Rajorshi Roy

While a Russia-Turkey rapprochement is driven by their particular national interests, its trajectory and outcome are likely to be shaped by the interplay of several geo-economic and geo-political factors.

• Published: August 16, 2016
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The Joint Communique issued by the recent NATO summit, held on July 8-9 in Warsaw, appears to have sown the seeds of a renewed confrontation with Russia.

• Published: August 08, 2016
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The shifting security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, brought about by an increasingly dominant China, is opening up new opportunities for Russia and Japan to partner together.

Amidst an evolving great power rivalry between Russia and China stretching from Eurasia to the Asia-Pacific, a Russian-Japanese rapprochement appears to be gaining momentum. This is exemplified by their renewed economic and political engagement, with the last round of talks being held on July 19 during Russian Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev’s visit to Tokyo.

The visit of Prime Minister Abe to Sochi back in May is another signal of the attempt to reset their bilateral ties. The agenda involved a “new approach” to resolve the Southern Kuril Islands boundary dispute that remains a festering issue and the biggest stumbling block in normalizing ties between the two countries.

Technically, Russia and Japan still remain at war due to the absence of a Second World War Peace Treaty and Tokyo still supports Washington’s sanctions against Moscow in response to the incorporation of Crimea in 2014. Against this backdrop, the “new approach” seems to have created a positive sentiment in their bilateral discussions. It can even result in a landmark reciprocal visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of this year.

Therefore, the key questions are: What are the interests of Russia and Japan in recalibrating their approach towards each other? And what are the limits of their rapprochement?

The China factor

The common denominator appears to be the challenge of a dominant China in their neighbourhood. Such ambitious integration projects as the One Belt One Road initiative (a plan to connect Asian, European, and African continents through transport and infrastructure development in Eurasia) are likely to strengthen Beijing’s rise as a continental and maritime power and have a profound impact on the regional strategic balance. In this light, the unequal dynamics of the engagement of Russia and Japan with China are noteworthy.

Moscow has been compelled to seek an entente with Beijing in order to tide over its confrontation with the West including accommodating China even in its core strategic space. As a result, the balance of the relationship has tilted heavily in favor of Beijing. In this light, a more meaningful engagement with Japan and other regional countries may provide the Kremlin with some breathing space and add pillars to Russia’s pivot towards Asia.

Otherwise, Russia runs the risk of being restricted to China. Russia’s measured position on the July 12 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s South China Sea ruling, which supported a diplomatic solution to the dispute and called for compliance with international law, highlighted the limits of a Russia-China entente.

Similarly, Japan remains wary of an assertive Beijing. A Russian-Chinese convergence of interests, particularly if Moscow takes a sympathetic view of Beijing’s positions, can further muddy the Asia-Pacific waters. In a highly symbolic move in June, Russian and Chinese navies sailed in the disputed waters near the Japanese Senkaku Islands. The Kremlin has also agreed to sell cutting-edge weapons platforms to Beijing, including the S-400 air-defence systems and SU-35 fighter jets which might alter the security balance in the region.

Meanwhile, apprehensions have grown in Japan about the U.S. commitment to its extended deterrence, as statements emanating from the U.S. presidential candidates have ruffled many feathers. Japan also did not lose sight of the fact that the U.S policy of isolating Russia has boosted the Moscow-Beijing partnership. A prolonged confrontation with Russia in Europe might divert America’s attention from the Asia-Pacific region, leaving Japan in a perilous position.

Therefore, given the geopolitical rivalries at play, a rapprochement with Russia can provide Tokyo options to better manage emerging crises. However, it is highly unlikely that Japan will abandon its military cooperation with the U.S. since it remains the cornerstone of its security policy. With America’s attention focused on the upcoming presidential elections, it is perhaps no coincidence that Abe has sought to re-engage Putin during the final months of Obama’s tenure. This will give him some leeway to explore synergies of cooperation with Russia.

Contours of rapprochement

The broad contours of the Japanese-Russian reconciliation appear to be taking shape. It involves weaving a web of economic partnerships to anchor the bilateral ties and build on the goodwill to resolve the boundary dispute. In several ways, Abe’s ‘eight point’ development blueprint seems to have struck a chord with President Putin.

First, given the compelling need to modernize Russia’s economy, Japan can be the source of high-tech knowledge and innovation. This assumes significance given the inherent limits of the Moscow-Beijing partnership. Neither has China been able to meet Russia’s high-tech requirements nor has its pace of investments been satisfactory.

Second, Japanese investments in the Far East can spur the region’s development. It can also subtly balance China’s increasing forays into Russia’s underbelly.

Third, a robust energy partnership can help Russia diversify its energy supplies from Europe and China. This acquires urgency, given Brussels’ plans to seek alternative suppliers of hydrocarbons and Beijing’s ability to play the energy card by virtue of being the major recipient of Russian gas in the region. It helps that Japan remains a net importer of energy. The Russian hydrocarbons can also let Tokyo diversify its energy imports from the volatile Middle East.

Fourth, an engagement with Japan strengthens the Kremlin’s narrative that Russia cannot be isolated. Meanwhile, the resolution of the historical boundary dispute can fortify Abe’s domestic legacy. Notably, Japan’s territorial problems with other neighbors remain far more contentious and immediate solutions distant.

Moreover, there exists a wider spectrum of potential cooperation. This involves combating terrorism, managing the Korean crisis, tapping the Northern Sea Route’s linkages and stabilizing Afghanistan. Russia has also been receptive to Japan’s Central Asian overtures in building economic linkages and tackling drug trafficking.

Limits of the reconciliation

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a breakthrough will emerge in the near future. This despite Abe cultivating a personal relationship with Putin against numerous odds, including breaking ranks with the G7 and adopting a more flexible position on the boundary issue. Perhaps it is even prudent that Abe plays a deft role in managing the adversarial relationship between Russia and the U.S. At the end of the day, the biggest winner of their confrontation is China. And the unchecked rise of an assertive Beijing is surely not in their core interests. These optics would not have been lost in the Kremlin either.

However, several roadblocks remain.

First, a trust-deficit persists due to Tokyo supporting the economic sanctions. Abe will find it daunting to insulate the Russian-Japanese rapprochement from the Moscow-Washington confrontation. Japan remains a key U.S. ally, being the fulcrum of the American rebalance towards Asia-Pacific. The U.S. plans to establish a missile defence in the region will further raise the stakes for the Kremlin.

Russia is likely to react by upgrading its own military capabilities, including those in the strategically important Kuril Islands. This will likely bury Japanese hopes of a speedy demarcation of these territories. It remains unclear whether Tokyo will then pursue a purely economic engagement. In the same vein, the Russian-Chinese entente can limit the Moscow-Tokyo rapprochement.

Second, the resolution of the boundary problem will involve compromises. Given the way Abe and Putin have cultivated domestic nationalism, it will require deft handling to arrive at a middle ground. Conversely, their central position in their power hierarchies might enable them to do just that.

Finally, given the complexities involved, a rapprochement can take wings if Abe and Putin believe that the trade-offs are worth leveraging. That will take a lot more than a few meetings.

The article was originally published in the Russia Direct.

• Published: 23 July, 2016

The June 5 mass shooting in the Kazakh city of Aktobe highlights emerging fault-lines in the Eurasian heartland. In one of the most violent incidents in the country’s history, clashes between armed attackers and security services left 19 dead — 13 attackers, three civilians, and three servicemen.

The incident was followed by a confusing narrative from the Kazakh government, which attributed the confrontation first to Islamic extremists, then to a coup orchestrated by security personnel, and finally, a “color revolution” engineered by outside powers. The motive behind the attack still remains unclear.

This narrative follows a pattern adopted by the governments of Central Asia, which often react to unrest by laying the blame on external actors. In doing so, they tend to ignore the domestic social, economic, and political undercurrents that have gained traction throughout Central Asia. While the Aktobe attack was successfully repulsed, it puts the spotlight on a hitherto stable Kazakh society. Given the region’s ethnic and economic linkages, and Kazakhstan’s position as the bellwether of regional stability, unrest here has the potential to exacerbate tensions throughout Eurasia.

Domestic Discontent

In several ways, Kazakhstan now faces a critical period in its history. For the past 25 years, its citizens have experienced wealth and economic growth fueled by rising hydrocarbon prices. This allowed President Nursultan Nazarbayev to ensure a trade-off between political stability and economic prosperity. Yet, in the recent past, a number of protests against the government’s policies, including land reforms, have erupted across the country. These can be attributed to the unraveling of domestic conditions that are quite similar to that of the Arab Spring.

For a primarily resource export dependent Kazakh economy, the fall in global commodity prices has brought on the biggest domestic churning. Russia’s ruble crisis and the slowdown in China’s economy have not helped either. The country is on the verge of a recession, with the tenge having lost 50 percent of its value. Meanwhile, the solution to the crisis appears distant. Proposed reforms are expected to be painful while infrastructure investment projects have a long gestation period.

In the meantime, economic turbulence is permeating the carefully woven social fabric. It is perhaps no coincidence that the attacks took place in the oil rich region of Aktobe, which has witnessed growing discontent over falling real wages and reduced employment opportunities.

Growing domestic discontent is also manifested in the social unrest brewing in the country. Despite being a secular democracy, the Kazakh government continues to regulate religion, particularly Islam. The evolution of political Islam is seen as a threat to the country’s stability, with its roots going back to the tumultuous period of the early 1990s. This has proved counterproductive, with controversial restrictions hurting the religious sentiments of the people. This trend is reflected in the increasing number of Kazakhs joining the Islamic State. The repercussions could be explosive if these fighters return home.

Similarly, the lack of credible democracy and absence of political reforms have contributed to the domestic unrest. Nazarbayev has been in power since independence. The appointment of clan members to key government posts has further fortified his regime. Moreover, the absence of a clear line of succession could mean the country is in store for a volatile power transition in the future.

Fault lines in Central Asia

Arguably, these festering issues have created a sense of disillusionment among the people. More worryingly, this sentiment is mirrored throughout Central Asia, but with a much higher intensity. Till now, Kazakhstan, due to its geographical location and a resource rich economy, had a viable safety net. Cracks are now emerging. Meanwhile, the rest of the Central Asian republics are in a deeper crisis, with their economies seriously undermined by the devaluation of the ruble. This is reflected in a dramatic fall in remittances from Russia. The return of migrant workers to a bleak domestic labor market will have its own set of social complications.

The specter of resurgent Islamic radicalization and extremism, both from Islamic State and neighboring Afghanistan, also haunts the region. The withdrawal of American troops from the region could allow militant groups to further strengthen cross-border terror links, a worrying proposition given the linkages between terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. As such, violent organizations with regional roots like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appear re-energized. The populous Fergana Valley continues to be a hotbed of religious extremism. To make matters worse, the military capabilities of the Central Asian countries remain suspect. There also exist ethnic and border disputes between the regional countries that tend to flare up occasionally.

Consequently, Central Asian regimes face serious domestic and external threats. However, their response of tightening state control instead of accommodating peoples’ concerns can prove counter-productive, allowing existing discontent to be cultivated by radical groups.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the region will face an Arab Spring type scenario, not least because preserving the stability of Central Asia is an area where Russia’s and China’s interests overlap. Moscow’s confrontation with the West has in turn strengthened the Russia-China entente; convergence of their interests in Central Asia has its roots in perceived Western attempts to foment unrest in the neighborhood. Russia’s focus has been to preserve its influence in its near abroad; similarly, the success of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt depends on a secure and stable Eurasia. Therefore, one can expect Russia and China to help the Central Asian regimes weather the storm. Their common interests are reflected in their growing interaction at multilateral Eurasian forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Sino-Russian agreement to seek convergences between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Silk Road Economic Belt.

It must also be said that the ruling regimes often tend to exaggerate the Islamic threat in order to strengthen their domestic control and divert attention from their local problems. Central Asian leaders want to be seen globally as a bulwark against terror as a way of legitimizing their rule. Even then, the psyche of the region continues to be overwhelmingly secular, and the turbulence of the 1990s acts as a grim reminder of the perils of domestic uprisings.

As such, the appetite for mass unrest appears a far-off possibility for now. However, there is no denying the existence of serious domestic headwinds. If the Aktobe incident is a benchmark, Central Asia needs to be prepared to face choppy waters in the future.

The article was originally published in The Diplomat

• Published: 23 June, 2016

Turkey’s unprecedented military action raises two questions: What is the likely impact on its ties with Russia? And, what are the dynamics of a ‘Russia-West’ collaboration over Syria?

• Published: December 22, 2015
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The new contours of a Russia-U.S. engagement appear to be shaping up. There is a growing realization in the U.S. that treating Russia as an adversary can be counter-productive.

• Published: June 11, 2015
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The new military doctrine reflects Russia’s views on the changing geo-political order. It perceives key military risks as emanating primarily from the ‘West’ and dwells on measures to counter them.

• Published: April 16, 2015
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The military cooperation agreement between Russia and Pakistan raises two pertinent questions: What are the driving factors behind Russia’s Pakistan strategy? And should India be concerned?

• Published: December 15, 2014
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While the ceasefire is a much needed respite yet it does raise two questions: What made the key players arrive at such agreements? Can these deals facilitate the initiation of a political dialogue in Ukraine?

• Published: October 10, 2014
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The recent additional economic sanction on Russia is yet another severe jolt. But faced with a gripping economic problem, sanctions can just be the incentive that Russia needs to implement structural reforms and reduce its dependency on the West. The emergence of anti-West and patriotic sentiments can help the Kremlin to push through difficult initiatives.

• Published: May 30, 2014
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