2007 will be remembered as the year of climate change and high oil prices. Starting with the first of the four reports of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the debate culminated in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC. Even the ill-fated Bali conference which failed to provide concrete direction to the future of international environmental policy reinforced the need for swift global action to curb carbon emissions. On the other hand, crude oil prices – a whisker away from the $100 a barrel mark – continue to fuel anxieties over the future of the energy economy. Though financial speculation and increasing demands from India and China are being touted as the main reasons that are driving the prices upwards, the spike has made everyone recognise that the end of ‘easy oil’ is imminent. In a bid to overcome the crisis, analysts and policy makers are scrambling for alternatives where there seems to be none. Unconventional sources such as oil sands, nuclear energy and even the much touted ethanol-blended petroleum fail environmental safety tests and are unable to provide a viable alternative.

Climate change and high energy prices are effecting a degree of geopolitical realignment. New players such as oil exporting African countries are coming to the fore while old ones like Russia are pushing to regain their lost glory. Other existing players are seeking to increase their international profile and are adopting assertive policies – Iran and Venezuela being cases in point. Among the many geopolitical reverberations that global warming and energy prices have caused, rival claims over the continental shelf in the Arctic represent a potentially dangerous turn in terms of a new scramble for the last vestiges of the world’s unclaimed resources.

As the frigid waters of the Arctic melt, its fabled riches in the form of oil, gas, and minerals are enticing countries that are located along its fringes – Canada, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. According to the US Geological Survey, approximately 25 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas lies beneath the Arctic waters in addition to mineral and other biological reserves. As the permanent ice cover recedes because of global warming, these riches would become accessible in the next 10 years. Further, the sky-rocketing prices of hydrocarbons and the impending fossil fuel crisis is also making oil exploration in difficult terrains such as the Arctic appear economically viable. According to some estimates, if global warming continues at the present rate, in about twenty years we would have an ice-free Arctic during summers. On the other hand, latest reports from NASA point out that the North West passage, a small waterway between the Canadian northern islands which connects the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, has almost become ice free. The passage, if open to shipping, can cut down significant amount of shipping time, which is otherwise wasted in the detour taken from Africa. If Canada were to assume control of the passage, it would have its hands on the pulse of future maritime commerce.

The five Arctic countries are rushing to secure their rights to the largest share in the pie. A Russian expedition, in a flagrant display of jingoism, planted the national flag under the North Pole on July 27, 2007. Russia claims that the 1240 mile underwater Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic is connected to the East Siberian Region and therefore is a part of its continental shelf. On August 22, the Deputy Director of the Marine Geology Research Institute stated that preliminary tests of the sea bed soil samples taken by the mini-submarines substantiate the Russian claim.

Not far behind, Canada has not only claimed that the ridge is connected to the Ellesmere islands, but has also in a dramatic assertion of sovereignty restated its long held claim that the North West Passage is inland waters. Canada first claimed the passage in the early 1970s. Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that the “first principle of the Arctic is to use it or lose it.” To consolidate its claim Canada is beefing up its military presence in the far north. Ottawa has announced its intention to build two new military bases in the Arctic and invest $3 billon to purchase six to eight patrol ships that would enable it to assert its rights on the passage and indirectly on other natural resources. Though Canada does not oppose international shipping in the region, it wants shipping in the passage to follow Canadian regulation and laws, instead of international law.

The Russian and Canadian claims are being strongly contested by the others. The Danes argue that the Lomonosov ridge is connected to their territory and have recently sent missions to map the Arctic sea bed. Their latest statements declare that there is convincing evidence that the ridge is connected to Greenland. Americans too sent a similar mission in mid-August even though they have not ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and therefore cannot stake a claim. They also assert that the North West Passage is international waters and have been at odds with the Canadians for many decades, though the problem has come to a head only now because the passage has become navigable.

Due to the legal complexities of the issue, which will play out in the coming years, it is too early to say how the crisis would unfold. It, however, lays bare the staggering consequences of the confluence of high oil prices and climate change for the Arctic environment, international political stability, resource sharing in the oceans and international law.

The ownership of straits and natural resources of the oceans are among the oldest and bitterly contested disputes between maritime states. But it is also one of the few areas that boasts of an international legal regime. International Law of the Seas as codified in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention defines an elaborate procedure for adjudicating continental shelf submissions. It defines a continental shelf as the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas that extends beyond the State’s territorial sea. According to the Convention, all maritime states have a continental shelf extending 200 nautical miles into the sea from the baseline. For all claims beyond 200 nautical miles, states have to present scientific and technical proof to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS then makes recommendations regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, all of which are binding on the claimant(s). In cases where the continental shelf might overlap between two or more states, an equitable agreement has to be effected on the basis of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. States have to submit claims to the CLCS within 10 years of their ratification of the LOSC.

The legal regime dealing with international straits is somewhat less clear. Part III of the LOSC describes the legal status of Straits as well as the rights and duties of coastal states and those of ships. However, the Convention does not state what constitutes a ‘Strait’ because of which many countries clash over the issue. A Strait would otherwise be the internal waters of the adjoining country were it not an ‘international strait’. International law takes over only when a waterway is accepted as an international strait. Ships passing through international straits have ‘right to transit passage’ and need not seek permission from the state(s) bordering the strait and would not be subject to the legislative provisions of the bordering states so long as they use the straits for peaceful transit. Thus, if Canada is not able to ensure that the North West passage is accepted as Canadian internal waters, it will not be able to regulate shipping in the area.

Russia, one of the earliest signatories to the Convention, presented a claim to the Lomonosov ridge way back in 2001. The CLCS rejected it on grounds of insufficient evidence. At that time the Russian claim was neither backed by posturing like the recent flag planting ritual nor did it invite frenzied responses from other Arctic countries. Recent nationalistic statements from Russia and even Canada are also surprising because the entire process of deciding the limits of the continental shelf is a long drawn out one. Even if the Russian argument that it will be able to submit a claim by the spring of 2008 were to be accepted, the CLCS would take some time to adjudicate the claim. Though Norway cannot present a counter claim to the CLCS since its 10 year time limit got over last year, Canada (by 2013) and Denmark (by 2014) certainly can.

The manner in which Russia and Canada staked their claims has political overtones – international and domestic – rather than merely legal and technical ones. Russia’s aggressive posturing, especially the utterly unnecessary flag-planting ceremony, was meant to convey a message to the West that it is very much a player in the international arena. A resurgent Russia, which is also the main exporter of natural gas to Europe, is eager to recapture its lost glory as a global power through its hydrocarbon might, and it is rushing to increase its reserves. With gas attaining an important profile in the global energy mix due to its environmental benefits and flexibility of usage, any increase to Russian gas reserves, which already are the largest in the world, will become a cause of alarm and anxiety especially for Europe and the United States.

The reassertion of the Canadian claim to the North West passage is motivated by domestic political considerations. Ensuring Canadian sovereignty over the North West passage was one of the electoral promises of the Harper government. Now that domestic support for the government is dwindling and criticism of its policies is increasing, Harper is raking up the issue of the North West Passage to whip up support by appearing to stand up against the Bush administration. Both President Bush and Prime Minister Harper know that asserting any territorial claim in the North West passage would require Canada to patrol the seas – a difficult and expensive proposition given the harsh and difficult climate. As Canadian opposition parties rightly point out, the $3 billion proposed to be spent on patrol ships is too small to inspire any confidence that the country will be able to back up its claim. Also, the ships will not be procured before 2013.

Immediate context, purposes and implications apart, the issue is a complicated jumble of legal, geopolitical and environmental issues. The unprecedented nature of the problem – resource claims in a melting Arctic – elicits few definite pointers as to how the crisis would be resolved both legally and politically. Russian claims are overlapping with those of Canada and Denmark and will definitely by contested and blocked by the latter. Many experts on international law such as Dr. Charlotte Breide point out that countries will have to settle the matter by negotiating international maritime boundaries for exploration of the resources since the CLCS will not adjudicate in such cases. Or there might also be an agreement for joint exploration. Both these scenarios would depend on the desire for compromise and co-operation between the various parties, and especially between Russia and the United States. For instance, the issue of the North West passage will most definitely result in an agreement between Canada and United States for joint patrolling, given that Ottawa does not posses the resources to press its claim or to patrol the seas single-handedly.

A more far reaching question is whether such claims should be entertained at all given the fragile nature of the Arctic ecosystem which will be further damaged by exploration and transit of ships. It may appear that the mirage of joint exploitation of Arctic resources is the ideal solution to maintain international political stability. But that is what it is – ‘a mirage’. The concept is inherently flawed as it skirts away from the crucial issue of developing general principles for protecting resource rich, yet fragile, ecosystems.

At present, international law does not have specific provisions to protect the Arctic environment. An effective solution to the Arctic problem should be along the lines of the Antarctic treaty (1961), which bans the exploitation of any and all natural resources in the region beyond the present territorial limits. This would maintain the geopolitical status quo among the Arctic countries, since no country would be hoarding hydrocarbon wealth.

The fact that the Arctic impasse has become a cause célèbre at a time when climate change is receiving so much attention should become an impetus for the United Nations and the CLCS to convene a special session of international legal experts. The prime agenda of the session should be to align international law with the changed political and environmental constellation of the international system.

If one were to take a positive view, this incipient conflict is actually a blessing in disguise. It gives international civil society an opportunity to press for the creation of a regime that ensures the protection of fragile eco-systems such as that of the Arctic. Such a regime would expand existing international law and clearly define principles of sustainable resource sharing in oceans for all maritime states. Lastly, by institutionalising environmental priorities over geopolitical imperatives, it would prevent the oceans from becoming another source of ‘easy oil’ and thus propel the international economy to move away from its dependence on fossil fuels.

As utopian as it may seem this is the only way forward. That is, if the destination is sustainable and equitable development

General Asfaq Pervez Kayani’s elevation as the 14th Pakistan Army Chief of Staff in November has been treated in the Indian media as a relatively low key affair. The General has been projected as a Musharraf ‘loyalist’ positioned primarily to retain Musharraf’s influence and hold on the Army. But transitions, particularly in Pakistan’s military etablishment, have rarely followed any given pattern and it can be expected of Gen Kiyani to initiate some new policy direction.

Kiyani, born in 1952, belongs to the post-Independence generation of Pakistani army men. Son of an NCO, Kiyani studied in the Military College at Jhelum. Subsequently, he did his graduation courses at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Staff College at Quetta and then later the National Defence College of Islamabad. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, Kiyani served as a young lieutenant in the Baloch Regiment. Since then his career graph has been on the ascendancy. In 1988 he was the deputy military secretary to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Kiyani was in charge of the extremely sensitive border operations as the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) during the 2001-2002 stand-off between India. In spite of the highly belligerent attitude displayed by key members of the Pakistani establishment, including the ISI chief, Eshanul Haq, who warned about “an all-time high risk” of conflict, the situation never went beyond the rhetoric. Insiders say it was Kiyani’s expert handling of the situation, and his constant contact with the Indian command that kept the eight-month stand-off from becoming an outright war. Kiyani’s deft handling of a tense situation was noted by President Musharraf who promoted him to the rank of Lieutenant General in September 2003 and trusted him the important command of the X Corps in Rawalpindi. Musharraf also gave him the charge of investigating the case regarding attempts to assassinate him in 2003. Kiyani was awarded the Hilal-I Imtiaz, Pakistan’s third highest civilian award and in 2004 he was appointed as the Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), a post he continued to hold till October 2007, when he was appointed as the Vice Chief. The final indication of Musharraf’s continued faith in Kiyani came on 28th November 2008 when the Chief’s baton was passed on to him. Musharraf’s autobiography In the Line of Fire has glowing references to Kiyani.

Generally perceived to be an apolitical person, Kiyani enjoys a degree of confidence among the leading political figures in Pakistan. This became apparent when Musharraf involved him in negotiations with Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Kiyani is also highly respected in the Army and it is for the first time that a person from the ISI has become the Chief. He also seems to enjoy a high degree of support from the Pakistani civil society. Though involved with Musharraf in ousting Justice Ifftekhar Chaudhury, he has not yet been targeted as ‘Musharraf’s henchman’.. According to some sources, he strikes a good chord in the Pentagon, a clear reference to which was made by the US State Department spokesperson that senior officers at Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency have had "some long-term interaction" with General Kiyani and "was comfortable with him."

As the new Army Chief, Kiyani has his task cut out. His crucial test would be his ability to handle the war on terrorism and stemming the rapidly growing internal insurgency. As the ISI boss, Kiyani had already been involved in fighting insurgency operations in Baluchistan and FATA. He has been a key player in the Pakistan government’s drive to control ‘Talibanization of the area’ since the National Security Resolution of 4th June 2007. Significantly, his earlier attempts to contain the threat in Waziristan and NWFP have not been visibly successful. Kiyani, unlike Musharraf, seems to prefer a mixed policy towards counter-insurgency which would involve both displays of force as well as negotiations. As the Vice Chief, Kiyani had already spoken about his desire to strike a balance between military and political solutions. This will be of continuous interest to observers.

One can note in this context two recent reports on Pakistan published by the Carnegie Endowment for the International Peace which have been very sceptical about the Pakistan army to successfully engage in counter-insurgency operations. One of the report titled Pakistan: Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror by Ashley J. Tellis in December 2007, argues that the Pakistani army is a conventional force and, therefore, inadequate to handle counter-insurgency. Many political analyst and commentators would agree to this assessment, for example, Massoda Bano a columnist for the Pakistan Observer writes that despite the strong aid flows from the US, the lower ranks of the military suffer from low morale; this being visible in the surrender of 250 soldiers in the tribal belts recently. In the second report Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe by Frederick Grare, the author mentions that at the core of the problem is the Pakistani military, which has not only dominated Pakistan’s politics but also developed a brand of nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur rather than on any rational approach. Inheriting a highly divided polity, the Pakistan Army has tried to muster solidarity by stoking religiosity, sectarianism, and the promotion of jihad outside its borders, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. According to Grare, this policy must be abandoned in favour of a more positive one making further availability of Western funds and resources subject to an increasing commitment of the military establishment towards proper democratization and not just half-hearted measures as being attempted now.

General Kiyani comes at a time of increasing domestic and external pressures on the Pakistani establishment to comply with democratic and liberal norms. His challenge will be to formulate an appreciable and appropriate role for the Pakistan Army during these times of change.

The latest US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear programme, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” of November 2007 (released on 3 December 2007) notes with “high confidence” that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme in the fall of 2003 and with “moderate confidence” that Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007. While noting with “moderate to high confidence” that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, it suggests that the halt to its pursuit of nuclear weapons was directly related to the international scrutiny and sustained international pressure. It recommends a greater degree of international scrutiny, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence. This it believes could prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons programme. The NIE examines with “high confidence” that Iran had the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decided to do so and with “moderate confidence” that convincing the Iranian leadership to forego nuclear weapons development would be difficult, due to the progress already made into producing a weapon, at least till 2003. It also notes that the Iranian leadership continues to link nuclear weapons possession with key national security and foreign policy objectives.

The conclusions of the latest Estimate are at variance with the one issued in May 2005, which assessed with “high confidence” that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and pressure. The White House National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley countered criticisms of the difference in the present assessment by the intelligence agencies with the previous estimate by stating that the present one was based “on new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months”. Reports noted that this could most probably be related to the intercept of communications from members close to Iran’s nuclear effort.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) saw the report as vindicating its stated positions on Iran’s nuclear weapons. Director General Mohammed ElBaradei noted that the findings were “consistent” with the IAEA’s assessment and that it provided Iran with a “window of opportunity” to resolve the crisis. While adding that Iran still needed to “clarify some important aspects of its past and present nuclear activities”, ElBaradei admitted that the Agency had “no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran”. Israel, which has long contended its fears and apprehensions to an Iranian nuclear bomb, rejected the American assessment. Defence Minister Ehud Barak stated that Tel Aviv cannot just depend on one assessment and lower its guard, even if it came from one of Israel’s ‘greatest friend’. Foreign Office spokesperson Mark Regev charged that Iran’s nuclear programme was geared towards the production of nuclear weapons from the beginning, as there was no other “logical explanation for the investment the Iranians have made in their nuclear program”. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, however, affirmed that diplomacy remained the correct path to prevent Iran from developing non-conventional weapons.

The NIE assessment seems to have toned down pressure over the possibility of a military strike against Iran. It also turns on its head one of the long-held US contentions that Iran was all along in pursuit of nuclear weapons and their related technology. Washington’s intelligence reassessment can be viewed from two angles. At one level, it further damages the credibility of its intelligence apparatus, particularly after the Iraq weapons of mass destruction fiasco. At another level, it would suggest that rigorous benchmarks have been put in place to prevent the occurrence of grave errors.

In making out a case for greater international scrutiny, the NIE is categorical in asserting that this was indeed the reason for Iran halting its nuclear-weapons-related activities in 2003. The White House, following this line of reasoning, is also arguing for greater pressures, including tighter sanctions to prevent Iran’s nuclear quest. This seems to suggest that the Iranian domestic dynamics and its impact on the nuclear debate or the technical difficulties encountered by Tehran are not being sufficiently accounted for. It, however, needs to be pointed out that the NIE admits that the decision to abandon its nuclear weapon aspirations is solely the preserve of “an Iranian political decision …” Such a decision it further cautions is “…inherently reversible”.

In the aftermath of the release of the assessment, the major players involved have reiterated the imperative of finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Reconciling Iran’s inalienable right to pursue a civil nuclear programme for ‘peaceful purposes’ and its nuclear weapon intentions would, however, require a greater degree of sophistication from all the sides. It remains to be seen if Washington’s re-assessment would pave the way towards more transparency and mutual complementarities among the players involved to address the remaining concerns.

The annual “Heroes’ Day” speech delivered by LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran on November 27, amid continuing attacks by the government forces, brought out in no uncertain terms his dissatisfaction with the international community’s approach towards the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The LTTE supremo came down heavily on the international community for displaying, what he called, “partisan and unjust conduct”, which “severely undermined the confidence” of Tamil people on them. On the whole “it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.” According to the LTTE chief, “even the countries that are the guardians of the peace efforts succumbed to the deception of the Sinhala State” and listed “freedom movement as a terrorist organisation”. In reality, there is a general perception among the Tamils of Sri Lanka that the indiscriminate anti-terrorist policies of the Western countries have boosted the morale of the belligerent Sinhalese elite.

Prabhakaran’s “Heroes’ Day” speeches apart from self-validation are also significant pointers to the action plan of the rebel group for the ensuing year. The tone and tenor of these speeches seek to galvanise the cadres and the diaspora community for the Tamil cause. In fact, the “Heroes’ Day” celebrations have now assumed the status of an annual festival among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Notably, this year’s speech was defensive and less on the rhetoric, capturing more the mood of disappointment over the military strategy employed by the Rajapaksa government than sharpening the political line.

Prabhakaran’s criticism of international community is in response to the steps taken by some of the western governments to check pro-LTTE activities in their countries. After the ban by EU, there were cases of LTTE operatives nabbed by security forces and cases of LTTE networks isolated and busted in Europe and North America. Such cases must have come as a setback for the LTTE operations, especially when Colombo had shifted a gear with its plans of military assault on the North.

In fact, over the past two years, the LTTE repeatedly appealed to “the international community” to pressurise the Colombo government to reach a deal but with little success. In his speech last year, Prabhakaran had emphasised that the LTTE had bent over backwards to maintain the ceasefire and negotiate an agreement despite grave provocations from the Lankan government. But as the Lankan army mounted its offensives and the EU banned LTTE, it alleged that international community was not playing an impartial role in the crisis.

The Lankan government has, on the other hand, sold it convincingly to the international community that it was the LTTE which provoked the government forces by launching suicide attacks and aerial raids. The mutual mudslinging has served the interests of the spoilers on both sides and reversed the peace process.

However, the fact that the Sri Lankan government is looking away from the path of dialogue and negotiation, strengthens the suspicion among the Tamils that many powerful countries around the world tacitly approve of these policies. Prabhakaran’s assertion that the international community is responsible for the failure of the peace process is grounded in this larger feeling of dismay among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Many neutral observers also agree that the government has no alternate peace plan or political solution at the moment. It would rather parade its military victory in the East as a possible alternative to an otherwise improbable dialogic process of seeking a southern political consensus on “what-to-offer” to the disgruntled Tamils.

Prabhakaran is not entirely off the mark when he says that “no political party in the South has the political honesty or firmness in policy to find a just solution to the Tamil national question”. The efforts at various levels to generate a power-sharing arrangement that would be acceptable to the Tamils have failed because of the competitive jingoism by political parties. If one political party or leader would bring in some idea at the table others would unite and rubbish it as inimical to the integrity of the Sri Lankan state. The latest body to frame a devolution proposal, which was composed of relatively less hawkish politicians and legal experts known for their progressive outlook, could only produce four different drafts. The only consensus that they can possibly arrive at ever is to deny any meaningful delegation of power to the Tamils that can resolve the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka.

While Prabhakaran’s perceptions of the southern political parties and politicians are shared by many impartial analysts in Sri Lanka and outside, his observations about international community are likely to be regarded as a naïve and desperate attempt to invoke the sympathy of the observers at the international level towards the genuine aspirations of the Tamils. However, now that the LTTE, as a militant organisation, stands at a critical period in its history, such irate remarks are more likely to earn disfavour than inspire sympathy of the external actors.

Moreover, there is a significant section within the “international community”, which is critical of the policies of the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan government is equally wary of “international community” in that sense. It should ideally be the strategy of the Tamil leadership (LTTE included) to show their sense of gratitude to these forces which may not be in the decision-making structures but having the ability to subject the issue to wider debate at the international level.

In his speech, the LTTE supremo also warned the government for overstretching itself by putting “its feet too wide apart in our land (one in East and the other in the North) as it did during past battles”. He claimed that the Sinhala nation had fallen into the trap set by the LTTE by getting into the East where they would be “forced to commit large numbers of troops to rule land without people”. Calling Operation “Ellalan”— the combined Black Tiger and Tamil Eelam Air Force attack — a success, he warned that “those who plan to destroy the Tamil nation will, in the end, be forced to face their own destruction”. Prabhakaran also indirectly alluded to the success of LTTE’s militant strategy in his speech and said that “only when we proved our military prowess and only when we were militarily in a position of strength that the Sinhala nation signed the ceasefire agreement”.

There is an old argument that a militarily weak LTTE would be a sitting-duck for the militarily stronger Sri Lankan armed force. Moreover, no government in Colombo is likely to concede any meaningful autonomy to a weakened Tamil community, if LTTE were to be neutralised militarily. Even if these are genuine arguments, they do not cut much ice with the so called “international community”, which has no patience for militant tactics. The LTTE leadership has to understand that they are operating in an environment where militancy has lost all its legitimacy whatsoever. A great deal of LTTE’s effort ought to be directed towards strengthening its political face. This has to be supplemented with a genuine desire to arrive at a peaceful settlement.

Otherwise, even if the Tigers have legitimate grievances, their tactics would leave them on the wrong side of history. While one may not doubt the capacity of the Tamil community to bounce back even after any eventual military defeat, it is infinitely wiser to secure the legitimate demands through the backing of the international community by adopting a non-militant approach as a revised strategy. This will also put the Sri Lankan government on the defensive. There is also a small but sympathetic constituency of silent peace-makers amongst the Sinhalese civil society who bear no animosity towards the Tamils and would like to support a transformed LTTE. The LTTE has to work towards changing its image from that of a ruthless war-making machine to a reasonable political entity fighting for the genuine rights of the Tamils.

In such circumstances, the LTTE has no other option but to learn to work with the international community and inspire their confidence in their strategy. Militant posturing will only indirectly contribute to the Sri Lankan government’s arguments that LTTE could never be trusted with any political commitment to sustain any dialogue for peace