Come August, Assam and Nagaland breathed a sigh of relief with the heavens opening up to an extent, bringing with it much respite to the local people from recurring floods and landslide plagued roadways. But with the retreat of the heavy rains, a different if not less difficult situation has emerged. The political atmosphere in both states was charged up with tension in early August following a "war like situation" in the Assam-Nagaland border near Jorhat district in Assam and Mokokchung district in Nagaland, respectively.

On August 5, functionaries of the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) issued a threat to forcefully march into Nagaland on August 8 and destroy the Nagaland Police check post at Tsutapela on the Mariani-Mokokchung road near the border town of Mariani in Assam. Assam and Nagaland have in the recent past contested over territory, which is further manifested by the demand of the Naga militant outfit-the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) for a greater Nagaland, encompassing areas in Assam. In July, some Naga villagers had raided three villages near Geleki in Sivasagar district of Assam, killing two residents and torching several houses. The incident had provoked the AASU to call for an economic blockade on Nagaland. This time around, the border crisis reached a tipping point when the Ao Senden (Hoho/council) issued a statement calling upon all Ao villages in the border areas to be prepared for any eventuality and asserted its resolve to forcefully defend every inch of Ao Naga land bordering Assam. The Senden's executive council decided to field volunteers from the border district of Mokokchung and nearby villages to thwart the threatened AASU invasion. Worse still, on August 8, villagers of the bordering Tzurang valley in Nagaland readied themselves for a bloody battle with the AASU armed with machetes, spears, and firearms. Mokokchung town also witnessed simmering tension with several hundred armed people gathering around the Ao Senden office. Many resorted to blank firing in order to pressurize the Ao Senden president, Temjenkaba, a lawyer by profession, to give them the go ahead to march to the Tsutapela police outpost to violently resist the AASU across the border. But the Sendem refused to resort to such an extreme step, before giving the Mokokchung and Jorhat district administrations a chance to prevent the crisis.

Thankfully, the situation did not spiral out of control as the five hundred AASU activists were intercepted by the Assam Police near New Sonowal border outpost before they could march to the Tsutapela outpost. The effective co-ordination between the Mokokchung and Jorhat administrations also held the situation in check. What was heartening to see was the strong resistance to the AASU's planned invasion by Assamese border villages, which univocally stated that they did not support any violent moves to resolve border differences. Villagers in Bosagaon, Panchul, Nagaon and New Sonowal came out in large numbers to prevent the AASU from marching to the outpost. They demanded that the AASU honour its March 22, 2004 Merapani joint declaration with the Naga Students' Federation (NSF), which supported a resolution of border disputes through a people to people approach. This position had been reinstated by the two student units on July 14, 2007 in a meeting at Guwahati. The restraint shown by the Assamese villages was duly appreciated by the NSF in a statement issued by its President, Imchatoba Imchen, on August 9 in Dimapur.

The question however arises as to why the AASU issued a threat of invasion in early August despite having stated its commitment to the joint declaration a month earlier. Lurking behind this unwarranted step by the AASU is a devious strategy of provocation of a violent clash between the Naga and Assamese border villages, which have witnessed harmonious relations for centuries, in order to gain political leverage. Such provocations are worrisome and beset with serious security implications. Similar border disputes between the two hill districts of Assam, namely Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills, in the 1980s and 1990s, which had resulted in non-violent youth mobilization, have at present spiralled into full fledged insurgencies like the United People's Democratic Solidarity and the Dima Halam Daogah, with both groups soliciting support from reluctant villagers on either side of the ethnic aisle by show of force.

Reactions in Naga villages to the AASU's threat are telling in this regard. Their violent responses could be easily manipulated by militant groups like the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) and the United Liberation Front of Asom to foment a violent border dispute in future. It cannot also be ruled out that these outfits could be behind the present crisis as well.

Ironically, it is under this sort of violent pressure that the three member Local Commission on Border held a meeting with representatives from Assam and Nagaland in Dimapur on August 6 to resolve the border dispute. The Commission has requested both states to carve out maps based on the "1.50 thousand scale" of the disputed areas. The Surveyor General of India has also agreed to chip in to help expedite the process. Indeed, it is unacceptable that both state governments continue to let a contentious issue fester for decades without holding any serious border talks to resolve the crisis. Their apathy only lands the local populace in a spot. Though the current tension has subsided, this issue could again raise its ugly head and provide a breeding ground of discontent for student organizations on both sides of the border, who, given a chance, will not hesitate to overrule local sentiments and discredit the sanctity of the Border Peace Coordination Committee (BPCC) formed by Assamese and Naga civil society. The BPCC has been trying to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful talks between the peoples on either side of the border to resolve the issue. There is every possibility that with the growing number of such potentially violent incidences under the nose of state forces, some, if not all, villages will definitely turn to militant groups for security.

The district administrations of Mokokchung in Nagaland and Jorhat in Assam need to be applauded for performing well the task they are normally assigned to do-maintaining law and order-for a change. The Deputy Commissioners, Abhishek Singh and L. S. Sangson of Mokokchung and Jorhat respectively were proactive in keeping the local people informed and guaranteeing them security. However, one cannot help but take note of the ability of AASU activists to reach the New Sonowal border outpost (so chillingly near the threatened place of attack-the Tsutapela border outpost) on August 8 without being intercepted by the state forces. A slight misinformation could have provoked the armed Naga villagers to rush towards the Tsutapela outpost and, in the process, kill innocents villagers caught in the line of fire. Notoriously, the NSCN (K) is supposedly functioning in this area and the NSCN (IM) is also sustaining a strong covert presence. With these two militant outfits joining the fray, the entire issue could have turned into a factional turf battle--a worse case scenario but not entirely improbable. It is therefore high time that the state governments take serious note of these issues, shake off their lethargy and work out an acceptable framework for border talks without always depending on the Centre to do what is necessary.

Bangladesh's Chief of Staff General Mooen U Ahmed's visit to India scheduled in the fourth week of August now stands postponed in wake of the severe floods sweeping across the country. This visit by the army chief was keenly awaited in India and is particularly significant in the light of the political developments that have taken place in Bangladesh ever since the Khaleda Zia-led BNP coalition government demitted office in October 2006. As is widely known, a series of unprecedented events led to the cancellation of the 9th Jatiya Sangsad (parliamentary) election and the promulgation of emergency with the present caretaker government under Fakhruddin Ahmed taking over on January 11, 2007. This second interim government immediately embarked on a series of sweeping political and electoral reforms aimed at consolidation of democracy, which included wide ranging anti corruption measures against individuals and institutions. While the caretaker government quickly took charge and stabilised the volatile domestic situation, given the nature of tasks it had on hand the government had to entrust and rely largely on the Army for implementing many of them.

Despite the civilian face of the present administration, the composition of the cabinet of advisors to the caretaker government is a clear reflection of the ground realities. Two of the ten advisors have a service background and the two most coveted posts in Bangladesh, namely that of the head of the Anti Corruption Committee and the Election Commission, are both held by ex army chiefs.

Certainly the army in Bangladesh has been the most stable organisation and the previous BNP government during its five years tenure relied largely on the army to restore law and order and address the growing internal violence in Bangladesh. Over the years the army has become the bastion of law in the country, which has ensured that continued to receive political support and patronage. While the present administration has firmly taken grip of the state of affairs, the army has also been making its presence felt in more than one way. Unlike in the past, ever since Bangladesh became a parliamentary democracy, the army has been visible periodically though it has been very rarely heard. On previous occasions, the army has performed duties when called upon to do so but quietly retreated to its barracks once the job was done.

But in the last seven months the army has not only been very active but also vocal about its performance and achievements. Ironically, the first political articulation by the present Army Chief was an open indictment of Bangladeshi politicians, although given the highly sensitive domestic opinion he had to at the same time affirm the army's intention to stay behind the scenes and not capture power or directly run the country.

As developments unfolded in Bangladesh it became apparent that the power centres were located not only within the interim government but also rested with the armed forces. President Iajuddin Ahmed's recent praise of the army as the saviour of the country is in recognition of the role played by the armed forces during recent crises. For the first time since 1991, the army has also been made responsible for the preparation of the national ID and voters list. In keeping with the government's promise of holding elections by 2008, the Election Commission has in fact laid out a timeline, which included October 2008 as the date by which the voters list with photographs is to be completed and the Jatiya Sangsad elections to be held by December. It also intends to discuss electoral reforms with the political parties between September and November 2007 and complete these by early 2008. But given the purposeful undermining of the two main political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist party as well as their leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, while at the same time ignoring various other forces, it is quite evident that the present dispensation is not above having its own political interests. While the Army's lack of political ambition has been reiterated time and again, there is no guaranteeing that either the army or the interim government is above structuring a political party to pursue their political ambitions. Indeed, it was during the Chief Advisor's first visit abroad for the SAARC Summit that Moeen Ahmed was brandishing his own brand of democracy suitable to Bangladesh. And despite the army's full backing to the government, the obvious strain between the two axes of power is also surfacing.

While many argue that the threat of the United Nations to withdraw Bangladeshi peace keeping forces from its blue helmet duties is effective to keep the army from taking on a more open political role, there is also a growing dissatisfaction within the armed forces and demands to emerge from behind the shadows of the technocratic government may soon gain more ground. Thus, Iajuddin Ahmed's recent advice to the army to stay above political ambition cannot certainly be seen in isolation.

Arguably, in the past, the consecutive military regimes have known to have embraced the very vices that they had usurped power to remove. Consequently, the idea of the armed forces running the government is not viewed with much favour in the country. On the contrary, Bangladeshis are demanding democracy more passionately than ever before. Notwithstanding the questionable track record of the democratic governments, there was a discernible hope in domestic quarters about the outcome of a non-elected government taking over power. Not only would the unfolding crisis be averted by this caretaker government, but also its reform plans would instil Bangladesh with stronger democratic practices which successive elected leaders have failed to do. Despite certain murmurs of dissatisfaction being heard across Bangladesh about some of its actions, it will be the army backed caretaker government that will for at least another year call the shots in Bangladesh.

Thus, when the Army Chief, recently promoted to a full general with extension of tenure beyond 2008, visits India, it would be the best opportunity to obtain a firm commitment on the various Indian security concerns that emanate from Bangladesh. Recent months have witnessed a spate of visits, talks, and meetings between India and Bangladesh. This frequency of bilateral contacts beginning with the External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's Dhaka visit in February 2007, have included amongst others the high profile foreign secretary talks. The number of meetings at varied levels now taking place by itself is a positive development irrespective of what ground has actually been covered between the two countries. There is also a clear indication that there is an effort by both nations to address their mutual concerns. And when one of Bangladesh's most important person, if not the most vital personality, visits India hopefully soon, the least one can expect is that the expression of political will be corroborated by actions in addressing India's vital security concerns that have long remain unattended.

The latest Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) Performance Report on Defence Services (No. 4 of 2007) has once again exposed the problems involved in Indian defence acquisition. The report has been critical virtually of all the processes of the acquisition cycle, from planning to the formulation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs), vendor selection, conduct of trial and evaluations and processes of induction. It is in this perspective that a close examination is needed to get into the genesis of the problems and come out with an alternative solution that promotes efficient acquisition, which is moreover in tune with the best international practices.

Defence capital acquisition is a long, complex and arduous process, and needs expertise in "technology, military, finance, quality assurance, market research, contract management, project management, administration and policy making." In India, this process starts with the Defence Planning Guidelines issued by the Defence Minister, which then leads to the formulation of long-term, medium-term and short-term perspective plans, delineating capital requirements in different time horizons. However, as the Audit Report shows, these perspective plans fall short both on the count of timely completion and guaranteed budgetary commitment, resulting in poor fulfilment of planned capital requirements. In the case of the Army, for instance, since 1992 the planned induction of capital requirements in respect of various Arms and Services varies from 5 to 60 per cent. The poor fulfilment of requirements is ascribed by the C&AG to the unrealistic formulation of Perspective Plans, especially the five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP), which does not take into account the availability of funds and the lead time required for acquisition. From this it is quite evident that in the present set up the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS), which is responsible for the preparation of perspective plan in consultation with the Services, lacks the required expertise and authority to fulfil its obligations of preparing realistic Perspective Plans.

The formulation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs) of weapons/platforms/systems is one of the most critical aspects of defence acquisition and has a strong bearing on defence capability and costs. Despite several reviews of procurement procedures, from DPP 2002 to the latest DPP 2006, QRs are still found to be narrow, unrealistic, inconsistent with the available technology, and worse, are anti-indigenisation, anti-inter se prioritisation and vendor-specific. This has led not only to sub-optimal use of resources but also to time overruns. The C&AG Report has strongly recommended that QRs should be "defined in terms of required functions and performance level," instead of detailed physical and technical characteristics. However, it is not the first time that an oversight agency like the C&AG has requested that QRs be broad-based and generic and thus designed to elicit more competition. Previously, DPP 2002, DPP 2006 and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence have all made recommendations on similar lines, but no substantial progress appears to have been made. It has to be noted that QR formulation is intricately linked to various other acquisition functions like solicitation of offers, trials and evaluations, etc. In other words, an inefficient QR makes vendor response restrictive and trial and evaluation process time-consuming, subjective and unfair. The 18 Army Contracts that were examined by the supreme Auditor show that out of 84 Requests for Proposal issued, only 24 vendors (less than 30 per cent) were pre-qualified after trials and, in none of the cases the number of successful vendors exceeded by two. Similarly, the time taken for trial and evaluation is found to be "unduly long" and lacked "objective and fair assessment". Keeping the above factors in mind, the current practice elicits the important question whether QR formulation should be left exclusively in the ambit of the Armed Forces/HQ IDS or whether should any other organisation, say a highly-professional acquisition organisation, have some role in defining the QRs?

At present, the Services Headquarters and HQ IDS are responsible for the formulation of QRs for the individual and common uses items, respectively. However, given the history of inappropriate QRs, leading to the vicious cycle of poor acquisition, an alternative approach needs to be worked out which would facilitate "faster, better and cheaper" acquisition and is at par with the best international practices. Given the structure of acquisition organisation in India, the present Acquisition Wing of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is theoretically best placed for the job. However, in the present set up, the Acquisition Wing is not a body responsible for the whole range of acquisition tasks. At present, it is merely performing the procurement functions (a part of acquisition process), leaving the rest to other functional heads, like IDS for planning, DRDO for research and development, Armed Forces for QRs, industries for production, Director General for Quality Assurance (DGQA) for quality assurance and test and evaluations. Moreover, in its present form, the Acquisition Wing is not quite a professional organisation. With a meagre staff, drawn from the MoD and the Services for short tenures, the complex task of capital acquisition is performed without adequate expertise. The personnel involved in acquisition lack "adequate training or exposure to project management, procurement or contract management." This handling of complex defence acquisition worth thousands of crores of rupees without proper expertise and by a set of scattered bodies cuts a sorry figure when compared to the best international practices adopted by some of the major weapon- producing countries.

In the developed countries, Defence acquisition is increasingly performed by large and highly professional and integrated bodies like France's Delegation General for Armament (DGA), Britain's Defence Equipment & Support organisation (DE&S), etc. These professional bodies are responsible for all crucial aspects of the acquisition cycle, from planning, design, delivery, and upgrade to the final disposal of assets. The role of the Armed Forces in these countries are restricted to only providing the broad operational requirements, leaving it to the special bodies to attain these within the given time, cost and technology parameters. Acquisition is performed by qualified professionals, drawn in sufficient numbers from a range of specialisations like Law, Finance, Management, Technology, and they are retained sufficiently for long periods to see through major projects. Besides, they are given continuous education and training to become world-class leaders in their respective fields.

In India, by contrast, defence acquisition is performed by different organisations accountable to different functional heads. As a result, each acquisition process has to go "through numerous approvals and submission points". This not only creates cross-validation with respect to overall planning and requirements but also generates different views and approaches among the organisations at each stage of acquisition, making it difficult to perform the critical acquisition functions in an efficient manner. Similarly, the Acquisition Wing provides little value addition as it merely performs the procurement functions and is remotely placed from the planning process, defence R&D, Defence Production, Quality Assurance and Test & Evaluation, leading to lack of a single point of accountability which is critical for efficient acquisition.

To overcome the present deficiencies surrounding the Indian acquisition system, it is time to create a separate integrated and professional acquisition organisation by incorporating all the acquisition functions under one head. The benefit of creating such a separate integrated acquisition organisation, which is in sync with the best international practices, lies in the fact that it will not only provide timely and cost-effective acquisition but will also ensure a single point of accountability. As the Acquisition Wing of the MoD was established with the aim of integrating all the acquisition functions, it can be empowered to lead this integrated organisation with a wider mandate. However, to bring all the acquisition functions under the Acquisition Wing is a huge challenge, as it involves a complete restructuring of the existing organisational structures and a change in existing equations. But given the history of poor acquisitions, as pointed out by the C&AG, a radical change needs to be brought in to make Indian defence acquisition 'faster, better, cheaper', and more integrated, and at par with best international practices.

After a month of global media frenzy, alliterative headlines, statements by senior politicians across continents, charges and rebuttals, the terrorist attempts in London and Glasgow appear to be finally gaining some concrete shape. The attempts, which coincided with the second anniversary of the July 7 terrorist attacks on the London Underground, and the subsequent arrests, present a changing trend. The most striking aspect of these failed terrorist attacks is the social and professional strata of the persons detained on charges of involvement. Profiles of the detained persons do not conform to the hitherto existing pattern of second or third generation Muslim immigrants or converts. Rather, persons with considerable professional expertise and a respectable career seem to have exploited the British National Health Service (NHS) to plan these attacks. Apart from sharing the same religious belief, the other common denominator among the perpetrators was their professional accomplishment.

However, strictly speaking, the involvement of professionals - based or raised in Europe - in terrorist activities is not all that new a phenomenon. Omar Sheikh - a dropout from the London School of Economics - was involved in terrorist activities in the Indian subcontinent. Dhiren Barot, a British convert, was given a forty-year sentence in 2006 (reduced to 30 years subsequently) on charges of planning terrorist attacks. It may also be recalled that some young German nationals or residents were recently arrested along the Pakistan-Iran border. German authorities suspect that young German nationals have chosen to go to Afghanistan to obtain training in terrorist camps there. Quoting August Hanning, the State Secretary for the Interior, as well as German Interior Ministry sources, German media reports have emphasised that Pakistan has become the Mecca for the training of Islamist combatants of different hues. The German Interior Ministry is reportedly aware of at least fourteen German radicals who have in recent months sneaked into Pakistan to obtain armed training there. German authorities are worried that these radicals might, upon their return, target installations in the home country. In fact, two Lebanese students made an unsuccessful attempt last year to explode suitcase bombs at Koblenz and Dortmund stations, angered by the publication of a cartoon series about the Prophet Mohammad in the Danish daily Jyllands Posten. And last week in Italy, police arrested an Imam and his assistants at a mosque in Perugia for using the internet to download combat training manuals as well as for hoarding chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives.

While European governments have been justifiably worried about the return of radicals from training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are at the same time confronted by a new trend - the involvement of autodidacts who use their professional expertise in other areas and supplement this with information gleaned from cyberspace. Observers of the global terror scenario have in unison suggested that the recent terror attempts in London and Glasgow were 'amateurish' or 'do-it-yourself' type and lacked 'professional execution'. However, the fact remains that that no government or security agency would wish to take any chance of attempts by such 'terror-clowns' succeeding even remotely, for it would only further encourage other autodidacts to indulge in such a sinister sport.

Apart from terrorist manuals that are freely available in cyberspace, rhetorical statements and more importantly the personal memoirs of jihadists who are believed to have waged jihad in various conflict zones also contribute enormously to the radicalisation of susceptible Muslim youth in Europe. For example, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir" written by Dhiren Barot under the pseudonym of 'Esa Al-Hindi is a classic case in point. In this book Barot not only justifies violence in a non-emotive style but his vivid operational details offer proof of the authenticity of his personal experience. The book was originally brought out by a Birmingham-based publishing house, Maktabah Al Ansaar in 1999, and till Barot's conviction in November 2006 an electronic version could easily be downloaded from the internet. Thus, the threat of silent and quick radicalisation of students and professionals with access to sophisticated means of communications, especially the internet, looms large before the international community.

The question that now confronts us is how to tackle this looming threat. The United Kingdom, for its part, has, since July 2005, been attempting to send strong signals to home-grown radicals and to roving rabble rousers from West Asia and other places that the rules of the game have changed. British courts recently awarded forty year sentences to the four perpetrators of the foiled July 21, 2005 attacks in London, and a ten year sentence to Younis Tsouli - a Moroccan terror internet expert based in the UK - on charges of running Jihadi websites. Gordon Brown's appointment of Admiral Sir Alan West as the Parliamentary Under Secretary in charge of Security is also a distinct measure in this direction. Whether other counter-terrorist measures like longer detention periods, prohibiting the frontal organisations of virulent radical Islamist groups, and cooperation with affected countries would be successful in the long run would depend upon a wider political consensus at home. Nonetheless, the exact nature of the threat has been eloquently assessed by Sir Alan when he described the present threat of radicalisation of a section of Muslim youth in the UK as a generational one and that the remedial process may take a minimum of fifteen years. It is time to build upon this sound understanding of the problem at hand.