individuals…”

    Muivah put out the view that some Indian-backed elements were attempting to disturb the on-going peace process. The NSCN-IM also accused the union government of using vested groups of a particular tribe to confuse the people. It accused Sumi/Sema civil society groups like the Western Sumi Hoho and the Sumi Hoho of collaboration with Azheto Chophy and betraying the Naga cause.

    On January 12, 2008, the NSCN-IM declared an ‘emergency’ in Nagaland and its Tartar Hoho (parliament) was placed under suspended animation from the next day. It has said that this move was necessitated by the precarious situation in the state that increasingly threatens “peace and normal state of affairs.” Two days later, NSCN-IM cadres gunned down three senior members of the NSCN-K.

    The ongoing unification move – sugar-coated unification as the NSCN-IM calls it – can be seen as an attempt to sideline Muivah and his Tangkhul tribe’s hegemony over the Naga issue. This was evident from the recent ‘Joint Declaration’, which proposed that the unification move would be led by the current NSCN-IM chairman Isak Chishi Swu (who seems to have had no prior knowledge of this) and the NSCN-K chairman S.S. Khaplang. Earlier in 2006, the Khaplang faction had issued a ‘Quit Notice’ asking the Tangkhuls to leave Nagaland at the earliest. At that time, it had alleged that Nagas have borne the brunt of the cruelty of the Tangkhuls who are from Manipur.

    The recent unification move also seems to be an attempt to strengthen the NSCN-K’s position, in collaboration with other smaller groups/factions. It is doubtful that this move will succeed because Muivah is still considered the most respected leader among Nagas and his hold over the NSCN-IM remains intact. The outfit is unlikely to be affected in a major way by the defection of Azheto Chophy along with 27 others. Here it is worth noting that, since entering into a formal ceasefire with the union government in 1997, the NSCN-IM has reportedly raised its cadre strength from 3,000 to 5,000 and has also nearly doubled its weapon holdings. At the same time, almost all major Naga civil society groups like the Naga Hoho, the Naga Mother’s Association, the Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, the Naga Students’ Federation and the United Naga Council are known to be actively supporting the NSCN-IM’s cause. For instance, in its reaction to the ‘Joint Declaration’, the influential United Naga Council said in a press statement that “it demeans the very purpose of Naga political struggle … Any kind of unification must be inclusive of all Nagas and that unification must be achieved in uniformity with the political aspiration of the Naga people and the ongoing political negotiations."

    One possible outcome of the latest development could be the emergence of a Sema/Semi- based militant outfit. This would, no doubt, strengthen the NSCN-K. But it would also certainly pave the way for a further escalation in factional killings in the state.

    National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) Terrorism & Internal Security IDSA COMMENT
    Pakistan Headed for an Uncertain Future Ashok K. Behuria January 31, 2008

    As the time for the election draws near, the tribal frontier is getting hotter with each passing day. Suddenly rumour mills are active that the new Army Chief is bypassing Musharraf in his interactions with the Americans and is going to allow them some foothold in Pakistan. Americans are now claiming that the Afghan resistance is on the wane and the “level of violent activity in the eastern provinces is down about 40 per cent.”

    As the time for the election draws near, the tribal frontier is getting hotter with each passing day. Suddenly rumour mills are active that the new Army Chief is bypassing Musharraf in his interactions with the Americans and is going to allow them some foothold in Pakistan. Americans are now claiming that the Afghan resistance is on the wane and the “level of violent activity in the eastern provinces is down about 40 per cent.”

    Simultaneously, there is an analysis by the Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General James Cartwright, that the "character of the fight in Pakistan has changed to some extent, and it is more focused inward." And he is reported to be raising a series of questions in this regard: “Is it a threat that the Pakistanis are ready to handle? Do they need help? Do they need training help? Do they need other types of help? That's what we're trying to assess right now.”

    Against this backdrop, the Pakistan Army's decision to push into Waziristan and fight Baitullah Mehsud's forces has made people believe that more than Musharraf, General Kiyani, the Army Chief, is eager to prove to the Americans that he can be relied upon. Analysts have even tried to interpret it as the first major indication that Kiyani might be attempting to establish his credentials as an army chief who is made of sterner stuff rather than being pushed into the sidelines as Musharraf's protégé.

    This school of thinking holds that Kiyani may not like to be known as a second Musa Khan who withered under the wings of President Ayub Khan. He has rather started behaving like General Yahya Khan – who like Kiyani also belonged to the Baloch Regiment – during 1969-70.

    Earlier Kiyani was portrayed in the Pakistani media as the Army Chief who sent his soldiers to lay a wreath at the grave of Banazir Bhutto and later met her husband privately. Even before that, Daily Times had reported that in his very first speech to trainee Army officers in Quetta, he had asked them to value public opinion and never meddle in politics. American journalists have even gone further and vouchsafed for his democratic credentials after he addressed his corps commanders for the first time in January 2008 (the first such address without Musharraf at the helm in the last decade). In this meeting, he reportedly made an assertion that ultimately the will of the people and their support was 'decisive'. This set off a slew of analyses that claim that with Kiyani in the saddle, Pakistan may have a smooth return to democracy after the elections.

    Politics is a game of glorious uncertainties. There are indications that Kiyani may not like Musharraf to tamper with the ongoing political process and may want the elections to be free and fair. However, it is not clear if he would like to intervene at this juncture if Musharraf were to try to manipulate the electoral process in favour of PML-Q and MQM. The crucial question that begs an answer in these circumstances is: Does Kiyani have the support of the corps commanders at the moment? At this juncture, the answer is in the negative; primarily because, key positions are still manned by Musharraf loyalists.

    Rumours about Kiyani's quiet defiance tend to throw up an argument that he might be seeking to cut into Musharraf’s external support base by demonstrating to the US that so far, his predecessor was half-hearted in his efforts against the militants in the tribal areas. At the same time, his pronouncements in favour of the "will of the people" and democracy are seen as calculated moves to eat into Musharraf's depleted support base at home.

    Musharraf's increasing exposure to the Western media is being interpreted as a move to engage primarily his critics in the West and show that even now everything in Pakistan is well under his control. He has also claimed that he was not too much of a dictator and would like to withdraw if the newly elected assembly did not want him. There are also reports that he has sent feelers to London to talk to Shahbaz Sharif, and is seeking to patch up with Nawaz Sharif.

    All these reports suggest that the force of circumstances has induced moderation in the most powerful actors on Pakistan’s political stage. The lawyers' movement (which started in January 2006) has certainly rattled all prospective dictators in the country. Moreover, Pakistani civil society is more active today than ever before. It is showing signs of increasing restlessness at the moment and in the event of rigged elections things may become very bad for the ruling establishment.

    Musharraf has pledged free and fair elections but has resisted demands for the formation of a national government to oversee the elections. It is well known that Musharraf's survival depends on denying his opponents a two thirds majority in the elections. Musharraf has taken some very astute steps to minimise his loss in the elections. He has banned all opinion polls, has asked the media not to indulge in anti-government propaganda, and has canvassed the people to support PML-Q. All this shows that he is desperate to get for his followers more than one third of the National Assembly seats to protect the constitutional revisions he has initiated thus far. Success in this regard will automatically defang his political opponents.

    If he can ensure this, the only threat to his authority then would be the Army Chief. And if Kiyani were to assert himself against Musharraf, in case there is a popular stir after the elections, there is a possibility that the Army may even split up into two opposite camps. That would be the real doomsday situation for Pakistan. However, one would expect that both Musharraf and Kiyani would not be that imprudent to allow their differences to snowball into a major crisis for the country.

    While the Americans might be seeking to promote Kiyani, pitting him against Musharraf is certainly not in their interest at the moment. However, if the coming elections prove all analysts wrong and strengthens the hands of anti-Musharraf forces, the US would need Kiyani more than Musharraf. In that situation, a subdued Musharraf with an Army Chief ready to give democracy a chance may be good news for Pakistan. Alternately, if the political forces, so far fragmented and disunited, seek to depose Musharraf, it could lead to a crisis. A grossly rigged election may unleash forces too difficult for both Musharraf and Kiyani to handle.

    If one takes into account balanced inputs from Pakistani analysts, the most probable scenario on the horizon, even with free and fair elections, is that of a hung assembly pulling in different directions. This may strengthen Musharraf's hands and remove the fear of an assertive Army Chief. In which case, the responsibility for bringing democracy back to Pakistan will devolve on the politicians. They will have to decide whether they and Musharraf deserve one another. In any event, Pakistan looks headed for an uncertain future.

    Pakistan Politics, Waziristan, Pakistan South Asia IDSA COMMENT
    Sarkozy’s Visit to India Nivedita Das Kundu January 29, 2008

    President Nicolas Sarkozy’s first visit to India on January 25-27, 2008 (along with 300 delegates) provided fresh impetus to the strategic partnership between the two countries. The visit reinforced the interests of both countries in maintaining close and friendly ties and in strengthening a multipolar world order. During his visit, Sarkozy had one-to-one talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, followed by discussions between the two sides on various sectors. The two countries signed several major agreements related to defence, nuclear research, space and healthcare.

    President Nicolas Sarkozy’s first visit to India on January 25-27, 2008 (along with 300 delegates) provided fresh impetus to the strategic partnership between the two countries. The visit reinforced the interests of both countries in maintaining close and friendly ties and in strengthening a multipolar world order. During his visit, Sarkozy had one-to-one talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, followed by discussions between the two sides on various sectors. The two countries signed several major agreements related to defence, nuclear research, space and healthcare. Stating that there is a convergence of ideas on international issues and releasing a Joint Statement and Joint Declaration on Global warming, the French president asserted that Indo-French strategic partnership would get fresh impetus from his visit.

    At present Indo-French co-operation lies on three pillars – defence, academic exchanges and co-operation in science and technology. In spite of immense opportunities in each other's economy, bilateral trade in 2006-07 was quite nominal. It is evident that economic and trade engagement needs a significant boost. Promises were made by the leaders of both countries earlier as well as this time to nearly triple trade to 12 billion euros by 2012. But the Indian business community feels that certain practical issues and concerns need to be addressed first, like the easing of visa regulations for Indian businessmen and facilitating easy work permits for skilled Indian workers.

    While addressing issues and concerns related to trade and economic co-operation, Sarkozy articulated the point that both countries are fast growing market-oriented economies and therefore there is a need to make greater efforts to penetrate each other's market. He promised that French companies will invest 10 billion euros over the next four years and that he will put in place the conditions for easing the entry of Indian businesses into the French market and engage more Indian companies for joint collaborative projects in sectors like healthcare/pharmaceuticals, encourage joint research and development in information and technology, telecommunications, automobile sector, consumer goods and high technology including nano and bio-technology sectors. The French side has shown interest in engaging India’s private sector companies as well as small and medium enterprises. Talks on expansion of inter-banking co-operation were also focused upon.

    In the energy sector, the French president mentioned that his country is ready to co-operate with India in the civilian nuclear domain. France and India together, he said, could promote nuclear energy with the highest standards of safety and security in accordance with their respective nuclear policies and international obligations. He even showed keenness for the construction of twenty new nuclear power units in various parts of India. Of course, these are contingent upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group revising its guidelines. Sarkozy stated that France will work at that forum to help India's case for grant of a waiver. He also said that France has been a strong supporter of the Indo-US nuclear deal, though he did not wish to comment on India’s domestic debate on the issue. But he gave the assurance that once the domestic Indian debate on the issue is resolved and as soon as the international waiver is obtained, France would actively involve itself in India’s nuclear energy programme.

    Joint development in agriculture is another significant feature of the evolving relationship between the two countries. India and France are also expanding the scope to venture further into the roads and railways sector.

    Military ties between India and France are developing steadily and today it includes joint research and development, production, marketing, regular co-operation between the different branches of arms and joint training exercises. During the Sarkozy visit, the two countries also discussed the scope for upgrading India's ageing 52 Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft. Under this programme, Indian Mirages would be upgraded to Mirage 2000-9 levels as flown by the French Air Force. Through the upgradation, the Indian Air Force is hoping to increase the life of its Mirage fighters by 25 years. The upgradation will involve fitment of advanced radars and avionics, and arming the aircraft with air-to-air missiles that have beyond visual range. It is important to note here that the Mirages will form one of the frontline aircraft of the Indian Air Force till the new 126 multi-role combat fighter jets are inducted by 2014. It is expected that the upgradation of Mirages would be undertaken at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) with the support of French companies Thallus International and Dassault. While it is true that defence co-operation between the two countries is significant, there is also a need to develop an institutional mechanism to link institutions and thus spur innovation as well as commercialisation of new technologies.

    On issues relating to extremism and terrorism, both countries have decided to address the threat bilaterally and globally. It is envisaged that the India-France Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism would be strengthened and both countries have decided to step-up ‘operational contacts’, to face this common threat.

    While addressing the conference on Indo-France Economic and Political co-operation, Sarkozy emphasised the point that “India is the perfect example of democracy and diversity in the [Asian] continent.” He also expressed support for including India in an expanded G-8. To quote: “Why should the G-8 be a meeting of just eight countries, how can only few of us … solve the global problems with India, China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa invited only for lunch on the final day? France does not accept this 20th century decisions, it is a matter of right for India to be part of an expanded G-13 or G-14. How can you deal with the major problems of the world without these significant countries of the world?" The French president also contended that India’s role is essential to “resolve the major crises of the world in the 21st century and not only regional crises [and] therefore we need to increase the members in UNSC too.”

    India-France Relations Nuclear and Arms Control IDSA COMMENT
    The Economic Consequences of Military Rule in Myanmar N. Neihsial January 28, 2008

    The recent public protests against the general price rise in Myanmar and the government crack down once again drew the world’s attention to the plight of the Myanmarese. But the focus has generally been on the political aspects, particularly the possibility of peaceful reconciliation and subsequent installation of a democratic government. In contrast, this paper attempts to peep into the economic aspects of military rule and its impact on the general public and concludes with certain possible implications for neighbouring countries like India.

    The recent public protests against the general price rise in Myanmar and the government crack down once again drew the world’s attention to the plight of the Myanmarese. But the focus has generally been on the political aspects, particularly the possibility of peaceful reconciliation and subsequent installation of a democratic government. In contrast, this paper attempts to peep into the economic aspects of military rule and its impact on the general public and concludes with certain possible implications for neighbouring countries like India.

    Myanmar, a country of 678,500 sq km, is inhabited by a population of over 47 million people. Its Gross Domestic Product is US$ 80.11 billion. Per capita GDP (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity) in 2002 was $ 1568, which was less than that of Cambodia ($ 1649) and Laos ($ 1678). Sector wise composition of the economy is: Agriculture 54.6 per cent, Industry 13 per cent, and Services 32.4 per cent. Labour force distribution among these sectors is 70 per cent, 7 per cent, and 23 per cent, respectively. The annual inflation rate is estimated to be 25 per cent (2005).

    Previous decades of poor economic performance was claimed to have been arrested in 1989, with the military government revoking the 1965 Law on Establishment of a Socialist Economic System. This was followed up by a number of legal measures to liberalise the economy and move towards a market system. These measures include: lifting of price controls on agriculture, liberal investment laws, creation of important elements of a financial infrastructure, privatisation of government corporations and subsequent efforts to develop an information technology industry. With these policy measures, the performance of the economy is claimed to have been improved. Sectors that contributed to economic growth were Mining, Communications and Financial Institutions, and not Agriculture — the main stay of the work force and the major component of the country’s GDP. More serious than these aberrations is the existence and operation of two parallel economies — the legal and the extra legal, and the way the military junta controls and exploits both at the expense of the common man.

    As pointed out, nearly 50 per cent of the growth in GDP was contributed by sectors like Mining, Communications and Financial Institutions. The military has been adept in institutionalising its involvements in business. For example, there are two prominent Enterprises/Corporations that are strangely under the Ministry of Defence — the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. (UMEH) and Myanmar Economic Corporation. The first is jointly owned by the Directorate of Defence Procurement and serving and retired military personnel. This firm has become the largest indigenous firm in the country, reaching a registered capital of 10 billion Kyats or $1.4 billion at the official exchange rate. All major foreign investments are done only through this corporation and so far it is reported that as many 47 joint ventures have been entered into through its auspices. Its range of business interests are rather large and include gem production and marketing, garment factories, wood industries, goods and beverages and other trading companies, supermarket, banking, hotels, tourism, transportation, construction and real estate, computers, telecommunications, electronics and equipment, and steel and cement industry. With no public transparency in its finances, UMEH is reported to give extensive business opportunities to the military leadership.1

    The Myanmar Economic Corporation, which is under the Ministry of Defence, is also involved in a wide range of economic activities including trading companies, agriculture produce, hotel and tourism enterprises, gems and mineral extraction and exploration, extraction and sale of petroleum and natural gas, telecommunications and other enterprises that were previously government monopolies. These two enterprises give the typical picture of the nature of privatisation and economic growth in Myanmar.

    The extra-legal economy is significantly as large as the legal one. This is largely contributed to by drug cultivation, production and trading or smuggling. The military’s indirect involvement and direct benefits are widely spoken of but not documented through systematic research. According to the US State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Myanmar continues to be the world’s largest source of illicit opium and heroin though production and cultivation began to decline since 1997.2 Although the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is denying its involvement and is officially cooperating with UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), it is difficult to cover up its involvement.

    Its involvement is in the form of corruption in the Army at various levels. A man working in an NGO team in Myitkyina explained, “the government is arresting and imprisoning some drug dealers. But they are released when they pay between 100,000 to 5 million Kyats. The main drug business is done by the wives of police, army and military intelligence officers. The police and the SPDC army are seen to be involved in the drug trade.”3 The evil has its own consequences such as drug abuse, gambling, prostitution and the spread of HIV/Aids from which ills the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) itself is not entirely free given its involvement.4 Same is the case in respect of the smuggling of illegal arms through Myanmar to India’s North East insurgent groups. Unconfirmed reports suggest that consequent to Myanmar’s signing of cease fire with some insurgent groups, like the KIA (Kachin Independent Army) for instance, the arms used by these groups were made available at cheap prices. Since these are in great demand among insurgent groups in India’s North East, they are smuggled and transported with the help and connivance of the Tatmadaw. The final delivery prices are of course reported to be as high as four to five times of the original price paid. The reported involvement of the military junta in giving sanctuary to Indian insurgents is also stated to be due to the deep rooted and extensive corruption of field Units who, by accepting a few lakhs of rupees from insurgents, are ever ready to give them protection.5

    The question is why a regular army that has been in control of political power for decades is so prone to corruption? Are there things that are fundamentally wrong with the Tatmadaw itself? The answer is ‘yes’. While the top echelons of the Tatmadaw are involved in high level corruption and legitimate control of the economy through the state apparatus, those in the field particularly at the lowest Unit level are at the receiving end when it comes to economic resource distribution. The salary and other benefits like ration even at the officer’s level are hardly sufficient for survival, forget about respectable provision to one’s family.6 The monthly salary of a Major in the Army is stated to be about 1.5 lakh Kyats, which should appear to be quiet high compared to pay package of equivalent rank in India.7 But the problem is, one bag of rice (a little less than 50 kg) costs between 18,000 to 20,000 Kyats. One kilogram of chicken costs 4000 Kyats. An ordinary soldier’s monthly pension is about 700 Kyats, which could hardly buy a cup of tea. It is also reported that ordinary soldiers are unable to feed or clothe themselves in respectable Uniforms. Under these circumstances, field units have no choice but to be corrupt and exploit the common people to fend for themselves. Thus, the involvement of Army, police and intelligence officers in drug trafficking, smuggling and other social evils including trafficking in women is only a logical extension of the economic policies of the SPDC Government.

    In spite of the power it wields, the Tatmadaw is not a profession much sought after by the youth. The most attractive thing for young men and women, whether educated or not, is to go abroad, earn some dollars and remit them home. And they do not use the official route to repatriate remittances, because the SPDC maintains the exchange rate at 6.0764 Kyats a dollar. Instead, money is remitted through hawala transactions, which yield 1300 Kyats per dollar. Similarly, the official exchange rate for the Indian Rupee is 1.5 Kyats, whereas in the hawala channel it yields 30 Kyats. The hawala network is under the control of Myanmar’s financial barons.

    Rampant corruption and the government’s inability to arrest and moderate inflation have made the profession of arms quite unattractive for the country’s youth. In fact, there are reports that the government recruits ‘Child Soldiers’, some as young as ten, under compulsion or duress or cheating. Though the SPDC vehemently denies this, there seems to be an element of truth in this given that the Deputy Director General of the Information Ministry, Ye Htut, claimed to have dismissed 141 minors between 2004 and August 2007 and returned them to their parents, and that disciplinary action has been taken against nearly 30 military personnel.8 Some observers conclude that in the context of the demand for democratic Government, “any popular uprising against the military regime could only succeed if there were important cleavages in the SPDC or within the rank and file of the armed forces.”9 But this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future considering the tight grip of the SPDC on the country through military repression, a manipulated economic system, an all powerful DDSI (Directorate of Defence Intelligence) apparatus and a pervading corrupt system imposed by the ruling junta.

    The domestic vulnerabilities of the SPDC regime are usually enumerated to be democratic opposition; the continuing absence of durable settlements with ethnic insurgents, economic decay and military overstretch in the campaign against various insurgent groups. What is missing in the list is the military’s exploitation of economic resources at different levels: (i) at the level of the Government, (ii) through the privatisation process in the form of enterprises and corporations and (iii) in the lower ranks through corruption and exploitation of the common people.

    The pertinent question, however, is: How far and how long the military Junta would be able to keep a population of nearly 50 million through repressive measures under extreme economic hardship, poverty and backwardness, while at the same time keeping them unaffected from the effects of a fast globalising world? As of now, the likely thing to happen in the foreseeable future, perhaps, is the breakdown of civil society on accounts of extreme economic hardship. The tendency of people to migrate to other countries, and particularly the neighbours, is likely to get intensified in the near future. It is important for India to take note of this, given that the North East is already plagued by insurgencies and illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Any influx from Myanmar would add to the complexity of this region. In fact it has been reported that even a small and backward hilly state like Mizoram has about 40,000 Burmese nationals.10 They are obviously finding it economically easier to survive here than in their own country.

    • 1. International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Report No.11 Burma/Myanmar: How strong is the military Regime? (December 21, 2000).
    • 2. International Narcotics control strategy report 1998 of US Department, as quoted in Asia Report No.11 Burma/Myanmar: How strong is the military Regime? (December 21, 2000).
    • 3. “Valley of Darkness: Gold mining and Militarization in Burma’s Hugawng Valley,” Report by the Kachin Development Networking Group (2007), p. 44.
    • 4. Ibid, p. 51, cited the minutes of a secret meeting called by the Northern Commander from September 25-27 in Myitkyina wherein it was recorded that as many as 9643 soldiers were currently infected with HIV, out of which 458 were officers.
    • 5. The Indian Express, November 17, 2007.
    • 6. An Army officer is reported to have narrated that if his Unit/Battalion gets deployed for three months to fight the insurgents, the Unit would get one month’s leave/rest. During this period, when there is no scope for blatant exploitation of people in the villages, they have to supplement their income by way of engaging themselves in some illegal activities such as felling of trees/timber from government reserve forests, transporting these by military vehicles, and selling them to financial barons who have all the right connections at the highest levels.
    • 7. Author’s conversation with a refugee whose relative is a Major in the Burmese Army.
    • 8. “Myanmar Recruiting Child Soldiers,” http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/10/30/myanmar.childsoldiers.ap/ind....
    • 9. ICG Asia Report No.11, December 21, 2000, p. 40.
    • 10. Nava Thakuria, “North East defies India’s Myanmar Policy,” North East Sun, November 30, 2007, p. 29.
    Myanmar East Asia IDSA COMMENT

    Pages

    Top