Events

Chairperson: Satish Chandra
Discussants: B. G. Verghese and D.K. Mehta

In an attempt to question whether the Indus Water Treaty holds any tangible ground in today’s day and age, this paper tracks the origins of the basic conflict, its origins and the detailed history that eventually led to it being drafted and signed in 1960. In the light of the history of the treaty, the authors have laid emphasis on the first proposal of the World Bank which was based on three very prominent principles: “The Indus basin water resources were sufficient to meet all existing and further uses of both countries; the water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed treating the Indus basin as a unit; and that the problem of Indus basin water resources should be resolved on a functional and not on a political plane.” The authors however do go on to say that the nature of the treaty did become political in due course of time, which is why one is obliged to question its survival.

The paper dwells on why exactly the treaty was signed and what it meant for both India and Pakistan and what other options either country had during the time of signing. For instance, the paper elucidates that India as the upper riparian could have chosen not to sign the treaty and use the waters of the Indus river system flowing through its territory, but it also states rather categorically that India also had its own compulsions to sign the treaty. The building pressure from the US and the World Bank for instance.

As the political relationship between the two conflicting nations has seen its ups and down, the study brings to light how the political dynamics is directly corresponding to the survival of the Indus water treaty. Especially given that now Pakistan has given a notice to India to take the Kishanganga hydroelectric proposal to a neutral expert and also sought to invoke a court of arbitration for the interpretation on the treaty.

Another aspect that this paper seeks to draw attention to is the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, which the authors feel is one that is often missed. It brings out the strong perception that India’s generosity towards Pakistan (Pakistan getting 80 per cent of the water resources), was at the cost of the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, despite there being a general opinion to change the treaty in certain respects, the paper is very clear in stating that neither side has officially communicated any desire to modify the treaty despite the increasing resentment in public opinion.

External Discussant: Mr. D K Mehta

One fact that was brought out very coherently by Mr. Mehta was that as a matter of fact, perception needs to be corrected. The main shortcoming from India’s side was that there has been no storage of water. At least 3 to 6 feet of water needs to be stored. He stated that it is absolutely imperative if India actually wants to make use of even the 20 per cent of the water that it does have from the Indus water treaty and a daily or a weekly balance needs to be maintained. States affected especially Jammu and Kashmir need to come up with some policies and facilities for storage. As far as the widely acknowledged generosity of India is concerned, it could be said that India should have probably asked for more at the time of the signing of the treaty.

External Discussant: Mr. B.G. Varghese

Mr. Varghese took a rather clear stand on the issue by saying that government secrecy between ministries needs to be done away with for good. And that this very problem has led to the downfall of many policy implementation programmes. Also the ideas of water storage need to be made clear, for example, a dead storage where water is stagnant is not a storage, but a silt trap. According to him, India was not being generous, but had an acute problem of refugees post partition. Therefore from the point of view of rehabilitation, India needed to provide some irrigation for the land in question and as an upper riparian India has delivered on the treaty.

Internal Discussants

One of the internal discussants was of the opinion that this paper very lucidly brings out the “lie that it was a successful treaty.” Also India has not explored the opportunities of hydroelectricity and storage with the water available. The review of this paper must be driven by certain important factors. For instance, at the time of the signing of the treaty, short term gains were looked at, Pakistan has had a hand in politicizing it. Also Ms. Ray asks of the authors to expand on exactly why India accepted the so called unfair terms of the treaty and also to state what “counter measures” can or may India take in the future.

Another discussant raised the doubt whether India was only generous or was just a bad negotiator.

General Discussion

In response to some of the questions raised by the internal discussants, one member said that contrary to popular belief, per capita availability is not the issue in Pakistan. It is actually the mismanagement of water made available by this treaty. Emphasis was also laid on sources of information in Pakistan which has made water a very important issue in the country. It has also been instigated by non-state actors like the chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, whose main source of information comes from Urdu dailies that are not particularly pro-India. Furthermore, the fact that these newspapers have a wide readership does not help matters either.

Chair’s Summary

The Chair concluded that what was required was effective policy implementation, which needs to be reviewed on a regular basis. The chair also spoke at length on how both countries need to evolve and revise the treaty with the changing times.

Report prepared by Shahana Joshi, Research Assistant, IDSA.

Chairperson: Shri K Santhanam
Discussants: Dr. R R Subramanyan & Shri S K Gupta

Chairperson: Shri R Banerji
Discussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Prof. Savita Pande

The paper titled “Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan” concerns itself with the context set by 9/11, though its key objective was to analyse the most recent trends in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The central argument of the paper is that there is no consensus within Pakistan on the issue of relations with the United States and the rise of radical Islamist groups renders the evolution of such a consensus even more challenging.

Key Drivers of Pakistani Foreign Policy were identified as:

• Increasing American Intrusiveness
• Karzai’s Inclination to Patch up with Pakistan
• India’s Impatience with Pakistan’s Response to Terrorism
• Garnering Continued Strategic Support from China
• Magnifying the India Threat by leveraging its Water Crisis
• Ensuring Adequate Energy Supplies

Ms. Kumar argued that within Pakistani circles, mistrust of the US has increasingly less to do with Indo-US relations, but about the American presence in the region. Citing examples of this, she outlined its implications and consequent Pakistani reactions. She also examined the contradictions resulting from Pakistan’s policy objective of playing a central role in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan while simultaneously extending support to the Taliban, the nature of which was further substantiated.

In relation to India, it was suggested that the tenor of the Pakistani attitude has been largely self–congratulatory in light of resumption of talks. It was contended moreover that the expected gains from the current round of talks must not be over-estimated. Recent co-operation between Pakistan and China was evaluated and understood as being inconsistent with international opinion and certain US policy pronouncements. Conclusion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline deal was deemed yet another instance of safeguarding national interest despite oppositional American pressures.

The paper’s overall assessment was that the US is likely to remain a significant element around which foreign policy in Pakistan is shaped. The US continues to perceive Pakistan as a crucial player in the Afghan theatre, even as the latter has redoubled efforts to minimize the scope for active Indian participation. The argument was made in conclusion that dialogue for its own sake was certainly unlikely to resolve outstanding issues that cloud the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

External Discussants:

Prof. Kalim Bahadur: On certain very important issues, national consensus within Pakistan remains intact, for example the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Condemnation of deployment of non-state actors as instruments of policy was near non-existent in Pakistan. In the same vein, actions directed by these elements against India enjoyed the tacit support of the establishment. The drone strikes launched from Pakistani soil delegitimised Pakistan’s overt stance that such American actions were counter to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s continued perception of its relationship with China as a useful hedge against both India and the US was also understood as vital to its foreign policy stance.

Prof. Savita Pande: “Memory”, “external environment” and “state’s domestic composition” are determinants of foreign policy as argued by a recent academic work on the subject. At the institutional level, there is lack of a clear delineation of responsibilities within the Pakistani establishment vis-à-vis external relations. Such entities as Blackwater were functioning in Pakistan with, rather that in spite of, the consent of the Pakistani leadership. Speaking in favour of maintaining an analytical distinction between the Afgan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, Prof. Pande described the optimistic, pessimistic and pragmatist positions which are all currently in vogue in Pakistan on the matter of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban. China’s pursuit of its own interests in the Af-Pak theatre was briefly examined to draw out lessons for India, while on the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, India’s centrality to the viability and success of this project was postulated.

Internal Discussants

Dr. Behuria mentioned the importance of drawing an analytical distinction between objectives and drivers of foreign policy. Adding to the list of drivers on the domestic front, he drew attention to the significance of economic decline and political clout of the military in shaping the context for foreign policy design in Pakistan.

Once again separating drivers from relevant issues, Dr. Kalyanaraman addressed important shifts in the Afghan scenario and corresponding attempts by Pakistan to reposition itself. He further identified the past year or so as the more closely relevant frame of reference for purposes of arriving at helpful conclusions about new developments in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The future of Afghanistan was singled out as a potently useful prism to anticipate Pakistan’s relationship with the US, China, Iran and India.

Discussion

The need to explicitly comment on the extent to which foreign policy in Pakistan is influenced by the military was highlighted and it was suggested to consider ways in which greater civilian control over policy formulation would change its content and character. The author was suggested to give proposals on how the dialogue might be supplemented to attain key goals on the Indian side. It was advised that a considered assessment be made of greater Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, for reasons of achieving strategic depth, in terms of the backlash that this would have for the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s attempts to strike a balance between its relations with the US and China was identified as meriting close observation.

Chair’s Summary

The chair took the view that consensus on key national issues in Pakistan has not quite broken down nor has the influence of the military sustained any erosion. He acknowledged a role for Pakistan in containing the effects of American involvement in Afghanistan while coping with the extremist blowback that this might incur. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion.

Report prepared by Kalyani Unkule, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Speaker: Hon. Sujata Koirala, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nepal

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Participants
Ladies and Gentlemen:

1. First of all, I would like to thank the institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for providing me with this opportunity to share my views with such an enlightened and important audience. I see around me here my trusted friends, and a galaxy of intellectuals. I feel honoured and proud to be amongst you all this afternoon.

2. I do not think it necessary here to reiterate and highlight the age-old ties between Nepal and India which are characterized by cordiality, goodwill, mutual trust and cooperation. Our bilateral relations are multifaceted in nature and scope. They encompass political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions, and many more. Besides, exchange of high-level visits and interactions among the leaders have further deepened, widened and heightened our relations. Exchanges and interactions between our peoples are the defining character of our bilateral ties.

3. If compared with its immediate neighbours, Nepal is small in size, population and economy. However, due to its geographical location between India and China and the resources it possesses, Nepal is geo-strategically important in South Asia, and beyond.

4. As Nepal has been facing the problem of unemployment, illiteracy and poverty, compounded by a decade-long insurgency, it is in dire need of international support in the priority areas. Such areas include restoration of damaged physical infrastructures, maintenance of fiscal balance, undertaking balanced economic development, creation of income generation activities, implementation of poverty alleviation programmes, and so on. In this context, we highly value the economic and financial assistance rendered by the Government of India since the early 1950’s. It has greatly contributed to the development of infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and other important sectors. India’s support has greatly supplemented to our efforts of nation building.

5. Investment is another area of our priority in which India has the largest share. The Government of Nepal encourages public and private sector of India to invest in Nepal in the sectors mutually agreed upon. Hydro-power, tourism, trade, and road connectivity and other infrastructure are main areas with greater potentials for long-term cooperation. Cooperation in these areas may also help reduce Nepal’s huge trade deficit with India in the days to come.

6. Nepal and India have unique relationship. We share open border which presents both opportunities and challenges. It has facilitated the movements of our peoples across the border to undertake activities for livelihood and sustenance. On the other hand, misuse of the open border by criminals has become one of the main challenges for both Nepal and India. Therefore, it has now become imperative to check such transnational crimes. I believe that these problems are not insurmountable. It is my strong conviction that constant vigilance by local administration along the border points and sharing of intelligence and developing counter intelligence mechanism between the existing security agencies of both countries needs to be intensified, reactivated and modernized.

7. Nepal and India have more than two dozens of bilateral mechanisms dealing with specific issues of mutual concern from political to sectoral expert level. They are meeting off and on, and charted out courses of action to resolve existing problems. But their decisions are not properly implemented. I believe that the main cause of frustration among the peoples on both sides arise from the non-implementation of these decisions. This has helped only to add anger of the people towards the governments of both countries. Therefore, implementation of the decisions taken, and the agreements and Memoranda of Understanding signed should be implemented in an effective and efficient manner with due sense of urgency by both countries.

8. Let me now come to the internal situation of Nepal. I know that you are quite aware of, and closely following, the political developments in Nepal. There is a deadlock among the major political parties on the issues of drafting new constitution and making the peace process conclusive. It is a fact that we could not complete these national issues within the stipulated time frame. But, I am happy to inform you that the tenure of the Constituent Assembly has been extended till May next year, with a broad consensus among all the political parties. We have taken it as a manifestation of the serious commitment of Nepal’s political parties to draft the constitution and bring the peace process to its logical conclusion. The present Government is working hard to realize these common objectives.

9. It is also a reality that there is still divergence of views among the parties supporting the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN)- Maoist in the opposition, about the procedures for drafting the constitution. The UCPN-Maoist wants first to form the government under its leadership, before moving ahead with the drafting of new constitution. On the other hand, the parties supporting the government want the UCPN- Maoist to fulfill its commitments made under various agreements and understandings in the peace process. The present government is ready to accommodate legitimate demands of the Maoists as per the rules and regulations of the country, which were set with the support of the Maoists themselves. The Government in turn expects the Maoists to be flexible as well. The present political uncertainty in Nepal is the result of inflexibility and rigidity on their part. They are still very adamant, uncompromising, and insisting on irrational demands against their own commitments. Our people are still suffering from Maoists’ atrocities, including forceful seizure of properties, targeted attacks, extortions, and other many unlawful activities. Fear still persists among the people. We have been calling upon the Maoists to become more flexible, comprising, and realistic. At this moment, I proudly recall the sterling job done by Girijababu, my late father, to bring the Maoist party into the mainstream of Nepalese politics, to hold elections for Constituent Assembly and to transform the county into a Republic.

10. Nepal is facing a number of serious problems. They include drafting a new constitution acceptable to all major stakeholders, maintaining law and order, meeting the requirements and legitimate aspirations of the people, and giving continuity to development projects. We are very clear that we can not draft constitution without the support of the Maoists. At the same time, we are also aware that time is running out very fast. Though we have extended the term of the Constituent Assembly by one year, this term will also pass by soon. If we cannot formulate an acceptable constitution within the remaining eleven months, the country will plunge into an unimaginable abyss, not to mention the tarnished image and shattered credibility of the major political parties in the eyes of our people. Therefore, formulating a broadly acceptable constitution and taking the peace process to its logical conclusion are our shared responsibilities, from which no party can escape.

11. We also know it very well that, given the divergent philosophical base of the political parties, it is not easy to reach consensus and achieve our immediate objectives. There is no alternative but to reach a common minimum ground where all of us can meet, and move forward together. In view of this, we have proposed a six-point work-plan, which is very close to the aspirations of our people. This work-plan includes –

1. Management of Maoist combatants under a formula acceptable to both sides. It includes options such as integration into the society, opportunities for foreign employment, rehabilitation and integration into security agencies, and monetary incentives by the government.
2. Dismantling of the paramilitary nature and structure of the Young Communist League (YCL).
3. Constituting a Commission to look into, and solve, the problem of the properties seized by the Maoists. The properties seized by the party should be returned to their owners without delay, and those by landless squatters may be taken care of by the government.
4. Prepare specific work-plan to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Process and formulate a new constitution, and strictly adhere to it.
5. Implementation of all agreements and understandings reached under the peace process; and
6. Formulation of a national consensus government after reaching agreement on the above points.

12. My party, the Nepali Congress, has remained very open to negotiations, very flexible, and sincerely committed to the peace process. We have been urging others too not to accord high priority to forming or leading the government. This is the time for charting the right course of action for the country. Our reasoned policies and moves will give the country a right direction. This will also generate hope among our people, who deserve far better future for themselves and their children. We are also convinced that a strong and effective central government is a must for addressing the problems of the people, and leading the country to the right direction.

13. The international community, too, has a stake in Nepal’s peace process. As I said in the beginning, Nepal has strategic importance not only for its neighbours, but also for the world at large. A peaceful and prosperous Nepal will be conducive to the maintenance of peace and security, and achieving development goals of its neighbours. It will contribute to the peace, progress and prosperity of other countries and regions. We all know it well that instability in a country creates problems for others as well. We are all sailing through the same waters. This is why we expect constructive and positive response form the international community in general, and from our neighbourhood in particular.

14. I thank you all for your patience and attention.

Thank You.